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Dec. 12, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Arizona v. hon.gordon/owen

Arizona Supreme Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: CR-24-0064-PR

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (951)

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Combined Opinion

                        by William Montgomery

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,
Petitioner,

v.

HON. ERIC E. GORDON, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE,
Respondent Judge,

GREGORY JAMES OWEN,
Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-24-0064-PR
Filed December 12, 2025

Special Action from the Lake Havasu Consolidated Court
No. M0844TR2022000209
REVERSED

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
The Honorable Eric E. Gordon, Judge
No. CR202300497
AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
257 Ariz. 95 (App. 2024)
VACATED

COUNSEL:

Charles F. Yager, Lake Havasu City Attorney, Sherman Jackson (argued),
Assistant City Prosecutor, Lake Havasu City, Attorneys for State of Arizona
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

Lawrence I. Kazan, Gregory M. Zamora, Debus & Kazan, LTD, Phoenix;
and Molly Patricia Brizgys, Kathleen E. Brody (argued), Mitchell Stein
Carey Chapman, PC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Gregory James Owen

Kevin D. Heade, Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Florence, and
Mikel Steinfeld, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys
for Criminal Justice

Eric M. Fraser (argued), Michael A. Moorin, Osborn Maledon, P.A.,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae of Cathy Feck, Dolores Adams, and
the Estate of Charles Feck

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES
BEENE and KING joined. JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE
PELANDER (Retired), dissented.
*

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Gregory James Owen rear-ended a Jeep stopped at a red light,
killing one of the Jeep’s passengers. After rear-ending the Jeep, Owen’s
vehicle continued through the red light and into the intersection.
Consequently, the State charged Owen with violating the enhanced penalty
statute, A.R.S. § 28-672, predicated on a violation of the red-light statute,
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a).

¶2 The enhanced penalty statute imposes a criminal penalty for
violating one of several enumerated civil traffic statutes if “the violation
results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death to another
person.” A.R.S. § 28-672(A). One of those statutes is the red-light statute,
which provides that “vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall
stop before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until an
indication to proceed is shown.” 1 See § 28-645(A)(3)(a).

*
Justice Maria Elena Cruz is recused from this matter. Pursuant to
article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Justice John Pelander
(Retired) was designated to sit in this matter.
1 “A person who violates [§ 28-645(A)(3)(a)] is subject to a civil
penalty . . . .” A.R.S. § 28-1521.
2
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶3 In this case, we must determine whether the enhanced penalty
statute applies to a fatal accident that occurs before the offending vehicle
enters an intersection against a red light. We hold that because a red-light
violation can only be committed once the vehicle enters an intersection, the
enhanced penalty statute cannot apply to a fatal accident that occurs before
an intersection, whether the accident consists of a single collision or the first
in a series of events.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 Owen was driving a motorhome on SR 95 in Lake Havasu City
when he rear-ended a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was stopped at a red light
at the intersection of SR 95 and Acoma Blvd. 2 The impact propelled the
Jeep into and through the other side of the intersection, killing one of the
passengers. Owen’s motorhome also continued through the intersection
while facing a red light. The State charged Owen with causing death by a
moving violation under the enhanced penalty statute based on a red-light
violation.

¶5 Following a bench trial, the municipal court observed in a
minute order disposing of the case “that in using the term ‘accident’ the
[L]egislature intended to mean that series of events that constitute an
accident.” The court therefore concluded that the “series of events that
constitute the ‘accident’ . . . includes and can be attributed to the
defendant’s violation of A.R.S. 28-645(A)(3)(a).” The court consequently
found Owen guilty as charged.

¶6 Owen appealed the verdict to the superior court, arguing that he
did not commit a red-light violation that resulted in the victim’s death
because “the accident happened before the intersection, and the predicate
moving violation can only happen upon entering an intersection.” The
superior court found that Owen did commit a moving violation because he

2 We have included an overhead photo of the intersection in question as
an Appendix. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201; see also, e.g., State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz.
377, 380 (1967) (confirming that courts may take judicial notice of a
geographic fact).
3
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

ran a red light. 3 However, the court also found, as a matter of law, that,
because the accident occurred before Owen ran the red light, he was not
guilty of violating the enhanced penalty statute. Accordingly, the superior
court reversed the municipal court’s finding of guilt and directed a verdict
of acquittal.

¶7 The State then filed a special action petition with the court of
appeals, challenging the superior court’s interpretation of the red-light and
enhanced penalty statutes. Echoing the municipal court, the court of
appeals reasoned that the use of the term “accident” in the enhanced
penalty statute encompasses a series of events broader than a single
collision. State v. Gordon, 257 Ariz. 95, 99 ¶ 15 (App. 2024). Consistent
with this reasoning and in reliance on State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, 126 ¶ 9
(App. 2001), and other out-of-state authorities, the court offered the
following broad interpretation of the term “accident”: “when determining
whether an accident resulted from a red-light violation, a court must
consider an accident as a continuous event in which the traffic violation
causes an event that results in death or injury.” Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99–100
¶¶ 15–16.

