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Feb. 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Bedell v. Parsons

Idaho Supreme Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 51892

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.5K)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51892-2024

PAUL MARTIN BEDELL, Individual, )
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- ) Boise, November 2025 Term
Appellant, )
) Opinion filed: February 19, 2026
v. )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
JOANNE PARSONS, Individual, )
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant- )
Respondent, )
)
and )
)
JOHN DOES I-X, )
)
Defendants. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Bruce L. Pickett, District Judge.

The decisions of the district court are reversed.

Kirton McConkie, Boise, for Appellant. Jon T. Simmons argued. Christine R.
Arnold appeared.

Rigby, Andrus & Rigby Law, PLLC, Rexburg, for Respondent. Hyrum D. Erickson
argued.

ZAHN, Justice.
This case concerns a dispute over the respective ownership interests in a piece of real
property located in Bonneville County, Idaho (“the Property”). Paul Martin Bedell and Joanne
Parsons were in a long-term, romantic relationship and were unmarried. During that relationship,
they purchased the Property. Both of their names were listed on the purchase and sale agreement
and the warranty deed conveying the Property. When their relationship ended, Parsons attempted
to quitclaim her interest in the Property to a non-profit organization in California. Bedell then filed
an action to quiet title to the Property solely in his name or, in the alternative, partition the Property
in kind by awarding him the entirety of the Property. Following several motions for summary
judgment, the district court concluded that Parsons had a 50% ownership interest in the Property,
ordered a partition by sale, and awarded Parsons her reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the decisions of the district court
and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bedell and Parsons were in a romantic relationship between 2007 and 2020.
For much of that time, they lived together in Parsons’ home in California. They never married.
Bedell and Parsons each testified that Bedell financially contributed to the utilities and
maintenance of the shared California home but did not pay any rent or mortgage. The parties also
testified that they jointly purchased investment properties in California to remodel and resell for
profit.
In 2014, Bedell and Parsons purchased the Property. Both of their names were listed on the
purchase and sale agreement and on the special warranty deed filed in Bonneville County. Bedell
paid all taxes, utilities, insurance, and other expenses for the Property. Parsons testified that she
and Bedell bought the Property as a vacation home and jointly hosted family and friends at the
Property.
Bedell and Parsons ended their romantic relationship in 2020. At that point, Bedell made
the Property his primary residence. Parsons later quitclaimed her interest in the Property to a non-
profit organization in California. Several weeks later, the non-profit quitclaimed the interest back
to Parsons.
Bedell then brought an action against Parsons in Bonneville County district court. Bedell
pleaded two claims, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that Parsons had no interest in the
Property; and (2) to quiet title to the Property solely in Bedell’s name. Parsons answered and filed
a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that she possessed a 50% interest in the Property
and seeking to quiet title jointly in her and Bedell’s names. Bedell later amended his complaint to
add a claim for partition in kind, seeking to distribute the entirety of the Property to himself.
A series of summary judgment motions followed. Relevant to this appeal, the district court
denied the parties’ initial cross motions for summary judgment on Bedell’s partition claim after
concluding there were genuine disputes of material fact concerning the parties’ respective

2
ownership interests. Following that decision, this Court issued our opinion in Demoney-
Hendrickson v. Larsen, 171 Idaho 917, 527 P.3d 520 (2023), which outlined a three-step inquiry
in partition actions:
The first step is for the district court to determine whether the parties to the
action possess some interest in the property at issue. See I.C. § 6-501. The second
step is to ascertain the “respective rights of the persons interested” in the subject
property. Id. In other words, the district court must determine the parties’ respective
ownership interests in the subject property. Id.; I.C. § 6-508. The third step is to
determine the most appropriate method of partition: a partition in kind or a partition
by sale. See I.C. §§ 6-501, 6-508. Critically, “when a sale of the premises is
necessary, the title must be ascertained by proof to the satisfaction of the court
before the judgment of sale can be made[.]” I.C. § 6-508 (emphasis added).
171 Idaho at 922, 527 P.3d at 525 (alteration in original). We held that, on the second step of the
inquiry, when two parties’ names are listed on a warranty deed and the deed fails to specify the
respective ownership interests of each party, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parties share
ownership equally. Id. at 924–25, 527 P.3d at 527–28. We further held that the presumption may
be rebutted with showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parties intended something
other than equal ownership. Id. at 925, 527 P.3d at 528.
Just before this Court issued Demoney-Hendrickson, Bedell had filed a second motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the court should grant his action for partition in kind and award
him 100% of the Property because he was the sole financial contributor to the Property. After
Bedell filed this motion and before Parsons’ response was due, we issued our decision in Demoney-
Hendrickson. Parsons then filed her third motion for summary judgment, arguing that Demoney-
Hendrickson established that she had a 50% ownership interest in the Property because Bedell’s
evidence submitted in support of his second motion failed to rebut the presumption of equal shares.
Bedell responded that the evidence rebutted Demoney-Hendrickson’s presumption of equal shares
because it showed that he was the sole financial contributor to the Property.
The district court denied Bedell’s motion but granted summary judgment for Parsons on
the partition claim, relying on Demoney-Hendrickson to conclude that (1) Parsons had an interest
in the Property because her name was on the deed, (2) Parsons possessed an equal interest in the
Property because the deed did not specify the parties’ respective ownership interests and Bedell
failed to rebut the presumption of equal shares, and (3) partition by sale was the appropriate method
of partition. The district court also awarded Parsons reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code
section 12-121.

