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Feb. 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ajaylan M Shabazz v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25S-CR-00183
• Panel: Mark S. Massa, Loretta H. Rush
• Judges: Molter, Goff, Slaughter, Massa, Rush

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (21.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by [Loretta H. Rush](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/4347/loretta-h-rush/)

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 25S‐CR‐183
FILED
Ajaylan M. Shabazz, Feb 23 2026, 1:37 pm

Appellant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

–v–

State of Indiana,
Appellee

Argued: September 30, 2025 | Decided: February 23, 2026

Appeal from the Allen Superior Court
No. 02D06‐2111‐MR‐20
The Honorable David Zent, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
No. 24A‐CR‐909

Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Rush, Chief Justice.

Remote court proceedings became commonplace during the COVID‐19
pandemic, and that forced experiment revealed several advantages, such
as increased access, efficiency, and flexibility. But when testimony is
involved, remote proceedings can pose heightened risks to individual
rights. With those risks in mind, Interim Administrative Rule 14(C) makes
clear that no part of a testimonial proceeding can occur remotely unless
the proponent shows good cause and the proceeding complies with
constitutional guarantees. This case tests those limits in a criminal trial.

Here, the State asked the court to allow a witness in a murder trial to
testify remotely, representing that he was incarcerated four hours away
and that the county jail lacked the resources to transport him. Over the
defendant’s objection, the court granted the request. The witness testified
virtually and implicated the defendant in the murder. After the jury
returned a guilty verdict, the defendant asserted on appeal that the court
erred in permitting the testimony because the State failed to show good
cause.

We agree and take this opportunity to set forth the standard for good
cause under Interim Rule 14(C) when the State seeks to present remote
testimony in a criminal trial. In these circumstances, the State must
present case‐specific evidence that permitting a particular witness to
testify remotely is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm
that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately
addressed if the witness were to testify in person. Because the State failed
to make that showing here, we hold that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the witness to testify virtually. But because we hold
the error was harmless, we affirm.1

1We held oral argument at Hanover College. We thank the college for its hospitality, the
attorneys for their excellent advocacy, and the students and guests for their courtesy and
insightful questions following argument.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 2 of 14
Facts and Procedural History
In May 2021, four individuals—Ajaylan Shabazz, Ariona Darling,
Dustin Blair, and Tiffany Ferris—often snuck into a filthy storage room at
a motel for shelter and to use drugs. Dustin was new to the group, only
knowing the others for a week or so. But Shabazz, Ariona, and Tiffany
had known each other for a few months. Shabazz claimed to look after the
two women, as “it was easy for them to be exploited,” and he referred to
Ariona as his fiancée.

On the evening of May 9, the four individuals were in the storage room,
with Tiffany sleeping in a chair as she withdrew from fentanyl. A bit later,
Shabazz and Ariona walked to a nearby gas station where they
encountered a stranger, Terry Smith, who was in town for the night. Terry
tried to “buy” Ariona, but when Shabazz told him she was his fiancée, the
men instead discussed trading and doing drugs. So, Terry drove them to
the motel, and they all entered the storage room.

Soon after their arrival, Dustin left the room, but Tiffany remained
“dope sick” in the chair. Shabazz then briefly left to coordinate his end of
a drug deal for Terry. At that point, Ariona started “looking for
something,” which led to her accusing Tiffany of stealing drugs. When
Tiffany denied it, Ariona made Tiffany, who was much smaller, strip off
her clothing and started beating her.

Sometime during the altercation, Shabazz reentered the storage room
and joined in the beating. He “picked Tiffany up easily and slammed her”
down, causing her head to hit the corner of a dresser. He also kicked her
and stomped on her head. Tiffany was bleeding profusely, including on
the carpet, and begged to be let go. But Ariona told Shabazz they needed
to “take care of this” and “finish her off,” so he helped pick Tiffany up and
carry her to the bathtub. Shabazz and Ariona then began cleaning up the
room, which included cutting up bloody portions of the carpet. Later that
morning, when Shabazz, Ariona, and Terry left together in Terry’s truck,
Tiffany remained bloody, naked, and motionless in the bathtub. And that
was how Dustin found her when he returned to the storage room, after
which police arrived and pronounced her dead.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 3 of 14
The State charged Shabazz with Tiffany’s murder under an accomplice
liability theory. During preliminary discussions on the first day of the jury
trial, the State told the court it was unable to secure the presence of one of
its witnesses, Miquan Jones, who was incarcerated at the time. Though the
State represented that it had filed a transport order one week before trial,
the record contains no supporting documentation. See Ind. Appellate Rule
50(B)(1)(d). Even so, the State requested that Jones be permitted to testify
virtually, telling the court that the county jail lacked “the resources” to
transport him to trial because he was in a prison located four hours away.
Shabazz objected. But the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning
that the county “doesn’t have unlimited resources as in if they can’t get
him, they can’t get him.”