¶8 Accordingly, the court reasoned that when “a driver fails to stop
and remain standing at a red light and then hits another vehicle,
immediately propelling both vehicles into the intersection, the entire
event—from initial collision to when the vehicles ultimately cease
movement—is an accident that resulted from the driver’s failure to stop at
the red light.” Id. at 100 ¶ 19. The court thus concluded that imposition
of the enhanced penalty does not require a driver to run a red light before
the initial collision so long as the accident comprises one continuous event
that results from a driver failing to stop at a red light. Id. ¶ 21.
Consequently, the court vacated the superior court’s decision and
remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. Id.

¶9 We granted Owen’s petition for review because whether a driver
must enter an intersection to commit a red-light violation before an accident
for the enhanced penalty statute to apply is an issue of statewide
importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the

3 Owen contends that “the municipal court and superior court
erroneously concluded that Owen violated the red-light statute.” This
issue is not before us.
4
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Owen argues that the enhanced penalty statute requires “both a
causal link and a certain temporal relationship” with the red-light statute,
such that it requires a red-light violation “before the accident and before
the resulting injury or death.” Owen thus contends that he is not guilty of
violating the enhanced penalty statute because he committed a red-light
violation only after he collided with the Jeep.

¶11 The State disagrees, asserting first that the enhanced penalty
statute uses the word “accident” instead of “collision,” which is a broader
term covering the entire event that begins when Owen struck the Jeep and
ends when the vehicles came to rest. The State therefore concludes that
because “the required conduct is the violation of the red-light statute and
the required result is the accident causing serious physical injury or death,”
the enhanced penalty statute’s causation requirement is satisfied.

¶12 We review the interpretation of statutes de novo. Cao v. PFP
Dorsey Invs., LLC, 257 Ariz. 109, 113 ¶ 15 (2024). “Our task in statutory
construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” In re
Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (quoting BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018)). To effectuate the text “we
interpret statutes according to their plain language,” id., giving “words
‘their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that
a different meaning is intended,’” State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, 228 ¶ 10
(2023) (quoting Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd.,
243 Ariz 539, 541 ¶ 7 (2018)). And “[w]here unambiguous, we apply the
express terms of a . . . statutory provision without resorting to secondary
methods of construction.” Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395, 398 ¶ 13 (2023)
(quoting Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs,
249 Ariz. 396, 406 ¶ 28 (2020)).

¶13 We are also mindful that the provisions of a penal statute “must
be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice
and effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in § 13-101.”
A.R.S. § 13-104. One of the stated purposes set forth in A.R.S. § 13-101(2)
is “[t]o give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed . . . .” We
turn to consider what constitutes a red-light violation.
5
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

A. Arizona’s Red-Light Statute

¶14 Owen asserts that any red-light violation requires a driver’s
failure to “stop before entering the intersection and . . . remain standing.”
The State counters that a driver can commit a red-light violation without
ever entering the intersection, as does the court of appeals, Gordon, 257 Ariz.
at 100 ¶ 21, and the dissent, infra ¶ 43.

¶15 As noted, the red-light statute requires: (1) a driver facing a
red-light to “stop”; (2) “before entering the intersection”; and (3) “remain
standing until an indication to proceed is shown.” § 28-645(A)(3)(a)
(Emphasis added.) Thus, a red-light violation can only occur in one of two
ways: (1) when a driver’s vehicle enters an intersection facing a steady, red
signal without stopping; or (2) after having come to a stop before an
intersection with a red light, the driver enters the intersection against the
red light. In either event, the driver must enter the intersection to commit
a violation. See Flashberg v. Krebs, 8 Ariz. App. 254, 256 (1968) (stating that
a materially identical prior version of § 28-645(A)(3)(a) “imposes the duty
to stop for a red light before entering an intersection”) 4; see also Lemieux v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 214, 215 (1982) (noting that liability under a
materially identical prior version of § 28-645(A)(3)(a) “turns on the precise
location of the [driver’s] vehicle at the moment the light turned red”). 5
Moreover, the Legislature has literally drawn a line to demarcate at what
point a violation occurs by defining an intersection as “the area embraced
within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines . . . .” A.R.S.
§ 28-601(8). 6

¶16 Accepting the State’s argument would void the requirement to
stop “before entering the intersection.” Likewise, the dissent’s

4 In 1968, § 28-645(A)(3)(a) provided that: “Vehicular traffic facing the
signal shall stop before entering the cross walk on the near side of the
intersection or, if there is no cross walk, then before entering the
intersection, and shall remain standing until green or ‘Go’ is shown
alone . . . .”
5 In 1982, § 28-645(A)(3)(a) stated that: “Vehicular traffic facing a steady
red signal alone shall stop before entering the intersection, and shall remain
standing until an indication to proceed is shown . . . .”
6 We have identified the intersection in the Appendix in yellow as defined
by the statute.
6
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

overemphasis on “stop” as the “actus reus” negates the intersection
element. Infra ¶ 45. And we must “give meaning to ‘[e]ach word, phrase,
clause, and sentence [of a statute] so that no part will be void, inert,
redundant, or trivial.’” Mussi, 255 Ariz. at 398 ¶ 13 (first alteration in
original) (quoting City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 72 (1949)).

