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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 25-0566

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (893)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Andrew M. Jacobs

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOSEPH E. JARVIS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ASSA ABLOY GLOBAL SOLUTIONS INC., et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0566
FILED 02-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S-8015-CV-2025-00553
The Honorable Steven C. Moss, Judge
The Honorable Eric E. Gordon, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Littler Mendelson PC, Phoenix
By Kristy L. Peters and Yijee Jeong
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Joseph E. Jarvis
Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Joseph Jarvis appeals the superior court’s order terminating
his employment lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction after it was removed to
federal court and dismissed there. He also appeals the court’s denial of his
motion to disqualify his case’s superior court judge under A.R.S. § 12-409.
For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On March 3, 2025, Jarvis filed this action in the superior court
against his former employer and certain associated persons alleging claims
arising from his employment and termination.1

¶3 On March 4, 2025, the court directed Jarvis to effect service of
the Summons and Complaint on all defendants within 90 days. See Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 4(i). Defendants executed a waiver of service and sent it to Jarvis on
April 7, 2025. But Jarvis never filed the waiver of service with the court.

¶4 On May 6, 2025, Defendants removed the case to federal
court. In their Notice of Removal, Defendants asserted federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing Jarvis asserted claims arising
under federal law, including claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Defendants
promptly notified the superior court of removal as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446 (d).

¶5 After removal, Jarvis filed a notice in superior court stating
that he had filed a motion to remand in federal court. His notice asserted
Defendants’ removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b). The court
then entered an order taking no action on Jarvis’ filings “unless and until
[the case] is remanded back” from federal court and staying the matter
effective May 6, 2025. As to Jarvis’ argument of improper removal, the
superior court reasoned that it was unclear “when service of process was
complete as to all [D]efendants, or even if all [D]efendants ha[d] yet been

1 Jarvis named as Defendants his former employer, Traka USA, LLC, related

corporate entities (ASSA ABLOY Global Solutions, Inc.; ASSA ABLOY Inc.;
and ASSA ABLOY AB), employees of the entities (Nico Delvaux, Danny
Garrido, Elizabeth Sidor, Stephen Goshea, Christy Law, Donniel Ogorek,
Lucas Boselli, and Stephanie Ordan), and defense counsel in Jarvis’ earlier,
related federal case: Littler Mendelson, P.C. and its attorneys Kristy Peters,
Yijee Jeong, and Erin Webber.

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JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

serv[]ed, though Plaintiff alleges a waiver request was submitted on March
7, 2025. It is unclear whether Defendant or Defendants ever signed that
waiver. Defendants did, however, employ counsel.”

¶6 Jarvis repeatedly moved in the superior court to vacate the
stay, lift the stay, and proceed against Defendants. The court repeatedly
declined to take action absent a remand from federal court and denied
Jarvis’ requests that it reconsider those rulings.

¶7 Meanwhile, in federal court, Jarvis filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, alleging federal judicial bias and misconduct
by Defendants and their counsel. The federal court dismissed the case,
terminated the action, and declared all pending motions moot without
issuing any remand order.

¶8 Defendants then filed a notice in the superior court that the
federal court dismissed and terminated Jarvis’ case. Defendants moved the
court to declare Jarvis a vexatious litigant. The court set a hearing on
pending motions in July 2025.

¶9 At the hearing, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction
over Jarvis’ case because the case had been removed to federal court and
dismissed there without any order remanding it to the superior court. The
superior court terminated Jarvis’ case, denied his pending motions as moot,
and declined to address Defendants’ request to declare Jarvis a vexatious
litigant for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied Jarvis’ motions for
reconsideration.

¶10 Jarvis then moved to disqualify his case’s assigned judicial
officer, Judge Steven Moss, under A.R.S. § 12-409(B)(5), who Jarvis claimed
exhibited bias, prejudice, or hostility towards him as a pro se litigant. Jarvis
also claimed the judge made “disparaging comments implying [Jarvis]’s
legal filings were ‘AI-generated’” and that the judge exhibited
“[i]ncompetence in applying clear procedural law.” The court assigned
Jarvis’ motion to a different judge, who denied it.

¶11 Jarvis timely appealed the court’s dismissal order and its
order denying his motion to disqualify. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const.
art. 6 § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Correctly Determined It Lacked Authority to
Proceed Once Defendants Removed Jarvis’ Case.

A. Defendants’ Removal Was Timely and Divested the
Superior Court of Jurisdiction Over Jarvis’ Case.

¶12 We review de novo whether removal complied with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446 and whether the superior court retained authority to proceed
because they are questions of law. See Tovrea Land and Cattle Co. v.
Linsenmeyer et al., 100 Ariz. 107, 114 (1966) (holding that the appellate court
is not bound by the conclusions of law made by the superior court); State v.
Dixon, 231 Ariz. 319, 320 ¶ 3 (App. 2013) (holding that subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo).

¶13 Jarvis argues Defendants’ removal of his case was untimely
under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(1), so the superior court erred by refusing to allow
his case to proceed. Defendants argue that upon removal, the superior
court lost jurisdiction unless and until the federal court remanded it.
Defendants are correct.

¶14 The record defeats Jarvis’ theory of untimely removal. He
claims he transmitted the summons and complaint to Defendants on March
7, 2025, while Defendants argue they received the summons, complaint,
and request to waive service by email on March 8 or 9, 2025 (according to
different filings in the record) which they executed and returned on April
7, 2025.