3
Bedell filed a motion to reconsider. In support of his motion, Bedell submitted his
deposition transcript, his answers to interrogatories, and spreadsheets detailing the expenses he
paid related to Parsons’ residence in California and to the Property. The district court determined
that the additional evidence still failed to rebut the presumption of equal shares and declined to
reverse its decision granting summary judgment to Parsons on the partition claim. However, it
reversed its prior decision awarding attorney fees to Parsons because there were pending
counterclaims, so its determination that Parsons was the prevailing party was premature.
Following the decision on reconsideration, Parsons filed a fourth motion for summary
judgment, requesting that the district court dismiss any potential claim for contribution as waived
because Bedell had failed to plead such a claim. The district court granted the motion and agreed
that Bedell had waived any contribution claim.
Parsons then filed a memorandum of costs and fees pursuant Idaho code section 12-121
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), arguing she was the prevailing party and that Bedell’s
continued pursuit of his partition claim was frivolous and without foundation following Demoney-
Hendrickson. The district court agreed and determined that Bedell’s continued assertion that he
had a 100% ownership interest in the Property was foreclosed by Demoney-Hendrickson.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred when it concluded the parties had equal ownership interests
in the Property.
2. Whether the district court erred when it determined Bedell had waived any claim for
contribution.
3. Whether the district court erred when it awarded Parsons attorney fees under Idaho Code
section 12-121.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When reviewing a lower court’s decision on summary judgment, this Court applies the
same standard used by the lower court. McOmber v. Thompson, ___ Idaho __, _, 572 P.3d 736,
743 (2025). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show there is no genuine dispute
of material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The facts and any inferences must be construed in favor of the
nonmoving party. McOmber, __ Idaho at ___, 572 P.3d at 743. If the moving party meets its
burden, the nonmovant must show more than “a mere scintilla of evidence” or “slight doubt” to
demonstrate that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id. (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153
Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012)).

4
To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must focus on the
elements of the claim and whether the disputed facts go to the challenged elements. Kelso v.
Applington, 173 Idaho 738, 747, 548 P.3d 363, 372 (2024). A fact is material if it has an impact
on the outcome of the case. Id. at 742, 548 P.3d at 367. It is not permissible for the trial court to
weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 749, 548 P.3d at 374.
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Bedell argues that the district court erred when it granted (1) Parsons’ third
summary judgment motion on Bedell’s partition claim, (2) Parsons’ fourth summary judgment
motion, which concluded that Bedell had waived a contribution claim, and (3) Parsons’ request for
attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse each
of the decisions and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A. The district court erred when it relied on disputed material facts or weighed the parties’
evidence to grant Parsons’ motion for summary judgment and conclude that she had an
equal ownership interest in the Property.
Bedell argues that the district court erred when it granted Parsons’ third motion for
summary judgment on the partition claim because there were genuine disputes of material fact
regarding the parties’ respective ownership interests. Given the disputed material facts, Bedell
argues summary judgment should have been denied. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.
As previously mentioned, in Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen, we held that a district court
must undertake a three-step inquiry when deciding a partition action:
The first step is for the district court to determine whether the parties to the
action possess some interest in the property at issue. See I.C. § 6-501. The second
step is to ascertain the “respective rights of the persons interested” in the subject
property. Id. In other words, the district court must determine the parties’ respective
ownership interests in the subject property. Id.; I.C. § 6-508. The third step is to
determine the most appropriate method of partition: a partition in kind or a partition
by sale. See I.C. §§ 6-501, 6-508. Critically, “when a sale of the premises is
necessary, the title must be ascertained by proof to the satisfaction of the court
before the judgment of sale can be made[.]” I.C. § 6-508 (emphasis added).
171 Idaho 917, 922, 527 P.3d 520, 525 (2023) (alteration in original). Similar to this case,
Demoney-Hendrickson concerned real property purchased by unmarried romantic partners,
Cynthia Juker and Reginald Larsen. Id. at 919, 527 P.3d at 522. Both of their names were on the
warranty deed, but the deed did not specify their respective interests in the property. Id. Juker later
died, and her estate filed an action for partition of the property. Id. at 919–20, 527 P.3d at 522–23.
Larsen filed a counterclaim and asserted that he had a 100% interest in the property. Id. at 920,

