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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

ADOPTION OF JAZZY (And a Companion Case).

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0632

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-632

ADOPTION OF JAZZY (and a companion case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found the mother

and the father unfit, terminated their parental rights,

concluded that adoption by the children's maternal aunt and

uncle would be in their best interests, and declined to order

post-decree contact. On appeal, the parents argue that the

judge abused his discretion by failing to (1) determine whether

the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) made

reasonable efforts to unify the family, (2) adequately consider

whether guardianship rather than adoption by kin was in the best

interests of the children, and (3) order future contact between

the parents and the children. We affirm.

Background. "We summarize the relevant facts and

procedural history as set forth in the judge's decision and as

1 Adoption of Yuri. The children's names are pseudonyms.
supported by the record, reserving other facts for later

discussion." Care & Protection of Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 704,

705 (2016).

1. DCF involvement. The family's history with DCF began

in 2011 when it investigated reports of child neglect pursuant

to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A reports). During the investigation,

the mother did not stop Yuri, a toddler at the time, from

walking out onto the roof alone. Many reports of physical

violence between the parents followed. In December 2019, a 51A

report was filed alleging neglect of Yuri and his younger sister

Jazzy following a report from the son that the parents had a

physical altercation the night before. The son reported that

the parents were hitting each other and then the son began to

hit the mother, which led the daughter to hit the son. After

investigating and learning the children had excessive absences

and tardiness from school, the department opened a case for

services.

In February 2020, the father brought the son to a police

station, reporting that the mother slapped the son after he

tried to get between the parents to stop the mother from

assaulting the father. Between January 8, 2020, and February

14, 2020, the children arrived late to school every day, which

2
prevented the son from engaging with support classes, as part of

his individualized education plan (IEP), for nearly two weeks.

In March 2020, the police responded to reports of screaming

and yelling inside the family home. The father reported that

the mother attacked him and broke a mirror. The father had a

mark on his back and a bump on his head. The mother was

arrested and charged with assault and battery on a family or

household member and possession of prescription medication that

did not belong to her. The father met with a response worker

the following day and voiced his concern for the mother, stating

that the prescription pills were not hers and that he wanted to

have her "committed." The department worker informed the father

that if the judge ordered the mother to stay away from the home,

the father was not to allow the mother back in the home. Later

that day, the social worker called the mother's cell phone and

could hear the children talking to the mother.2 As a result, the

department became concerned that the mother was back in the home

after her release from jail, raising further concern because of

the mother's ongoing domestic violence and substance use.

2 The judge did not credit the father's testimony that DCF
did not work with him to keep the mother out of the home. The
judge also did not credit the mother's testimony that she was
never told by DCF that she was not allowed into the home.

3
A final 51A report was filed on May 6, 2020, alleging that

the reporter had not seen either child for several weeks, and

that when the reporter visited the family home to conduct a

wellness check, the mother was sitting outside the apartment,

though the reporter believed the father had obtained a

restraining order against the mother. During the check, the

children were sleeping at 9:30 A.M. and not engaged in their

schoolwork. Later on May 6, 2020, DCF response workers arrived

with police at the family home. The mother answered the front

door, yelling that the home was hers and that she took care of

her children. The mother also said that the father tried to

lock her out of the home but that she had a key. The children

were removed from the home. During the transport to a foster

placement, the children stated that they were scared of their

mother and reported that the mother is always in the home, that

she breaks in, and that she assaults the father.

1. Care and protection proceedings. DCF filed a care and

protection petition the following day, and the children were

placed with their maternal grandparents from May 2020 through

December 2021. Since December 2021, the children have lived

with their maternal aunt and uncle in a neighboring State. When

the children were placed with the maternal aunt and uncle, they

did not know to brush their teeth regularly or how to bathe or

4
wash their hair. Additionally, they did not appear to have a

bedtime routine and getting them to bed was difficult. Since

being placed with the aunt and the uncle, Yuri no longer

requires an IEP and is employed at a restaurant.

Throughout the care and protection proceedings, three

separate foster care reviews found that neither parent

participated in their action plans in each review period, and

that they barely engaged in any recommended services. The only

services the parents completed were two parenting courses, from

which the trial judge concluded they gained little to no

parenting skills. The trial judge further found that both

parents still refused to take accountability for how their

actions led to their children's removal and continued to lack

insight into how their lack of engagement contributed to

continued DCF care.

Along with not meaningfully engaging in services, the

mother and the father failed to maintain contact with their

children or the department throughout the pendency of the case.

Neither parent had an in-person visit with the children since

January 2022. That visit took place at Chuck E. Cheese and

ended with a police response due to the escalated and verbally

assaultive behavior of the mother and the father. When the

maternal aunt was called back to pick up the children from this

5
visit, she reported that they were distraught, crying, and

hyperventilating.

