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Nov. 28, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Arizona v. Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto

Arizona Supreme Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: CR-24-0281-PR

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

ASALIA GUADALUPE ALVAREZ-SOTO,
Appellant.

No. CR-24-0281-PR
Filed November 28, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
The Honorable Jason Holmberg, Judge
No. S1100CR201703501
AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
258 Ariz. 417 (App. 2024)
VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy
Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Jacob R. Lines
(argued), Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for State of
Arizona

Rosemary A. Gordon Pánuco (argued), Attorney for Asalia Guadalupe
Alvarez-Soto

Seth M. Apfel (argued), Apfel Law Group, P.L.L.C., Phoenix; and David J.
Euchner, Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE,
MONTGOMERY, KING, and CRUZ joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider two issues arising from a search and seizure of
evidence and subsequent litigation to suppress it: (1) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
of narcotics discovered during a traffic stop; and (2) whether State v.
Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107 (App. 2010), correctly states the appellate standard
of review for video evidence. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because the trooper who conducted the traffic stop had
reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. We further hold that Sweeney does
not correctly state the appellate standard of review for video evidence
because appellate courts may not independently review evidence.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 14, 2018, while patrolling Interstate 10 (“I-10”)
in Pinal County, Trooper Ashton Shewey (“Shewey”) suspected Defendant,
Asalia Guadalupe Alvarez-Soto, violated A.R.S. § 28-721(B) (impeding
traffic flow by failing to drive in the right lane) and conducted a traffic stop.

¶3 During this stop, while processing a written warning, Shewey
asked Defendant about her travel plans and requested her consent to search
the vehicle, which Defendant declined. Shewey then requested consent to
conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle with his canine, Chili, and Defendant
agreed. Chili, trained to detect narcotics, alerted to the driver-side of the
car, leading to a search that uncovered a suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle
containing fifty-five pounds of marijuana. Shewey arrested Defendant and
the State charged her with possession and transportation of marijuana for
sale.

¶4 Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized
during the stop, arguing, in part, that Shewey lacked reasonable suspicion
for a traffic violation. At the evidentiary hearing, Shewey testified about

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

his law enforcement experience, decision to initiate the traffic stop, and
conduct during the stop.

¶5 Shewey began his law-enforcement career in 2009 with the
Pinal County Sheriff’s Department (“PCSD”). Before joining the PCSD,
Shewey attended the Southern Arizona Law Enforcement Training Center
Academy, where he received general training on traffic laws, illegal
narcotics, felony codes, and basic traffic investigations. He also attended a
four-week post academy training and then completed an additional
fourteen-week field training program. During his time with the PCSD,
Shewey became a patrol deputy, working in the Casa Grande, Stanfield,
and Maricopa areas. His responsibilities included making traffic stops,
responding to calls, and investigating criminal violations, thefts, burglaries,
and any other calls made to the 911 dispatch center. While on patrol, he
focused on drug interdiction.

¶6 After working on patrol for two years, the PCSD promoted
Shewey to canine deputy in part due to his drug trafficking enforcement
activities. The promotion required a physical, written, and oral board
exam. Shewey began working as a canine deputy under the High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area task force. He worked as a PCSD canine deputy for
about three years.

¶7 Shewey then joined the Arizona Department of Public Safety
where he completed its twelve-week trooper academy, which included
training on advanced traffic investigations. After completing his first year
as a highway trooper, a prerequisite to serve as a canine trooper, Shewey
became a canine trooper.

¶8 Shewey also testified that he knew drug-trafficking
organizations often use Chevrolet Malibus, specifically models from 2002
to 2008, as “company vehicles”—vehicles used by narcotics couriers
operating out of border cities. Often, these company vehicles have a record
of multiple United States–Mexico border crossings and are newly
registered because trafficking organizations typically purchase them in the
name of the person transporting the narcotics.

¶9 Shewey also testified that, in his experience, it is common
practice on I-10 for troopers to stop vehicles traveling in the middle lane
when traffic passes them on the right because § 28-721(B) mandates “all

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

slower traffic stay to the right.” Troopers enforce § 28-721(B) to deter
collisions and erratic lane changes caused by slower vehicles remaining in
the middle lane.

