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Feb. 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v Robinson

Michigan Supreme Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 167595

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus
Chief Justice: Justices:
Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong

PEOPLE v ROBINSON

Docket No. 167595. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 9, 2025. Decided
February 4, 2026.

In 2013, a jury convicted defendant, Todd D. Robinson, of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, after a judge in the Jackson Circuit Court, acting as a one-person
grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, filed a two-count indictment against him. Before
trial, defendant had unsuccessfully moved the trial court to either hold a preliminary examination
or quash the information. Defendant’s direct appeal of his convictions failed, as did his first motion
for relief from judgment. After the decision in People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022)—which
held that a defendant charged under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 is entitled to a preliminary
examination and that these statutes do not authorize a judge serving as a one-person grand jury to
issue a criminal indictment—defendant filed a second motion for relief from judgment in the
Jackson Circuit Court, asserting that Peeler applied retroactively and that it entitled him to relief.
Defendant also argued that because his indictment was invalid under Peeler, the circuit court never
obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over his case and his convictions were therefore void. The
trial court, Thomas D. Wilson, J., denied the motion, ruling that Peeler does not apply retroactively
and that, even if it did, defendant could not establish prejudice as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)
because the jury convicted him after a fair trial. The Court of Appeals, CAMERON, P.J., and N. P.
HOOD and YOUNG, JJ., affirmed in a published opinion, holding that although defendant’s
indictment violated the principles expressed in Peeler, that decision did not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction, announce a new rule of law, or apply retroactively on collateral review. ___
Mich App ___ (June 13, 2024) (Docket No. 365226). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the
Supreme Court, which ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address
(1) whether the initiation of this case by an indictment filed by a judge acting as a one-person
grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 without conducting a preliminary examination,
contrary to Peeler, deprived the Jackson Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered
the indictment void ab initio; (2) whether Peeler clearly established a new principle of law; (3) if
Peeler clearly established a new principle of law, whether Peeler applies retroactively to cases
pending on collateral review; and (4) whether defendant was entitled to relief from judgment under
MCR 6.502(G) and MCR 6.508(D). ___ Mich ___; 14 NW3d 429 (2024).
In a unanimous opinion by Justice WELCH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, held:

Under Peeler, a judge sitting as a one-person grand jury pursuant to MCL 767.3 and MCL
767.4 may not issue a criminal indictment, and a defendant may not be charged under this statutory
scheme without a preliminary examination. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Peeler
does not apply retroactively on collateral review and that violations of Peeler’s holdings do not
implicate a circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and it therefore did not err by affirming the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment. However, the panel
erred by concluding that Peeler did not announce a new rule of law. Accordingly, this aspect of
the panel’s decision was vacated, and the Court of Appeals judgment was affirmed on alternative
grounds.

1. Under MCR 6.502(G)(2), subsequent motions for relief from judgment are generally
   prohibited unless an exception applies, such as a claim of new evidence or a retroactive change in
   law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment was filed, or the trial court lacked
   subject-matter jurisdiction over the trial.

2. MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 constitute a statutory scheme commonly known as the
   “one-man grand jury law,” which authorizes judges conducting criminal inquiries to subpoena
   witnesses and issue arrest warrants. Although the law does not state that a judge sitting as a one-
   person grand jury may issue an indictment, judges sometimes did so without providing defendants
   with a preliminary examination. Peeler ended that practice by holding that a defendant subjected
   to a one-person grand jury is entitled to a preliminary examination before proceeding to trial and
   that a judge may not issue a criminal indictment under the one-man grand jury law. Peeler did not
   address subject-matter jurisdiction or whether it would apply retroactively on collateral review.

3. Peeler did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the
   right of the court to exercise jurisdiction over a class of cases, and it is therefore not dependent on
   the particular facts of the case but rather on the character or class of the case pending. For that
   reason, although an improper charging document might implicate a circuit court’s in personam
   jurisdiction over a defendant, it does not implicate a circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It
   was undisputed that defendant’s case was a criminal matter, and it was similarly undisputed that
   circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over that class of cases. Accordingly, the fact that
   the charging procedure was erroneous did not implicate the circuit court’s subject-matter
   jurisdiction over the case, nor, for similar reasons, did the lack of a preliminary examination strip
   the circuit court of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

4. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Peeler does not apply retroactively on collateral
   review under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a), but it erred by concluding that Peeler did not announce a new
   rule of law. As a general matter, judicial decisions that express new rules are not applied
   retroactively to other cases that have become final. A rule of law is considered new either when
   an established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first impression is decided that was not
   adumbrated by an earlier appellate decision—in other words, when the result was not dictated by
   precedent existing when the defendant’s conviction became final. Peeler established a new rule
   of law because it ended the existing and judicially accepted practice of allowing one-person grand
   juries to issue indictments, because it decided this issue as a matter of first impression, and because
   no existing precedent dictated that the trial court in Peeler reject the legitimacy of the indictment.
   Accordingly, under the federal test, Peeler was presumed not to apply retroactively unless it
   constituted a new substantive rule of constitutional law, which it did not: Peeler’s rule was not
   substantive because it concerned the process of getting to trial and the manner of determining a
   defendant’s culpability rather than categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal
   laws and punishment beyond the state’s power to impose, and it was not constitutional in nature
   but rather statutory. To determine whether a decision applies retroactively under the state test, a
   court considers the factors set forth in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965), and adopted in
   People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669 (1971): (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance
   on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice. The Linkletter-Hampton factors
   weighed against Peeler’s retroactive application because (1) Peeler concerns the process of getting
   to trial, not the fairness of the trial itself; (2) it was undisputed that, before Peeler, prosecutors and
   judges relied on the assumption that the one-man grand jury law allowed judges to issue criminal
   indictments; and (3) the practice appeared to have been used with some regularity over many
   decades in some courts, and calling the resulting convictions into question when they resulted from
   fair trials that applied the most stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would unnecessarily
   hinder the administration of justice in Michigan. Accordingly, the Linkletter-Hampton factors did
   not support applying Peeler retroactively on collateral review.

Court of Appeals judgment affirmed in part on alternative grounds and vacated in part.

Justice HOOD did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel that issued
the decision under review.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

OPINION
Chief Justice: Justices:
Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood

FILED February 4, 2026

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 167595

TODD DOUGLAS ROBINSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except HOOD, J.)

WELCH, J.
The so-called “one-man grand jury law,” MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, authorizes

judges to investigate criminal offenses, subpoena witnesses, and issue arrest warrants. In

People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381, 394; 984 NW2d 80 (2022), we held that defendants charged

under the one-man grand jury law are entitled to a preliminary examination. We also held

that a judge serving as a one-person grand jury may not issue a criminal indictment. Id. at

1. The questions in this appeal are whether the errors we addressed in Peeler implicate a circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and whether Peeler applies retroactively on

collateral review.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the answer to both questions is no. We

disagree, however, with the panel’s conclusion that Peeler did not announce a new rule of

law. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on alternative grounds, and

we vacate the aspects of the panel’s analysis that are inconsistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2012, a circuit judge acting as a one-person grand jury filed an indictment that

charged defendant Todd Douglas Robinson with open murder, MCL 750.318, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL

750.227b. Defendant moved the trial court to hold a preliminary examination or,

alternatively, to quash the information. The trial court denied that motion, and the jury

convicted defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and

felony-firearm. Defendant’s direct appeal failed, as did his first motion for relief from

judgment.

After we issued our opinion in Peeler, defendant filed the instant motion for relief

from judgment, which is his second. Through that motion, defendant asserted that Peeler

applied retroactively and that it entitled him to relief. Defendant also argued that because

his indictment was invalid under Peeler, the circuit court never obtained subject-matter

jurisdiction over his case. As a result, defendant argued, his convictions are null and void.

The trial court denied the motion and held that Peeler does not apply retroactively.

Even if it did, the trial court reasoned, defendant could not establish prejudice because the

2
jury convicted defendant after a fair trial. See MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b) (requiring a defendant

seeking relief from judgment to establish that the alleged irregularities resulted in

prejudice). The trial court did not address defendant’s arguments concerning subject-

matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. People v Robinson, ___

Mich App __; __ NW3d ___ (June 13, 2024) (Docket No. 365226). The panel held that

although defendant’s indictment violated the principles expressed in Peeler, (1) Peeler

does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, and (2) Peeler does not apply retroactively

on collateral review. In reaching the latter holding, the panel held that Peeler did not

announce a new rule of law. Defendant then applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

We ordered oral argument on the application. Our order directed the parties to

address:

(1) whether the initiation of this case by an indictment filed by a judge acting
as a one-man grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, and without a
preliminary examination, contrary to People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022),
deprived the Jackson Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and
rendered the indictment void ab initio; (2) whether Peeler “ ‘clearly
establishe[d] a new principle of law;’ ” League of Women Voters v Sec’y of
State, 508 Mich 520, 565 (2022), quoting Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465
Mich 675, 696 (2002); (3) if Peeler clearly established a new principle of
law, whether Peeler applies retroactively to cases pending on collateral
review; and (4) whether the defendant is entitled to relief from judgment
under MCR 6.502(G) and MCR 6.508(D). [People v Robinson, ___ Mich
__, __; 14 NW3d 429, 429 (2024).]

