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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Handy v. Shaw

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 25-0461 FC

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

                        by Andrew M. Jacobs

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CEDRIC HANDY, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

BRITTANI SHAW, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0461 FC

FILED 03-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2018-071435
The Honorable David W. Garbarino, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Connelly Law Office PLLC, Mesa
By Lawton Connelly
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Respondent Brittani Shaw (“Mother”) appeals the superior
court’s order denying her petitions seeking to modify legal decision-
making and parenting time. That order left in place the court’s prior order
awarding Cedric Handy (“Father”) sole legal decision-making authority for
their child B.H. (“Child”), restricting Mother’s parenting time to supervised
therapeutic visits, and barring Mother from Child’s school. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Mother and Father Trade Abuse Allegations and Share
Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time as to Child.

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of Child, born in March
2018. They did not marry, and a custody dispute ensued. During it, each
party alleged the other parent abused Child, but the court found that
neither parent had presented evidence of abuse. While continuing to claim
Father abused Child, Mother requested an equal parenting time
arrangement. In June 2023, the court awarded the parties joint legal
decision-making and equal parenting time.

¶3 Shortly after the June 2023 order, Mother again alleged that
Father abused Child. On June 27, 2023, the Department of Child Safety
(DCS) removed Child from Mother’s care because of suspicion Mother
abused Child as part of fabricating her own abuse allegations.

B. The Court Grants Father Sole Legal Decision-Making and
Greatly Restricts Mother’s Parenting Time After Finding
Mother Abused Child, Manufactured Evidence of Abuse,
and Made False Allegations Against Father.

¶4 Two days after DCS removed Child from Mother’s care, on
June 29, 2023, Father petitioned to modify legal decision-making and
parenting time. The court held an evidentiary hearing on February 21, 2024
and, on March 11, 2024, issued an order granting Father the relief he sought,
making detailed findings.

¶5 First, the court found Mother abused Child and made false
allegations that Father had abused him. The court concluded that these
facts were a significant and continuing change in circumstances materially
affecting Child’s welfare that could justify modifying its prior legal
decision-making and parenting time order.

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HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶6 Second, the court considered whether a modification of legal
decision-making and parenting time was in Child’s best interests, as A.R.S.
§ 25-403 requires. The court made detailed findings as to Mother’s
treatment of Child, including that Mother: (1) “has committed acts of child
abuse against the [C]hild to manufacture evidence of abuse by Father”; (2)
“had the [C]hild forensically interviewed no less than three times regarding
[the] allegations of abuse”; and (3) presented Child to Phoenix Children’s
Hospital for a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner examination, “claiming that
Father had anally penetrated the [C]hild and choked him,” even though all
evidence during the relevant periods showed that Father was never left
alone with Child.

¶7 The court rested its analysis in part on DCS’ support for the
conclusion that Mother abused Child and that it would be against Child’s
best interests for Child to remain with Mother. The court noted “DCS
believed that Mother was in fact responsible for manufacturing the
evidence of abuse and that she was the individual who physically assaulted
the child,” and that DCS “proposed substantiating the abuse allegations
against Mother.” The court also found Mother’s actions contributed to
Child suffering from night terrors for two months and that Mother had
alleged abuse in Child’s presence, resulting in concerns that Child was
echoing those allegations during interviews. The court determined this
conduct reflected a pattern of attempting to restrict or eliminate Father’s
parenting time rather than promote Child’s welfare.

¶8 Mother presented evidence of her mental-health evaluation,
which the court cited in reaching its conclusions about Mother’s treatment
of Child. The court noted that: (1) the evaluator did not contact Father and
appeared unaware that Child had been removed from Mother’s care by
DCS; (2) Mother told the evaluator that the court removed Child because
the court “does not like [her]”; and (3) Mother continued to make false
allegations against Father and, “[d]espite [] clear evidence to the contrary,”
“insist[ed] she was not the person who abused the [C]hild.”

¶9 Meanwhile, the court found Child adjusted well in Father’s
care. Since residing with Father, Child no longer experienced enuresis
issues or terrors. Child attended school, enrolled in guitar lessons and
karate, and, despite some difficulty with math and reading, met his
kindergarten benchmarks. The court further found Father was more likely
to facilitate frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the other
parent.