¶17 Thus, in the matter before us, Owen could not commit a red-light
violation until after his vehicle crossed the connection of the lateral curb
lines comprising the intersection of SR 95 and Acoma Blvd. We next
consider the circumstances in which the enhanced penalty statute applies
to an accident.

B. Arizona’s Enhanced Penalty Statute

¶18 Owen argues that because the accident occurred before he went
through the red light, any red-light violation did not result in an accident.
The State asserts—as the court of appeals, Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶ 15, and
the dissent, infra ¶ 49, likewise reason—that the accident here, for purposes
of imposing an enhanced penalty, constituted an entire series of events
commencing with the initial impact and continuing through the
intersection. Thus, the State further argues that “[t]he contact with the
victim’s vehicle and defendant’s vehicle was a simultaneous event with
failing to stop for a red light and barreling through the entire intersection.”
The State therefore concludes that “Owen’s failure to stop at a red light and
remain standing directly caused both vehicles to go through the entire
intersection and cause the death of [the Jeep’s passenger].”

¶19 An enhanced penalty for a civil traffic violation only applies if:
(1) a driver violates a specified statute; (2) that “violation results in an
accident”; and (3) that accident “caus[es] serious physical injury or death to
another person.” § 28-672(A)(1). As noted by the court of appeals, the
Legislature did not define “results in.” Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 100 ¶ 18.
Accordingly, we may look to a dictionary to “define a word’s natural and
obvious meaning.” See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 (1997). And in this
case, because “results in” is a phrasal verb that carries the same general
meaning as its verb, we consider the definition of “result.” See, e.g., Bryan
A. Garner, The Chicago Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation 82 (2016).

7
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶20 Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2002) defines
“result” as “to happen or issue as a consequence or effect.” 7 An accident
is thus a consequence of, or the effect of, a moving violation, which makes
the violation a cause of the resulting accident. Cause, Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The enhanced penalty statute, therefore,
establishes a relationship between a moving violation and an accident that
constitutes “[a] sequence of causally connected events.” Causation, The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (3d ed. 2015) (discussing event
causation, involving “the act of bringing about an effect, which may be an
event”). Accordingly, the plain terms of the enhanced penalty statute
require a sequence of events: first, a moving violation, and then, an
accident, regardless of whether the accident consists of a single event or a
series of events.

¶21 The State therefore errs in arguing that an accident that occurs
simultaneously with a violation can satisfy the enhanced penalty statute’s
requirements. Such a conclusion negates the necessary causal relationship
by conflating a sequence of two events into one continuous or simultaneous
event. See A.R.S. § 13-203 (providing that “[c]onduct is the cause of a result
when” it is the but-for cause of a result and “[t]he relationship between the
conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by
the statute defining the offense.”). 8 This error is illustrated with a
comparison to our robbery statute, A.R.S. § 13-1902.

7 We cite to the 4th edition of Webster’s New World College Dictionary
because it is close in time to the enactment of the version of § 28-672 before
us, see 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 297 § 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.), and it focuses on
the actual use of language and includes terms and usage that first appeared
in the United States. ix (Michael Agnes, Ed. in Chief, 4th ed. 2002).
Furthermore, “[l]inguistic evidence is collected on a daily basis in the form
of citations of words and expressions used in print and speech.” Id.
8 Section 13-203 applies to our construction of the enhanced penalty
statute pursuant to § 13-102(D): “Except as otherwise expressly provided,
or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this title shall
govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside
this title.”
8
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶22 Section 13-1902(A) provides:

A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any
property of another from his person or immediate presence
and against his will, such person threatens or uses force
against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of
property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or
retaining property.

(Emphasis added.) Section 13-1901(2) further provides that “‘[i]n the
course of committing’ includes any of the defendant’s acts beginning with
the initiation and extending through the flight from a robbery.” In
contrast, there is no language in the enhanced penalty statute to suggest
that it is sufficient for a moving violation to begin and extend through an
accident, or vice versa. The moving violation and accident events are
independent and must proceed sequentially for the enhanced penalty
statute to apply. Nonetheless, the court of appeals and the dissent share
the State’s conclusion with similar reasoning and with misplaced reliance
on inapposite cases.