5
527 P.3d at 523. Relying solely on the language of the warranty deed, the district court determined
that Juker had a 50% ownership interest in the property because both parties’ names were on the
deed, which did not include any indication of their respective ownership interests. Id.
We reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 927,
527 P.3d at 530. We first explained that, when read together, Idaho’s partition statutes require the
three-part inquiry described above. Id. at 921–22, 527 P.3d at 524–25. On the first step, we held
that the district court correctly determined the warranty deed conveyed some interest in the
property to Juker. Id. at 922, 527 P.3d at 525. However, we held that the district court erred when
it refused to consider Larsen’s evidence that the parties intended for Larsen to own 100% of the
property. Id. at 925, 527 P.3d at 528. We held that, when two parties’ names are listed on a warranty
deed and the deed fails to specify the respective ownership interests of each party, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the parties share ownership equally. Id. at 924, 527 P.3d at 527. We
further held that the presumption may be rebutted with a showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the parties intended something other than equal ownership. Id. at 925, 527 P.3d at
528.
We had not issued our opinion in Demoney-Hendrickson when Bedell filed his lawsuit.
Just before we issued our decision in Demoney-Hendrickson Bedell moved for summary judgment
on his partition claim, arguing that he had a 100% ownership interest in the Property because he
paid the entirety of the purchase price and was the sole financial contributor to the Property. Bedell
asserted that Parsons’ name was only included on the purchase and sale agreement and the
warranty deed as an accommodation to the grantor, Fannie Mae, and therefore the district court
should determine that Parsons had a 0% ownership interest in the Property.
Before Parsons responded to Bedell’s motion, we issued our decision in Demoney-
Hendrickson. Following that decision, Parsons filed her third motion for summary judgment and
requested that the district court determine she had a 50% ownership interest in the Property and
order a partition by sale. Parsons asserted that because her name was on the warranty deed for the
Property and failed to specify her interest in the Property, under Demoney-Hendrickson, the
presumption of equal shares applied. Parsons cited to her deposition testimony and discovery
responses to further support her position that she owned a 50% interest in the Property. Namely,
she referenced her testimony and statements that (1) she and Bedell had jointly purchased and sold
real estate in the past, (2) she and Bedell jointly looked at properties for sale in Idaho and jointly

6
decided to make an offer on the Property, (3) she negotiated the sale price of the Property, (4) she
and Bedell signed the purchase and sale agreement for the Property and a subsequent addendum
to the agreement, (5) Bedell expressed to her that the home was purchased for both of them, (6)
Bedell told the realtor to add Parsons to the deed, (7) she used her own money to decorate the
house on the Property, and (8) she contributed materials from one of her properties to construct an
outbuilding on the Property.
In response, Bedell asserted that he had rebutted the presumption of equal shares. He cited
to his affidavit and other evidence establishing that he paid the entire purchase price for the
Property; that he never asked Parsons to contribute to the purchase of the Property; that he
subsequently paid all the taxes, insurance, maintenance and repairs for the Property; that he had
resided in the Property since its purchase; that he intended the Property to be his residence in Idaho;
and that he had maintained Idaho residency since purchasing the Property. Bedell also disputed
Parsons’ contention that she was involved in the decision to make an offer on the Property and that
she was involved in negotiating its purchase price. Further, Bedell asserted that he did not ask for
Parsons’ name to be included on the deed, and he believed his realtor shared information with
Fannie Mae about Bedell and Parsons flipping properties together, which led Fannie Mae to require
that Parsons’ name be included on the purchase and sale agreement, which in turn resulted in the
title company adding Parsons’ name to the warranty deed.
The district court held a hearing on the motions and later issued a written decision denying
Bedell’s motion, granting Parsons’ motion, and ordering a partition by sale. Applying the first step
in the Demoney-Hendrickson inquiry, the court determined that Parsons had an interest in the
Property because her name was on the deed. On the second step, the district court concluded that
the unambiguous inclusion of Parsons’ name on the warranty deed, without any specification
concerning the nature of her interest in the Property, was sufficient to invoke the presumption of
equal shares. The district court then considered the extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties in
support of their respective positions, as follows:
• Both parties were present when they were looking for properties to purchase and they
intended that there be “some kind of co-ownership.”
• The parties jointly owned several properties in California and would “flip” properties as a
business.

