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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Nagorka

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 702
• Docket Number: 2025CA0001-M

• Judges: Flagg Lanzinger

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.9K)

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Syllabus

assault, felonious assault, sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance, cumulative error, excessive sentence, App.R. 16(A)(7), Brady claim

Combined Opinion

                        by [Judith Ann Lanzinger](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8112/judith-ann-lanzinger/)

[Cite as State v. Nagorka, 2026-Ohio-702.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2025CA0001-M

    Appellee

    v.                                              APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                    ENTERED IN THE

ADAM NAGORKA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2023-CR-0859

                             DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 2, 2026

    FLAGG LANZINGER, Presiding Judge.

    {¶1}     Adam Nagorka appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common

Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

                                              I.

    {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Nagorka on one count of assault on a peace officer in

violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a fourth-degree felony, and one count of felonious assault on a peace

officer in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a first-degree felony. The charges were based upon

allegations that Nagorka shoved Officer F. (an on-duty police officer with the City of Brunswick),

and then punched Officer F. on the side of the head, causing Officer F. to suffer a concussion.

Nagorka pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

    {¶3}     At trial, the State presented evidence indicating that EMS and police officers with

the City of Brunswick responded to Nagorka’s daughter’s (“R.N.”) apartment after they received

a call that R.N. might be harming herself. Witnesses described the scene inside R.N.’s apartment
2

as “chaotic[.]” Testimony and police bodycam footage the State presented at trial indicated that

R.N. was inside a bedroom at the end of a narrow hallway, refusing to come out and screaming

expletives at officers through the closed bedroom door. Several people were inside R.N.’s

apartment, including Nagorka and some of R.N.’s children.

   {¶4}    Officer F. and three other officers who responded to the scene testified on behalf of

the State. Officer F. explained that there was “a lot going on” inside the apartment because several

people were standing around, some of the interior doors were locked, and he did not know if R.N.

was armed and/or needed medical attention. The State played Officer F.’s bodycam footage, and

Officer F. testified as to the events depicted in the footage.

   {¶5}    Officer F.’s bodycam footage showed Nagorka standing near the entrance of R.N.’s

apartment while officers spoke to individuals inside the apartment about the situation. As officers

were speaking to some of the individuals, Nagorka walked past Officer F. and other officers and

proceeded down the narrow hallway toward R.N.’s bedroom. Officer F. asked Nagorka what he

was doing, and Nagorka responded: “I’m doing what I want to do.” Officer F. positioned himself

in front of Nagorka and instructed him to go back down the hallway, explaining that officers

needed to ensure R.N. was okay before he could speak with her. Nagorka refused, saying the

police were “all fucking assholes” and telling Officer F. to “get the fuck out of [his] way.”

   {¶6}    The bodycam, which was positioned on Officer F.’s chest, then showed Nagorka’s

chest make contact with Officer F.’s chest. Officer F. explained that Nagorka had tried to “walk

right through [him] forcefully[,]” so he pushed Nagorka back to gain distance between them.

Officer F. explained that Nagorka “put his hands up and came back at [him,]” and that he deflected

Nagorka’s hands. Officer F. explained that Nagorka then came around with his right fist and

punched him on the left side of his head. Officer F.’s bodycam did not capture the punch due to
3

its position on Officer F.’s chest and how close Officer F. and Nagorka were standing together in

the narrow hallway. Officer F. explained that he struck Nagorka back, and another officer

approached Nagorka from behind and wrestled him to the ground. Officers then arrested Nagorka.

Officer F. testified that he did not immediately seek medical attention, but that he went to the ER

hours later and was diagnosed with a concussion.

   {¶7}    Three other officers who responded to the scene testified on behalf of the State,

none of whom saw the physical altercation between Officer F. and Nagorka. One of the officers

testified that he heard shoving and a punch, which he described as “a fist against skin and bone.”

That officer then turned and “tackle[d]” Nagorka.

   {¶8}    The State also presented testimony from an ER physician and a chiropractor who

treated Officer F. The ER physician testified that she examined Officer F., and that he had an

abrasion near his left eye, which was consistent with a blunt force injury to his head. The ER

physician also testified that she diagnosed Officer F. with a concussion. The chiropractor testified

that he treated Officer F. for head and neck pain Officer F. suffered after the injury.