During trial, the State called twenty‐one witnesses, including Terry and
Dustin. Ariona couldn’t testify because she had passed away before trial,
but Terry gave an eyewitness account of Shabazz’s involvement in
Tiffany’s murder. And Dustin testified that Shabazz later admitted to him
that he had committed the murder and warned Dustin to keep quiet.
Before Jones provided similar testimony virtually, Shabazz renewed his
objection. The court again overruled it, and the jury heard Jones testify via
live, two‐way video that, while he and Shabazz were both incarcerated in
the county jail, Shabazz admitted to killing Tiffany and then threatened
Jones to keep quiet. The jury also learned that Jones had contacted the
State to offer to testify against Shabazz in exchange for being released on
home detention and that he had been so released.

The State also presented testimony establishing that Tiffany died from
drowning after sustaining multiple blunt‐force injuries consistent with
punching and kicking. DNA evidence further showed that Tiffany’s blood
was recovered from Shabazz’s shoes. And the State introduced an
incriminating letter that Shabazz had written to Terry. Shabazz also
testified, claiming that Terry murdered Tiffany but admitting that he had
helped carry her into the bathroom. The jury ultimately found Shabazz
guilty, and the court imposed a sixty‐three‐year sentence.

Shabazz appealed, raising several issues, including that the trial court
erred by permitting Jones to testify virtually. The Court of Appeals

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 4 of 14
disagreed, concluding that good cause supported allowing Jones to testify
virtually and that the testimony did not violate Shabazz’s constitutional
confrontation rights. Shabazz v. State, 255 N.E.3d 533, 542 (Ind. Ct. App.
2025). Judge Tavitas wrote separately, disagreeing with both conclusions.
Id. at 550 (Tavitas, J., concurring in result). But she concurred in result,
finding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Shabazz petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the
Court of Appeals’ opinion. App. R. 58(A).2

Standard of Review
Resolving this appeal turns on interpreting and applying Interim
Administrative Rule 14(C), which permits courts to conduct a testimonial
proceeding “remotely for all or some of the case participants for good
cause shown.” Ind. Interim Administrative Rule 14(C). We determine
what constitutes good cause de novo, but we review a trial court’s good‐
cause determination for an abuse of discretion. B.N. v. Health & Hosp.
Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 363 (Ind. 2022).

Discussion and Decision
Over the past five years, courts nationwide have seen a significant
increase in remote proceedings. Indiana is no different. And since January
2023, such proceedings have been governed by Interim Administrative
Rule 14. That rule defines a “remote proceeding” as “any proceeding,
including without limitation entire proceedings or parts of it, using
telephone or videoconferencing capabilities to allow case participants to
appear virtually.” Interim Admin. R. 14(A)(1). There is no question that
the rise of virtual participation has enhanced access, efficiency, and
flexibility for parties and lawyers alike. But not all court proceedings are

2We granted transfer to address only the remote‐testimony issue. We summarily affirm the
remaining portions of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. See App. R. 58(A)(2).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 5 of 14
the same. To that point, for testimonial proceedings—those where a trial
court receives sworn oral testimony—the rule expressly acknowledges
that “[p]resenting live testimony in court remains of utmost importance.”
Interim Admin. R. 14 cmt.

Consistent with this recognition, Interim Rule 14 establishes a
presumption that all testimonial proceedings, such as criminal trials, will
be conducted in person. Interim Admin. R. 14(C). But there are exceptions.
Relevant here, a court can conduct a testimonial proceeding “remotely for
all or some of the case participants for good cause shown.” Id. In addition
to this good‐cause showing, the proceeding “must comply with
constitutional and statutory guarantees.” Id.

In the civil context, we have explained that the good‐cause showing
requires “particularized and specific factual support.” B.N., 199 N.E.3d at
364. But we have not decided whether this same standard applies in
criminal cases—particularly when, as here, the State asks a court to permit
a witness to testify virtually. Unlike in civil cases, such a request in a
criminal trial necessarily implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights to
confront adverse witnesses, as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13 of the
Indiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13; U.S. Const. amend. VI. And, as
Judge Tavitas observed in her concurrence, those rights are uniquely
vulnerable when testimony is presented remotely, since video or
telephonic formats may diminish a witness’s sense of the proceedings’
gravity or constrain the factfinder’s ability to fully assess a witness’s
demeanor in evaluating credibility. See Shabazz, 255 N.E.3d at 553 (Tavitas,
J., concurring in result); see also United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315
(11th Cir. 2006) (“The simple truth is that confrontation through a video
monitor is not the same as physical face‐to‐face confrontation.”).

