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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

ASSOCIATED v. CITY OF PHOENIX

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 24-0658

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (31.4K)

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Syllabus

Judicial Assistant Manual 2025 Whether a 2006 initiative allowing certain local governments to "regulate minimum wages" impliedly repealed a 1984 legislative referral prohibiting political subdivisions from mandating that government contractors pay their employees prevailing wages.

Combined Opinion

                        by Michael S. Catlett

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ASSOCIATED MINORITY CONTRACTORS OF ARIZONA, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

CITY OF PHOENIX, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0658
FILED 02-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-001435
The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix
By Jean-Jacques Cabou, Alexis E. Danneman, Karl J. Worsham, Jordan M.
Buckwald
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

Robert G. Schaffer PLC, Scottsdale
By Robert G. Schaffer
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Goldwater Institute, Phoenix
By Jonathan Matthew Riches
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees
Frazier Law, PLLC, Scottsdale
By John Thorpe
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Tempe City Attorney’s Office, Tempe
By Eric C. Anderson, Clarence E. Matherson, Jr.
Counsel for Amicus Curiae City of Tempe

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua D. Bendor, Hayleigh S. Crawford, Joshua Katz
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Arizona

Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix
By Brett William Johnson, Tracy Olson, Ian R. Joyce
Counsel for Amicus Curiae AZLTA, et al.

OPINION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined. Presiding Judge Catlett also filed a special concurring opinion.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 We resolve how two voter-approved, statewide ballot
measures interact. The first, enacted in 1984 by legislative referral, prohibits
“political subdivisions” from making contractors or subcontractors pay at
least “the prevailing rate of wages[.]” S.C.R. 1001, 36th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 1984); A.R.S. § 34-321(B) (1984). The second, enacted in 2006 by
initiative, allows a “county, city, or town” to “regulate minimum wages
. . . within its geographic boundaries[.]” Ariz. Sec’y of State, 2006 Publicity
Pamphlet, 101 (2006), https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/
PubPamphlet/english/Guide.pdf; A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). We decide
whether the 2006 law repealed the 1984 law, such that cities may again
mandate that contractors pay prevailing wages. Our answer is no.

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STATUTORY BACKGROUND

I.

¶2 Prevailing wages appeared early in statehood. In 1913,
Arizona’s Civil Code set an eight-hour workday for “all laborers, workmen,
mechanics or other persons” the State or its political subdivisions
employed. Ariz. Civ. Code, § 3103 (1913). These employees could not
receive “less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where
the work is performed[.]” Ariz. Civ. Code, § 3103. But the Code also treated
certain private workers as government employees: “laborers, workmen,
mechanics, and other persons doing manual or mechanical labor employed
by contractors or sub-contractors” of the State or its political subdivisions.
Ariz. Civ. Code, § 3103. These workers, too, had to receive at least the
current rate of daily wages in the locality, called a “prevailing wage.”

¶3 During the Great Depression, the federal government
adopted a prevailing wage law. To this day, the federal Davis-Bacon Act
requires that laborers receive minimum hourly rates under certain federal
contracts exceeding $2,000. 40 U.S.C. § 3142 (a). That Act requires federal
contractors to pay “minimum wages” the Secretary of Labor “determines
to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics
employed on projects” like “the contract work in the civil subdivision of the
State” where work is performed. 40 U.S.C. § 3142 (b).

¶4 After the Davis-Bacon Act, states adopted “Little Davis-Bacon
Acts.” Arizona was no exception. In 1933, our legislature passed House
Bill 37, codified at A.R.S. § 34-322, providing this:

Every contract in excess of one thousand dollars in amount,
to which the state of Arizona, or any political subdivision
thereof, is a party, which requires or involves the employment
of laborers or mechanics in the construction, alternation or
repair of any public buildings, or other improvements of the
state of Arizona or any political subdivision thereof, shall
contain a provision to the effect that the rate of wages for all
laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor or any
subcontractor on such public buildings or improvements,
shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of
a similar nature in the county, city, town, village, or other
civic division of the state in which the public building or
improvement is located[.]

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See State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 460–61 (1934) (quoting ch. 71, session laws
of 1933); see also Indus. Comm’n v. C&D Pipeline, Inc., 125 Ariz. 64, 65 (App.
1979) (calling the “Arizona Public Works Act, A.R.S. § 34-321, et seq.” the
“Little Davis-Bacon Act”). In 1979, we declared Arizona’s Little Davis-
Bacon Act unconstitutional for delegating too much legislative power to
labor unions. See C&D Pipeline, Inc., 125 Ariz. at 67.

¶5 Still, Arizona’s Little Davis-Bacon Act lingered. But in 1984,
the people buried it. The legislature referred Prop. 300; it passed in a
statewide vote. See S.C.R. 1001, 36th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. Prop. 300 declared
that “the rates of wages paid under public works contracts . . . is of
statewide concern.” S.C.R. 1001, § 3; A.R.S. § 34-321(A) (1984). It repealed
§ 34-322 and amended § 34-321. After that, no public works contract could
mandate that workers receive at least “the prevailing rate of wages[.]”
S.C.R. 1001, §§ 2–3; A.R.S. § 34-321(B) (1984). We call § 34-321(B) “the
Prevailing Wage Prohibition.”

II.

¶6 Arizona long deferred to federal law for its minimum wage.
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
establishing a federal minimum wage at 25 cents an hour. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (a)(1) (1938). At first, FLSA’s coverage was narrow, applying only to
employees engaged in interstate commerce or producing goods for
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a) (1938). But later, Congress extended FLSA to
most American workers.