   {¶9}    After the State rested, defense counsel moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which

the trial court denied. The defense then presented testimony from Nagorka and three of his

grandchildren (i.e., R.N.’s children).

   {¶10} Two of the grandchildren testified that they did not see the physical altercation

between Nagorka and Officer F. The third grandchild testified that he saw Nagorka walk down

the hallway toward R.N.’s bedroom. That grandchild testified that Nagorka did not touch an

officer, but that an officer “threw [Nagorka] to the ground and then another cop jumped in.” On

cross-examination, the State asked that grandchild if he stole anything from Drug Mart earlier in

the year, to which he responded “Yes.”
4

   {¶11} Nagorka testified that he went to R.N.’s apartment to see if she and her children

were okay. Nagorka testified that Officer F. stopped him as he was walking toward R.N.’s

bedroom, and that Officer F. pushed him. Nagorka testified that he never punched Officer F., and

that he was tackled from behind, which pushed him into Officer F. After the defense rested,

defense counsel renewed his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied.

   {¶12} The jury found Nagorka guilty of the charged offenses. The trial court set the matter

for sentencing and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. The trial court ultimately sentenced

Nagorka to twelve months in prison on the assault charge, and six to nine years in prison on the

felonious assault charge. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently and gave

Nagorka credit for time served. Nagorka now appeals, raising nine assignments of error for this

Court’s review.

                        ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I AND II

   MR. NAGORKA’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
   WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF
   THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO
   CONSTITUTIONS.

   {¶13} In his first and second assignments of error, Nagorka purportedly challenges the

sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. Despite labeling them as separate assignments

of error, Nagorka argues his first and second assignments of error together. Yet the sufficiency

and manifest weight of the evidence are “quantitatively and qualitatively different[,]” and it is not

appropriate to argue them together. State v. Irvine, 2019-Ohio-959, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. Omenai, 2024-Ohio-1571, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.).

That said, a review of Nagorka’s combined argument indicates that Nagorka has solely challenged

the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency. While Nagorka cites case law regarding the

sufficiency standard, he has presented no argument as to how the State failed to present sufficient
5

evidence in support of his convictions for assault and felonious assault. See App.R. 16(A)(7).

Nagorka has neither set forth the elements of the offenses, nor explained which element(s) the

State failed to prove. This Court will not develop a sufficiency argument on Nagorka’s behalf.

State v. Ross, 2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.).

   {¶14} This Court now turns to Nagorka’s challenge to the manifest weight of the

evidence. When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is

required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier

of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.

1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). “This Court

will not overturn a verdict on a manifest weight challenge simply because the jury chose to believe

the State’s version of the events.” State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-196, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.).

   {¶15} Nagorka asserts that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the

evidence for several reasons, including: (1) the record contains inconsistencies and a lack of

conclusive evidence that Nagorka assaulted Officer F.; (2) none of the other officers saw Nagorka

punch Officer F.; (3) defense counsel failed to point out that Officer F. stated in his bodycam

footage that he had “no idea how he was struck in the altercation[;]” (4) discrepancies existed

between Officer F.’s bodycam and his testimony; (5) the State presented no corroborating

evidence; (6) Officer F.’s concussion diagnosis was based upon his self-reported symptoms, not

objective testing; (7) the jury was unaware that Officer F. was involved in past excessive-force

claims; (8) the jury was “poisoned” against Nagorka because the bodycams captured R.N. making
6

inflammatory and irrelevant statements; (9) the State’s questioning of Nagorka about internet posts

was inflammatory and irrelevant; and (10) the State improperly used Nagorka’s grandson’s

juvenile record to impeach his credibility.

   {¶16} Initially, this Court notes that much of Nagorka’s challenge to the manifest weight

of the evidence misrepresents the record. For instance, Nagorka claims that Officer F.’s bodycam

footage contains a statement from Officer F. indicating that he had “no idea how he was struck in

the altercation.” Nagorka has not provided a timestamp of where that statement appears in Officer

F.’s bodycam, nor was this Court able to locate it. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Nagorka also claims the

State presented no corroborating evidence even though an ER physician testified that she observed

an abrasion near Officer F.’s left eye, which was consistent with a blunt force injury to his head,

and that she diagnosed Officer F. with a concussion.