The parents were initially permitted to call the children.

However, because the parents would call at inappropriate times,

such as during school hours or late at night, the plan was

changed so that the parents had to contact the maternal aunt and

uncle before speaking with the children. After several calls

pursuant to this plan, the maternal aunt saw the children hang

up crying and upset. The parents were subsequently "blocked" on

the children's cell phones and social media accounts. In

September 2022, the father had a virtual visit with the

children; it went well, but the children were quiet and

minimally engaged. In May 2023, the department scheduled the

mother and the father for a family visit, but they arrived at

the wrong office location and on the wrong date.

Both children testified in camera at the trial to answer

questions agreed on by the parties. The son was fifteen years

old, and the daughter was thirteen. Both children testified

that they loved their parents, but that they wanted to live with

their aunt and uncle.

The trial judge concluded that neither parent "made any

effort to engage with the [d]epartment, participate meaningfully

in their service plan, or maintain contact with their children

6
for the past five years." Based on his findings, he ruled that

(1) the parents were unfit to assume parental responsibility for

the children and would likely remain unfit for the indefinite

future, (2) the best interests of the children would be served

by terminating parental rights, (3) adoption by the children's

maternal aunt and uncle would be in their best interests, and

(4) any future contact would best be left to the informed

decision-making of the adoptive parents.

Discussion. 1. Reasonable efforts. The mother and the

father argue that the judge failed to make a reasonable efforts

determination in his ultimate findings and that such failure

calls into question the trial judge's findings of permanent

unfitness.

"Before seeking to terminate parental rights, the

department must make 'reasonable efforts' aimed at restoring the

child to the care" of the parents (citation omitted). Adoption

of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 60 (2011). "The court shall make the

certification and determinations required under this section in

written form, which shall include the basis for the

certification and determinations." G. L. c. 119, § 29C. "A

judge's determination that the department made reasonable

efforts will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous."

Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020). Despite

7
this requirement, "even where the department has failed to meet

this obligation, a trial judge must still rule in the child's

best interest." Id., quoting Adoption of Ilona, supra at 61.

The parents touched on reasonable efforts during cross-

examination and in their closings. Assuming without deciding

that this was sufficient to timely raise the issue,3 we are not

persuaded there was reversible error. Here, the parents are

correct that the trial judge did not make a written finding of

fact or conclusion of law stating that DCF made reasonable

efforts to reunify the parents and the children. Nonetheless,

the record, and the trial judge's findings in the aggregate,

demonstrate that DCF did make such reasonable efforts. First,

the trial judge stated on the record at one of the final days of

trial that he "found reasonable efforts for each of the

children" and approved the adoption plan proposed by DCF.4

3 The department cites Adoption of Yalena, 100 Mass. App.
Ct. 542 (2021), as support for the proposition that an argument
that the department failed to make reasonable efforts must be
raised before trial. For the purposes of this appeal, we do not
need to resolve this question. We note that "[r]aising the
issue at an early stage in the proceedings allows the department
to remedy the [allegedly] inadequate services, which in turn
fosters a greater chance of family reunification." Adoption of
West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 242.

4 To the extent the parents argue that the trial judge erred
by not considering whether DCF made reasonable efforts
specifically to reunify the family at trial, their argument is
misplaced. Once the trial judge approved DCF's proposed
permanency plan in July 2021, reunification of the family was no

8
Second, the trial judge found that DCF recommended services to

the parents to ameliorate their parental shortcomings, but that

the parents did not "meaningfully engage" in any of those

services, except for two parenting classes from which the

parents gained "little to no parenting skills."5 Moreover, while

the trial judge recognized in his findings "the challenges to

communication where parents are homeless and have no address,"

he emphasized that the parents made no attempt to remain in

contact with DCF or the children and that they "want[ed] nothing

to do with DCF."6 Put differently, where the parents refused to

communicate with DCF and meaningfully engage in the services it

recommended, it cannot be said that DCF did not make reasonable

efforts. See Adoption of Lenore, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 278

longer consistent with the permanency plan. See Care &
Protection of Rashida, 488 Mass. 217, 220 n.6 (2021), S.C., 489
Mass. 128 (2022), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C ("'[i]f a court
has determined . . . that reasonable efforts to safely return
the child to his [or her] parent or guardian are inconsistent
with the permanency plan for the child,' the department must
make 'reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner
in accordance with the permanency plan'").

5 Contrary to the parents' contention, the trial judge did
acknowledge that the mother engaged in services to ameliorate
her substance use, but found that she was not consistent in
engaging in those services and denied her drug use throughout
much of DCF's involvement with the family.