¶7 For decades, Arizona did not adopt its own minimum wage,
so only FLSA applied. In 1997, the Arizona Legislature passed A.R.S. § 23-
362. Through that statute, “[t]he legislature declare[d] that the
establishment of a uniform minimum wage is a matter of statewide
concern.” A.R.S. § 23-362(A) (1997). It prohibited political subdivisions
from mandating higher minimum wages: “No political subdivision of this
state may establish, mandate or otherwise require a minimum wage that
exceeds the federal minimum wage[.]” A.R.S. § 23-362(B) (1997).

¶8 Between 1997 and 2007, the federal minimum wage
stagnated. Contrast 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1996) with 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (2007).
Concerned Congress “refused to raise the Minimum Wage since 1996,” the
Arizona Minimum Wage Coalition pushed an initiative called the “Raise
the Minimum Wage Act for Working Arizonans” (“the 2006 Act”). 2006
Publicity Pamphlet, supra. Denominated Prop. 202, the 2006 Act passed in
November 2006.

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¶9 The 2006 Act repealed the prohibition on political
subdivisions creating their own minimum wages. 2006 Publicity Pamphlet,
supra. It replaced one statutory section with new language and created two
new sections. See id.; see also A.R.S. §§ 23-362 to -64 (2007). As amended,
§ 23-362 defined certain terms, including “wage,” which it defined as
“monetary compensation due to an employee by reason of employment[.]”
A.R.S. § 23-362(E) (2007).

¶10 New § 23-363 required employers to “pay employees no less
than the minimum wage, which shall be six dollars and seventy-five cents
($6.75) an hour beginning on January 1, 2007.” A.R.S. § 23-363(A) (2007). It
also increased “the minimum wage” in 2008 and 2009 “by the increase in
the cost of living.” A.R.S. § 23-363(B) (2007). And it clarified that an
employer may pay “a wage up to $3.00 per hour less than the minimum
wage” if an employee’s tips and wages exceed “the minimum wage for all
hours worked.” A.R.S. § 23-363(C) (2007).

¶11 New § 23-364 created a civil enforcement action. A.R.S. § 23-
364(A), (E) (2007). It let the legislature raise “the minimum wage.” And it
allowed counties, cities, and towns to do two things. First, they may
“regulate minimum wages and benefits within” their “geographic
boundaries.” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). Second, they may “consider
violations of [the 2006 Act] in determining whether employers may receive
or renew public contracts[.]” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007).

¶12 In 2016, the legislature amended a different wage law to
define the phrase “minimum wage.” 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 203, § 2(5)
(2d Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2579). The legislature defined “minimum wage” as
“the nondiscretionary minimum compensation due an employee by reason
of employment, including the employee’s commissions, but excluding tips
or gratuities.” A.R.S. § 23-350(5) (2016).

¶13 Later in 2016, Arizonans again addressed the minimum wage.
The Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act (“the 2017 Act”) amended § 23-
363 to increase the minimum wage after 2017. A.R.S. § 23-363(A) (2017). It
also changed how employees earn and use sick time. See A.R.S. §§ 23-372
to -73 (2017). But it did not alter § 23-364(I), allowing counties, cities, and
towns to “regulate minimum wages[.]” That subsection remains
unchanged; we call it “the Local Permission Provision.” See A.R.S. § 23-
364(I) (2025).

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶14 In 2023, the Phoenix City Council (“Phoenix Council”)
considered a “Prevailing Wage Ordinance for City Projects.” That
ordinance required businesses contracting with the City of Phoenix
(“Phoenix”) for construction projects costing at least $250,000 to pay certain
employees “prevailing” wages. The Phoenix Council enacted the
ordinance. But the Council quickly changed its mind and repealed it.

¶15 Two months later, the Arizona Attorney General (“Attorney
General”) opined that “[a] city may regulate the minimum wages paid
within its geographic boundaries under Arizona Revised Statutes § 23-
364(I)[.]” Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. I23-004, 1 (June 15, 2023),
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I23-004.pdf. The
Attorney General reasoned that “[t]he plain text and context in which the
Minimum Wage law was enacted support” interpreting “the Minimum
Wage statute as exempting counties, cities, and towns from” “the Prevailing
Wage statute’s earlier prohibition.” Id. at 8. To the Attorney General, a city
can regulate wages “to require that employees of contractors on local public
works projects be paid not less than the prevailing wage.” Id. at 1.

¶16 After the Attorney General’s opinion, the Phoenix Council
passed a new prevailing wage ordinance (“the Phoenix Ordinance”). It
requires a contractor or subcontractor under certain contracts costing more
than $4 million to pay its workers “not less than the Prevailing Wage Rate
for the same class and kind of work in the Phoenix metropolitan area.” To
determine the “Prevailing Wage Rate,” the Phoenix Ordinance defers to the
United States Secretary of Labor’s wage rates under the Davis-Bacon Act.
That same day, the Tucson City Council passed Ordinance Number 12066
(“the Tucson Ordinance”) with language like the Phoenix Ordinance
(collectively, “the Prevailing Wage Ordinances”), but covering contracts
totaling “no less than $2 [million.]” In this way, Phoenix and Tucson
(collectively, “the Cities”) created their own Little Davis-Bacon Acts.

¶17 The Associated Minority Contractors of Arizona, Arizona
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, and Arizona
Builders Alliance (collectively, “the Minority Contractors”) sued to enjoin
the Prevailing Wage Ordinances. The Minority Contractors claimed the
Prevailing Wage Prohibition remains good law after the Local Permission
Provision, so the Cities still cannot mandate prevailing wages.