   {¶17} Additionally, this Court notes that the underlying transcript is almost 600-pages

long, containing testimony from ten witnesses. Yet the only citation to the transcript contained in

Nagorka’s assignment of error is to a transcript page wherein the chiropractor who treated Officer

F. testified that he referred Officer F. to a neurologist. Although Nagorka cites generally to the

State’s Exhibit 1, which contains the officers’ bodycam videos, he does not direct this Court to

any specific portion of those videos. Nagorka then makes conclusory statements to support his

assignment of error, which do not establish that his convictions were against the manifest weight

of the evidence. See State v. Mastice, 2007-Ohio-4107, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Taylor,

1999 WL 61619, *3 (9th Dist. Feb. 9, 1999) (“It is the duty of the appellant, not this court, to

demonstrate his assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority

and facts in the record.”).
7

      {¶18} It is the duty of Nagorka, not this Court, to construct an argument in support of his

assigned error. See App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Marshall, 2025-Ohio-2283, ¶ 56 (9th Dist.), quoting

In re E.G., 2017-Ohio-2584, ¶ 27 (9th Dist.). (“[I]t is not the duty of this Court to scour the record

for evidence and construct an argument on [Nagorka’s] behalf.”). At best, Nagorka’s challenge to

the manifest weight of the evidence is based upon assertions that the jury erroneously believed the

State’s version of the events, which is not a basis for reversal. Harris, 2024-Ohio-196, at ¶ 19 (9th

Dist.).

      {¶19} For the foregoing reasons, Nagorka’s first and second assignments of error are

overruled.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

      THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL
      RULE 29 MOTION AS THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF
      PROOF FOR A CONVICTION OF FELONIOUS ASSAULT AND
      ASSAULT.

      {¶20} In his third assignment of error, Nagorka asserts that the trial court erred by denying

his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29. This Court rejects Nagorka’s assignment of error

outright because Nagorka has failed to develop an argument in support of his assignment of error.

See App.R. 16(A)(7). Nagorka simply quotes Crim.R. 29, sets forth the sufficiency standard, and

then summarily concludes:

      All the trial court needed to review was the [bodycams] of the officers. In that
      review and review alone, the motion of acquittal should of (sic.) properly been
      granted. There is no evidence that Mr. Nagorka intended to cause harm, or serious
      physical harm to [Officer F.]

      {¶21} As previously noted, it “is the duty of the appellant, not this court, to demonstrate

his assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority and facts in

the record.” Mastice, 2007-Ohio-4107, at ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Taylor, 1999 WL 61619, at *3
8

(9th Dist. Feb. 9, 1999). This Court will not scour the record, including an almost 600-page trial

transcript, and construct an argument on Nagorka’s behalf. Marshall, 2025-Ohio-2283, at ¶ 56

(9th Dist.); see App.R. 16(A)(7). Nagorka’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO USE
    JUVENILE RECORDS TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF A
    WITNESS.

    {¶22} In his fourth assignment of error, Nagorka asserts that the trial court erred by

allowing the State to use “records” of his grandson’s “juvenile conviction” to impeach his

credibility. For the following reasons, this Court overrules Nagorka’s fourth assignment of error.

    {¶23} Evid.R. 609(D) provides that “[e]vidence of juvenile adjudications is not

admissible except as provided by statute enacted by the General Assembly.” Under R.C.

2151.357(H), “[e]vidence of a judgment rendered and the disposition of a child under the judgment

is not admissible to impeach the credibility of the child in any action or proceeding.” As this Court

has explained, “[t]he limitation imposed by Evid.R. 609(D) ‘has always been to prohibit the use

of a juvenile adjudication for purposes of general impeachment of a witness’s credibility.’” State

v. Price, 2017-Ohio-4167, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Robinson, 98 Ohio App.3d 560, 568

(8th Dist. 1994).

    {¶24} Nagorka’s argument regarding the State’s use of juvenile “records” fails on its

premise. The State asked Nagorka’s grandson on cross-examination if he stole anything from

Drug Mart earlier that year, to which he responded: “Yes.” Defense counsel did not object.