¶10 In describing Defendant’s traffic stop, Shewey recounted that,
while on patrol, he observed a 2007 Chevrolet Malibu traveling on I-10. He
ran its plate through his license-plate reader and conducted a border
crossings check on it. The results revealed that the vehicle was newly
registered out of Nogales, Arizona, and recently crossed through the United
States–Mexico border multiple times. This information interested Shewey
because, based on his training and experience, it fit the profile for a
company vehicle. Consequently, Shewey decided to follow Defendant and,
if he observed a traffic violation, to initiate a stop.

¶11 Shewey followed Defendant’s vehicle in the middle lane and
observed it traveling three miles per hour over the posted seventy-five mile
per hour speed limit. After “several minutes” and “several miles,” the
vehicle slowed to seventy miles per hour. When Defendant slowed,
Shewey observed another vehicle, a red SUV, pass her in the right lane.
Shewey’s dashcam video, which was admitted into the evidentiary hearing
record, captured Defendant driving in the middle lane and the red SUV
passing her. Shewey decided to stop Defendant for violating § 28-721(B)
because the red SUV passed her in the right lane, and she was traveling
under the posted speed limit—indicators that she was driving less than the
speed of traffic.

¶12 After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that “the
stop was justified” and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury
convicted Defendant of both marijuana counts, and the court imposed
concurrent five-year prison terms. Defendant appealed. The court of
appeals, in a split opinion, vacated the convictions, holding that Shewey
lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop under § 28-721(B). State v.
Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. 417, 423 ¶ 22 (App. 2024). The State sought review
in this Court. We granted review because this case presents a recurring
issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6,
section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

DISCUSSION

I.

¶13 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an
abuse of discretion, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the ruling. State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58, 60 ¶ 9 (2016). On review,
“we consider ‘only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.’”
State v. Mitcham, 258 Ariz. 432, 437 ¶ 13 (2024) (quoting State v. Thompson,
252 Ariz. 279, 290 ¶ 26 (2022)). We defer to the trial court’s factual findings
if they are supported by the record but review de novo whether those facts
establish reasonable suspicion. See State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, 233 ¶ 6
(2015).

A.

¶14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018). Thus, when
a law enforcement officer unreasonably detains an individual in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially created “exclusionary rule” allows
a court to exclude evidence obtained during the violation. Mitcham, 258
Ariz. at 441 ¶ 32.

¶15 “Law enforcement officers ‘seize’ individuals by temporarily
detaining them during traffic stops.” Thompson, 252 Ariz. at 290 ¶ 28.
Under the Fourth Amendment, officers “can stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if
the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Therefore, an officer only needs
reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. See id.

¶16 An officer’s reasonable suspicion arises from both the
combination of the officer’s perception of the facts and his understanding
of the applicable law. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014).
When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, courts give
deference to the officer’s trained ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious actions. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 24 ¶ 26 (App. 2007).

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

¶17 Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation. Evans, 237
Ariz. at 234 ¶ 8. Courts determine whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed in
consideration of the officer’s training and experience. Id. “Although a mere
‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the
standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for
probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting Prado
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quotation altered)); see also
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.

¶18 Relevant here, the Arizona Legislature codified the
reasonable suspicion standard for traffic violations in A.R.S. § 28-1594: “A
peace officer or duly authorized agent of a traffic enforcement agency may
stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual
or suspected violation of this title . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

B.

¶19 We begin our de novo review to determine if the record
establishes reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop by considering
Shewey’s understanding of the facts and relevant law. See Heien, 574 U.S.
at 60–61. The traffic statute at issue in this case, § 28-721(B), states that:

On all roadways, a person driving a vehicle proceeding at less
than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and
under the conditions then existing shall drive the vehicle in
the right-hand lane then available for traffic or as close as
practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway,
except when overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left
turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.