Against this backdrop, this case requires us to clarify how Interim Rule
14 applies in criminal proceedings when remote testimony intersects with
a defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation. Shabazz asserts that
the trial court erred by allowing Jones to testify virtually because the State
failed to make the requisite good‐cause showing and that the testimony
violated his confrontation rights. The State counters that it provided, and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 6 of 14
the trial court made, “particular findings of good cause based on the
circumstances in this case” and that Shabazz waived his constitutional
claims by failing to make a cogent argument.

We agree with the State that Shabazz waived his constitutional
challenges. He failed to explain how the trial court deprived him of his
confrontation rights, to develop an argument under either constitutional
provision, or to analyze authority in support of these challenges. See App.
R. 46(A)(8)(a); Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) (“[A] court
which must . . . make up its own arguments because a party has presented
them in perfunctory form runs the risk of being an advocate rather than
an adjudicator.”). But we agree with Shabazz that the State failed to show
the requisite good cause. In reaching this decision, we conclude Interim
Rule 14(C) requires a heightened good‐cause showing—informed by, but
separate from, a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront witnesses—
when the State seeks to have a witness testify remotely in a criminal trial.
And because the State failed to make that showing here, we hold that the
trial court abused its discretion by permitting Jones to testify virtually. But
because we hold that the error was harmless, we affirm.

I. The trial court abused its discretion by permitting
Jones to testify virtually.
We first address the standard governing how the State shows “good
cause” for a trial court to permit a witness to testify remotely against a
criminal defendant at trial under Interim Rule 14(C). Because the rule
authorizes remote participation in a testimonial proceeding only if it
complies with constitutional guarantees, the good‐cause showing in a
criminal case is necessarily shaped by a defendant’s constitutional rights.
And because both the Indiana and federal constitutions guarantee a
defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses face to face, those rights
inform the meaning of “good cause” in this context. But we address only
how a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights bear on Interim Rule
14(C). We do not conduct a constitutional analysis here, as this appeal
does not present a preserved constitutional challenge.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 7 of 14
Ultimately, we conclude that to show good cause under Interim Rule
14(C) for remote testimony in a criminal trial, the State must present case‐
specific evidence that allowing a particular witness to testify remotely is
necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that would
otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately addressed if the
witness were to testify in person. Applying that standard here, we hold
that the State failed to make the required showing, and thus the trial court
abused its discretion by permitting Jones to testify virtually.

A. In a criminal trial, the good‐cause showing required by
Interim Rule 14(C) for a witness to testify remotely is
informed by a defendant’s constitutional rights to
confrontation.

Three years ago, we explained that a showing of good cause under
Interim Rule 14(C) requires “particularized and specific factual support.”
B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 364. But that holding arose in a civil case. And this is
our first time addressing how the good‐cause requirement applies in a
criminal trial, particularly given the rule’s express mandate that the
proceeding “comply with constitutional . . . guarantees.” Interim Admin.
R. 14(C). Because of this mandate, it follows that the State’s good‐cause
showing is informed by the minimum constitutional prerequisites for
allowing an adverse witness to testify remotely against a criminal
defendant.

Although neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has
directly addressed whether live, two‐way virtual testimony complies with
the confrontation rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment or Article 1,
Section 13, other courts have consistently drawn guidance from Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). There, the Supreme Court articulated a two‐
part framework that has since been adopted by nearly every jurisdiction
to consider constitutional challenges to remote testimony in criminal
cases. See State v. Tate, 985 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn. 2023) (collecting cases).
While we do not address a constitutional challenge here, we do find one
prong of the Craig framework applicable to a good‐cause showing in a
criminal trial under Interim Rule 14(C): the State must present case‐

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 8 of 14
specific evidence that allowing a witness to testify remotely is necessary to
further an important public policy interest. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852–55. In
this context, an “important public policy interest” is not an abstract
governmental interest, but one grounded in the need to prevent a real,
identifiable risk of harm that would otherwise result from requiring the
witness to testify in the defendant’s physical presence. See id. at 855–56.
This requirement is consistent with the “particularized and specific factual
support” good‐cause standard under Interim Rule 14(C) for civil cases but
heightened to accommodate the unique risk virtual testimony poses to
criminal defendants. And it aligns with our precedent interpreting Article
1, Section 13, which similarly permits departures from in‐person
confrontation when necessary to avert serious harm arising from face‐to‐
face testimony against a defendant. See Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 988–
89 (Ind. 1991).