7
• The proceeds from the sale of Bedell’s home in California were used to purchase the
Property, but Bedell was only able to do this because he had been living in Parsons’
California home for the previous seven years.
• Parsons paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance for Parsons’ California home, where the
parties jointly resided, while Bedell paid utilities and other costs of living, which allowed
him to save money to purchase the Property.
• Parsons used materials from some of her other California properties to make improvements
to the Property, which constituted monetary contributions toward the Property.
• The parties jointly made the decision to purchase the Property, but Parsons insisted they
offer a lower purchase price, which the sellers accepted.
• Parsons furnished and decorated the interior of the Property using her own funds.
After reciting this evidence, the district court stated:
Considering these facts, the [c]ourt finds that partition is proper. However, with the
conflicting positions of the parties and lack of evidence as to contributions when it
comes to their intentions and what each contributed to the [P]roperty, it is not
possible for the [c]ourt to determine how it would assign an unequal division that
would be fair and equitable. As such, the [c]ourt is left to accept the presumption
that each party has an equal interest of 50% in the [P]roperty.
On the third step, the district court ordered partition by sale after concluding there was no
evidence that the residence and surrounding acreage could be divided without prejudicing the
parties. The district court then invited the parties to file a motion to reconsider if they wished to
submit additional evidence: “Should either party wish to file a Motion to Reconsider and present
the [c]ourt with additional and more conclusive evidence that would help the [c]ourt determine an
unequal, but fair and equitable division of the property, the [c]ourt would entertain that motion.”
Bedell then filed a motion for reconsideration and asserted that the district court erred by
improperly weighing the evidence and relying on disputed material facts. In support of his motion
to reconsider, Bedell submitted additional evidence. Bedell cited to his discovery responses in
which he stated that the materials Parsons claimed to have contributed were only scrap lumber that
had been piled on the Property, that Parsons did not pay a mortgage on the California house
because it was paid off, and that Bedell had paid over $250,000 in household expenses for the
California house. Bedell also cited to his deposition, where he testified that he, not Parsons,
communicated with the realtor when negotiating the sale price of the Property.

8
After hearing oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, the district court issued a
written decision denying the motion and took the “opportunity to clarify its findings and legal
analysis in its decision.” The court first dispensed with Bedell’s argument that Parsons had a 0%
ownership interest in the Property, concluding that:
As a matter of law, it is the position of this [c]ourt that a co-tenancy implies an
ownership interest in the subject property. It is the position of this [c]ourt that ‘an
interest’ implies an interest greater than zero (0%). The law allows for that interest
to be unequal, but does not provide that a cotenants interest in the property can be
zero.
The court then acknowledged that it had improperly relied on disputed facts in its summary
judgment decision but determined that the following facts were undisputed and supported its
previous conclusion that Parsons had a 50% ownership interest in the Property:
• The parties were in a long-term relationship when they purchased the Property.
• The parties’ finances were “highly interrelated.”
• Bedell and Parsons considered the California house to be their home and represented
themselves as a married couple.
• Bedell did not pay rent while living in Parsons’ home but did contribute to the household
expenses.
• The parties looked at several properties together and had specific attributes and amenities
in mind. They took those things into account when they decided to purchase the Property.
• Parsons was present at closing on the Property.
• Parsons’ name was on the purchase and sale agreement and on the deed for the Property.
• The parties’ relationship continued after purchasing the Property, they continued to jointly
reside in Parsons’ California home after the purchase, and they jointly visited and
entertained friends at the Property.
• Bedell made the Property his primary residence after his and Parsons’ relationship ended.
• The parties agreed and advised the district court that Parsons’ ownership interest in the
Property must be either 0% or 50%.
The district court determined that, while no single fact was dispositive as to the parties’ intent,
when the facts were considered together, along with the inclusion of Parsons’ name on the warranty
deed, they indicated a joint intent that the Property be “their home.”