Based on the evidentiary hearing record, Shewey derived his
understanding of § 28-721(B) from his training and nearly decade of law
enforcement experience. From Shewey’s perspective, Defendant’s speed
fluctuation—from seventy-eight to seventy miles per hour—while traffic in
the right lane advanced, suggested that she was traveling below the normal
speed of traffic. On these facts, combined with Defendant’s failure to move

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

into the right lane, Shewey’s conclusion that a violation of the traffic statute
“may be afoot” satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s minimal reasonable
suspicion threshold. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.

¶20 Defendant contends that Shewey did not have the requisite
reasonable suspicion to lawfully stop Defendant’s vehicle because he
misconstrued § 28-721(B)’s requirements. After an extensive analysis of the
traffic laws, the court of appeals’ majority determined Shewey lacked
reasonable suspicion because his interpretation of § 28-721(B) “cast too
wide a net.” Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 422 ¶ 21 (quoting Sweeney, 224 Ariz.
at 107 ¶ 22). The court reasoned that Shewey’s application of the statute
was not objectively reasonable because it would subject all travelers to
“virtually random seizures.” Id. Specifically, it explained that Shewey
lacked reasonable suspicion because he failed to sufficiently account for the
judicially discerned legislative intent to “provide some measure of
flexibility in certain traffic statutes.” Id. at 421 ¶ 17 (citing State v. Livingston,
206 Ariz. 145, 148 ¶ 10 (App. 2003), for the proposition that statutory
language in A.R.S. § 28-729(1) “requiring drivers to remain ‘as nearly as
practicable’ within a single lane, reflects an ‘express legislative intent to
avoid penalizing brief, momentary, and minor deviations outside the
marked lines.’”).

¶21 We are unpersuaded that Livingston supports the court of
appeals’ conclusion that Shewey lacked reasonable suspicion merely
because Defendant’s driving involved a “brief, momentary, and minor
deviation” from § 28-721(B)’s requirements. We concur with the conclusion
in the court of appeals’ dissenting opinion that the record reflects
Defendant’s continued violation of the statute “rather than a brief and
momentary one.” Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 32 (Gard, J., dissenting).
We need not revisit Livingston’s holding because this case is factually
distinguishable.

¶22 We similarly reject the majority’s assertion that Shewey’s
interpretation of § 28-721(B) would require drivers to violate our speeding
laws to comply with the statute. Id. at 421–22 ¶¶ 18–19. As the dissent
notes, Defendant had “multiple ways to adjust her driving in the minutes
leading up to the stop to ensure compliance with all laws including, at a
minimum, by immediately falling in behind the vehicle in the right-hand
lane when it became obvious that its speed exceeded hers.” Id. at 424 ¶ 30
(Gard, J., dissenting).

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

¶23 The court of appeals also incorrectly reframed the question
before it as one of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
reasonableness. Id. at 421 ¶ 16 (“We address whether drivers on Arizona’s
highways are compelled by § 28-721(B) to move from the middle lane to the
right lane if they are passed by a lone vehicle on the right when the state
has failed to elicit any testimony as to the speed of that vehicle.”). Whether
Defendant in fact violated § 28-721(B) is a question for a traffic court; it is
not dispositive of the validity of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
See Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 7 (“The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some
minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” (quoting
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7)).

¶24 The Fourth Amendment does not require an Arizona officer
to interpret every traffic provision with “some measure of flexibility” before
initiating an investigatory stop; it requires only that the officer have a
particularized and objective basis to suspect that a violation may have
occurred. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. An officer’s
reasonable mistake about the facts or the relevant law does not preclude
reasonable suspicion. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60–61 (“To be reasonable is not to
be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the
part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law
in the community’s protection.’” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949)) (citation modified)). In fact, reasonable suspicion may rest
on an objectively reasonable mistake of law when the statute’s application
“requires hard interpretive work.” Id. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); State v.
Stoll, 239 Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). Therefore, the question before us
is whether Shewey’s understanding of § 28-721(B) was objectively
reasonable. See generally Heien, 574 U.S. at 66.