Nagorka has not addressed the State’s question in his merit brief, explained how it violated the

Rules of Evidence, or argued that it resulted in plain error given his trial counsel’s failure to object.

See App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 21-22, citing Crim.R. 52(B). Despite
9

Nagorka’s assertion to the contrary, the State did not introduce “records” pertaining to his

grandson’s juvenile adjudication. Nagorka’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

    APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
    EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE
    SIXTH AND FOURTEEN[TH] AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO
    CONSTITUTION.

    {¶25} In his fifth assignment of error, Nagorka argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. For the following reasons, this Court overrules Nagorka’s fifth assignment

of error.

    {¶26} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,

2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Nagorka must

establish: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment[;]” and (2) that

“the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonable

representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. To

establish prejudice, Nagorka must show that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for his

counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Sowell, 2016-

Ohio-8025, ¶ 138. “This Court need not address both prongs of Strickland if an appellant fails to

prove either prong.” State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-8847, ¶ 27 (9th Dist.).

    {¶27} Nagorka asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he

failed to: (1) object to the State’s use of juvenile records to impeach his grandson’s credibility; (2)

object to the State’s use of still frames taken from the bodycam videos during trial; (3) object to
10

the admission of the officers’ bodycams, and failed to set viewing parameters on those videos prior

to their admission; (4) properly cross-examine the ER physician about concussions and her

diagnosis of Officer F.; (5) retain a medical expert for trial; (6) cross-examine Officer F. about

prior excessive-force claims against him; (7) “play, use, address, or cross examine the officers on

the portion of the video, when [Officer F.] asks the other officers, ‘who hit him?’”; and (8) object

to the State’s use of Facebook posts he made after the alleged assault, which the State failed to

authenticate. As explained below, Nagorka has failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance.

   {¶28} First, Nagorka’s argument that his trial court rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to object to the State’s use of juvenile records to impeach his grandson fails on

its premise. As explained in this Court’s resolution of Nagorka’s fourth assignment of error, the

State did not introduce—and the trial court did not admit—Nagorka’s grandson’s juvenile records.

Instead, the prosecutor asked Nagorka’s grandson if he stole anything from Drug Mart earlier that

year. Nagorka has not explained how his trial counsel’s failure to object to this question was

deficient, nor how it affected the outcome of the trial. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Sowell at ¶ 138.

   {¶29} Second, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to object to the State’s use of still frames taken from the bodycam videos during

trial lacks merit. The record reflects that the State took still frames from some of the bodycam

videos to show the respective positions of Nagorka and Officer F.’s bodies during the seconds-

long physical altercation. The State introduced these still frames during some of the officers’

testimony. Defense counsel then used many of the still frames during his cross-examination of the

officers (and during his closing argument) to the defense’s advantage, including to elicit testimony

that none of the still frames showed Nagorka with a “closed fist.” This Court fails to see how
11

defense counsel’s failure to object to still frames that defense counsel later used to the defense’s

advantage resulted in a deficient performance.

     {¶30} Third, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to object to the admission of the officers’ bodycams, and failed to set viewing

parameters on those videos prior to their admission lacks merit. Initially, we note that Nagorka

claims bodycam videos “are hearsay and should never be admitted into evidence without redaction

or an objection” without citing any authority in support of his position. See App.R. 16(A)(7).

Regarding the parameters of the videos, the record reflects that the trial court, the prosecutor, and

defense counsel discussed this issue after the State rested. Defense counsel specifically asked how

the trial court would “handle it if the jury wants to view the body cams?” The trial court explained

that the prosecutor would give the court parameters, and that it would allow the jury to see those

portions of the bodycams. Defense counsel then asked the prosecutor if he knew what the

parameters would be, and the prosecutor responded that they could “put [their] heads together on

that” because they both knew which portions of the video were played for the jury. Defense

counsel then indicated that “subject to that[,]” he had no objection to the admission of the

bodycams.