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HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶10 Given these findings, the court awarded Father sole legal
decision-making authority, restricted Mother’s parenting time to four hours
per week of supervised therapeutic visits, and barred Mother from
exercising visitation at Child’s school or being present on campus, which it
found necessary to protect Child’s physical and emotional welfare. Finally,
“[f]or the Court to consider lifting the supervision requirement,” it required
Mother to “engage in therapy with a forensically informed therapist who
shall be provided with the DCS reports,” the Best Interests Assessment,
Court-Appointed Advisor materials, Mother’s psychological evaluation,
and the court’s orders.

C. The Court Denies Mother’s Petitions to Modify the March
2024 Order.

¶11 In July 2024, Mother petitioned the court to modify the order
requiring the therapeutic supervised parenting time, arguing that she had
discharged her obligations under the March 2024 order by engaging with a
forensically informed therapist. In November 2024, Mother petitioned the
court to modify legal decision-making, arguing Father was not meeting
Child’s medical and educational needs, had ongoing housing instability,
and was not communicating through the court-ordered co-parenting
application.

¶12 The court held an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petitions.
Mother appeared with counsel and presented testimony from her
forensically informed therapist and the therapeutic supervisor. Father did
not appear at the hearing. The court noted Father’s absence and later
admonished him for failing to appear.

¶13 The court denied Mother’s requests in an under advisement
ruling, finding Mother had not demonstrated a material change in
circumstances affecting Child’s welfare as to warrant modifying the March
2024 order. The court found that the testimony and reports from Mother’s
forensically informed therapist did not explain or reconcile the court’s prior
findings that Mother had abused Child to fabricate allegations against
Father, and that Mother continued to deny wrongdoing. The court
concluded that these deficiencies did not provide the needed assurance that
Mother no longer endangered Child or that she would comply with
parenting time restrictions.

¶14 Considering the A.R.S. § 25-403(A) best-interests factors, the
court found several factors neutral and others weighing against
modification. The court repeatedly concluded that the credible evidence

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HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

did not establish a material change warranting relief. The court expressed
concern about Child’s medical needs and noted Father’s failure to appear
to update the court, admonishing Father. The court nonetheless found that
any concerns as to Father did not outweigh its concerns regarding Mother’s
mental health and the abuse-related findings underlying the March 2024
order.

¶15 The court thus denied both petitions, leaving the March 2024
order in place. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const.
art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶16 Father did not file an answering brief. When an appellee fails
to file an answering brief, we may treat the failure to respond as a
confession of error. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966).
However, we do not apply that rule mechanically when a child’s best
interests are at issue. See Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We
have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is paramount in
custody determinations.”); see Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. at 85. Because this
appeal concerns parenting time and legal decision-making determinations
that affect Child’s best interests, we decline to treat Father’s failure to file
an answering brief as a confession of error and address the merits of
Mother’s appeal.

I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Modification
Based on Mother’s Therapeutic Evidence.

¶17 Mother argues the court abused its discretion by
conditioning modification on her admission to past conduct and
improperly reapplying findings in the March 2024 order. We disagree.

¶18 As an initial matter, Mother’s framing — that the court
improperly considered facts it found in March 2024 — misconceives the
court’s role in considering petitions to modify legal decision-making or
parenting time. The court must determine “whether there has been a
change of circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child.”
Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343 ¶ 14 (App. 2020) (quoting Black
v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1997)). That inquiry necessarily requires
measuring the present against the past — in this case, the facts the court
found in March 2024. If the court finds such a change of circumstance, the
court will then consider whether modification is in the child’s best interests.
Id. We review the court’s ruling on these questions for abuse of discretion.
Id.

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HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶19 The March 2024 order imposed therapeutic supervision based
on findings that Mother abused Child to manufacture evidence of abuse
against Father and persisted in false allegations despite contrary evidence.
Those findings formed the basis for the restrictions on Mother’s parenting
rights. For the court to remove these restrictions requires Mother to
demonstrate a change of circumstance that affects the welfare of Child —
which, here, could have been demonstrating that the facts found in March
2024 were untrue, or could have been demonstrating that Mother had
accepted responsibility for the wrongs those facts embody.

