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                  by Michael J. Brown](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10802561/state-v-guerrero/about:blank#o1)

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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Guerrero

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 25-0190

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (517)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Michael J. Brown](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6183/michael-j-brown/)

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL GUERRERO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0190
FILED 02-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-158455-002
The Honorable Suzanne Scheiner Marwil, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Cynthia Dawn Beck, Lindsay Ficklin
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph E. Begun, Kyla Padbury (Certified Limited Practice Student)
Counsel for Appellee
STATE v. GUERRERO
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Michael Guerrero appeals from his conviction
and resulting sentence for unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle.
He argues the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial after
one of the State’s witnesses violated a pretrial ruling. Because no
reasonable probability exists that the error influenced the jury’s verdict,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Around nine o’clock one evening, an officer driving a
marked patrol car noticed a black Honda Civic that had been identified as
part of armed robbery investigation. The officer followed the car, which
Guerrero was driving. Suddenly, Guerrero accelerated to more than 60
miles per hour in a residential area even though the speed limit was 30.
After activating the patrol car’s emergency lights and siren, the officer
pursued Guerrero for about two blocks, or approximately ten seconds.
Because a police helicopter was “overhead to continue surveillance on the
vehicle,” the officer slowed down and turned off the lights and siren with
the hope it would allow Guerrero to “slow down and create less of a risk
in [the] neighborhood.”

¶3 After a few blocks, Guerrero stopped the car, dropped off a
passenger, and resumed speeding. The helicopter maintained visual
contact as Guerrero entered a freeway, moving “much faster than the flow
of traffic, weaving in and out of traffic.” At some point he slowed down
to move with the flow of traffic and unmarked police vehicles followed at
a distance. After Guerrero had driven about ten miles and exited the
freeway, officers used a special device (grappler) to forcibly stop his car
and eventually took him into custody.

¶4 During an interview with a detective, post-Miranda
warnings, Guerrero admitted he noticed the police vehicle behind him,

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STATE v. GUERRERO
Decision of the Court

saw the lights, heard the siren, did not stop, and ran from the car after the
freeway chase. The State then charged Guerrero with willfully fleeing or
attempting to elude a pursuing marked law enforcement vehicle, a class 5
felony.

¶5 Before trial, Guerrero filed a motion in limine to prevent the
State from introducing evidence about the armed robbery. In his motion,
Guerrero alleged he drove his cousin to the store to buy diapers,
remaining in the car while his cousin was in the store. His cousin
returned to the car without diapers and they drove away. When his
cousin noticed a police vehicle following them, he aggressively demanded
that Guerrero “speed up, don’t stop” but did not tell Guerrero he
committed a robbery. Because Guerrero was not charged with armed
robbery, he asked the court to prevent the State from disclosing why the
police tried to pull him over. But he agreed the State’s witnesses could
testify that police officers pursued the Honda Civic as part of an
investigation. The trial court granted the motion.

¶6 The officer who first tried to stop Guerrero testified at trial.
Following his testimony, a juror submitted a question, asking, “why did
[the officer] follow the car in question?” The officer explained he followed
Guerrero because the car was “involved for the call that we were on.” The
court then instructed the jury that “given the elements of this charge, you
don’t need to concern yourselves with the reasons for the stop of the car in
question. You can be assured that the stop was lawful.”

¶7 The next day, a different officer who was involved in the
freeway chase testified that he was part of the Special Assignments Unit,
which is “tasked with apprehension of violent criminals [including]
homicide suspects, robbery suspects, kidnapping suspects.” No objection
was made. Several questions later, when asked why he responded to the
incident, the officer said that his “[u]nit was requested due to an armed
robbery investigation.” Defense counsel did not immediately object but
after several more questions were asked, none of which mentioned armed
robbery, defense counsel requested a bench conference and moved for a
mistrial based on the violation of the motion in limine. The trial court
denied the motion but offered to give a curative instruction to the jury.

¶8 The court then told the jury: “[Y]ou are charged with simply
evaluating what the defendant is charged with. You should not concern
yourself[,] for purposes of evaluating that charge[,] on the subject of the
investigation.” The final jury instructions included the following: “You
should not concern yourself with the reason for the law enforcement stop

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STATE v. GUERRERO
Decision of the Court

of the defendant. You should only consider whether the State has proven
the elements of the charged offense.”

¶9 The jury returned a guilty verdict and the trial court
sentenced Guerrero to two years’ imprisonment. Guerrero timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1) and
13-4031, -4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Guerrero argues the trial court erred by denying his mistrial
motion. He asserts the “violation of the motion in limine was so
prejudicial that it ultimately deprived him of a fair trial and thwarted
justice.” We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 142, ¶ 57 (2000).

¶11 When considering whether a mistrial is appropriate based
on a witness’s testimony, a court determines “(1) whether the testimony
called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in
considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the
circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” State
v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, ¶ 40 (2003).

¶12 As to prong one, Guerrero argues the second officer’s
reference to the armed robbery investigation called the jurors’ attention to
unnecessary information when determining whether the State proved the
elements of unlawful flight, infra ¶ 15. Guerrero also points to the juror
question on why the police followed the car, supra ¶ 6, to establish the
jurors’ interest in the reason for pursuit.

¶13 The trial court granted the motion in limine because the
court recognized that jurors would likely view armed robbery as a
dangerous and violent crime, which could negatively affect the jury’s
view of Guerrero. This was especially true given the testimony detailing
the extensive law enforcement response, including a high-speed chase in a
neighborhood, a helicopter, and a grappling device. The State did not
charge Guerrero with armed robbery, and Guerrero maintained that he
had no knowledge of the crime. Thus, any testimony connecting Guerrero
to the armed robbery investigation called the jurors’ attention to
inappropriate matters.

¶14 But Guerrero’s argument fails under the second prong of the
analysis—the probability that the improper testimony influenced the
jurors. See Lamar, 205 Ariz. at 439, ¶ 40. As stated in A.R.S. § 28-622.01, a

4
STATE v. GUERRERO
Decision of the Court

“driver of a motor vehicle who wilfully flees or attempts to elude a
pursuing official law enforcement vehicle is guilty” of unlawful flight if
the law enforcement vehicle is “appropriately marked to show that it is an
official law enforcement vehicle” and is being operated in accordance with
A.R.S. § 28-624(C). That section outlines that an authorized emergency
vehicle operated as a police vehicle must “sound[] an audible signal by
bell, siren or exhaust whistle” while in motion. A.R.S. § 28-624(C).

¶15 The State presented substantial evidence supporting each
element of the crime. Indeed, Guerrero admitted to law enforcement that
he was aware of the police vehicle behind him and heard the siren but did
not stop. He even admitted to seeing the vehicle’s emergency lights,
further showing he was aware of the pursuing law enforcement vehicle.
Given the strength of the evidence presented at trial, “there is no
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different,” State v.
Kleinman, 250 Ariz. 362, 365, ¶ 13 (App. 2020), had the officer avoided the
brief, but nonetheless improper, reference to an armed robbery
investigation.

¶16 On top of that, the trial court instructed the jurors twice that
they need not concern themselves with the reason for the pursuit. The
court explained the stop was lawful, and they should only consider
whether the State proved the elements of unlawful flight. The court also
included a limiting instruction in the final jury instructions. We presume
that juries follow curative instructions, State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 571,
¶ 48 (2003), and limiting instructions, State v. Prince, 204 Ariz. 156, 158,
¶¶ 7–9 (2003). The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Guerrero’s motion for mistrial.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm Guerrero’s conviction and sentence.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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