Jennings & Turner v. US - Court Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before public ation in the Atlantic and Maryland Re porters. Use rs are requested to noti fy the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that c orrections may be m ade before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUM BIA COURT OF APP EALS No s. 23 - CF -0 205 & 23 - CF - 022 9 R ONNIKA M. J ENNI NGS & D EREK B RIAN T URNER, A P PELLANT S, V. U NITED S TATES, A PPELLEE. Appeal s from the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia (2018 - CF1 - 006028 & 2017 - CF1 - 015352) (Hon. Marisa J. D emeo, Trial Judge) (Argu ed October 16, 2025 Decided February 26, 2026) Matthew M artens, with wh om Zacha ry H alpern, Paul Piazza, an d Leah Fugere wer e on the bri efs, for appellant Ronnika M. Jennings. Madeleine Jose ph, with whom Tobias S. Loss - Eaton, Scott L owder, Abigail Scheper, a nd Susan Whaley were on the briefs, for appellant D ere k Brian Turner. Elizabeth G abriel, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Daniel J. Lenerz, and Michael Truscott, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before B ECKWITH and S HANKER, Associate Judge s, a nd T HOMPSON, Senior Judge. S HANKER, Associate J udge: A v iolent fe ud between residents of the S outheast D.C. ne ighborhoods of Wahler Place and Trenton Park left t hree individuals dead

2 and several more injured over the course of ten m onths in 2016 and 2017. Appella nts Derek Brian Turner and Ronnika Jennings were charge d with dozens of offenses related to these events. Following a jury t rial, Mr. T urner was convicte d of committing two m urders, multiple assaults, an array of firearm offenses, and several obstruction of just ice offenses. Ms. Jennings, a M etropolitan P oli ce D epartment (MPD) employee, was acquitted of her most serious charge s but was convicted of being an accessory after th e fact (AAF) an d obstructing justice for using her positio n within the police depa rtment to assist Mr. Turner i n the wake of his cr imes. We affirm Mr. Turner ’s convict ions for the murders, assaults, an d relat ed fir earm offenses because t hey rest on solid evidentiary and constitut ional ground. T he government, how ever, presented insuffi cient evidenc e to support Ms. Jennings ’s AAF convictions, so those must be reversed. In addition, we agree with all pa rties that both appellants’ obstruction of justice convictions must be vacated. I. Background A. Summary T he string of violen t incidents be tween residents of the Wahler Place a nd Trenton Park ne ighborhoods began in May 2016. S hootings tha t occurred on January 7, February 17, and March 1, 2017, however, form the core of this case. The first incident left its target, Devin Hal l, dead. The second left a bysta nder injured

3 but its two main ta rgets unscathed. The third left Andrew McPhatter, one of the uninjured ta rgets of the Februa ry 17 shooting, dea d. In the days after ea ch of these incidents, Mr. Turner calle d Ms. Jennings on the phone, and Ms. Jennings ran a search in an MPD data base for information re lated to each inc ident before ca lling Mr. Turner back. The next stage of this case began on March 8, w hen police tem porarily seiz ed and then searched Mr. T urner’s car afte r Mr. Turner was the target of an attempted drive - by shooting. This se arch led to evidence conne cting Mr. Turner to the thre e shooting incide nts mentioned a bove — including a g un likely use d in the shootings — and he was arre sted. His two cell phon es were also seized an d then sear ched. Thereafter, Mr. Turner and several associ ates planned to pin ownership of the gu n on someo ne else. Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings we re eventually indict ed for participat ing in the violent feud betw een residents of the two neighborhoods. Following pretria l challenges seeki ng to suppress evidence against them and an eleven - week tri al, a jury convicte d Mr. Turner of most of the cha rges against him and ac quitted Ms. Jennings of all but five of the charges she fa ced.