¶18 The Cities moved to dismiss, arguing the Local Permission
Provision now lets them regulate minimum wages, and the Prevailing
Wage Ordinances do so. The Minority Contractors moved for summary

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Opinion of the Court
judgment. The superior court denied the Cities’ motion to dismiss and
granted summary judgment for the Minority Contractors, concluding a
prevailing wage is not a minimum wage. The court declared the Prevailing
Wage Ordinances unlawful and enjoined them.

¶19 The Cities timely appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§ 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶20 The Cities challenge summary judgment. They argue the
superior court misinterpreted the phrase “minimum wages” by concluding
a prevailing wage is not a minimum wage. We review “a grant of summary
judgment de novo.” Joshua Tree Health Ctr., LLC v. State, 255 Ariz. 220, 222
¶ 8 (App. 2023). The parties agree on the facts, leaving only legal issues,
which we review de novo. Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 432 ¶ 17 (App. 2021).
For the Minority Contractors to get declaratory relief, they must have the
law right. See A.R.S. § 12-1832. And to get a permanent injunction, they
must show: (1) they prevail on the merits; (2) damages are inadequate; (3)
the balance of hardships favors them; and (4) public policy favors them.
Brown v. City of Phoenix, 258 Ariz. 302, 308 ¶ 17 (App. 2024).

¶21 The Cities posit that the 2006 Act impliedly repealed the
Prevailing Wage Prohibition. They think a prevailing wage is a type of
minimum wage, so the Local Permission Provision and the Prevailing Wage
Prohibition conflict: the former allows the Prevailing Wage Ordinances and
the latter prohibits them.

¶22 The Minority Contractors challenge that premise—they say a
prevailing wage is not a minimum wage. They maintain their
interpretation leaves both statutes intact. To them, the Local Permission
Provision lets cities regulate wages for all employees in a geographic area,
but it does not let cities mandate prevailing wages. The Minority
Contractors also argue the Prevailing Wage Ordinances violate due process.

I.

¶23 The parties spill much ink debating whether a prevailing
wage generally is a type of minimum wage. The superior court concluded
a prevailing wage is not a minimum wage, reasoning that an “overlap in
the colloquial meaning of the word ‘minimum’ does not mean that
‘minimum wage laws,’ . . . encompass[] ‘prevailing wage laws.’”

¶24 Regardless of whether a prevailing wage can ever qualify as
a minimum wage, we answer a more-specific question tied to statutory text:

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
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did the Local Permission Provision use the phrase “minimum wages” in a
manner that includes prevailing wages? We conclude the Local Permission
Provision did not do so, and thus the Prevailing Wage Prohibition still bars
the Prevailing Wage Ordinances.

A.

¶25 Answering the question posed requires statutory
interpretation. “[W]e apply the same interpretive standards to initiatives
as we do to statutes.” State v. Green, 248 Ariz. 133, 135 ¶ 9 (2020). “The
primary purpose in construing a voter initiative is to effectuate the intent of
the electorate that adopted it.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶26 “The most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of
the statute, and if it is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning
and the inquiry ends.” State v. Jones, 246 Ariz. 452, 454 ¶ 5 (2019).
“Statutory terms must be given effect in accordance with their commonly
accepted meanings[.]” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137,
142 ¶ 16 (2024).

¶27 We analyze “the entire text, considering the context and
related statutes on the same subject.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568
¶ 11 (2019). “Context is always relevant” because when “a provision is part
of a broader statutory scheme”—as most provisions are—“context can tell
us the overall objective.” In re Chalmers, ___ Ariz. __, __ , 571 P.3d 885,
889 ¶ 18 (2025). So when construing a specific provision, we consider the
whole statute and statutes of the same subject or general purpose. In re
Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024).

¶28 “When a statute’s plain language is unambiguous in context,
it is dispositive.” Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 5. But if statutory language
“can be reasonably read in two ways,” we can look to “alternative methods
of statutory construction” like “the [statute’s] historical background, its
spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing
interpretations.” Planned Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 17.

B.

¶29 The Cities say a minimum wage sets a wage floor and the
Prevailing Wage Ordinances do too for some employees, so the Ordinances
regulate minimum wages. The Local Permission Provision says a city may
“regulate minimum wages and benefits within its geographic boundaries
but may not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in this
article.” A.R.S. § 23-364(I). Neither the Local Permission Provision nor the

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2006 Act define the full phrase “minimum wages.” But the 2006 Act defines
part of that phrase. It says a “wage” is “monetary compensation due to an
employee by reason of employment, including an employee’s commissions,
but not tips or gratuities.” A.R.S. § 23-362(E) (2007). The Cities posit that a
prevailing wage meets that definition.

¶30 According to the Cities, to define the full phrase “minimum
wages,” all we need to do is take the statutory definition of “wage” and add
it to the dictionary definition of “minimum.” Quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary, the Cities say, “the ordinary meaning of ‘minimum’ is ‘the
smallest acceptable or possible quantity in a given case.’” Taking that
meaning of “minimum” and adding it to the definition of “wage,” the Cities
claim prevailing wages are minimum wages.

¶31 The Cities get textualism wrong. Textualism is not a math
equation where the whole always equals the sum of its literal parts. When
interpreting text, the meaning of two or more combined words sometimes
means something different than the sum of its parts. Idioms are an
example. Consider this phrase: “goes down in flames.” Combining the
sum of its individual parts, that phrase has this literal meaning: to move
toward a lower position while surrounded by a hot glowing body of ignited
gas. But in common parlance, it can mean something else—to fail suddenly
and spectacularly. Picking among that phrase’s meanings—literal vs.
idiomatic—requires context. If referring to a meteor, the literal meaning
applies; if referring to a losing legal argument, the idiomatic does.