9
The district court rejected Bedell’s evidence as unconvincing because it consisted of
Bedell’s own statements and because it was refuted by Parsons’ evidence:
The only evidence presented that can unequivocally establish that Petitioner never
intended [Parsons] to have an ownership interest is that [Bedell] stated so in his
complaint and subsequent filings as well as his deposition. However, this assertion
is refuted by [Parsons] in her pleadings and deposition. Therefore, as the finder of
fact, the [c]ourt looked to the previously stated facts in making its findings.
. . . As stated previously, [Bedell]’s testimony that he never intended to gift
[Parsons] any ownership interest is disputed by [Parsons]. As such, [Bedell]’s
assertion cannot be considered fact without the [c]ourt determining that [Bedell] is
more credible than [Parsons]. The [c]ourt is not able to make findings based on a
determination of credibility in a summary judgment capacity.
On appeal, Bedell argues the district court erred when it continued to rely on disputed
issues of material fact in its decision on reconsideration to conclude that Parsons had a 50%
ownership interest in the Property. Bedell contends that the district court improperly weighed the
parties’ credibility when it accepted Parsons’ evidence and rejected Bedell’s. We agree and reverse
the district court’s decision.
To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party need only present evidence that creates
a disputed issue of fact on a triable issue. Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, 157,
426 P.3d 1249, 1257 (2018). The nonmoving party is not required to persuade the court that the
trier of fact would resolve the disputed issue of fact in his favor. Id. A party asserting the existence
of a genuine dispute of material fact must support his assertion with specific citations to the record,
including depositions, affidavits, declarations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Here, the record reveals that Bedell presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact concerning the parties’ intent regarding their respective ownership interests
in the Property. The evidence that Bedell submitted in connection with the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment and his motion for reconsideration indicated that: (1) Parsons did not
participate in negotiating the purchase price for the Property; (2) Parsons did not financially
contribute to the purchase of the Property; (3) Parsons did not contribute materials that were used
to improve the Property; (4) Bedell never intended to grant Parsons an ownership interest in the
Property; (5) Parsons’ name was only included on the purchase and sale agreement because Fannie
Mae required it after the realtor mentioned that Bedell and Parsons had previously purchased real
property together; (6) Parsons’ name was only included on the warranty deed because the title

10
company required it, given Parsons’ inclusion on the purchase and sale agreement; (7) Parsons did
not pay any mortgage on her California home; and (8) Bedell financially contributed to the
California home.
As previously mentioned, to defeat summary judgment, Bedell only had to establish the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. He was not required to establish that the trier of
fact would resolve that dispute in his favor. Bedell met his burden. His evidence disputed the
additional evidence on which Parsons relied for her motion. In addition, Bedell’s evidence
supported his position that he never intended to grant Parsons an ownership interest in the Property,
which was sufficient to create a genuine dispute regarding whether Bedell could overcome the
rebuttable presumption of equal shares. Put differently, for purposes of summary judgment, Bedell
did not need to rebut the presumption, but instead only needed to establish the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact whether the parties intended to grant Parsons something less than
an equal ownership interest in the Property. See Nelson v. Evans, 166 Idaho 815, 823–24, 464 P.3d
301, 309–10 (2020) (holding that trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on basis of
rebuttable presumption because it failed to examine evidence to determine if there was a genuine
dispute of material fact whether the nonmoving party could rebut the presumption).
The district court erred when it essentially determined that Bedell could not rely on his own
deposition testimony for purposes of summary judgment and then weighed the parties’ other
evidence and concluded that Parsons’ evidence was more persuasive. Deposition testimony is not
“lesser evidence” when submitted in response to a summary judgment motion. Rather, our
summary judgment rule specifically permits a party opposing summary judgment to support their
argument with citations to deposition testimony. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Bedell did exactly that. That
Parsons contested the evidence simply demonstrated the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. This is a common approach to defeating a motion for summary judgment.
The district court erred when it weighed each parties’ evidence and concluded that Parsons’
evidence was more persuasive than Bedell’s. The district court’s statements in its decision denying
Bedell’s motion for reconsideration indicate that it mistakenly believed it could not consider
Bedell’s statements as evidence unless it first determined Bedell was more credible than Parsons.
Bedell and Parsons each submitted their respective testimony under oath. Their deposition
testimonies constituted sworn facts for purposes of summary judgment. While their testimonies
directly contradicted each other on certain points, these contradictions simply demonstrated the