Accordingly, to establish good cause under Interim Rule 14(C) for
permitting a witness to testify remotely against a criminal defendant at
trial, the State must present case‐specific evidence that allowing the
witness to testify remotely is necessary to prevent a concrete and
substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be
adequately addressed if the witness were to testify in person. This
heightened showing has two essential components, each of which
warrants brief explanation.

First, the State must present case‐specific evidence. The trial court is
best positioned to balance a defendant’s rights against the asserted need
for remote testimony in each case. But the court can perform that function
only if it is presented with evidence tailored to the specific witness and
circumstances at issue. Cf. G.W. v. Madison State Hosp., 245 N.E.3d 153, 159
(Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (finding no error in permitting an involuntary
commitment proceeding to take place remotely after considering evidence
on how a courtroom hearing would harm the patient’s well‐being). When
the State fails to make this evidentiary showing, the defendant is left with
little meaningful opportunity to test the factual basis for the claimed
necessity. And without adversarial testing of that necessity, the trial court
lacks the factual context required to determine whether remote testimony
is truly necessary.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 9 of 14
Second, the State must demonstrate that remote testimony is
necessary—not merely helpful—to prevent a concrete and substantial
harm associated with requiring a particular witness to testify in person.
General concerns about efficiency, logistics, or expense are insufficient.
See, e.g., Newson v. State, 526 P.3d 717, 722 (Nev. 2023); State v. Rogerson,
855 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Iowa 2014). Instead, the State must show why in‐
person testimony would likely cause serious harm and why that harm
cannot be mitigated through reasonable measures short of remote
testimony. For example, virtual testimony may alleviate the likelihood
that a child witness will be traumatized by testifying in the presence of
their abuser. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855; Brady, 575 N.E.2d at 989. Or it may
protect the health and safety of trial participants when there is a
heightened risk that a specific witness could spread a highly contagious
illness “in a confined courtroom setting.” Tate, 985 N.W.2d at 302. Across
these contexts, the critical inquiry is the same: whether dispensing with in‐
person testimony from a particular witness is necessary to prevent a
concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise occur.

In short, good cause under Interim Rule 14(C) looks different when the
State wants to elicit remote testimony against a criminal defendant at trial.
In this context, good cause exists only if the State presents case‐specific
evidence that requiring a particular witness to testify in person would
likely result in a concrete and substantial harm, making remote testimony
necessary. We now turn to whether the State made that showing here.

B. The State failed to present case‐specific evidence that
Jones’s virtual testimony was necessary to prevent a
concrete and substantial harm.

Recall that during preliminary discussions on the first day of Shabazz’s
trial, the court granted the State’s request to allow Jones to testify
virtually. The court made that decision based solely on the State’s
representations that Jones was incarcerated four hours away and that the
county jail did not have the resources to transport him. For two
independent reasons, we hold that the State’s proffered justification fell
short of “good cause shown” under Interim Rule 14(C).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 10 of 14
The State did not provide the trial court with any evidence—
testimonial, documentary, or otherwise—demonstrating Jones’s inability
to testify in person. Indeed, the State merely asserted that a transport
order had been filed and that the county jail could not bring Jones to trial
because it did not “have the resources.” The record doesn’t include any
such transport order. And while we don’t doubt the sincerity of these
representations, unsworn statements by attorneys are not evidence. Gajdos
v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Ind. 1984); Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst.
13.1900. Therefore, on this record, the State failed to present the court with
any evidence supporting its request that Jones testify virtually.

But even if those representations had been supported by evidence, the
State failed to demonstrate that requiring Jones to testify in person would
have caused a concrete or substantial harm. To be sure, securing Jones’s
in‐person attendance may have been inconvenient or costly. But, as
explained above, mere inconvenience or expense, standing alone, do not
constitute the types of harm that public policy deems important enough to
justify permitting a witness to testify remotely against a criminal
defendant. See Newson, 526 P.3d at 722; Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d at 507. That
is especially true here, as the State offered no evidence or explanation of
what specific resources were lacking, why those limitations existed, or
how they rendered in‐person testimony impracticable in this case. Only at
oral argument did the State suggest, for example, that transporting an
incarcerated witness from a penal facility poses safety risks in the absence
of adequately trained officers. But this assertion was never presented to
the trial court. And even if it had been, the identified risk, standing alone,
doesn’t explain why transporting Jones in particular would have posed a
concrete or substantial danger.