     {¶31} Nagorka’s argument on appeal is premised on the fact that the parties did not set

viewing parameters on the bodycam videos, which requires this Court to assume that this was not

done. “This Court is confined to the record on appeal and may not engage in assumptions to

sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel argument.” State v. Zeber, 2017-Ohio-8987, ¶ 8 (9th

Dist.), quoting State v. Higgins, 2012-Ohio-5650, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). Thus, Nagorka’s argument lacks

merit.
12

   {¶32} Fourth, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to properly cross-examine the ER physician about concussions and her diagnosis of

Officer F. lacks merit. As this Court has explained, “decisions regarding cross-examination are

within trial counsel’s discretion, and cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” State v. Rosa-DeJesus, 2024-Ohio-2472, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 2013-

Ohio-3868, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.).

   {¶33} Fifth, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to retain a medical expert for trial lacks merit. Nagorka’s argument is based entirely upon

speculation that a medical expert would have provided relevant, favorable testimony for the

defense. As this Court has explained, a defendant “cannot establish ineffective assistance of

counsel based upon his or her trial counsel’s failure to obtain an expert witness when the

defendant’s argument is based ‘entirely upon speculation that such a witness exists, and

speculation as to what the testimony of such a witness would be.’” State v. Moffett, 2016-Ohio-

5314, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 2003-Ohio-4518, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). Thus, Nagorka’s

argument lacks merit.

   {¶34} Sixth, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to cross-examine Officer F. about prior excessive-force claims against him lacks

merit. As noted, “decisions regarding cross-examination are within trial counsel’s discretion, and

cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rosa-DeJesus at ¶ 23,

quoting Smith at ¶ 23. Moreover, as explained in our resolution of Nagorka’s eighth assignment

of error, Nagorka has not established that evidence of Officer F.’s involvement in a prior excessive-

force lawsuit would have been admissible at trial. See Evid.R. 402; Evid.R. 404(B). Thus,

Nagorka’s argument lacks merit.
13

   {¶35} Seventh, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to “play, use, address, or cross examine the officers on the portion of the video,

when [Officer F.] asks the other officers, ‘who hit him?’” lacks merits. While Nagorka cites

generally to Officer F.’s bodycam video, he fails to identify the timestamp of where that question

appears in Officer F.’s bodycam footage, nor was this Court able to locate it. See App.R. 16(A)(7).

It is Nagorka’s burden to establish error on appeal, which he has failed to do. Mastice, 2007-Ohio-

4107, at ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Taylor, 1999 WL 61619, at *3 (9th Dist. Feb. 9, 1999) (“It is the

duty of the appellant, not this court, to demonstrate his assigned error through an argument that is

supported by citations to legal authority and facts in the record.”).

   {¶36} Eighth, Nagorka’s argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to object to the State’s use—and the trial court’s admission—of Facebook posts

he made after the alleged assault fails on its premise. This Court’s review of the transcript indicates

that the State never introduced Facebook posts during trial, nor did the trial court admit them.

Instead, the record reflects that the prosecutor had printouts of Facebook posts wherein Nagorka

referred to the police as the “Blue Line Gang[.]” When the prosecutor asked Nagorka if he had

any thoughts on the “Blue Line Gang[,]” defense counsel objected. The trial court then held a

sidebar wherein the prosecutor and defense counsel discussed the Facebook posts. The trial court

indicated it would allow the State to question Nagorka about his “Blue Line Gang” comment for

impeachment purposes. Defense counsel then asserted a continuing objection.

   {¶37}     After the sidebar, the State asked Nagorka if he ever used the phrase “Blue Line

Gang” to refer to the Brunswick police, to which Nagorka responded “Yes.” While the prosecutor

questioned Nagorka as to his “Blue Line Gang” comment, there is no indication that the prosecutor

introduced the Facebook posts, nor does the record reflect that the trial court admitted them into
14

evidence. The prosecutor then switched subjects and questioned Nagorka as to any injuries he

suffered during his altercation with Officer F. Thus, the record reflects that defense counsel did

object to the Facebook posts, which the State ultimately did not introduce during trial.

Consequently, Nagorka’s argument lacks merit.

    {¶38} For the foregoing reasons, Nagorka’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI

    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE CROSS
    EXAMINATION OF AND PERMITTING INTERNET POSTS INTO
    EVIDENCE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHENTICATION.

