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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to F.G.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0120

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.2K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by Andrew J. Becke

I
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0120
FILED 02-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD34665, JS22647
The Honorable Adele Ponce, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Monica G. (“Mother”) appeals a July 2025 order terminating
her parental rights as to F.G.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 F.G. was born in January 2022. This appeal arises out of the
third dependency for F.G.

I. First Dependency

¶3 In February 2022, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)
was informed that Mother was seen falling multiple times while pushing
F.G. in a stroller. During one fall, the weeks-old child “roll[ed] out” of the
stroller and was taken to the hospital. Mother was so intoxicated that no
information could be gathered from her, and a bottle of alcohol was found
in the stroller.

¶4 DCS took F.G. into care by court order and filed a dependency
petition, alleging Mother was unwilling or unable to parent F.G. due to
substance abuse. Mother did not contest the petition, and in April 2022, the
court found F.G. dependent, adopting a family reunification case plan.
Mother then actively, and apparently successfully, participated in services
DCS provided.

¶5 In April 2023, on DCS’s motion, F.G. was placed back in
Mother’s physical custody. In June 2023, on DCS’s motion, the court
dismissed the dependency. That apparent success, however, did not last
long.

II. Second Dependency

¶6 In October 2023, Mother was seen stumbling and pushing
F.G. in a stroller into oncoming traffic. Police found a nearly empty bottle
of alcohol and a baby bottle containing alcohol in the stroller. Mother and
F.G. were taken to a hospital, where Mother appeared to be intoxicated and
had a blood alcohol content of 0.395.

1 The superior court also terminated father’s parental rights as to F.G., but

he is not a party to this appeal.

2
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

¶7 DCS again took F.G. into care by court order and filed the
second dependency petition, alleging Mother was unwilling or unable to
parent F.G. due to substance abuse. Mother again did not contest the
petition, and in December 2023, the court again found F.G. dependent,
adopting a family reunification case plan. As with the first dependency,
Mother then actively, and apparently successfully, participated in services
DCS provided.

¶8 In October 2024, Mother moved to have F.G. returned to her
physical custody, to which DCS did not object. The court granted the
motion, and F.G. was again placed with Mother.

¶9 In January 2025, DCS moved to dismiss the dependency,
noting that it had provided Mother “with every service and tool offered in
hopes she is able to maintain [sobriety] on her own without court
oversight.” On January 15, 2025, the court dismissed the second
dependency and, in doing so, found that DCS had made reasonable efforts
to finalize the family reunification plan.

III. Third Dependency

¶10 Just weeks later, on February 3, 2025, DCS received a report
that Mother was intoxicated—described as “staggering” and
“stumbling”—at her transitional residence. Residence staff took Mother’s
car keys because she intended to drive to F.G.’s daycare to pick F.G. up. A
breathalyzer test showed Mother had a blood alcohol content of 0.205. DCS
removed F.G. from Mother’s custody.

¶11 DCS then filed a third dependency petition, alleging Mother
was unwilling or unable to parent F.G. because of substance abuse. This
time, Mother contested the dependency allegations.

¶12 Later in February 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights based on (1) substance abuse, and (2) F.G.’s
placement in out-of-home care pursuant to court order and that, within 18
months after being returned to Mother, the child had again been removed
from Mother’s care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (11). The petition to terminate
alleged that Mother had demonstrated an inability to manage her substance
abuse despite being offered services to maintain sobriety. DCS reported
providing Mother extensive rehabilitative services, including individual
counseling, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, transportation,
urinalysis testing, and visitation.

3
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

¶13 In May 2025, the superior court held a combined contested
dependency and termination adjudication hearing. After hearing testimony
from several witnesses (including Mother) and receiving exhibits, the court
found F.G. dependent due to Mother’s inability to parent because of
ongoing alcohol abuse. The court found that Mother’s “longstanding
alcohol abuse problem” had resulted in F.G.’s repeated removal from
Mother’s care, as well as the removal of Mother’s other children not
involved in this case. The court further noted that F.G. had been removed
from Mother’s care due to alcohol abuse just as the second dependency was
being dismissed.

¶14 The court granted DCS’s petition for termination, finding by
clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s prolonged substance abuse
and F.G.’s prior removal constituted grounds for termination of Mother’s
parental rights. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (11). The court found by a
preponderance of evidence that termination was in F.G.’s best interests.

¶15 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§
8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶16 Mother argues that the superior court erred by: (1) relying on
DCS’s efforts from the first and second dependencies to satisfy the diligent
efforts requirement of the third dependency, and (2) finding sua sponte it
was futile to offer Mother further rehabilitation services.

¶17 To support a termination order, the court must find (1) a
ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing
evidence, and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interests by a
preponderance of evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). In reviewing the court’s termination order, we accept the
court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence and inferences support them
and affirm the court’s legal conclusions about the statutory grounds for the
termination unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023).

4
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

I. The Superior Court Properly Considered Reunification Services
Provided During Previous Dependencies in Assessing Whether
DCS Complied with Its Duty to Provide Services.

¶18 Mother argues the superior court erred by relying on the
reunification services provided in the first and second dependencies to
conclude the elements of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11) were met in the third
dependency. We disagree.