¶23 As noted, the court of appeals relied on Powers to define an
accident as consisting of a series of events. Gordon 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶ 15.
Powers involved a driver who accidentally struck a mother and her infant
daughter, killing the mother and seriously injuring the daughter, and then
driving away. Powers, 200 Ariz. at 125 ¶ 2. The question before the court
was whether the driver could be charged with one or two counts of leaving
the scene of an accident. Id. ¶ 3. The driver challenged the second count
as multiplicitous, which would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,
because there was only one accident scene. Id. ¶ 5. The State countered
that there were two separate accidents, one involving the mother and the
second involving the infant. Id. at 126 ¶ 7. The court concluded that
“[t]he plain and ordinary meanings of the terms ‘accident’ and ‘scene of the
accident’ do not depend on the number of victims. As commonly
understood, only one accident scene exists even though accidents often
involve multiple victims and impacts.” Id. ¶ 9. 9

9 On review before this Court, we noted that “[n]othing in the statute’s
language refers to accident victims—the focus is on the scene of an
accident.” State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 363, 364 ¶ 8 (2001).
9
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶24 Given the Double Jeopardy context and the crux of the analysis,
it is clear that the court was engaged in determining the appropriate unit of
prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Moninger, 258 Ariz. 18, 22 ¶ 12 (2024)
(“Whether conduct is divisible into separate and distinct violations is
informed by the scope of the relevant statute's allowable unit of
prosecution.”). Thus, Powers’ consideration of what constitutes an
accident is inapposite to this case because the unit of prosecution is not at
issue, let alone the number of victims or impacts. 10 Additionally, the court
of appeals’ misplaced focus on “accident” leads to a conclusion that
conflates the predicate event—a red-light violation—with the resulting
event, the fatal accident. As discussed, the enhanced penalty statute
requires a red-light violation to precede a fatal accident.

¶25 With respect to the dissent’s analysis and conclusion, it
contradicts our statutory interpretation jurisprudence, overlooks the
successive nature of the causal relationship between a red-light violation
and a fatal accident, and misapprehends the application of victim rights.

¶26 First, the dissent seeks to combine the red-light and enhanced
penalty statutes to create a general safety measure “so that the language of
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a) must be read in the context of the two provisions
together.” Infra ¶ 40. Respectfully, the fact that the red-light statute is
enumerated in the enhanced penalty statute necessarily requires that the
two be read together. Regardless, as the dissent acknowledges, the
enhanced penalty statute cannot change the meaning of the red-light
statute. Infra ¶ 41. Nonetheless, the dissent asserts that the meaning of
both statutes “should be assessed through the lens—the context—of the
overall object of the combined statutes,” which is “to prevent serious or
fatal injuries by requiring vehicles to stop before the intersection at a red
light.” Id. However, we have previously analyzed legislative action
regarding the enhanced penalty statute and concluded that “it is clear that
the [L]egislature’s primary focus was on addressing non-driver traffic
fatalities.” State v. Patel, 251 Ariz. 131, 139 ¶ 36 (2021). Furthermore, “[i]t
is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a
statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.” State ex rel.
Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 209 (1960); see also Mussi, 255 Ariz. at 402

10 The same is true for the court of appeals’ citations to Commonwealth v.
Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438 (Pa. 2021), and Nield v. State, 677 N.E.2d 79 (In.
1997).
10
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶ 34 (“It is a basic principle that courts will not read into a statute something
which is not within the manifest intention of the [L]egislature as indicated
by the statute itself.” (quoting Town of Scottsdale v. State ex rel. Pickrell, 98
Ariz. 382, 386 (1965))). This takes us to the second error.

¶27 Our colleagues’ invocation of Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2009), as well as the court of appeals’ approving citation, is
problematic for two reasons. First, the Brogdon court utilized a method of
statutory interpretation inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. And
second, the Brogdon court effectively rewrote the statute in question, an
approach inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence.

¶28 In Brogdon, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that “[i]n
construing statutes, we look to the literal language of the statute, the rules
of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of
which is to construe the statute so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Where
the literal language does not square with reason or intent, then the literal must
yield.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

¶29 Looking to the text, utilizing canons of construction, and
employing rules of reason and logic is all consistent with our jurisprudence.
And at first glance, it may seem our approach to applying the plain
meaning of a statute—the “literal language” in the parlance of Brogdon—is
in accord with the Brogdon court. Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11
(2003) (noting that we apply the plain meaning of a statute “unless [it]
would lead to impossible or absurd results”). However, Brogdon’s
approach permits a court to ignore the plain meaning of the text if it
perceives a departure from legislative intent. In other words, Brogdon
engages in discerning legislative intent and then considers the text. That
is not our method. We do not look beyond the text of a statute to discern
a legislative purpose absent ambiguity because the plain meaning of the
text itself reflects the intent of the Legislature. S. Arizona Home Builders
Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023) (“Statutory
interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of the words the
[L]egislature chose to use.”); Farris v. Advantage Cap. Corp., 217 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 5
(2007) (“A statute’s plain language is the best indicator of legislative
intent, and we will not ‘engage in other means of statutory interpretation’
unless a statute is ambiguous.” (quoting Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212
Ariz. 255, 257 ¶ 7 (2006))); see also State ex rel. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v.
Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432, 437 ¶¶ 23– 24 (2023) (Bolick, Beene, Montgomery, and
11
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

King JJ., concurring) (rejecting an approach to statutory interpretation
whose “primary goal . . . is to discern and give effect to legislative intent”
instead of seeking to “cogently and consistently apply a plain meaning
approach” in order to avoid divergent outcomes). The Brogdon court’s
approach, and that of the dissent, further illustrates how this approach can
run afoul of other principles of interpretation. Tunkey, 254 Ariz. at 437
¶ 24.