¶25 The phrase “normal speed of traffic at the time and place and
under the conditions then existing” in § 28-721(B) provides no quantitative
metric. Thus, reasonable minds may differ about its interpretation and
application. Indeed, the fact that the court of appeals’ majority and
dissenting opinions, as well as the parties in this case, each offered
competing interpretations confirms that the statute’s application is subject
to legitimate debate. Accordingly, we conclude that if trial and appellate
judges cannot reach consensus on the statute’s proper application even after
exhaustive statutory analysis—“hard interpretive work”—we cannot deem
an officer’s real-time literal interpretation of the law to be objectively

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

unreasonable. Heien, 574 U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); cf. State v.
Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67, 73 ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule because “[i]t is unreasonable to require the police to
predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do
so”).

¶26 The statutory phrase “normal speed of traffic” may be
ambiguous and perhaps provides fodder for a spirited defense against a
§ 28-721(B) citation in traffic court. But the issue before us is not whether
Shewey’s stop would result in an adjudicated traffic offense. Even if
Shewey misinterpreted the law, reasonable suspicion survives if his
mistake was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Heien, 574
U.S. at 61 (“[R]easonable men make mistakes of law, . . . and such mistakes
are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion.”). Shewey
routinely enforced § 28-721(B) and testified it was common practice for
troopers to stop vehicles traveling in the middle lane when traffic passes
them on the right. He observed Defendant traveling below the speed limit,
which prevented him from traveling the speed limit in the middle lane, and
then witnessed the red SUV pass her in the right lane, after which she failed
to move to the right. The court of appeals’ conclusion that Defendant was
penalized solely for being passed is inaccurate. Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz.
at 421–22 ¶ 18. These facts establish that Shewey’s belief was grounded in
experience and a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Thus, further
inquiries into alternative statutory bases for the stop or potentially innocent
explanations for Defendant’s conduct, such as her slowing below the speed
limit upon noticing Shewey’s vehicle, are unnecessary.

¶27 Defendant nevertheless argues that Shewey’s pre-traffic-stop
knowledge of her vehicle’s border crossings and registration in Nogales
cannot justify the seizure. We agree that those background factors—shared
by many lawful motorists—are too generalized to constitute reasonable
suspicion on their own. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 22 (“[C]ircumstances
or factors that do not reliably distinguish between suspect and innocent
behaviors are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion . . . .”). But the
State does not justify Shewey’s stop on this basis. Indeed, as Defendant
conceded at oral argument before us, Shewey’s motive for the traffic stop is
immaterial under the Fourth Amendment because the constitutional
inquiry is whether his justification for the stop was reasonable. Jones v.
Sterling, 210 Ariz. 308, 311 ¶¶ 10–11 (2005) (“[E]vidence seized as a result of
a traffic stop meeting ‘normal’ Fourth Amendment standards is not

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

rendered inadmissible because of the subjective motivations of the police
who made the stop.”). Shewey’s consideration of these factors in deciding
to follow Defendant’s vehicle does not undermine his objectively
reasonable basis for the stop under § 28-721(B).

¶28 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Shewey’s decision
to initiate a brief investigatory stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. His interpretation of § 28-721(B) was objectively reasonable,
his observations of Defendant’s driving supported his suspicion that she
was traveling “less than the normal speed of traffic,” and his actions
reflected his professional judgment rather than arbitrary enforcement. See
Glover, 589 U.S. at 380; Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 7. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to
suppress.

II.

¶29 We next consider whether State v. Sweeney, which implies that
appellate courts should conduct de novo review of video evidence,
correctly states the appellate standard of review. 224 Ariz. at 111 ¶ 12
(positing that appellate courts should conduct an “independent review” of
video evidence because “the trial court is in no better position to evaluate
the video than the appellate court”). We hold Sweeney conflicts with this
Court’s long-standing principle that appellate courts may not
independently review evidence.

¶30 We briefly note that Sweeney’s novel departure from our
appellate standard of review is premised entirely on two inapposite
cases—Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 406 ¶ 13 (App. 2001), and State v.
McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 29 (Iowa 2005). Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 111 ¶ 12.
Danielson did not involve video evidence, but rather the interpretation of
statutes and a divorce decree—both subject to de novo appellate review.
201 Ariz. at 406 ¶ 13. In McCoy, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed video
evidence and affirmed the trial court’s factual findings. 692 N.W.2d at 29.
The court applied de novo review, not as a departure from appellate
deference to trial court fact-finding, but as the requisite standard of review
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. Neither case justifies
Sweeney’s call for “independent” appellate review.