¶19 Under § 8-533(B)(11), termination is permitted when the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following are true:

(a) The child was cared for in an out-of-home placement
pursuant to court order; The agency responsible for the care of the child made
diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification
services; The child, pursuant to court order, was returned to the
legal custody of the parent from whom the child had been
removed; and Within eighteen months after the child was returned,
pursuant to court order, the child was removed from that
parent’s legal custody, the child is being cared for in an out-
of-home placement under the supervision of the juvenile
court, the division or a licensed child welfare agency and the
parent is currently unable to discharge parental
responsibilities.

¶20 Mother contests the superior court’s findings only on the
second element, whether DCS “made diligent efforts to provide
appropriate reunification services.” § 8-533(B)(11)(b). She argues that a
court cannot rely on reunification services provided in a prior dependency
to meet the diligent efforts requirement in a current dependency. Not so.

¶21 In interpreting statutes, we “read each word, phrase, clause,
and sentence in a manner that ensures ‘no part of the statute is void or
trivial’ and will give meaning to the statute’s clear and unequivocal
language.” In re B.W., __ Ariz. __, ¶ 16, 572 P.3d 88, 94 (2025) (quoting
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142, ¶ 15 (2024)).
”Under this plain meaning analysis, we look first to the language of the
provision, for if the statutory language is clear, judicial construction is
neither required nor proper.” Id. (citations omitted and cleaned up).

5
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

¶22 Section 8-533(B)(11) plainly describes a temporal sequence.
First, the child must be in an out-of-home placement pursuant to a court
order. § 8-533(B)(11)(a). Second, (once the child is in an out-of-home
placement) DCS must provide reunification services. § 8-533(B)(11)(b).
Third, (once the reunification services have been provided) the child must
have been returned to the legal custody of the parent. § 8-533(B)(11)(c). And
finally, (once the child has been returned to the parent’s legal custody)
within 18 months of the child’s return, the child is again removed from the
parent’s legal custody, is cared for in an out-of-home placement, and the
parent is then unable to discharge parental responsibilities. § 8-
533(B)(11)(d). When each of these elements have been met by clear and
convincing evidence, grounds exist for termination.

¶23 Previous memorandum decisions from this Court have
uniformly concluded the superior court is entitled to rely on reunification
services provided in an earlier dependency to satisfy § 8-533(B)(11)(b)’s
requirement that DCS “made diligent efforts to provide appropriate
reunification services.” E.g., In re M.B., 1 CA-JV 23-0214, 2024 WL 2154556,
at *2, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. May 14, 2024) (mem. decision) (rejecting the
argument that “DCS was obligated to provide additional reunification
services after the children were removed from Mother’s care a second time
following dismissal of the first dependency”); Gerardo L. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 1 CA-JV 18-0441, 2019 WL 1959967, at *3, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. May 2,
2019) (mem. decision) (affirming termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11)
without making an appropriate reunification services finding in the current
dependency where such a finding was made in a prior dependency); Shawn
N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, CA–JV 15–0361, 2016 WL 3884916, at *3, ¶ 16 (Ariz.
App. July 14, 2016) (mem. decision) (same); Vanetta H. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 1 CA-JV 15-0115, 2015 WL 6391392, at *3, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Oct. 22,
2015) (mem. decision) (same). This interpretation is consonant with the
purpose of § 8-533(B)(11)—to “expedite termination proceedings so that
children will ‘spend less time in foster care’ and be placed in ‘permanent
homes sooner.’” Adrian E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 240, 245, ¶ 21
(App. 2016).

¶24 In short, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11) does not require DCS to provide
additional reunification services in a current dependency provided that it
made diligent efforts to provide those services in a recent dependency and
the reunification needs have not significantly changed. The record here
shows that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification
services in the prior dependencies, which resulted in dismissal of those
dependencies after F.G. was returned to Mother’s care. Mother does not
genuinely challenge that showing. Aside from a single mention in her brief

6
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO F.G.
Decision of the Court

that the services provided “never addressed the underlying trauma that
was the impetus for her substance abuse,” Mother fails to develop any
argument about the adequacy of the services provided in the first and
second dependencies.

¶25 Mother does not challenge the superior court’s analysis of the
remaining § 8-533(B)(11) findings or the court’s finding that termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in F.G.’s best interests. By failing to do so, she
concedes that those findings are supported by the record and waives those
issues on appeal. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–78,
¶¶ 5–7 (App. 2017).

II. Because Reasonable Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Findings on the Prior Removal Grounds, We Do Not Consider
Mother’s Arguments Regarding Substance Abuse and Futility.

¶26 Mother argues that the superior court erred by determining
that further reunification services would be futile. Because, under the
circumstances present here, no further reunification services were required,
this argument can only apply to the superior court’s findings on the
substance abuse grounds under § 8-533(B)(3).

¶27 Mother has not shown the superior court erred in granting
termination based on the prior removal statutory grounds. Thus, this court
need not address her challenges to the substance abuse findings. See Jesus
M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear
and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on
which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims
pertaining to the other grounds.”).

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

7