4 B. The Feud Betw een Residents of Wahler P lace and Trenton Par k In May 2016, a resident of Wahl er Plac e wa s murdered. The next day, Mr. Turner, a lso a Wahler Place re sident, was shot nea rby. Two months later, a Tre nton Park resid ent was shot. Later that same day, Mr. Turner, a female as sociate, and another Wahler Plac e resident named A ntwan Jones were the ta rgets of a shooting nea r Wahler Place. Mr. Jones suffere d non - fatal gunshot wounds, w hile the other two escaped m ostly un harmed. T hat same night, a hail of gunfire disrupted a large social gathering in a parking lot near t he Trenton Park neighborhood, leaving two wounde d and damaging seve ral cars. A month after that, in August 2016, several Trenton Park residents a ppeared in a video posted on YouTube (the “parking lot video ”) in which the y reference d the parking lot shoot out. A video la ter discovered on Mr. Turner ’s pho ne show ed Mr. Turner and another Wahler Place resident sitting in a car while the other Wa hler Place res ident mad e statem ents res ponding to the August 2016 pa rking lot video. On November 23, 2016, a shootin g took place at Whee ler Market, a corner store near Wa hler Place. Mr. Turner was wearing a GPS tracking devic e at the time in connection with a different ma tter, and th e GPS tracki ng data showed his device near Wheeler Ma rket around the time of the shooting.

5 That same day, after the Wheeler M arket incident, Mr. T urner twi ce called Ms. Jennings, an MPD station clerk. Mr. Jones, who was Mr. Turner ’s Wahler Place associate an d Ms. Jennings ’s longti me friend, had introdu ced Mr. Turner to Ms. Jennings. Ms. Jennings worked in a Southeast D.C. police distri ct, where she primarily helpe d members of the public with requests for in formation. As part of her job, Ms. Jennings had access to Cobal t, MPD’s interna l records - management system, along with the Washington Area Law Enforcement System (WALES) and Na tional Crime Informa tion Cente r (NCIC) databa ses, which conta in police informa tion from other source s. Although membe rs of the public cannot access any of these databases, station clerks like Ms. Jennings can use Cobalt to generate a “ public packe t” of certain inform ation — such as a police rep ort documenting a burgl ary intended for use in an ins urance claim — suitable for public disclosure. Cobalt’s “ internal pac ket,” by contrast, contains more se nsitive information, i ncluding the “sourc es, methods, [and ] witnesses” as sociated with a particular inve stigation. On t he day of the Whee ler Market shooting, Ms. Jennings accessed a Cobalt report for th at incident te n minutes afte r Mr. Turner called her. C. The January 7, Fe bruary 17, and March 1, 2017, Shoot ings Shortly after the New Year, on January 7, 2017, a Trenton Park reside nt named Devin Hal l was shot to dea th in his car. One witness tol d 911 that the

6 shooter — one person — had gotten out of a white Lexus bearing p aper tags, shot the victim, and fled i n the same white Le xus. Another witne ss, Sharon Mouton, describ ed seeing a “white, tan - ish” “Pontiac - ish vehicle” in the pa rking lot where the shooting took pl ace. At the time, Mr. Turner owned and drove a white Lexus. Ms. Mouton saw two people g et out of the car and start sho oting, then dri ve quickly away. Ms. Mouton identified one shooter as “he avy - set” and “light skinned - ish” and the other as having “ brown” skin and wearing dreadl ocks. Mr. Jones, one of the victim s in the July 2016 shoot ing along with Mr. Turner, weighed between 250 and 260 poun ds. Mr. Turner w ore dreadlocks at t he time. Polic e recovered . 40 caliber and 10 mil limeter she ll casings from the sc ene of the murder. Two cell phones late r recovered from Mr. T urner had pinged a cell tower 0. 2 miles from the shooting minute s after the shooting t ook place. Mr. Turner was still on G PS monitoring a t the time of the Devin Hall m urder, and his GPS data from that day showed t he GPS device located close to Mr. Turner ’s home around t he time of the murder. Weeks earlie r, however, on December 18 a nd December 23, dat a from Mr. Turner ’s GPS device showed that it was at Mr. Turner’s home, but Mr. Turner was captured on video a t a different loc ation at that sa me time. At trial, the g overnment ’s GPS expert opine d that publicly a vailable inform ation exists o n how to “defeat a GPS d evice.”