¶30 Applying its stated method of statutory interpretation, the
Brogdon court interpreted its red-light statute 11 to “require[] that a driver
facing a red traffic light stop behind the stop line or crosswalk and also
behind those vehicles stopped in observance of the traffic light.” 683 S.E.2d
at 104. (Emphasis added.) In reaching this result, Brogdon added
language to its statute as the dissent does to ours. Infra ¶ 46. But “it is
not the function of the courts to rewrite statutes.” City of Phoenix v. Butler,
110 Ariz. 160, 162 (1973). “Moreover, we recognize that a judicial
expansion of statutory language can violate a defendant’s due process right
to fair warning.” Powers, 200 Ariz. at 126 ¶ 8. And if we were to adopt
Brogdon’s logic and that of our dissenting colleagues, then a red-light
violation could occur anytime a vehicle rear-ended another one anywhere
before a red light, regardless of how far it occurred before the intersection.
Say, for example, the 80th car from a red light in a traffic jam rear-ends the
79th car. The dissent’s logic would result in a red-light violation in this
situation, even though they were a quarter mile from the intersection. See
infra ¶ 46 (asserting that “’[b]efore the intersection can be three inches, ten
feet, thirty feet, or some other distance.”).

¶31 Finally, the third error concerns the errant invocation of the
Victims’ Bill of Rights. Restitution is certainly a constitutionally
guaranteed right. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8); Patel, 251 Ariz. at 134

11 Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-21 (a)(3)(A) (2014), the statute at issue in Brogdon,
provides:

Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED
signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there
is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side
of the intersection or, if there is no crosswalk, before entering
the intersection, and shall remain standing until an indication
to proceed is shown.
12
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

¶ 11. But for restitution to be due here, Owen must be “convicted of the
criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or injury.” Art. 2,
§ 2.1(A)(8).

¶32 However, Owen’s red-light violation did not result in the
accident because the accident occurred prior to Owen entering the
intersection. Instead, the accident was the result of—a consequence
of—Owen’s failure to stop before his vehicle collided with the Jeep, which
is a violation of § 28-701(A). 12 However, the Legislature did not include a
violation of § 28-701(A) in the enhanced penalty statute. Therefore, Owen
does not stand convicted of criminal conduct for which restitution could be
ordered.

¶33 The circumstances here reflect an outcome the Legislature may
wish to address. See Patel, 251 Ariz. at 140 ¶ 37 (noting legislative action
to address a perceived statutory “loophole” involving a driver who ran a
red light and killed a pedestrian). Regardless, the fact that the plain
meaning of the enhanced penalty statute does not achieve the dissent’s
preferred resolution does not make our application of its plain meaning
absurd. Infra ¶ 58.

CONCLUSION

¶34 For the reasons stated, we vacate the court of appeals’ opinion
and affirm the superior court’s order reversing the municipal court’s
judgment of conviction and directing a verdict of acquittal.

12 Consequently, the dissent’s claim that our interpretation “absolves
Owen of full accountability” is incorrect. Infra ¶ 48. It is up to the State
to charge the appropriate offense.
13
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
Opinion of the Court

APPENDIX

https://az511.gov/

Owen’s vehicle and the Jeep moved right to left through the intersection.
See supra ¶ 2.

14
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

BOLICK, J., joined by PELANDER, J. (Retired), dissenting:

¶35 On January 14, 2022, Gregory James Owen was driving his
motorhome trying to make it through a yellow light before it turned red.
He failed to get there in time as the light turned red before his arrival. Had
his vehicle entered the intersection on the red light and then smashed into
other vehicles thereby causing serious physical injury or death, he would
have been subject to an enhanced criminal penalty.

¶36 But in regard to the criminal offense, under the majority’s
view, Owen was lucky. Because standing between him and the
intersection was a Jeep Grand Cherokee that had properly stopped for the
red light. As the trial court found, Owen’s motor home “barrel[ed] into
the victim’s vehicle . . . forcing both of the vehicles through the red light
and finally coming to a stop on the other side of the intersection.” The
Jeep’s backseat passenger/victim was killed. But Owen, according to the
majority here, was not subject to the enhanced criminal statute because the
initial crash occurred before Owen’s motor home hurtled into the
intersection.