    {¶39} In his sixth assignment of error, Nagorka asserts that the trial court erred by

allowing the State to cross-examine him about Facebook posts without properly authenticating the

posts, and by admitting them into evidence. As explained in this Court’s resolution of Nagorka’s

fifth assignment of error, this Court’s review of the record indicates that the State did not

introduce—nor did the trial court admit—Nagorka’s Facebook posts during trial. Moreover,

Nagorka’s sixth assignment of error fails to direct this Court to the portion of the transcript upon

which he relies. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Marshall, 2025-Ohio-2283, at ¶ 56 (9th Dist.), quoting In

re E.G., 2017-Ohio-2584, at ¶ 27 (9th Dist.) (“[I[t is not the duty of this Court to scour the record

for evidence and construct an argument on [Nagorka’s] behalf.”). Nagorka’s sixth assignment of

error is overruled.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VII

    THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS DEPRIVED MR. NAGORKA
    OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

    {¶40} In his seventh assignment of error, Nagorka argues that the cumulative effect of the

errors at trial deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
15

    {¶41} “Under the cumulative error doctrine, a conviction may be reversed when the

cumulative effect of errors deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though

none of the errors, in isolation, was prejudicial.” State v. Gilbert, 2025-Ohio-4623, ¶ 93 (9th Dist.),

citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. “In the absence

of multiple errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.” Gilbert at ¶ 93, citing State v.

Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 132. “Likewise, if a defendant fails ‘to demonstrate any prejudice

resulting from the errors he has alleged, he cannot demonstrate cumulative error.’” Gilbert at ¶

93, quoting State v. Straughan, 2021-Ohio-1054, ¶ 68 (9th Dist.).

    {¶42} Nagorka has not shown that multiple errors occurred during his trial or that he was

prejudiced as a result of any errors that occurred. Accordingly, Nagorka has not established

cumulative error. See Gilbert at ¶ 93. Nagorka’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VIII

    THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
    FAILING TO PRODUCE THE DOCUMENTATION SURROUNDING
    [OFFICER F.’S] INVOLVEMENT IN THIRY-FIVE COUNTS OF
    EXCESSIVE FORCE WHILE ON DUTY AS A SWORN PEACE OFFICER
    FOR THE STATE OF OHIO.

    {¶43} In his eighth assignment of error, Nagorka argues that the State committed a Brady

violation by not producing evidence regarding Officer F.’s involvement in past excessive-force

claims. For the following reasons, this Court overrules Nagorka’s eighth assignment of error.

    {¶44} “It is well settled that a defendant is entitled to rely on the prosecution’s duty to

produce evidence that is favorable to the defense.” State v. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 25. In Brady

v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable
16

to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30,

citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

    {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence

is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence

was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (3) that the defendant was prejudiced

as a result.” Brown at ¶ 30, citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999). “Evidence

is material—or prejudicial—‘when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Brown at ¶ 30, quoting Turner

v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017). As this Court has explained, “[o]rdinarily, Brady

claims cannot be established on direct appeal . . . because they require defendants to prove that the

government withheld evidence that was favorable and material to their defense and the record on

direct appeal is limited to what was presented at trial.” Covender v. State, 2023-Ohio-172, ¶ 17

(9th Dist.).

    {¶46} Prior to the start of trial, the State made an oral motion in limine to prohibit defense

counsel from mentioning Officer F.’s prior involvement in an excessive-force lawsuit while

Officer F. was employed with the City of Euclid, as well as the discipline Officer F. received in

connection with that lawsuit. The State indicated that it did not “have all the details” regarding

the prior lawsuit, but that it did not want defense counsel mentioning it during trial because it was

irrelevant to the underlying charges.

    {¶47} In response, defense counsel requested the trial court to reserve ruling on the State’s

motion in limine until the issue was raised during trial. The trial court then questioned defense

counsel as to how information regarding Officer F.’s past conduct could possibly become relevant

during trial. Defense counsel argued that testimony during trial could potentially open the door to
17

this evidence. The trial court indicated that it would reserve its ruling on the issue until the issue

arose during trial, but instructed defense counsel not to mention it during opening statements or

voir dire. Neither the State nor the defense raised the issue of Officer F.’s prior involvement with

an excessive-force lawsuit during trial.