7 Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings exchange d phone calls in the days a nd weeks following the shooti ng, on January 8, 12, 15, and 23. After some of these calls, Ms. Jennings searche d for Mr. Turner ’s name in W ALES an d NCIC. I n February 2017, three shootings took place near the Trenton Park neighborhood. First, on February 16, 2017, a Trenton Park resident was shot at by an individual w ho emerged from a “beige” or “golden” ca r. Two h ours later, Ms. Jennings viewed the pol ice report for the shoot ing. Second, on Februa ry 17, 2017, Tre nton Park residents A ndrew McPhatte r, Raheem Osb orne, an d a byst ander, Joseph Tyler, wer e the victims of a shooting. Mr. McPhatter and Mr. Osborne we re driving in Mr. McPhatter ’s car when Mr. Osborne noticed a white car following them. Mr. Osborne later des cribed t he car as a “white Honda - style vehicle, two - door, with paper tags,” w hich he also characterize d as a “Honda Accord.” Minute s later, whe n Mr. McPhat ter and Mr. Osborne parked the car and got out, a man emerged from the white car and bega n shooting at them using a black semi - automa tic firearm. The man wore dreadlocks and a mask. Mr. McPhatter fired back using his own gun, and he and Mr. Osborne fled. Mr. McPhatt er wa s uninjured, but Mr. Osborne was hit in the thigh, and Mr. Tyler was hit in the face and arm.

8 Minutes before the shooting, one of Mr. Turner ’s cell phones pi nged a cell tower in the area. Police recovered ca sings from 10 millimete r and .40 caliber bulle ts at the scene. Three days after t he shooting, Mr. Turner called Ms. Jennings. Th e day after that, on February 21, Ms. Jennings viewed the police report in C obalt for the February 17 shoo ting. Third, on Februa ry 22, 2017, thre e Trenton Park r esi dents were the victims of a shooting in the area around 10 th Street and Alabama Avenue, Southea st. Nine minutes after this shooting, Mr. Turner texted Mr. Jones, “ [C]heck your local news, boy.” Mr. Turner called Ms. Jennings two hours la ter, and Ms. Jennings searched Cobalt for the polic e reports perta ining to the Februa ry 17 and 22 shootings the next morning. The tw o spoke by phone on Februa ry 23 and February 26. On the morning of M arch 1, 2017, Mr. McP hatter was shot to d eath at the intersection of Whe eler Roa d and Upsal Street, Southeast. Security footage showe d Mr. McPhat ter in his car driving down Upsal S treet, followed minutes later by a white vehicle. After the shooting, two witnesse s observed a white car lea ving the area in wh ich the cr ime was co mmitted at a “high rate of sp eed.” Mr. Turner ’s cell phones pinged a nearby cell tower a round the time the shooting took place. The police recove red 10 millimete r bullet casings from the scene.

9 Minutes after Mr. McPhatt er was shot, Mr. Turner call ed Ms. Jennings. The two exchanged ca lls over the next several hours. On March 2, Ms. Jennings searched Cobalt for the polic e report corr esponding to the shooting of Mr. McPh atter, and she and Mr. Turner spoke on the phone later that d ay. Mr. McPh atter died on March 5. On March 6, Mr. Turner and Ms. Je nnings spoke on the phone. D. The Searc hes of M r. Turner’s Car and Cell Phones On March 8, 2017, Mr. Turner was the target of a drive - by shooting in front of a Court Services and O ffender Supervi sion Agency (CSOSA) office in Southeast D.C. Mr. Turner had driven his wh ite Lexus to the CS OSA of fice earli er that day, and other individuals we re seen getting into and out of the ca r. Mr. Turner, accompanied by his assoc iate Arman Johnson, w as walking from the CSOSA offi ce in the direc tion of his white Lexus when gunfire erupted fro m a gold Ford Explor er that had been observed rolli ng by the CSOSA office a half hour earlier. No one was hit, but four cars parked a long the street, includin g Mr. Turner ’s Lexus, we re struck by bullets. Mr. Turner initially le ft the scene, and police rebuffe d an unidentified woman’s attempt to gain access to Mr. Turner ’s vehicle and r etrieve so me items inside. Police received consent from the owners of the othe r three cars to conduct a search at the scen e; when Mr. Turner returned to the sce ne, he declined to c onsent