¶20 The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Mother
did neither. Mother complains the court created “an impossible catch-22
by conditioning modification on Mother’s willingness to confess to the very
conduct she denies.” But the court properly suggested a way Mother could
demonstrate a change in circumstances that could show Child would be
safe with her. The record shows the court did not demand a confession. To
the contrary, the court confirmed that Mother’s forensically informed
therapist had reviewed the DCS reports, the Best Interests Assessment and
Court-Appointed Advisor materials, and Mother’s psychological
evaluation. The court probed the discrepancy between those materials,
each documenting findings of abuse, and the therapist’s opinion that
Mother posed no current risk to Child. When asked whether Mother
denied the conduct described in those materials, the therapist ultimately
confirmed that she did. The court had to consider whether Mother’s
continued denial undermined the probative value of the therapeutic
opinions offered to show a material change in circumstances. We see no
abuse of discretion in its resolution of that question.

¶21 In denying Mother’s petition, the court reasoned that
Mother’s therapeutic evidence did not explain or reconcile its prior findings
with Mother’s current mental state. The court observed that Mother
“seemingly continues to deny that she engaged in any wrongdoing against
the Child.” The court found that the therapist’s testimony did not “explain
the purported transformation of Mother’s mental health from someone who
abused the Child for the purpose of limiting Father’s parenting time to
someone who is safe to be with the Child unsupervised.” Given its view of
the totality of the case’s record, the court did not abuse its discretion by
finding the therapist’s opinions “[did] not give the Court any comfort
Mother is not a danger to the Child or that Mother is likely to honor the
Court’s orders.” See Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 523 ¶ 14 (1999) (holding
that the “primary task” for a trial court is to weigh the evidence and
consider all the circumstances to determine whether modification is
warranted).

6
HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶22 Mother’s suggestion that the court should not consider facts
already found is incorrect as a matter of law. Once a change in
circumstances is alleged, Mother’s parenting capabilities should not be
assessed “in a vacuum.” See Hendricks v. Mortensen, 153 Ariz. 241, 244 (App.
1987) (quoting Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 180 (1982)). To the
contrary, the court may consider prior circumstances to evaluate the
present risk and Child’s best interests. See id. That’s what the court did
here, given its earlier findings of abuse. Where a prior order rests on
findings of child abuse, a parent’s continued denial of that conduct bears
on the court’s assessment of the parent’s insight, ability to mitigate risk, and
likelihood of future compliance with the court’s orders. See In re Pima Cnty.
Juv. Dependency Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601, 604 (App. 1990) (explaining
in a dependency action that parents’ present denial of responsibility for past
abuse and neglect supports a finding they are not “presently willing to or
capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control”); see
Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 51 ¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2016)
(holding in dependency that “domestic violence need not be continuous or
actively occurring” if it remains substantiated and unresolved,
“particularly” where the parent denies the conduct). For these reasons, the
court acted within its discretion in finding that Mother failed to
demonstrate a material change in circumstances affecting the Child’s
welfare. Because the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Mother’s therapeutic evidence did not justify modifying the March 2024
order, we see no error.

II. The Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Prohibiting Mother’s
Presence on Child’s School Campus.

¶23 Mother argues the order prohibiting her presence on Child’s
school campus violates her fundamental right to direct Child’s education
under the Fourteenth Amendment and A.R.S. § 1-602(A)(1). We disagree.

¶24 Although parents possess a fundamental liberty interest “in
the care, custody, and management of their children,” that right is not
absolute. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97 ¶ 7 (App.
2016). Those rights may be limited where it is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest, including preventing a child’s physical
endangerment or significant emotional impairment. Paul E. v. Courtney F.,
246 Ariz. 388, 394 ¶ 22 (2019).

¶25 The court imposed the school restriction in conjunction with
the award of sole legal decision-making authority to Father under A.R.S.
§ 25-401(3), including exclusive authority over educational decisions, and

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HANDY v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

as part of a broader protective framework grounded in prior findings that
Mother abused Child and fabricated allegations of abuse. Consistent with
that authority and those findings, the court directed that its order
containing the school restriction be provided to Child’s school, that Child
not be released to Mother or her designees, and that Mother not be present
on campus.

¶26 Here, the court determined Mother had abused Child and
that her exercise of physical control over Child exposed Child to danger
and injury. That is a compelling interest that justifies limiting Mother’s
custodial rights. Paul E., 246 Ariz. at 394 ¶ 22. Because the court’s findings
show the compelling state interest in protecting Child’s physical and
emotional well-being, and evidence supports that finding, the court did not
abuse its discretion or violate Mother’s constitutional rights. See id. at 394–
95, 397 ¶¶ 20, 22, 35.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm. Mother requests an award of attorneys’ fees under
A.R.S. § 25-324. Father prevailed, so we deny her request.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

8