6 We note that where a parent is unhoused or the department
knows the address it has for a parent is out of date, the better
practice is to send an e-mail message and text a cellular
telephone number if provided by the parent.

9
(2002) (for DCF to satisfy its duty to make reasonable efforts,

"heroic or extraordinary measures . . . are not required"). The

record and the judge's oral finding of reasonable efforts, plus

the evidence of domestic violence and substance use over a

period of years coupled with the parents' failure to take

responsibility or learn despite action plans and some limited

engagement with services, demonstrate that DCF did make such

reasonable efforts. We discern no error.7

1. Consideration of guardianship. The parents also assert

that a guardianship plan was proposed to the trial judge and

that he abused his discretion by failing to consider it. We

disagree the parents had proposed guardianship rather than

adoption.

After an initial determination of parental unfitness, the

trial judge must then determine whether it is in the best

interests of the children to permanently terminate the parent-

child relationship. See Adoption of Ramona, 61 Mass. App. Ct.

260, 265 (2004). When the rights of both parents are

terminated, the judge is required to assess all placements for

the child, including the DCF plan and the plans presented by any

7 We also note that, "[d]espite the moral overtones of the
statutory term 'unfit,' the judge's decision was not a moral
judgment or a determination that the mother and father do not
love the [children]." Adoption of Bianca, 91 Mass. App. Ct.
428, 432 n.8 (2017).

10
other party. Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474-475

(2001). See G. L. c. 119, § 26; G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). "In

choosing among placement plans, it falls to the sound discretion

of the trial judge to determine what is in the best interests of

the child, and our review on appeal is one of 'substantial

deference.'" Adoption of Bianca, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 434

(2017), quoting Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225 (1998),

cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034

(1999).

Here, the parents never proposed a competing permanency

plan for the trial judge to consider. The parents argue that

the father's counsel specifically raised guardianship with kin

as an alternative plan during trial, but the record says

otherwise. At trial, guardianship was only mentioned when

counsel for the father (1) asked the maternal aunt if she had

ever "looked at other forms of permanency such as guardianship"

or filed a petition for guardianship, and (2) suggested to the

trial judge that one of the judge's in camera questions to the

children should inquire about "adoption versus guardianship."

This limited mention of guardianship was inadequate to

constitute a competing plan.8 See Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass.

8 Additionally, when DCF proposed a permanency plan of
guardianship in June 2021, the father filed an objection to it.

11
App. Ct. at 475 ("In cases where the parents have offered a

competing plan, the judge must assess the alternatives and, if

both pass muster, choose which plan is in the child's best

interests, however difficult that choice may be" [emphasis

added]). It was in the trial judge's discretion to conclude

that the adoption plan proposed by DCF was in the best interests

of the children.9

1. Post decree contact. The parents argue that the trial

judge abused his discretion by not ordering posttermination or

postadoption contact between the parents and the children. We

are not persuaded.

"After finding parental unfitness, a judge 'has broad

discretion to determine what is in a child's best interests with

respect to custody and visitation with biological family members

thereafter.'" Adoption of Breck, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 652, 664

(2025), quoting Adoption of Ursa, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 571

(2023). "An order for postadoption visitation is not warranted

in the absence of a finding that a significant bond exists

9 To the extent the parents argue that the trial judge
thought he was unable to order a plan of guardianship, we
disagree. The record reflects that the trial judge correctly
understood that he was conducting a trial to determine whether
the children were in need of care and protection and whether the
parents' parental rights should be terminated. The trial was
not to decide whether the children were to be adopted. See
G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (describing additional orders trial judge
can make upon finding child in need of care and protection).

12
between the child and a biological parent and that continued

contact is currently in the best interests of the child"

(quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of West, 97 Mass.

App. Ct. at 247.

Here, the trial judge expressly concluded that there are no

significant bonds between the parents and the children, and that

"any post-termination contact is best left to the informed

decision making of the adoptive parents."10 He noted that

neither parent had visited the children since the father's

virtual visit in September 2022 due to the parents having little

to no contact with DCF and failing to confirm visits. The trial

judge also emphasized that the parents' last in-person visit

10This order implicitly included postadoption visitation,
given the findings of no bonds. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass.
App. Ct. at 247. Contrary to the parents' contention, the
maternal aunt did not unreasonably obstruct the parents'
communications with the children; the trial judge credited the
maternal aunt's testimony that the parents were blocked from the
children's cell phones and social media accounts only after the
parents called the children at inappropriate times, and that the
children repeatedly became upset and cried after calls with the
parents.

13
with the children resulted in the police being called and the

children crying and hyperventilating. We discern no error.

Decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Allen, JJ.11),

Clerk

Entered: March 2, 2026.

11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

14