¶32 Our supreme court has warned against interpreting statutes
like the Cities urge. See State v. Serrato, 259 Ariz. 493, ___ ¶ 15 (2025). The
question in Serrato was whether arson of an occupied structure included the
arsonist’s presence. Id. at ___ ¶¶ 11–12. The statute said an “‘occupied
structure’ is one ‘in which one or more human beings either is or is likely to
be present or so near as to be in equivalent danger at the time the fire or
explosion occurs.’” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting A.R.S. § 13-1701(2)). Unsurprisingly,
dictionary “definitions confirm[ed] that ‘human being’ encompasses all
people.” Id. ¶ 13. So an arsonist igniting a structure would do so to an
occupied structure. Id. ¶ 14. But the court rejected that interpretation. Id.
¶ 15. It advised against “conflat[ing] textualism with literalism.” Id. And
it rejected “strict constructionism,” which adopts “a narrow, crabbed
reading.” Id. It said courts must instead use textualism, which “does not
limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text.” Id. (emphasis
added) (cleaned up).

¶33 So we cannot simply take the literal meaning of “minimum,”
add it to the statutory meaning of “wage,” and see what materializes. We

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must instead determine the full-phrasal meaning of “minimum wages” as
used in context.

C.

¶34 To obtain the common meaning of the full phrase “minimum
wages,” we may look to dictionary definitions. See Planned Parenthood, 257
Ariz. at 142 ¶ 16. Here, those definitions cut both ways.

¶35 Some dictionaries support the Cities. Merriam Webster
defines a “minimum wage” as “a wage fixed by legal authority or by contract
as the least that may be paid either to employed persons generally or to a
particular category of employed persons.” Minimum Wage, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minimum
%20wage (last visited Feb. 24, 2026) (emphasis added). And Collins defines
the phrase as “the lowest wage that an employer is allowed to pay an
employee, according to a law or agreement.” Minimum Wage, Collins,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/ dictionary/english/minimum-wage
(last visited Feb. 24, 2026) (emphasis added). These definitions support the
Cities—a prevailing wage is the lowest wage an employer may pay some
employees for work under certain contracts with a public entity.

¶36 Other dictionaries support the Minority Contractors. The
Cambridge Dictionary defines a “minimum wage” as “the smallest amount
of money that employers are legally allowed to pay someone who works
for them.” Minimum Wage, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary
.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/minimum-wage (last visited Feb. 24,
2026). And the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries define “minimum wage” as
“the lowest wage that an employer is allowed to pay by law.” Minimum
Wage, Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, https://
www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/minimum-
wage (last visited Feb. 24, 2026). These definitions support the Minority
Contractors—neither necessarily include wages paid after voluntarily
contracting with the government.

¶37 We will not cherry-pick which dictionary definition we
prefer. That would be like “entering a crowded cocktail party and looking
over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S.
511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Doing so is fine for party goers but
not for neutral arbiters of legal disputes. Dictionaries are a dead end.

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D.

¶38 There is good news: “inconclusive dictionary definitions do
not render [a phrase] ambiguous.” Drummond, 247 Ariz. at 19 ¶ 9. Instead,
“[w]hen dictionary definitions are unavailing, . . . context is critical.” Id. at
18 ¶ 7. Context provides a path out. Reading the phrase “minimum wages”
in context “dispels any purported ambiguity[.]” Id. at 19 ¶ 9.

1.

¶39 The 2006 Act repeatedly used the phrase “the minimum
wage.” See A.R.S. §§ 23-362 to -64 (2007). By using a definite article “the”
before “minimum wage,” the 2006 Act signals that “minimum wage” refers
to a particular type of compensation. See Smith v. Melson, Inc., 135 Ariz. 119,
121 (1983). And the 2006 Act clarified what type of compensation that is.

¶40 The 2006 Act used “the minimum wage” to denote the
nondiscretionary minimum amount of hourly compensation an employer
must legally pay all employees because of employment. The 2006 Act made
employers “pay employees no less than the minimum wage,” which the Act
defined as “six dollars and seventy-five cents ($6.75) an hour.” A.R.S. § 23-
363(A) (2007). So no matter what work an employee performed, their
employer had to pay at least $6.75 an hour in 2007. And that requirement
triggered once an employment relationship existed.

¶41 The 2006 Act also provided that “the minimum wage” would
increase annually. A.R.S. § 23-363(B) (2007). Again, “the minimum wage”
referred to the minimum hourly amount an employer legally must pay
employees because of employment. A.R.S. § 23-363(A) (2007).

¶42 The 2006 Act exempted “any employee who customarily and
regularly receives tips or gratuities from patrons or others[.]” A.R.S. § 23-
363(C) (2007). For those employees, the Act set the minimum wage at $3.75
an hour if an employer proved an employee received at least $3.00 an hour
in tips. A.R.S. § 23-363(C) (2007). In this way, the 2006 Act let customers
subsidize the minimum hourly amount employers paid. See A.R.S. § 23-
363(C) (2007). But that exception did not alter that “the minimum wage”
was the minimum amount ($6.75 beginning January 1, 2007) employers
legally had to pay all employees because of employment. If customer tips
fell short, the employer remained on the hook.

¶43 The 2006 Act also required employers to “post notices in the
workplace . . . notifying employees of their rights[.]” A.R.S. § 23-364(D)
(2007). And if an employer did not do so, that would “raise a rebuttable

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presumption that the employer did not pay the required minimum wage
rate.” A.R.S. § 23-364(D) (2007). “[T]he required minimum wage rate”
again referred to the minimum hourly rate an employer legally had to pay
because of employment. See A.R.S. §§ 23-363(A) (2007); 23-364(D) (2007).