¶15 Regardless, Jarvis failed to file either Defendants’ signed
waiver or any proof of service with the court. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1)
(noting that a waiver of service must “be filed in the action”), (g)(1)
(providing that a “person effecting service must file proof of service with
the court”). Those omissions defeat Jarvis’ theory that removal was
untimely. That theory depends on a definite service date triggering the 30-
day removal clock in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(1), but none is present here. See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c)(4); 4.2(d)(4) (noting that when defendants execute
waivers of service, the rules of civil procedure “apply as if a summons and
the pleading being served had been served at the time of filing the waiver”
(emphasis added)).

¶16 Given that record, Defendants’ voluntary appearance on May
6, 2025, when they filed the Notice of Removal, was timely. A party can
waive objections to service and personal jurisdiction by appearing and

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JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

litigating in a manner inconsistent with preserving those defenses.
McMahan v. Grasshopper Trans. Inc., --- Ariz. ---, --- ¶¶ 23–24, 577 P.3d 468,
473 (App. 2025). Defendants’ voluntary appearance here “has the same
effect as a timely and valid service of process.” Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting Montano
v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978)).

¶17 Removal divested the superior court of authority to proceed.
Section 1446(d) provides that once a party serves and files their notice of
removal, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case
is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d). After that, the state court “los[es] all
jurisdiction over the case,” and any subsequent state-court orders issued
before remand are “absolutely void.” Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan,
P.R. v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 63–64 (2020) (quoting Kern v.
Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 (1881)). The superior court’s May 6, 2025
order, staying the case and explaining it would take no action until the
federal court remanded it, complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d).

¶18 Because the federal court did not remand the case, the
superior court never regained jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d);
Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. at 63–64. The court thus correctly concluded it
lacked the authority to proceed and properly terminated the matter.

B. Jarvis Fails to Establish Any Other Defect in Defendants’
Notice of Removal.

¶19 Jarvis also argues that removal was defective because there
was no unanimous consent to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(2)(A) and
because the Notice of Removal supposedly included a third party who was
not a plaintiff. These arguments lack merit.

¶20 First, Defendants correctly note that Jarvis offered no
explanation in his opening brief as to which defendant allegedly failed to
consent to removal. Because Jarvis fails to explain this argument, it is
waived. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452 ¶ 101 n.9 (2004) (failure to develop
argument generally results in abandonment and waiver of issue). His
belated attempt to explain this in his reply brief does not cure this waiver.
See VEREIT Real Est., LP v. Fitness Int’l, LLC, 255 Ariz. 147, 154 ¶ 23 (App.
2023).

¶21 Second, taking Jarvis’ argument to mean that the Notice of
Removal improperly included Huiqin Du, Defendants further note that Du
was properly included because Jarvis identified her as a co-plaintiff in his
initial complaint, even demanding a jury trial on her behalf. Defendants’

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JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

inclusion of Du in the Notice of Removal establishes no defect in the
removal.

C. Jarvis’ Argument That Lack of Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Should Have Defeated Removal Fails.

¶22 Jarvis also argues removal was improper because his
complaint asserted only state law claims. This argument fails for two
reasons.

¶23 First, as Defendants point out, upon removal, the state court
is divested of authority to proceed unless and until the case is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d). Thus, whether a case is removable and whether federal
subject matter jurisdiction exists are questions for the federal court. Stoll v.
Hawkeye Cas. Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 185 F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1950). Because
the federal court never remanded this case, the superior court properly
declined to address this argument.

¶24 Second, Jarvis’ complaint asserted multiple claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to -634,
including age discrimination, equal pay, and denial of a promotion. These
give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Hinkley v. Envoy Air, Inc., 968
F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that the federal court has jurisdiction
because the case arose under federal law, the ADEA). Thus, Jarvis’
argument likewise fails on the merits.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Jarvis’ Motion to Disqualify the Judicial Officer.

¶25 Lastly, Jarvis appeals the order denying his motion to
disqualify Judge Moss under A.R.S. § 12-409, contending the judge’s rulings
and comment reflected incompetence, bias, and hostility towards Jarvis as
a pro se litigant. Defendants respond that Jarvis’ allegations amount to
disagreement with the court’s decisions and do not establish judicial bias.
Defendants are correct.

¶26 We presume judges are free of bias and prejudice. State v.
Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 510 ¶ 11 (1999). The party seeking disqualification
bears the burden of establishing bias by a preponderance of the evidence
through specific, non-conclusory facts. See id. We review the denial of a
motion to disqualify for abuse of discretion. Matter of Cameron v. State ex
rel. Dep’t Econ. Sec., No. 1 CA-CV 23-0261 FC, 2024 WL 1113572, at *4 ¶ 19
(Ariz. App. Mar. 14, 2024) (mem. decision).

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JARVIS v. ASSA ABLOY, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶27 Jarvis’ arguments are conclusory and rest on disagreement
with the court’s legal rulings rather than facts demonstrating bias.
Additionally, his assertion of “incompetence” as an independent basis for
relief fails because incompetence is not a ground for disqualification under
A.R.S. § 12-409. Because Jarvis failed to present specific facts showing
hostility or a reasonable basis to question Judge Moss’ impartiality, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jarvis’ motion. See
State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 256 (1997) (finding that unfavorable rulings
are insufficient support for a claim that a judge is biased or prejudiced
against a party).

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm. Defendants request an award of their reasonable
attorneys’ fees, citing ARCAP 21, and their costs, citing A.R.S. § 12-341. But
ARCAP 21 “only establishes the procedure for claiming attorneys’ fees and
does not create any substantive right to them.” Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
21(a)(2). We thus deny Defendants’ request for fees, but grant them their
costs subject to their compliance with ARCAP 21. Jarvis requests that the
Court award him costs and sanction Defendants under ARCAP 25. We
deny Jarvis’ request for sanctions.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

7