¶37 If this seems a discordant, improbable result, that is because
the enhanced penalty statute does not split hairs in this fashion; and to the
extent it is ambiguous, it is legally absurd to interpret it in the fashion the
majority does here. For that reason, we would affirm the court of appeals’
unanimous holding that the relevant statutes “do[] not require a vehicle to
have entered the intersection before causing the accident,” State v. Gordon,
257 Ariz. 95, 97 ¶ 2 (App. 2024), and uphold Owen’s conviction.

¶38 The enhanced criminal penalty statute applies if a motorist
commits one of several enumerated moving violations “and the violation
results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death to another
person.” A.R.S. § 28-672(A). The predicate statute at issue here is A.R.S.
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a), which provides in relevant part that “vehicular traffic
facing a steady red signal alone shall stop before entering the intersection
and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown.”

¶39 In interpreting statutes, if the point of the statute is obvious
from its text, we are admonished to effectuate it as best we can with fidelity

15
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

to the text. This is referred to as the “presumption against ineffectiveness”
canon, which instructs that “[a] textually permissible interpretation that
furthers rather than obstructs the [statute]’s purpose should be favored.”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 63 (2012) (“This canon follows inevitably from the facts that
(1) interpretation always depends on context, (2) context always includes
evident purpose, and (3) evident purpose always includes effectiveness.”);
see also In re Chalmers, 571 P.3d 885, 889 ¶ 18 (2025) (citing State v. Serrato,
568 P.3d 756, 760 ¶ 16 (2025)).

¶40 The majority essentially interprets § 28-645(A)(3)(a) in
isolation as a red-light-running statute, so that if a vehicle manages to skid
to a stop before entering the intersection on a light that has turned red, or
slams into legally stopped vehicles that prevent it from entering the
intersection, technically no violation has occurred. But once the statute is
conjoined with § 28-672(A), the combination is clearly a safety measure, so
that the language of § 28-645(A)(3)(a) must be read in the context of the two
provisions together.

¶41 That is not to say, at all and to the contrary, that the second
statute changes the meaning of the first, but rather that the meaning of both
should be assessed through the lens—the context—of the overall object of
the combined statutes. Chalmers, 571 P.3d at 889 ¶ 16 n.2 (setting forth in
pari materia doctrine). Plainly, that object is to prevent serious or fatal
injuries by requiring vehicles to stop before the intersection at a red light.
As we explain below, the conclusion that there is no enhanced penalty
where death is precipitated by an accident that initially occurs before the
intersection and is continued through the intersection—that is, where the
offending driver has not stopped for a red light before the intersection and
death or serious injury occurs after the vehicles proceed through the
intersection—is at best a hypertechnical one that defeats the statutes’ clear
purpose. Given that a plain-meaning approach would lead to a different
result, we should favor that interpretation.

¶42 Construing § 28-645(A)(3)(a), the majority aptly observes that
it requires “(1) a driver facing a red-light to ‘stop’; (2) ‘before entering the
intersection’; and (3) ‘remain standing until an indication to proceed is
shown.’” Supra ¶ 15 (emphasis in original). That is exactly right. It

16
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

should be clear that if these three elements are satisfied, as they are here,
the statute is violated; and if that violation causes an accident that results in
death or serious injury, an enhanced penalty accrues.

¶43 But the majority rewrites the statute to add a fourth element,
holding that “the driver must enter the intersection to commit a violation.”
Supra ¶ 15. Had the Legislature intended such meaning, it could have said
“vehicular traffic may not enter an intersection on a red light,” or words to
that effect. Had it done so, we would be obliged to enforce that language,
whatever the consequence. But it did not.

¶44 This added fourth element, in the majority’s view, is the
crucial element, concluding that “a red-light violation can only be
committed once the vehicle enters an intersection.” Supra ¶ 3. Thus, the
fact that “Gregory James Owen rear-ended a Jeep stopped at a red light,
killing one of the Jeep’s passengers,” supra ¶ 1, does not, in the majority’s
view, amount to violating a statute instructing that on a red light, a driver
“shall stop before entering the intersection.” Supra ¶ 2 (citing
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a)).

¶45 In contrast to the majority, in our view, the statute’s operative
term is stop. That is the actus reus of the violation. In its three elements,
the statute tells us what, where, and when. The “when” is a solid red light.
The “what” is to stop. And the “where” is before the intersection. 13 Under
this plain reading, the entry of the vehicle into the intersection is not an
implicit (much less dispositive) element of the crime, but merely proof
positive that the crime was committed. Indeed, by shearing off the
antecedent “before” from “the intersection,” the majority renders that
crucial term devoid of meaning, which the majority aptly instructs is an
inappropriate way to read a statute. Supra ¶ 16.