¶44 Finally, the 2006 Act let the legislature “raise the minimum
wage established” in the Act. A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). This may sound
repetitive, but “the minimum wage” here again referred to the minimum
hourly amount an employee legally had to receive for performing work.

2.

¶45 In the same subsection (I), the 2006 Act housed the Local
Permission Provision. A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). It did not mention “the
minimum wage.” It said, “A county, city, or town may by ordinance
regulate minimum wages[.]” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007) (emphasis added). The
Local Permission Provision used the plural phrase “minimum wages,” not
a definite phrase.

¶46 But “minimum wages” in the 2006 Act most naturally
referred to “the minimum wage” in each county, city, or town (i.e., in the
geographic area). Consider this example: Flagstaff raises “the minimum
wage” in the city to $18.00 an hour. And Pima County raises “the minimum
wage” in the county to $20.00 an hour. The 2006 Act allowed them to do
so. But one would refer collectively to those differing wage rates as
“minimum wages,” not “the minimum wage.” So the 2006 Act’s shift to
plural language when conferring power across multiple local governments
did not alter that the 2006 Act governs the minimum hourly amount
employers must legally pay all employees because of employment. In other
words, “the minimum wage” and “minimum wages” had similar
meanings—the only difference being that the former established the
statewide minimum wage and the latter conferred power to enact
minimum wages in smaller geographic areas. That local power must be
understood in the context of the 2006 Act as a whole. Drummond, 257 Ariz.
at 18 ¶ 5 (we consider the whole statute).

¶47 The rest of the sentence using the phrase “minimum wages”
supports our conclusion. That sentence’s second half said a county, city, or
town “may not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in
this article.” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). “[A] minimum wage” there referred
to “the minimum wage,” $6.75 an hour, the minimum hourly rate an
employer had to pay because of employment.

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¶48 The 2006 Act also let political subdivisions “consider
violations of this article in determining whether employers may receive or
renew public contracts[.]” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). This tells us two things.
One, the 2006 Act let political subdivisions consider a failure to pay “the
minimum wage” when awarding public contracts. But, again, “the
minimum wage” is the minimum hourly rate employers are required to pay
employees because of the employment relationship (even if those rates
differ by geographic area). Two, the 2006 Act authorized cities to condition
“public contracts” on compliance with “the minimum wage” but conferred
no broader authority over such contracts. See A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (2007). So
the 2006 Act impacted no other limit on political subdivisions’ authority
over public contracts, including the Prevailing Wage Prohibition.

3.

¶49 Finally, we consider other statutes in pari materia with the 2006
Act. One is relevant. In 2016, the legislature amended Arizona’s wage laws
to define the phrase “minimum wage.” A.R.S. § 23-350(5) (2017). Like the
2006 Act, those laws govern employee compensation, and thus the 2006 Act
and the wage laws are in pari materia—they are “of the same subject or
general purpose[.]” See Stambaugh, 242 Ariz. at 509 ¶ 7; A.R.S. §§ 23-350 to
-62; see also State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Orlando, 259 Ariz. 531, 537 ¶ 24 (2025).
The Cities do not fight the legislature’s definition—they embrace it. That
definition is this: “‘[m]inimum wage’ means the nondiscretionary
minimum compensation due an employee by reason of employment,
including the employee’s commissions, but excluding tips or gratuities.”
A.R.S. § 23-350(5) (2017).

¶50 That definition lines up with how the 2006 Act used the
phrases “the minimum wage” and “minimum wages.” Like the 2006 Act,
§ 23-350 defined “minimum wage” as the minimum hourly rate employers
are required to pay employees because of the employment relationship.
With this, our destination is clear.

¶51 And that end point is this: the 2006 Act used the phrases “the
minimum wage” and “minimum wages” to mean the minimum hourly rate
all employers in a particular geographic area must legally pay all
employees once an employment relationship exists.

E.

¶52 Having arrived there, we now determine whether the wages
mandated under the Prevailing Wage Ordinances qualify as “minimum
wages” under the Local Permission Provision. They do not.

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Opinion of the Court
¶53 From an employee’s perspective, the Prevailing Wage
Ordinances do not automatically result in minimum hourly pay rates upon
employment. Under those Ordinances, employees receive a prevailing
wage only when they work on certain public projects. The Ordinances
apply only to a subset of workers working on a subset of projects. Most
prominently, they apply only when a public contract exceeds certain
values—$4 million for the Phoenix Ordinance, $2 million for the Tucson
Ordinance. Plus, the Prevailing Wage Ordinances have more exceptions.
The Phoenix Ordinance lists nine; the Tucson Ordinance lists eight. And
the Ordinances apply only to mechanics, laborers, or other workers when
the United States Secretary of Labor has established a prevailing wage.

¶54 So simply gaining employment does not earn an employee a
prevailing wage. He must instead work for a company having a contract
with Phoenix or Tucson exceeding the minimum value triggering the
Prevailing Wage Ordinances. That contract must avoid all other exceptions
in the Ordinances. He must work on a project subject to the Ordinances—
working on a private project is insufficient. And he must perform a type of
work entitled to a prevailing wage. Once narrowed this way, it can hardly
be said that the Prevailing Wage Ordinances legally entitle all employees to
minimum hourly pay rates because of an employment relationship.

¶55 From an employer’s perspective, the Prevailing Wage
Ordinances do not legally require prevailing wages until it enters a
qualifying contract with the Cities. Whether an employer does so is
discretionary—an employer subjects itself to the Ordinances only by
entering a contract with Phoenix or Tucson exceeding certain values ($4
million in Phoenix; $2 million in Tucson) and not otherwise exempt. Even
then, an employer need not pay any employee a prevailing wage until it
assigns him to a project subject to the Prevailing Wage Ordinances. Because
the Prevailing Wage Ordinances do not legally require an employer to pay a
prevailing wage until they voluntarily enter a qualifying contract and
assign an employee to perform certain work on that contract, the
Ordinances do not “regulate minimum wages” under the 2006 Act.