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse

of discretion. People v Christian, 510 Mich 52, 74; 987 NW2d 29 (2022). A trial court

3
abuses its discretion when it “makes a decision that falls outside the range of reasonable

and principled outcomes or makes an error of law.” Id. at 75 (quotation marks and citations

omitted). We review de novo whether a trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over

a defendant’s trial. People v Washington, 508 Mich 107, 121; 972 NW2d 767 (2021).

Finally, whether a judicial opinion applies retroactively is a question of law that we review

de novo. People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385, 387; 759 NW2d 817 (2008).

B. PROCEDURAL BAR

Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his second motion for relief from

judgment. Our rules generally prohibit second or subsequent motions for relief from

judgment. See MCR 6.502(G)(2). There are, however, exceptions to that bar. A defendant

may file a second or subsequent motion for relief from judgment based upon:

(a) a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for
relief from judgment was filed,

(b) a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first
such motion was filed, or

(c) a final court order vacating one or more of the defendant’s
convictions either described in the judgment from which the defendant is
seeking relief or upon which the judgment was based. [MCR 6.502(G)(2). 1]

A court may waive the provisions of MCR 6.502(G)(2), however, “if it concludes that there

is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of the crime.” Id. Finally, the bar

1
Although not relevant here, we note that the third exception was adopted shortly before
the trial court entered the order at issue in this case and had not yet become effective. See
Amendment of Rule 6.502, 510 Mich cxxxi, cxxxii (2022) (adopting MCR 6.502(G)(2)(c)
effective January 1, 2023).

4
against successive motions for relief from judgment does not apply if a trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over the trial. Washington, 508 Mich at 131.

C. THE ONE-MAN GRAND JURY LAW

“Enacted in 1917, MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 are part of a statutory scheme that

quickly became known as the ‘one man grand jury’ law.” Peeler, 509 Mich at 389, citing

People v Doe, 226 Mich 5, 6; 196 NW 757 (1924). The law authorizes judges conducting

criminal inquiries to subpoena witnesses and issue arrest warrants. See MCL 767.3 and

MCL 767.4. Despite the law’s nickname, however, the governing statutes do not state that

a judge sitting as a one-person grand jury may issue an indictment. Peeler, 509 Mich at

1. Nevertheless, for many years, “the power of a judge conducting an inquiry to issue

an indictment was simply an unchallenged assumption . . . .” Id. at 399. Based upon that

assumption, Michigan judges acting under the one-man grand jury law sometimes issued

indictments without providing defendants with a preliminary examination. See id.

Peeler ended that practice. As explained earlier, Peeler held that (1) defendants

subjected to a one-person grand jury are entitled to a preliminary examination before

proceeding to trial and (2) a judge may not issue a criminal indictment under the one-man

grand jury law. Id. at 400. Relevant to this appeal, Peeler never mentions subject-matter

jurisdiction, nor does it address whether it would apply retroactively on collateral review.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that because his indictment was improper under Peeler, the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. The parties also discuss whether

Peeler applies retroactively on collateral review. If either issue is resolved in defendant’s

5
favor, he would clear the procedural bar against successive motions for relief from

judgment. See MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a); Washington, 508 Mich at 131. We address both

issues in turn.

A. WHETHER PEELER IMPLICATES SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal term of art that concerns a court’s authority to

hear and determine a case.” Washington, 508 Mich at 121, citing Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich

23, 36; 490 NW2d 568 (1992). If a circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a

trial, any subsequent judgment is void ab initio. Washington, 508 Mich at 129-130. That

rule applies on a successive motion for relief from judgment. Id. at 131. A judgment is

not void, however, when there are jurisdictional or procedural issues that do not implicate

subject-matter jurisdiction. People v Scott, 513 Mich 180, 212; 15 NW3d 159 (2024). The

dispositive issue, therefore, is whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over

defendant’s trial. If it did not, then defendant’s conviction would be void ab initio.