13 The majority correctly notes that a statute defines “intersection.” Supra
¶ 15 (quoting A.R.S. § 28 -601(8) (defining intersection as “the area
embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines”).
That is of no particular moment here, except to designate where a motorist
must fail to stop (before entering it) in order for the requisite crime to be
committed.
17
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

¶46 “Before the intersection” can be three inches, ten feet, thirty
feet, or some other distance. That necessarily depends on whether vehicles
are already stopped at the light. 14 See Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99, 104
(Ga. App. 2009) (construing similar statutory language and concluding that
“a reasonable reading of the statute requires that a driver facing a red traffic
light stop behind the stop line or crosswalk and also behind those vehicles
stopped in observance of the traffic light”). 15 Even Owen’s counsel
conceded at oral argument that the proper place to stop at a red light is

14 To support its contrary reading of the statute, the majority cites Lemieux
v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 214 (1982). Supra ¶ 15. There the Court stated
that “[t]he issue presented in this special action is if persons who have been
previously hypnotized concerning the matters of the litigation will be
permitted to testify at a civil trial.” Lemieux, 132 Ariz. at 215. The Court’s
focus on that singular issue renders its brief summary of a prior version of
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a) the very definition of dictum.
15 The majority criticizes the dissent for citing Brogdon, even though it is
the most on-point case the parties cited, both in terms of an analogous
statute and facts (although Brogdon, unlike Owen, eventually stopped
before the intersection due to the chain reaction of stopped vehicles). The
majority disavows Brogdon because it says that where the literal statutory
language does not square with reason or intent, then the literal must yield.
Supra ¶¶ 27– 30. By contrast, this Court applies the plain meaning of
statutory language rather than searching for legislative intent, see State v.
Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432, 438 ¶¶ 30– 32 (2023) (Bolick, J., joined by Beene,
Montgomery, and King, JJ., concurring), and we are glad that the entire
Court here embraces that approach. This dissenting opinion is entirely
textualist in its approach. Thus, though we too do not embrace the one
portion of Brogdon on which the majority focuses, we agree with the Brogdon
court that it engaged in “a reasonable reading of the statute,” and we are
presented with no equally on-point authority that reaches a contrary result.
18
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

behind a vehicle that has already stopped, which surely reflects common
knowledge. 16

¶47 Nor, as the majority concedes, is the fact that the accident was
a continuous series of events significant. We agree that the term “results
in” suggests that the combination of the requisite moving violation and an
accident triggers an enhanced penalty “regardless of whether the accident
consists of a single event or a series of events.” Supra ¶ 20. Given that
concession, we are not sure how the majority can find no violation here
even under its expansive reading of the statutory elements, given that
Owen’s vehicle did not come to an eventual stop until after the intersection.

¶48 Clearly, Owen failed to stop at the red light before the
intersection. Indeed, the municipal court, superior court, and court of
appeals all agreed that Owen violated § 28-645(A)(3)(a)). As the trial court
found, the Jeep’s driver slowed her car to a stop when the light turned red.
By contrast, Owen made a fatal miscalculation about being able to beat the
light. Owen plowed his motorhome into the Jeep at more than thirty miles
per hour. Both vehicles then hurtled through the intersection, leading
ultimately to the Jeep passenger’s death. By the statute’s plain language,
the fact that the catastrophe began a car’s length before the intersection does
not absolve Owen of the enhanced penalty.

¶49 Indeed, the majority unpersuasively suggests an “accident”
connotes a split-second (or split-millisecond) moment of impact. See supra
¶¶ 1, 20–22. That would be a “collision,” which is not the term used in the
statute. Accidents, by contrast, are often unfolding events, such as a chain-
reaction crash. See Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶¶ 14–15 (collecting case law
and dictionary definitions to that effect). Here, as the trial court found, the
vehicles traveled in tandem after the initial collision through the

16 Owen’s counsel indicated, and the majority here asserts, supra ¶ 32, that
Owen might have violated a different statute, such as excessive speed or
following too closely. Perhaps so. But Owen may well have violated
multiple laws. Under a correct interpretation of § 28-645(A)(3)(a), he is
guilty of failing to stop before the intersection on a red light, which makes
him eligible for an enhanced criminal penalty under § 28-672(A). That is
what the State charged and proved.
19
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

intersection until they came to a stop on the other side of the intersection.
Surely this type of accident is encompassed within the scope of the statutes.

¶50 Similarly, the majority excises from § 28-645(A)(3)(a) the
passage “and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed has been
shown.” How does a vehicle “remain standing” if the statutory command
is violated only upon entering the intersection? This Court has repeatedly
held that we disfavor statutory readings that render words superfluous.
Chalmers, 571 P.3d at 889 ¶ 18 (citing Serrato, 568 P.3d at 760 ¶ 16). Read as
a whole, the statute requires vehicles to stop before entering the intersection
and remain standing before the light turns green. Owen failed to heed that
requirement.