11
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Those disputes should have been resolved at trial,
not on summary judgment. In concluding on reconsideration that it could not consider Bedell’s
testimony, the district court committed the very error it was concerned about; it implicitly
concluded that Bedell’s testimony was less credible than that of Parsons.
We hold that the district court erred when it rejected Bedell’s evidence and granted
Parsons’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons previously discussed, Bedell’s evidence
demonstrated the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the parties’ intent. The
district court should have granted Bedell’s motion for reconsideration and reversed its prior
decision granting summary judgment in favor of Parsons. See I.R.C.P. 56(a) (“The court must
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). We therefore reverse the district
court’s decisions denying Bedell’s motion for reconsideration and granting summary judgment in
favor of Parsons, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bedell also argues that the district court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that a
co-tenant cannot have a 0% ownership interest. “Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a
judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance
for other issues on remand.” Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 359, 2 P.3d 738, 744 (2000).
“In offering guidance, however, we are aware that such guidance should only be given on issues
that are absolutely necessary, and regarding issues that have a practical effect on this appeal;
otherwise, we would be offering an impermissible advisory opinion cloaked as ‘guidance.’” Hood
v. Poorman, 171 Idaho 176, 191, 519 P.3d 769, 784 (2022) (quoting N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors
Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 164 Idaho 530, 540, 432 P.3d 976, 986 (2018)). For purposes of guidance
on remand, we take this opportunity to clarify the language in Demoney-Hendrickson concerning
ownership interests in real property.
Our opinion in Demoney-Hendrickson was premised in part on Idaho Code section 55-508,
which provides that “[e]very interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or more persons,
other than executors or trustees, as such constitutes a tenancy in common, unless expressly
declared in the grant or devise to be otherwise.” I.C. § 55-508. Our discussion alternatively refers
to “interests” and “ownership interests” in the real property. Compare, e.g., 171 Idaho at 925, 527
P.3d at 528, with id. at 924, 527 P.3d at 527. Here, it appears that the district court’s conclusion
that a co-tenant cannot have a 0% ownership interest in real property may have been based on our

12
use of the word “ownership” in Demoney-Hendrickson. In its decision denying Bedell’s motion
for reconsideration, the district court cited Demoney-Hendrickson for the premise that, “[a]bsent
specific language setting forth each parties’ specific interest, the legal ‘default’ is the presumption
of equal ownership.”
While this is an accurate description of what we said in Demoney-Hendrickson, the
referenced sentence did not cite to any legal authority. In retrospect, our use of the word
“ownership” in reference to the parties’ respective interests in the property was imprecise. We
therefore take this opportunity to clarify that Demoney-Hendrickson should not be read to hold
that co-tenants cannot have a 0% ownership interest in real property. That was not an issue raised
in that appeal, and we did not make such a holding. Rather, we remanded the case so the district
court could consider any extrinsic evidence that the parties wished to offer concerning the parties’
intent regarding their respective ownership interests.
In short, while we used the word “ownership” at times to describe the legal interests at
issue in Demoney-Hendrickson, nothing in that decision mandates that each name included on a
warranty deed must own a fee simple interest in the real property that exceeds 0%. Rather, the law
recognizes a variety of interests in real property. Ownership interests can be unequal to the point
that, although two individuals were listed on the deed and jointly possessed the property, they only
intended one person to own the property. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mocabee, 167 Idaho 59, 70, 467 P.3d
423, 434 (2020); Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 879 A.2d 897, 904 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). There have
been several decisions, including one from this Court, reasoning that, even though multiple parties
are listed on a deed, if one party’s ownership interest is 100%, this leaves the other co-tenant with
a 0% ownership interest. See, e.g., Wilson, 167 Idaho at 70, 467 P.3d at 434; Berger v. Repnow,
16 N.W. 3d 452, 459 (N.D. 2025); Fairbanks Dev., LLC v. Johnson, 330 So. 3d 183, 188–90 (La.
2021).
Furthermore, the law recognizes other interests in property short of fee simple ownership.
See Alvin L. Arnold, Real Estate Investor’s Deskbook § 1:64 (3d ed. Mar 2025 update) (explaining
interests in property can be ownership (freehold), possessory (leasehold), or nonpossessory). It is
possible for a party to be listed on a deed and yet possess something less than an ownership interest
in the property, meaning the party has a 0% ownership interest. See, e.g., Diaz v. Home Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n of Elgin, 786 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); T-Vestco Litt-Vada v. Lu-cal