Washington, 508 Mich at 129-130.

Michigan courts do not have inherent subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 121.

Instead, the courts derive subject-matter jurisdiction “from our constitutional and statutory

provisions.” Id. Our Constitution gives circuit courts “original jurisdiction in all matters

not prohibited by law[.]” Const 1963, art 6, § 13. In addition, MCL 600.601 provides:

(1) The circuit court has the power and jurisdiction that is any of the
following:

(a) Possessed by courts of record at the common law, as altered by the
state constitution of 1963, the laws of this state, and the rules of the supreme
court.

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(b) Possessed by courts and judges in chancery in England on
March 1, 1847, as altered by the state constitution of 1963, the laws of this
state, and the rules of the supreme court.

(c) Prescribed by the rules of the supreme court.

Based upon these constitutional and statutory provisions, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is

presumed unless expressly denied by constitution or statute.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich

442, 458; 579 NW2d 868 (1998), citing Bowie, 441 Mich at 38.

Of particular relevance to this case is the fact that subject-matter jurisdiction “is the

right of the court to exercise jurisdiction over a class of cases, such as criminal cases.”

Goecke, 457 Mich at 458 (emphasis added). Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction “is ‘not

dependent on the particular facts of the case’ but, instead, is dependent on the character or

class of the case pending.” Washington, 508 Mich at 121, quoting People v Lown, 488

Mich 242, 268; 794 NW2d 9 (2011) (emphasis added). For that reason, improper charging

documents do not implicate a circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Goecke, 457 Mich

at 458-459. See also In re Elliott, 315 Mich 662, 675; 24 NW2d 528 (1946). After all,

improper charging documents do not affect whether a circuit court has the right to exercise

jurisdiction over criminal cases generally. Instead, an improper charging document may

implicate a circuit court’s in personam jurisdiction over a defendant. 2 Goecke, 457 Mich

at 459.

2
As our cases have made clear, a circuit court’s jurisdiction remains “limited to [the
offenses] specified in the return made by the examining magistrate.” People v Curtis, 389
Mich 698, 708; 209 NW2d 243 (1973), citing People v Evans, 72 Mich 367; 40 NW 473
(1888). See also People v Dochstader, 274 Mich 238, 244-245; 264 NW 356 (1936). Our
holding today does nothing to disturb this settled precedent.

7
With those principles in mind, we hold that a Peeler violation does not implicate a

circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It is undisputed that defendant’s case was a

criminal matter, and it is similarly undisputed that circuit courts have subject-matter

jurisdiction over that “class of cases.” Goecke, 457 Mich at 458. The fact that the charging

procedure was erroneous thus did not implicate the circuit court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 458-459. For similar reasons, the lack of a preliminary

examination did not strip the circuit court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

B. WHETHER PEELER APPLIES RETROACTIVELY ON COLLATERAL REVIEW

Jurisdiction aside, the Court of Appeals also held that Peeler does not apply

retroactively on collateral review under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a). We agree with this

conclusion, albeit on different grounds.

As a general matter, “judicial decisions which express new rules normally are not

applied retroactively to other cases that have become final.” People v Barnes, 502 Mich

265, 268; 917 NW2d 577 (2018). When determining whether an opinion applies

retroactively, therefore, the Court must first consider the “threshold question” of whether

that “decision amounts to a new rule of law.” League of Women Voters v Secretary of

State, 508 Mich 520, 566; 975 NW2d 840 (2022).

“ ‘A rule of law is new for purposes of resolving the question of its retroactive

application . . . either when an established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first

impression is decided which was not adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.’ ” Id.,

quoting People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 68; 330 NW2d 366 (1982) (ellipsis in League of

8
Women Voters). Put another way, “ ‘a case announces a new rule if the result was not

dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’ ”

People v Walker, 328 Mich App 429, 438; 938 NW2d 31 (2019), quoting Chaidez v United

States, 568 US 342, 347; 133 S Ct 1103, 185 L Ed 2d 149 (2013).

