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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.S.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0150

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Michael J. Brown](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6183/michael-j-brown/)

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0150
FILED 02-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD19755
The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Veronica F. Rios
Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 D.S. (“Mother”) challenges the denial of her motion to set
aside the juvenile court’s decision terminating her parental rights to her
child, A.S. For reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 A.S. was born prematurely and substance-exposed to
methamphetamine and marijuana in September 2023. Later that month, the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of A.S. and petitioned for
dependency based on substance abuse and an unstable living condition.

¶3 In April 2025, the juvenile court approved changing the case
plan to family reunification, concurrent with termination and adoption, and
ordered DCS to meet with Mother concerning substance abuse testing and
mental health services. In June, over Mother’s objection, DCS filed a motion
to terminate her parental rights as to A.S. based on prolonged substance
abuse and 15 months in out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3),
(8). Several weeks later, at the initial termination hearing, Mother contested
the motion. The court advised Mother that if she failed to appear at future
hearings without good cause, the court could proceed on the motion for
termination in her absence “based on the record and the evidence
presented.”

¶4 Mother failed to appear at the next hearing, a pretrial
conference held September 4, 2025. Finding no good cause for her failure
to appear, the court explained that Mother waived her right to contest the
allegations of the motion for termination. After hearing testimony from the
DCS caseworker and admitting exhibits into evidence, the court indicated
it would grant the motion, with a final order to follow.

¶5 A week later, and before the court issued its formal
termination order, Mother’s counsel moved to set aside the court’s decision
to grant DCS’s motion, claiming Mother could not attend the pretrial

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
Decision of the Court

conference because she was at an inpatient substance abuse treatment
facility from September 3 through September 10. DCS objected, asserting
voluntary inpatient treatment was not good cause for Mother’s failure to
appear because she did not alert the case manager and her decision to enter
treatment was “of her own volition.” DCS argued that Mother disregarded
the court’s warnings and deliberately decided not to appear at the pretrial
conference.

¶6 The court then issued its order terminating Mother’s parental
rights on both grounds alleged in DCS’s motion, finding no good cause for
Mother’s absence. In a later minute entry, the court denied Mother’s
motion to set aside, finding that (1) she could have entered treatment “any
time during the two years” the case had been pending, or even the day
following the pretrial conference, and (2) her “decision to enter [inpatient
treatment] rather than attend her hearing, knowing the consequences of
that decision, does not excuse her absence.” Mother timely appealed, and
we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by denying her motion
to set aside the termination finding. We review the court’s ruling for an
abuse of discretion. Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101,
¶ 15 (App. 2007). We reverse only if the ruling was “manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.” Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 83, ¶ 19 (App.
2005) (citation omitted).

¶8 A court may terminate parental rights by accelerating the
proceedings and receiving evidence when a parent fails to appear at a
scheduled hearing, so long as the parent had proper notice, was properly
served, and was advised of the consequences of failing to appear. Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 353(f). “[A] parent seeking to set aside a severance judgment
entered after failing to appear at a final severance hearing . . . must show
good cause for the nonappearance and a meritorious defense.” Trish A. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84, 89, ¶ 19 (2019) (citation modified).

¶9 To prove good cause, Mother must show “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304, ¶ 16 (App. 2007). Excusable neglect exists if
the neglect “is such as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person in

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
Decision of the Court

the same circumstances.” Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 163 (App.
1993).

¶10 The juvenile court determined that Mother failed to appear
without good cause at the pretrial conference, noting that Mother entered
inpatient treatment voluntarily even though she had notice the termination
proceeding could continue in her absence. Nothing in the record before us
contradicts the court’s finding. Mother received notice “that failure to
appear for further hearings without good cause shown could result in the
[c]ourt proceeding on the severance motion in her absence based on the
record and evidence presented.” See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 351(c)(2) (requiring
a hearing notice to advise parents that failure to appear without good cause
can result in waiver, admission of allegations, and advancement of
proceedings in their absence).

¶11 As the court noted, Mother was informed of the time and date
of the pretrial conference and warned of the consequences of failing to
appear. The court acted within its discretion in finding Mother’s absence
was without good cause. See Brandi K. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-
0023, 2021 WL 2837151, at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. July 8, 2021) (mem. decision)
(stating that a father’s failure to appear due to voluntary inpatient treatment
was not good cause); April M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 2 CA-JV 2018-0013,
2018 WL 2175887, at *2, ¶¶ 7–8 (Ariz. App. May 11, 2018) (mem. decision)
(determining that a mother’s failure to appear due to voluntarily entering a
substance abuse treatment facility was not good cause).

¶12 Mother contends that her inpatient treatment constituted
excusable neglect, but she waived this contention by failing to raise it in the
juvenile court. See Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 44, ¶ 19
n.3 (App. 2008) (noting that a parent waives an argument by failing to raise
it in the juvenile court).

¶13 Finally, Mother has not made any meaningful argument,
either in the juvenile court or on appeal, that she has a meritorious defense
to the court’s termination finding. Thus, she cannot establish that the
juvenile court erred in denying her motion to set aside. See id.; Crystal E. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (recognizing “it is
generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the
appellant”). And even assuming Mother has attempted to raise a
meritorious defense in her appellate briefing, her failure to include that
analysis in her motion to set aside means the issue is waived. See In re
Termination of Parental Rights as to M.A., 1 CA-JV 25-0044, 2025 WL 3002970,
at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 2025) (mem. decision) (“Our aversion to

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
Decision of the Court

waiver in the juvenile context does not stretch so far as to allow Father a
do-over where he chose not to reveal any potentially meritorious defense
in a motion where that was the issue.”). Mother has not shown the juvenile
court erred.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to A.S.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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