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One Oil Co., 651 S.W.2d 284, 289–91 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding oil and gas leases were
nonpossessory interests despite language in the deed that title was conveyed).
Finally, Idaho Code section 55-508, which formed the basis for our discussion of Idaho
law concerning tenancies in common, is not limited to ownership interests. Instead, it provides that
cointerests in real property constitute a tenancy in common, unless declared to be otherwise. 4
Thompson on Real Property § 32.01, Second Thomas Edition (David A. Thomas ed., 2004). The
statute does not specify that an interest in property must be an ownership interest. The district court
therefore erred when it held as a matter of law that a co-tenant listed on a warranty deed cannot
possess a 0% ownership interest in the real property. As explained above, it is possible for a party
on a warranty deed to have a property interest short of fee simple ownership. If this were the case,
then that cotenant would necessarily have a 0% ownership interest in the property.
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the district court’s decisions denying Bedell’s
motion for reconsideration and granting Parsons’ third motion for summary judgment. In light of
this decision, we also reverse the district court’s decision awarding Parsons costs and attorney fees
under section 12-121.
To be clear, we have not concluded that Bedell rebutted the presumption of equal shares.
Instead, our decision simply holds that Bedell’s evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact concerning the parties’ intent regarding their respective ownership interests
in the Property. As a result, the district court erred when it granted Parsons’ third summary
judgment motion and concluded she had a 50% ownership interest in the property.
B. The district court did not err in granting Parsons’ fourth motion for summary judgment
and concluding that Bedell had waived any claim for contribution.
Following the district court’s decision on the partition action, Parsons filed a fourth motion
for summary judgment and requested that the court determine that Bedell had waived any claim
for contribution because he failed to plead it in his complaint or his amended complaint. Bedell
countered that Idaho is a notice pleading state and that he had pleaded facts sufficient to put
Parsons on notice that he was seeking contribution for amounts related to the Property.
The district court concluded that Bedell failed to assert a contribution claim in either his
complaint, his amended complaint or in subsequent proceedings in the case. Bedell argues that he
raised the issue of contribution multiple times and that under Idaho’s liberal pleading standards,
he pleaded enough facts in his complaint and amended complaint to put Parsons on notice of a
contribution claim. He further asserts that a contribution claim is inherent in a partition claim and

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a claim for contribution automatically arises when a cotenant expends funds for the common
benefit of the property. We agree with the district court and affirm its decision granting Parsons’
fourth motion for summary judgment.
Bedell did not plead a claim for contribution in either his complaint or his amended
complaint. Further, Bedell repeatedly argued before the district court that evidence of unequal
contributions supported his claim for unequal ownership interests. The closest he came to asserting
a claim for contribution was when he argued that his unequal contributions would support a
compensatory adjustment. However, a compensatory adjustment is not a claim for reimbursement
or contribution. Instead, it is a doctrine applied in a physical partition action to compensate for
unequal parcel values when a parcel is divided and the portion received by one party is worth more
than the portion awarded to the other party. Nordgaarden v. Kiebert, 171 Idaho 883, 896, 527 P.3d
486, 499 (2023).
It was not until Bedell’s response to Parsons’ third motion for summary judgment that he
submitted evidence concerning the amounts he expended on the Property. Even at that point,
Bedell did not indicate that he was seeking contribution from Parsons. Instead, he asserted that his
expenditures established that he intended to have the sole ownership interest in the Property.
It was not until Parsons filed her fourth motion for summary judgment motion, seeking to
dismiss any potential claim for contribution, that Bedell expressly asserted he was making a claim
for contribution and cited to legal authorities in support of a contribution claim. Bedell asserts that
Parsons’ fourth summary judgment motion establishes that she was on notice that he was making
a contribution claim. We are not persuaded.
Parsons’ motion establishes at most that she filed it out of an abundance of caution to
foreclose any other possible claim that Bedell could raise related to the Property. She did not make
any arguments concerning a contribution claim in her three prior summary judgment motions.
Further, Parsons’ counsel stated at the hearing on the fourth motion for summary judgment that
they believed Bedell had waived any claim for contribution by failing to plead it and the instant
motion was brought to ensure the claim could not be raised at the end of the case.
Finally, Bedell fails to establish that a right to contribution is inherent in a partition claim.
Bedell cites four Idaho cases to support his contention that he did not have to separately plead a
cause of action for contribution because his partition action included a claim to contribution. The
cases that Bedell cites, however, do not support his premise.