The Court of Appeals held that Peeler did not announce a new rule of law. We

disagree. First, Peeler unquestionably ended the existing and judicially accepted practice

of allowing one-person grand juries to issue indictments. See Peeler, 509 Mich at 399 (“It

seems that the power of a judge conducting an inquiry to issue an indictment was simply

an unchallenged assumption, until now.”) (emphasis added). Second, Peeler decided “ ‘an

issue of first impression . . . which was not adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.’ ”

League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 566, quoting Phillips, 416 Mich at 68. Until Peeler,

no appellate court had ruled on whether the one-man grand jury law allowed judges to issue

indictments. Finally, no existing precedent dictated that the trial court in Peeler reject the

legitimacy of the indictment. See Walker, 328 Mich App at 438.

Because Peeler established a new rule of law, we presume that it does not apply

retroactively. See Barnes, 502 Mich at 268. But our inquiry does not end there. The

United States Supreme Court has explained that “courts must give retroactive effect to new

substantive rules of constitutional law.” Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190, 198; 136

S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). See also Barnes, 502 Mich at 271-272. We must

therefore determine whether Peeler announced a new substantive rule of constitutional

law. 3 “Substantive rules include ‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary

3
Until 2021, United States Supreme Court precedent provided two exceptions to the
presumption against retroactivity: (1) opinions announcing a new substantive rule of

9
conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of

defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Montgomery, 577 US at 198, quoting

Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 330; 109 S Ct 2934; 106 L Ed 2d 256 (1989).

Peeler did not announce a new substantive rule of constitutional law. First, Peeler

concerned the process of getting to trial. Peeler, 509 Mich at 400. It did not concern

“ ‘categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishment

altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.’ ” People v Poole, ___ Mich __, _; __

NW3d ___ (January 22, 2025) (Docket No. 166813); slip op at 10, quoting Montgomery,

577 US at 201. Instead, Peeler regulated “ ‘the manner of determining [a] defendant’s

culpability.’ ” Id. at ___; slip op at 10, quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 201. Second, our

holding in Peeler was “statutory,” not constitutional. Peeler, 509 Mich at 400.

Consequently, the federal test does not demand retroactive application of Peeler.

Having determined that Peeler does not apply retroactively under the federal

retroactivity test for new rules, we “must also consider whether [the opinion] applies

retroactively on state-law grounds.” Barnes, 502 Mich at 273. To do so, we apply the

Linkletter-Hampton factors. See id. at 273 n 5; Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 6. See

also People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669; 187 NW2d 404 (1971); Linkletter v Walker, 381

US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965). Those factors are: “ ‘(1) the purpose of the

constitutional law, and (2) opinions announcing “a ‘watershed rule’ of criminal procedure.”
Barnes, 502 Mich at 271, quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 198. In Edwards v Vannoy, 593
US 255, 272; 141 S Ct 1547; 209 L Ed 2d 651 (2021), however, the Supreme Court
eliminated the “watershed rule” exception from the federal test.

10
new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration

of justice.’ ” Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 4, quoting Hampton, 384 Mich at 674.

The Linkletter-Hampton factors weigh against Peeler’s retroactive application.

With respect to the purpose of the new rule, as explained earlier, Peeler concerns the

process of getting to trial, not the fairness of the trial itself. See generally Peeler, 509 Mich

1. Because the rule’s purpose is unrelated to the fairness of a trial, the first Linkletter-

Hampton factor does not favor retroactive application. See Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip

op at 4. With respect to the general reliance on the old rule, it is undisputed that before

Peeler, prosecutors and judges relied upon the “unchallenged assumption” that the one-

man grand jury law allowed judges to issue criminal indictments. Peeler, 509 Mich at 399.

See also id. at 393-394. The second Linkletter-Hampton factor therefore weighs against

Peeler’s retroactive application. See Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 4. Finally, although

the exact number of defendants subjected to the errors identified in Peeler is unknown, the

practice appears to have been used with some regularity over many decades in some courts.

Calling into question convictions in numerous cases in which defendants were convicted

following a fair trial under the most stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would

therefore hinder unnecessarily the administration of justice in Michigan. For that reason,

the third Linkletter-Hampton factor also weighs against Peeler’s retroactive application.

Thus, the Linkletter-Hampton factors do not support applying Peeler retroactively on

collateral review.

11
IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that a Peeler error does not implicate a circuit court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction and that Peeler does not apply retroactively on collateral review. Accordingly,

we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s

second motion for relief from judgment. However, we vacate the Court of Appeals’

analysis holding that Peeler did not announce a new rule of law.

Elizabeth M. Welch
Megan K. Cavanagh
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas

HOOD, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel that
issued the decision under review.

12