   {¶48} At issue in this case was whether Nagorka shoved and then punched Officer F.,

causing Officer F. to suffer a concussion. Nagorka has not established that information regarding

Officer F.’s prior involvement in an excessive-force lawsuit would have been relevant and/or

admissible at trial. See Evid.R. 402 and Evid.R. 404(B); State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-815, ¶ 27-39

(8th Dist.). Aside from the statements of counsel summarized above, the record contains no

information regarding Officer F.’s prior involvement in an excessive-force lawsuit, nor what

evidence existed in that regard. See Covender, 2023-Ohio-172, at ¶ 17 (9th Dist.) (explaining that

Brady claims ordinarily cannot be established on direct appeal because the record is limited to

what was presented at trial). Thus, Nagorka has not established on appeal that the State suppressed

evidence, which caused him to suffer prejudice. See Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, at ¶ 30; Covender at

¶ 17. Consequently, Nagorka’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IX

   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
   DEFENDANT, ADAM NAGORKA, BY SENTENCING HIM TO SIX TO
   NINE YEARS IN PRISON AS SAID SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE AND
   CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

   {¶49} In his ninth assignment of error, Nagorka argues that the trial court erred by

sentencing him to six to nine years of incarceration because the sentence is excessive, and the trial

court failed to consider the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11. For the following reasons,

Nagorka’s ninth assignment of error is overruled.
18

   {¶50} In reviewing a felony sentence, “[t]he . . . standard for review is not whether the

sentencing court abused its discretion.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “[A]n appellate court may vacate or

modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence” that:

(1) “the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes[,]” or (2) “the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and

convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

   {¶51} A sentencing court has “full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the

statutory range” and is not “required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing . . . more

than the minimum sentence[ ].” State v. Foster, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus.

“[N]evertheless, in exercising its discretion, the court must carefully consider the statutes that

apply to every felony case. Those include R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of

sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance in considering factors relating to the

seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender.” State v. Mathis, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38.

“Unless the record shows that [a] court failed to consider the factors, or that the sentence is

‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the factors, the court is presumed to have considered the statutory

factors if the sentence is within the statutory range.” State v. Fernandez, 2014-Ohio-3651, ¶ 8 (9th

Dist.), quoting State v. Boysel, 2014-Ohio-1272, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

   {¶52} As noted, the jury found Nagorka guilty of one count of assault on a peace officer

in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a fourth-degree felony, and one count of felonious assault on a

peace officer in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a first-degree felony. The count for assault

carried a mandatory term of at least 12 months of incarceration. R.C. 2903.13(C)(5)(a); R.C.
19

2903.13(C)(6). The count for felonious assault carried a maximum indefinite term of 11 to 16.5

years of incarceration. R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a); R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a).

   {¶53} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it considered “all of the

relevant factors set forth in the statute[,]” the PSI, as well as the information the State and defense

counsel presented in their sentencing briefs and during the hearing. The trial court indicated that

Nagorka’s conduct showed a “complete utter disrespect” for law enforcement, and that Nagorka

continued to fail to take responsibility for his actions. The trial court sentenced Nagorka to twelve

months in prison on the assault charge, and six to nine years in prison on the felonious assault

charge. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently and gave Nagorka credit for time

served. In its subsequent sentencing entry, the trial court explained that the “prison term for this

offense would adequately punish the offender and/or protect the public from future crime by this

offender and/or others.”

   {¶54} Nagorka has not established that the record does not support the trial court’s

findings under the relevant statutes, or that his sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See State v.

Sampson, 2023-Ohio-2342, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.). “The trial court had full discretion to impose a prison

sentence within the statutory range, including a maximum sentence.” Id. Instead of imposing the

maximum sentence, the trial court sentenced Nagorka to a total prison term of six to nine years.

Thus, Nagorka’s sentence is within the statutory range, and the record neither shows that the trial

court failed to consider the sentencing factors, nor that Nagorka’s sentence is “strikingly

inconsistent” with those factors. See Fernandez, 2014-Ohio-3651, at ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting

Boysel, 2014-Ohio-1272, at ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, Nagorka’s ninth assignment of error is

overruled.
20

                                            III.

   {¶55} Nagorka’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                           Judgment affirmed.

   There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

   We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

   Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

   Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                   JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
                                                   FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:

CHRISTINE A. RUSSO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEFANIE H. ZARANEC, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.