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The first decision, Dorsey v. Dorsey, is not applicable because it dealt with contribution
claims associated with the dissolution and winding up of a limited liability company, not a partition
action between cotenants. 172 Idaho 667, 673, 535 P.3d 1040, 1046 (2023). Because Dorsey deals
with an entirely different legal claim, it has no applicability here.
In Bahnmiller v. Bahnmiller, 145 Idaho 517, 181 P.3d 443 (2008), the plaintiff initiated a
partition action against her ex-husband and his father because the property was titled in all their
names. Id. at 519, 181 P.3d at 445. The district court determined they owned the property as tenants
in common, ordered a partition by sale, and ordered that reimbursement payments to the parties be
made from the proceeds of the sale. Id. at 519–20, 181 P.3d at 445–46. The father-in-law’s
reimbursement amount exceeded the amount of his one-third interest in the property, meaning that
the other two owners had to contribute a portion of their proceeds to the father-in-law to equalize
the division. Id. at 521–22, 181 P.3d at 447–48. The facts do not address whether the father-in-law
pleaded a claim for contribution, nor does the decision address whether a contribution claim is
inherently part of a claim for partition. See generally id. at 519–523, 181 P.3d at 445–49. Rather,
the issues on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the plaintiff’s contention
that the district court erred in awarding the father-in-law reimbursement for certain expenses. Id.
Bahnmiller is inapplicable because it does not address the legal premise at issue here.
Our decision in Watts v. Krebs, is similarly inapplicable because it did not address whether
a claim for contribution is inherent in a partition action. See 131 Idaho 616, 622–23, 962 P.2d 387,
393–94 (1998). Instead, the relevant issue on appeal was whether the defendant waived his right
to contribution when he signed a partition agreement with the plaintiff. Id. at 622, 962 P.2d at 393.
Therefore, Watts is also inapplicable.
The final decision, Keyser v. Morehead, 23 Idaho 501, 130 P. 992 (1913), did not involve
a claim for partition. Instead, it concerned the right of a cotenant to use improvements to an
irrigation ditch. 23 Idaho at 505–06, 130 P. at 993–94. This Court held that, where an irrigation
ditch owned by tenants in common was improved at the expense of all the cotenants but one, and
that one cotenant later offered to pay his share of the expenses so he could use the improvements,
the co-owners could not deprive him of his right to use the improvements. Id. at 507–08, 130 P. at
994–95. While we acknowledged that a right to contribution exists among cotenants, we did not
hold that a contribution claim to enforce that right automatically arises. See id. Again, the case
does not address the legal premise at issue here.

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However, Bedell correctly notes that the district court failed to address Bedell’s request
that he be permitted to amend his complaint. While Bedell did not file a motion to amend, he
included the request in his memorandum opposing Parsons’ motion. Parsons’ only response to this
argument is that Bedell has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied the motion.
Parsons is correct that this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review when
reviewing the denial of a request to amend a complaint. Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, 675, 434 P.3d 1275, 1281 (2019).
When this Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the four-
part inquiry is “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 864, 421 P.3d 187,
194 (2018)). The failure to articulate how the district court abused its discretion constitutes a
waiver of a party’s argument. Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone, 173 Idaho 172, 180–81, 539
P.3d 992, 1000–01 (2023).
We initially note that it is unclear whether inclusion of a request to amend in a
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment constitutes a motion. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(A)
(providing that a request for a court order must be made by a written motion). However, we need
not resolve that question today because Bedell has waived the issue. Rather than pinpoint how the
district court abused its discretion, Bedell cites our caselaw holding that leave to amend should be
freely granted and argues that his right to contribution was beyond dispute and Parsons failed to
establish why leave should be denied. This is essentially a merits argument that should have been
made to the district court below. It was within the district court’s discretion whether to grant the
request. Bedell is now appealing that denial to this Court and, as such, he is required to grapple
with the applicable standard of review. His failure to do so constitutes a waiver of this issue. We
therefore affirm the district court’s decision granting Parsons’ fourth motion for summary
judgment and determining that Bedell waived any contribution claim he may have.

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C. Having reversed the district court’s grant of Parsons’ third motion for summary
judgment, we likewise reverse the district court’s order granting Parsons’ motion for
attorney fees.
Bedell additionally challenges the district court’s award of costs and fees to Parsons under
section 12-121, arguing that his claims below were not unreasonable, frivolous, or without legal
foundation. However, we need not address the merits of Bedell’s challenge. Because we reverse
the district court’s decisions granting Parsons’ third motion for summary judgment and denying
Bedell’s motion to reconsider, we also reverse the district court’s order for attorney fees to Parsons.
Kelso v. Applington, 173 Idaho 738, 749, 548 P.3d 363, 374 (2024) (holding that because summary
judgment had been reversed and remanded, there was no prevailing party and so the district court’s
award of attorney fees should be vacated). On remand, the district court can address any request
for attorney fees that may be filed at the conclusion of the case. See id.
D. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Parsons requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. A court
can award attorney fees to a prevailing party under section 12-121 if the case was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. I.C. § 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). However, because this case
is remanded to the district court for further proceedings, there is not a prevailing party at this stage
in the proceedings. Litster v. Litster Frost Inj. Laws. PLLC, 174 Idaho 860, 882, 560 P.3d 1007,
1029 (2024). Therefore, we decline to award Parsons attorney fees on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed herein, we reverse the district court’s decisions (1) granting
Parsons’ third motion for summary judgment, (2) denying Bedell’s motion for reconsideration,
and (3) awarding Parsons costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121. However, we affirm
the decision granting Parsons’ fourth motion for summary judgment. We remand this case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and MEYER CONCUR.

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