F.

¶56 Even if the phrase “minimum wages” was ambiguous, the
Minority Contractors would prevail. Again, when text is ambiguous, “we
may use alternative methods of statutory construction, including
examining the [statute’s] historical background, its spirit and purpose, and
the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.” Planned
Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 17.

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Opinion of the Court
¶57 Start with statutory history. Before the 2006 Act, Arizona law
said political subdivisions could not “establish, mandate or otherwise
require a minimum wage that exceeds the federal minimum wage[.]”
A.R.S. § 23-362(B) (1997). That subsection did not address—either way—
political subdivisions’ authority to contractually mandate prevailing
wages. This is because, starting in 1984, the Prevailing Wage Prohibition
applied. The 2006 Act expressly repealed only the section prohibiting a
county, city, or town from setting its own minimum wage. And the 2006
Act should be understood with reference to the prohibition it repealed and
replaced; that prohibition did not cover prevailing wages, which the people
separately banned in 1984. See A.R.S. § 34-321(B).

¶58 The 2006 Act’s purpose also cuts against the Cities’
interpretation. The 2006 Act described its “[p]urpose and intent.” 2006
Publicity Pamphlet, supra, § 2. Section 2 said the “purpose in enacting the
Act” is that “[a]ll working Arizonans deserve to be paid a minimum wage
that is sufficient to give them a fighting chance to provide for their
families.” Id. § 2(1). Moreover, “[i]ncreasing the minimum wage reduces
dependency on taxpayer-funded public services.” Id. § 2(4).

¶59 Interpreting the 2006 Act to allow local governments to
require all employers to pay employees certain wages only because of
employment directly furthers those purposes. But allowing local
governments to contractually require prevailing wages for certain
employees performing certain work on certain projects does not. For
example, if Phoenix requires all employers to pay all employees at least
$18.00 an hour, that arguably benefits “[a]ll working” Phoenicians and
reduces their “dependency on taxpayer funded public services.” Id. § 2(1),
(4). Requiring some employers to pay some employees an increased hourly
rate when those employers enter certain contracts (worth more than $4
million) does not benefit “[a]ll working” Phoenicians. Id. § 2(1). That
benefits only a subset of the City’s citizens when they perform certain work
on a subset of projects.

¶60 Lastly, the effects and consequences of the Cities’
interpretation militate against it. That interpretation would grant the Cities
broad power. With that power, the Cities could dictate how much any
employer pays any employee anytime an employer contracts or
subcontracts with the Cities. Put differently, the Cities by ordinance could
dictate pay whenever an employee works under a public contract,
regardless of the contract’s value or the nature of the work performed.
From a policy perspective, some might think the Cities should have this
power. Others might find this power objectionable. We do not take policy
positions, so we are agnostic. But regardless of one’s policy views,

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Opinion of the Court
interpreting the 2006 Act to grant such power does not align well with the
Act’s history or purposes.

¶61 So the Cities prevail only if the Local Permission Provision
unambiguously uses the phrase “minimum wages” as they claim. That
Provision does not do so.

II.

¶62 The Cities argue the Local Permission Provision impliedly
repealed the Prevailing Wage Prohibition. The Cities maintain those laws
contradict because the former allows prevailing wages and the latter
prohibits them. They claim the Local Permission Provision is more recent
and specific, so it impliedly repealed the Prevailing Wage Prohibition.
Because we conclude the Local Permission Provision does not allow the
Cities to mandate prevailing wages, implied repeal does not apply.

¶63 We disfavor implied repeal. See e.g., Jurju v. Ile, 255 Ariz. 558,
562 ¶ 21 (App. 2023). But if statutes “cannot be harmonized to give each
effect and meaning,” we may find an implied repeal. Id. (quoting Cave Creek
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 7 ¶ 24 (2013)).

¶64 Our interpretation lets both laws cohabit. Again, the Local
Permission Provision uses “minimum wages” to mean “the minimum
hourly rate all employers in a particular geographic area must legally pay
all employees once an employment relationship exists.” Supra ¶ 51. And “a
prevailing rate of wages” does not meet that definition. Supra ¶¶ 52–55.
Vice versa, the Prevailing Wage Prohibition does not touch the Cities’
power to “regulate minimum wages,” at least as the Local Permission used
that phrase. The Local Permission Provision and the Prevailing Wage
Prohibition coexist peacefully; implied repeal does not apply. See Hounshell
v. White, 219 Ariz. 381, 391 ¶ 40 (App. 2008).

III.

¶65 The Cities also argue the Local Permission Provision repealed
the Prevailing Wage Prohibition under A.R.S. § 1-245. That statute says a
former statute is “deemed repealed and abrogated” “in all cases provided
for by [a] subsequent statute,” regardless of whether the former statute is
“consistent or not with the provisions of the subsequent statute[.]” A.R.S.
§ 1-245. But “[o]ur implicit repeal jurisprudence is inextricably intertwined
with § 1-245’s substantive command.” In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28, 34 ¶ 33
(2024). Put differently, “the doctrine of implicit repeal provides the
mechanism by which . . . courts” “determine whether a subsequent statute

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Opinion of the Court
‘provide[s] for’ the same ‘cases’ as a former statute, a necessary prerequisite
for applying § 1-245.” Id. By deciding whether two laws conflict, we also
answer whether § 1-245 applies. Id.