That said, we recognize that counties vary in their available resources,
and some may have difficulty securing the equipment or personnel
needed to safely transport an incarcerated witness over a long distance on
short notice. But that recognition must be weighed against the fact that the
State—not the county—initiates criminal prosecutions and confines
individuals in penal facilities. And this record simply “does not reflect
that the State made much of an effort at all to gain” Jones’s attendance.
Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 725 (Ind. 2002). For example, although the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 11 of 14
State remarked that it had filed a transport order a week before trial, it
took no apparent steps to enforce that order through a subpoena or to
otherwise compel Jones’s presence. See Ind. Code § 35‐37‐5‐3. Because the
State failed to exhaust available means to secure Jones’s in‐person
testimony, we cannot conclude that his virtual testimony was necessary
rather than merely convenient. Holding otherwise would effectively allow
the State to rely on generalized resource constraints to justify remote
testimony whenever an incarcerated witness must be transported to a
criminal trial. Interim Rule 14(C) demands more.

All in all, the State did not carry its burden of showing good cause
because it failed to present case‐specific evidence that requiring Jones to
testify in person would likely have caused a concrete and substantial harm
and that permitting him to testify virtually was necessary to avert that
harm. And because of that failure, the trial court abused its discretion by
permitting Jones to testify virtually. We now turn to whether that error
was harmless.

II. The error in permitting Jones to testify virtually
was harmless.
Although Interim Rule 14(C) is informed by constitutional guarantees,
a violation of that rule does not automatically require review under the
harmless‐beyond‐a‐reasonable‐doubt standard. That standard applies
only to properly preserved constitutional claims. And here, as explained
above, Shabazz waived his constitutional challenges. Accordingly, the
only issue before us is the alleged misapplication of Interim Rule 14(C).
And because we’ve concluded the trial court erred in applying the rule,
we assess whether that error was harmless by applying Appellate Rule
66(A)’s probable impact test. See Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491–92
(Ind. 2023); B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 365.

Under that test, Shabazz “bears the burden of demonstrating how, in
light of all the evidence in the case, the error’s probable impact
undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko,
211 N.E.3d at 492. In conducting this review, we consider the likely impact

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 12 of 14
of Jones’s improperly admitted testimony “on a reasonable, average jury.”
Id.

Shabazz contends that Jones’s testimony was not harmless because the
case involved “so many moving parts,” making it “difficult to believe” the
testimony “was not a major factor in the jury’s decision.” While we agree
that this case had many moving parts, the record does not support a
conclusion that Jones’s testimony affected the verdict in a way that
undermines our confidence in it.

Jones testified that while he was in jail, Shabazz admitted he had killed
Tiffany. He further testified that Shabazz threatened to have him “hurt or
killed” if he “didn’t change [his] story.” On cross‐examination, however,
Jones acknowledged that he had contacted the State while incarcerated
and offered to testify against Shabazz only in exchange for release on
home detention—a benefit he ultimately received. Though this latter
testimony plainly called Jones’s credibility into question, we recognize
that his initial testimony viewed in isolation was quite incriminating. Still,
we must assess its impact in light of all the evidence before the jury.

And the State presented overwhelming independent evidence that
Shabazz acted with another to kill Tiffany. Terry provided an eye‐witness
account of the events, testifying that Shabazz kicked Tiffany, picked her
up and slammed her down, and helped carry her into the bathroom to
“finish her off.” Dustin testified that Shabazz told him he’d killed Tiffany
and threatened Dustin to “keep [his] mouth shut.” Shabazz himself
admitted to being present during the beating and to helping carry Tiffany
into the bathroom. The State introduced forensic evidence showing that
Shabazz’s shoes were stained with blood containing Tiffany’s DNA. And
the State admitted into evidence a note Shabazz sent to Terry urging him
to “keep it solid,” and stating, in reference to Ariona’s death, that “we got
a scapegoat on this case!”

Against this evidentiary backdrop, Jones’s testimony was, at most,
cumulative. And the jury had multiple independent, corroborating bases
to reasonably conclude that Shabazz was an accomplice to Tiffany’s
murder. Accordingly, Shabazz has failed to show that the probable impact
of the trial court’s error—considered in light of all the evidence—

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 13 of 14
undermines our confidence in the verdict. The error was therefore
harmless.

Conclusion
The State did not carry its burden of showing good cause under Interim
Rule 14(C). We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by
permitting the witness to testify virtually. But because we hold that the
error was harmless, we affirm.

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Gregory L. Fumarolo
Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S‐CR‐183 | February 23, 2026 Page 14 of 14