¶51 Nor does the causation requirement in the enhanced penalty
statute change the result. Owen’s violation of § 28-645(A)(3)(a)—his
failure to stop at the red light before the intersection—was clearly the
but-for cause of the accident that killed the Jeep’s passenger. See supra
¶ 20. No independent or intervening circumstances or factors affected the
outcome. Causation, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The causing
or producing of an effect.”).

¶52 The majority resorts to statutory interpretation rules to guide
its analysis. Supra ¶ 13. Specifically, it cites A.R.S. § 13-104, which
instructs that penal statutes “must be construed according to the fair
meaning of their terms and to promote justice and effect the objects of the
law, including the purposes stated in § 13-101.” That statute in turn states
that one purpose is to “give fair warning of the nature of the conduct
proscribed.” A.R.S. § 13-101(2).

¶53 But fair warning of what? The statutes on their face give fair
warning that a driver who fails to stop before an intersection on a red light
and causes death or serious injury will be held to account. The obvious
point of the statute is to prevent harm for failing to stop. It is not apparent
what warning is omitted from, and what unfair prejudice is inflicted upon,
a person who fails to stop for a red light before the intersection and in the
process strikes a lawfully stopped vehicle and causes death or serious
injury. Such a plain reading, it seems to us, promotes justice and effects
the objects of the law.

20
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

¶54 The majority overlooks at least four other purposes stated by
§ 13-101, all of which, in our view, are served by the plain meaning of the
statute: “To proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests” (§ 101(1)); “To
differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses
and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each” (§ 101(4)); “To insure the
public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the
deterrent influence of the sentences authorized” (§ 101(5)); and “To impose
just and deserved punishment on those whose conduct threatens the public
peace” (§ 101(6)). A reading of the statute that absolves Owen of full
accountability for his actions fails all those objectives.

¶55 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees victims the right to
justice and due process. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A). As Owen was
charged under the enhanced penalty statute, decedent’s family acquired
victim status. See State v. Patel, 251 Ariz. 131, 133 ¶ 3 (2021); State v.
Hamilton, 249 Ariz. 303, 306 ¶ 6 (App. 2020). The enhanced penalty statute
also provides for victim restitution. A.R.S. § 28-672(G). Of course, the
right to restitution evaporates under the majority’s reading of the statute.

¶56 In that regard, it is the Jeep’s driver who did not have fair
warning of the statute’s scope, as altered by the majority here. Had she
seen Owen’s motorhome barreling toward the stopped Jeep in her rear-
view mirror, and tried to avoid an accident by entering the intersection
against the red light with the exact same result (an accident leading to the
passenger’s death), perversely she would have preserved the family’s
restitution rights, because then, in the majority’s view, Owen would have
committed the predicate crime leading to the enhanced penalty.

¶57 But only if she was able to move the entire vehicle into the
intersection before the crash. Had an inch of the rear bumper not yet
entered the intersection, then in the majority’s eyes the accident would have
occurred before the intersection and Owen would not have violated
§ 28-645(A)(3)(a). Why would the Legislature possibly have enacted a law
to penalize the first result but not the second? Indeed, it would seem
logical that plowing into a car stopped for a red light would constitute a
worse infraction than entering the intersection on a red light, because (1) the
driver seeing a stopped car would be on notice that the light was red or

21
STATE V. HON. GORDON/OWEN
JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Ret.) Dissenting

changing to red (here, it was red); and (2) hitting a stopped car waiting for
the red light to change would definitely, not merely probably, cause serious
damage. It is inconceivable that the Legislature would assign an enhanced
penalty to a driver that hurtled into an intersection on a red light, thereby
causing death or serious injury, but absolve a driver who did exactly that
while simultaneously propelling through the intersection a vehicle that was
stopped for the red light.

¶58 Which leads to our final argument. It is difficult to clear the
threshold into legal absurdity, but as illustrated by the foregoing example,
the statute as the majority construes it does so. “A result is absurd if it is
so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have
been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and
discretion.” State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶ 17 (2001) (quoting Perini
Land Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The cited case in turn provides that “[i]f enforcing the
clear language of the constitution results in an absurd situation, the [C]ourt
may look behind the bare words of the provision to discern its intended
effect.” Perini, 170 Ariz. at 383. If two plausible statutory interpretations
exist, the Court should choose the one that makes sense. See Scalia &
Garner, at 234 (“Some absurd outcomes can be avoided without doing real
violence to the text.”). Our colleagues obviously believe their statutory
interpretation is correct; but if they think “before entering the intersection”
can plausibly mean a command to stop at a red light before the intersection,
they should interpret it in that manner to avoid an absurd and manifestly
unjust result.

¶59 Surely after this case the Legislature can, if it wishes, further
clarify what we consider an already clear statute. But even if it does, it will
be cold comfort to the victim family, which in our view was clearly within
the intended protective scope of the enhanced penalty statute.

¶60 For all the foregoing reasons, and with great respect to our
colleagues, we dissent.

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