¶66 Our implied repeal conclusion makes § 1-245 irrelevant. The
Local Permission Provision does not address cases provided for by the
Prevailing Wage Prohibition. The latter forbids the Prevailing Wage
Ordinances; the former does not. So the Local Permission Provision did
not repeal the Prevailing Wage Prohibition under § 1-245.

ATTORNEY FEES

¶67 The Minority Contractors request attorney fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-348 and the private attorney general
doctrine. We deny their request under § 12-348 because they do not identify
the subsection entitling them to fees, nor do they explain why they are
entitled to fees. See Ferneau v. Wilder, 256 Ariz. 68, 76 ¶ 27 (App. 2023). We
also deny the Minority Contractors’ request under the private attorney
general doctrine because they do not explain how they meet that doctrine’s
requirements. See Ariz. All. for Retired Ams., Inc. v. Crosby, 256 Ariz. 328, 334
¶ 20 (App. 2023). But as the prevailing party, we award the Minority
Contractors costs on appeal upon complying with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

CONCLUSION

¶68 The Local Permission Provision does not permit the
Prevailing Wage Ordinances. And the Local Permission Provision did not
repeal the Prevailing Wage Prohibition. With these conclusions, we need
not address the Minority Contractors’ due process arguments. We affirm
the judgment.

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Catlett, J., Specially Concurring
C A T L E T T, Judge, specially concurring:

¶69 I have three more points to make.

I.

¶70 The first concerns how we interpret statutes born from ballot
measures. As the opinion explains, our supreme court instructs that “[t]he
primary purpose in construing a voter initiative is to effectuate the intent of
the electorate that adopted it.” State v. Green, 248 Ariz. 133, 135 ¶ 9 (2020)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 ¶ 10
(1999). And this court has dutifully applied that maxim when interpreting
initiatives, even recently. See Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y, Inc. v. Ariz. Sec’y of State,
258 Ariz. 570, 583 ¶ 36 (App. 2024).

¶71 Once upon a time, the supreme court also instructed that we
determine legislative intent when interpreting statutes. See Ariz. Dep’t of
Revenue v. Action Marine, Inc., 218 Ariz. 141, 143 ¶ 10 (2008); Premier
Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9 (2016). Recently
though, the court steered away from legislative intent and embraced text
and context. We are now instructed to “determine the meaning of the
words the legislature chose to use . . . according to the plain meaning of the
words in their broader statutory context, unless the legislature directs . . .
otherwise.” S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281,
286 ¶ 31 (2023); see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137,
142 ¶¶ 15–16 (2024).

¶72 This turn away from legislative intent is wise. As judges, we
swear an oath to the Constitution and the law, not the intent of politicians.
Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 26; A.R.S. § 38-231(E). We aren’t trained to glean what
they intended when enacting statutes. But we are trained to take text and
determine its original public meaning. The rule of law requires we do only
that. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).

¶73 Three years ago, the supreme court’s conflicting
instructions—legislative intent vs. statutory text—came to a head. In State
ex rel. Arizona Department of Revenue v. Tunkey, four justices rejected
legislative intent in favor of statutory text. 254 Ariz. 432, 437–39 ¶¶ 23–32
(2023) (Bolick, J., concurring) (“the Tunkey Concurrence”). The Tunkey
Concurrence explained that we should “apply a plain meaning approach to
statutory interpretation going forward.” Id. at 437 ¶ 24.

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Catlett, J., Specially Concurring
¶74 To the Tunkey Concurrence, the rule of law and separation of
powers compels a textual approach for four reasons. One, only “the words
of a statute . . . are the law.” Id. ¶ 26. Two, “[l]egislative intent is at best
amorphous and at worst illusory.” Id. ¶ 27. “The quest [for legislative
intent] is inherently subjective and therefore corrosive of the rule of law, for
it licenses judges to credit not what the legislature said through the words
it enacted but what it meant to say.” Id. at 437–38 ¶ 27. Three, seeking
legislative intent “invites imprecision in legislative drafting if we appear to
be at the ready to rescue a poorly drafted statute with a sharpened blue
pencil.” Id. at 438 ¶ 27. And four, “[w]e exceed our limited constitutional
authority when we displace plain meaning with legislative intent.” Id.

¶75 But is the Tunkey Concurrence binding? Yes. Mere months
ago, the supreme court adopted its approach and rejected legislative intent.
In State v. Gordon, the court rejected the dissent’s reliance on a Georgia
Court of Appeals’ opinion, which said that among interpretative rules “the
most important . . . is to construe the statute so as to give effect to the
legislature’s intent.” ___ Ariz. ___ , ___ , 581 P. 3d 215, 222 ¶ 28 (2025)
(quoting Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99, 104 (Ga. App. 2009)). The majority
said that “approach permits a court to ignore the plain meaning of the text
if it perceives a departure from legislative intent.” Id. ¶ 29. Citing the
Tunkey Concurrence, the majority explained that we instead look to “the
text of a statute to discern a legislative purpose absent ambiguity because
the plain meaning of the text itself reflects the intent of the Legislature.” Id.;
see also State v. Marner, ___ Ariz. __, __ , 2026 WL 249230, at *4 ¶ 19 (2026)
(“The words in a statute are not evidence of a legislator’s intent, rather they
are law that judges apply[.]”). So absent ambiguity, Arizona courts ignore
legislative intent and focus instead on text and context.

¶76 The same principles should apply when interpreting statutes
stemming from ballot measures. But for now, opinions saying we consider
electorate intent in that context remain binding. See Green, 248 Ariz. at 135
¶ 9. In fairness, the supreme court hasn’t had occasion to correct course
post Gordon. But when that opportunity comes, the court should do so.

¶77 After all, “we apply the same interpretive standards to
initiatives as we do to statutes.” Id. Based on that equal-treatment rule, we
should look to text—not electorate intent—when interpreting ballot
measures. See Gordon, 581 P.3d at 222 ¶ 28.