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

¶31 Sweeney’s “independent” appellate review standard also
conflicts with our jurisprudence. In Adair, we reaffirmed that appellate
courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion, viewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in
the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling. 241 Ariz. at 60 ¶ 9. We
defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonably supported
by the record but review de novo the ultimate constitutional question
presented in the motion to suppress. Id. (citing Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 6).
The State argues that Sweeney improperly allowed the court of appeals to
substitute its view of the evidence for the trial court’s credibility findings,
while Defendant contends that a purely visual record warrants
independent appellate review. Both arguments misinterpret the standard
stated in Adair. Adair’s framework already incorporates video evidence
within the ordinary standard of review and reflects Arizona’s
long-standing rule that distinguishes deference to factual findings from de
novo review of legal conclusions.

¶32 Sweeney’s approach, and the court of appeals’ reliance on it
here, rests on the erroneous premise that an appellate court conducts de
novo review of the trial court’s fact-finding when the record includes a
video. Alvarez-Soto, 258 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 10. Although it is obvious that both
courts can view the same recording, the trial court remains uniquely
situated to evaluate video evidence in context. For example, after hearing
testimony explaining what a video depicts, the trial court is in a superior
position to resolve disputes about perspective, timing, or events occurring
beyond the scope of the video, to assess witness credibility and demeanor,
and to integrate those findings with any other evidence presented. The
appellate court’s role is to review whether the trial court’s findings are
reasonably supported by the record, not to reweigh the credibility or effect
of visual evidence itself. Designating video recordings as a unique class of
evidence, subject to de novo review, erases that distinction and vitiates
appellate courts’ deference to trial court fact-finding.

¶33 Appellate courts may, of course, view video evidence to
determine whether a factual finding is clearly unsupported by the
record—that authority already exists within Adair’s two-tier framework.
For example, if a trial court found that a car was blue, but the video plainly
shows it was red, the appellate court may correct that error without
abandoning the deferential standard. However, when a video is open to
differing interpretations or requires contextual testimony, appellate courts

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STATE V. ALVAREZ-SOTO
Opinion of the Court

must defer to the trial court’s findings if reasonably supported by the
evidence. See State v. Steinle, 239 Ariz. 415, 418 ¶ 10 (2016) (recognizing that
a “complete understanding of the total tenor and effect” of video evidence
may depend on accompanying testimony (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988))).

¶34 Under Adair, appellate courts may reconcile any clear
inconsistency between a trial court’s factual findings and what the video
evidence plainly depicts while continuing to review factual findings for
reasonable support in the record and legal conclusions de novo. Adhering
to one unified standard promotes uniformity across evidentiary formats,
reinforces the trial court’s role as the primary factfinder, and prevents
appellate reweighing of evidence under the guise of “independent” review.
See Eric J. Magnuson & Samuel A. Thumma, “Same as It Ever Was”: Why
Audio-Video Recordings in and of Trial Court Proceedings Should Not Change the
Standard of Appellate Review, 24 J. App. Prac. & Process 213, 233 (2024) (“The
format of evidence being challenged on appeal should not alter the
standard of appellate review. Audiovideo [sic] evidence should be treated
the same way that appellate courts treat every other type of evidence, with
the standard of review being clearly erroneous (for factual findings) or an
abuse of discretion (for rulings on admissibility).”). Therefore, to the extent
Sweeney suggests that appellate courts may engage in de novo or
“independent” review of video evidence, we disapprove that standard and
clarify that the Adair standard governs review of all suppression rulings,
including those involving video evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

¶35 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s
motion to suppress based on the traffic stop’s reasonableness, vacate the
court of appeals’ opinion, and remand to the court of appeals to address
Defendant’s claim that Shewey unlawfully extended the traffic stop.

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