¶78 But even without an equal-treatment rule, the reasons for
looking to text for legislative statutes apply equally to ballot measures.
One, only “the words” voters adopt “are the law.” See Tunkey, 254 Ariz. at
437 ¶ 26 (Bolick, J. concurring). Two, “[voter] intent is at best amorphous

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Catlett, J., Specially Concurring
and at worst illusory.” See id. ¶ 27. If we can’t glean what tens of legislators
intend when enacting a statute, we can’t glean what millions of people do
when approving a ballot measure. That “quest is inherently subjective and
therefore corrosive of the rule of law, for it licenses judges to credit not what
the [voters] said through the words [they] enacted but what [they] meant
to say.” See id. at 437–38 ¶ 27. Three, seeking voter intent “invites
imprecision in [ballot measure] drafting if we appear to be at the ready to
rescue a poorly drafted [ballot measure] with a sharpened blue pencil.” See
id. at 438 ¶ 27. And four, “[w]e exceed our limited constitutional authority
when we displace plain meaning with [electorate] intent.” See id.

¶79 When it can, the supreme court should clarify that electorate
intent isn’t our primary consideration when interpreting statutes stemming
from ballot measures. Only text is.

II.

¶80 The second point is case specific. Two more interpretative
canons weigh against the way the Cities interpret the 2006 Act.

¶81 First, local governments “‘have only such legislative powers
as have been expressly, or by necessary implication, delegated to them by
constitution or by the legislature.’” Vangilder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 252
Ariz. 481, 488 ¶ 24 (2022). So legislative delegations to local governments
are “strictly construed.” Id.; see also Green, 248 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 9.

¶82 Second, those delegating extraordinary powers usually do so
clearly. In other words, “[e]xtraordinary grants of regulatory authority are
rarely accomplished through modest words, vague terms, or subtle
devices.” See West Virginia v. E.P.A., 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022). The judiciary
presumes those who enact laws—in Arizona, the legislature and the
people—delegate major policy decisions using clear language. See id.; see
also Roberts v. State, 253 Ariz. 259, 270 ¶ 40 (2022) (adopting the major
questions doctrine). The U.S. Supreme Court assumes Congress doesn’t
“hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S.
457, 468 (2001). We should assume Arizonans don’t either.

¶83 The Cities’ interpretation stumbles over both canons. The
Cities think the phrase “minimum wages” repealed the voter-approved
Prevailing Wage Prohibition and granted them power to contractually
mandate wages. But we must strictly construe the Local Permission
Provision’s delegation, see Vangilder, 252 Ariz. at 488 ¶ 24, and assume the
people intended to delegate only those powers reflected in text, see Roberts,
253 Ariz. at 270 ¶ 40. If the people had displaced a law they enacted in 1984

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ASSOCIATED, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.
Catlett, J., Specially Concurring
to delegate the broad authority the Cities now claim, they would have done
so more clearly.

III.

¶84 And the third point is this: we shouldn’t interpret initiatives
in a way few (if any) voters would have anticipated.

¶85 In Arizona, “[d]irect lawmaking through referendum,
initiative, or legislative referral, each of which is enshrined in the Arizona
Constitution, is an important component of the separation of powers[.]”
Lane v. City of Scottsdale, 258 Ariz. 460, 469 ¶ 33 (App. 2024) (Catlett, J.,
specially concurring). “But voters have a concomitant interest in voting
with eyes wide open and in not being led astray by false or misleading
election materials[.]” Id.

¶86 Section 19-102(A) regulates “[t]he form of petition for a law or
amendment to the constitution of this state or county legislative measure,
or city or town ordinance . . . proposed by the initiative to be submitted
directly to the electors[.]” And it “requires that such forms contain a
. . . description of the principal provisions of the ballot measure.” Lane, 258
Ariz. at 470 ¶ 38 (Catlett, J., specially concurring). “[W]hen analyzing the
. . . description on initiative petition forms, we ask whether [it] ‘either
communicates objectively false or misleading information or obscures the
principal provisions’ basic thrust.’” Id. Similarly, the ballot language must
“contain a summary of the principal provisions of the measure, not to
exceed fifty words[.]” A.R.S. § 19-125(D). “[P]roper ballot language must
be ‘neither false nor clearly misleading,’ and should ‘reasonably be
regarded as an attempt to provide necessary and appropriate information
to the voting public.’” Lane, 258 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 16.

¶87 Again, under the Cities’ view, the 2006 Act displaced a
statewide ballot measure and returned broad power to certain local
governments to impose prevailing wages. Yet one would search in vain for
any mention that the 2006 Act would do so in any of the ballot materials
provided to the public. Nothing in the petitions circulated to get the 2006
Act on the ballot told the public that the Act would displace the Prevailing
Wage Prohibition—which likely would’ve made § 23-364(I) a principal
provision. See Ariz. Sec’y of State, I-13-2006 [Prop. 202] Application for
Initiative or Referendum Petition Serial Number, 1 (Nov. 18, 2005),
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/I-13-2006-full.pdf. Nothing
in the Secretary of State’s publicity pamphlet alerted voters that the 2006
Act would grant local governments the power the Cities now claim. See

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Catlett, J., Specially Concurring
2006 Publicity Pamphlet, supra, at 101–13. And nothing on the ballot notified
voters that a “yes” vote would grant the Cities that power. Id. at 114.

¶88 So it is unlikely anyone voting “yes” understood that the 2006
Act would operate as the Cities now claim. And with that improbability,
along with everything else we’ve said, the Cities’ interpretation fails. One
might even say it goes down in flames.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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