10 to a search of his Lexus. O fficers did not searc h the car at that time, but they t owed it to the secure gar age of the Department of Forensi c Sciences for late r processing. When Mr. Turner learned of this, he was “distraught. ” That evening, Mr. Turner spoke to Ms. Jennings on the phone for twenty - four m inutes. Police obtaine d two search warrants re lated to Mr. Turner ’s Lexus. T he first warrant authorize d a search of t he vehicle for bul let fragme nts, casings, e lectronic devices, and wri tings relat ed to t he identities of those targeted in the shooting and the unidentified woman who attempted to acces s th e Lexus before i t was sei zed. While conducting thi s first search, pol ice found a 10 millime ter Glock handgun in the Lexus’s loc ked glove compa rtment, which pro mpted them to halt the sea rch temporarily. They then obtained a s econd warrant, which included a uthorization t o fully process a nd test the firearm along with authori zation to searc h the car for related item s. In addition to the gun, police ultimate ly found and seized paper shooting targe ts, a Maryland paper license plate, parking tickets, mail addressed to Mr. Turner, insuranc e cards and credi t cards in Mr. Turner ’s na me, a copy of the vehicle’s registration listing Mr. Turner, and a ma sk with Mr. Turner ’s DNA on it. A government fire arms expert examined t he 10 millimeter bulle t casings found at the scenes of the Janua ry 1, 2017, m urder of Hall, the February 16, 17, and 22, 2017, assaults (including the assaults of Mr. McPhatt er, Mr. Osborne, and

11 Mr. Tyler), and the March 1, 2017, murder of Mr. McPhat ter, an d at trial provided his opinion that they had bee n identified as having b een fired from the Glock found in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus. DNA was found on t he gun, but a government fore nsic expert determi ned that the DNA came from “at least two individua ls” and the results of DNA testing were “inconclusive” as to Mr. Turner: his DNA could not be ruled in or out. P olice arr ested Mr. Turner for unlawful possession of the Glock foun d in his vehicle. They seized tw o cell phones belonging to Mr. Turner duri ng a search incident to th e arrest. Police obtained the first of two sets of search warra nts to search th ese pho nes that s ame day in March 2017, but the se initial searches yielded no data. Nea rly six months la ter, in September 2017, pol ice obtained a second set of search warra nts for the phones; this time, they were able to extract the phone s’ data. T hat data showed tha t on t he day after Mr. Turner ’s arrest, Mr. Jones texted Ms. Jennings: “Hey Ni k, man, they say he in di strict court, can you check for me and see what they got[?]” Mr. Jones and Ms. Jennings e ngaged in several calls that day. 1 On March 14, 2017, Mr. Turner w as indicted in fe deral court on a felon - in - 1 Mr. Jones died two weeks later.

12 possession c harge for the handgun fou nd in his car. In a series of recorded ja il calls, Mr. Turner developed a plan for a gi rlfriend, Ma rshay Hazelwood, to falsely clai m ownership of the gun. 2 During this plannin g period, Mr. Turner referred to Ms. Jennings, or communicate d with her, several times. On May 13, 2017, Mr. Turner spoke with Ms. Hazel wood a nd Ms. Jennings in a t hree - way call. Mr. Turner told Ms. Jennings that he wanted Ms. Hazelwoo d to meet her and that Ms. Jennings should “just let her know.” Later tha t day, Mr. Turner told Ms. Hazelwo od: Make sure you go see Nik. . . Le t her know just give you the run down on e verything,. .. on everything and everybody.. . . I don’t want you to talk t o her over the junk.. . . Talk to her in pe rson.. . . Tell her wha t I need. Two week s later, Ms. Hazelwo od told Mr. Turner that she was getting re ady to meet “Nik.” Shortly therea fter, Mr. Turner a nd Ms. Hazelwood spoke again, an d the following e xchange took pla ce: 2 Something like this ha d happened before. A Wahler Place resident named Jerrad Childs (nic knamed “Heavy”) claimed ownershi p of a firearm, allowing a second Wahle r Place resident named Sukarno Turne r — of no relatio n to Derek Turner — to secure a favorable ver dic t in a felon - in - possession case against him in federal court. Derek Turner appea rs to have refe renced this inci dent in a jail ca ll with Sukarno Turner, saying that he was goi ng to “work it the sa me way Heavy worked it.”

13 Turner: Everything a lright? Hazelwoo d: Yeah. Turner: She sa id it? Hazelwoo d: Yeah. Turner: What, they fishin’? Hazelwood: No. Turner: Huh? Hazelwood: I said she said no. . . . Double chec k. Nothing right now. Turner: What, like, I ain’t never c ome up? Hazelwood: Uh - uh. Turner: Y’all j ust made my day. Hazelwood: Mine too. Turner: Text her a nd tell her I sa id I send my love, m an. Tell her I’m on the phone ri ght now. Shortly after, Ms. Hazelwood texted Ms. Jennings, “He said he sent his love,” and Ms. Jennings replied, “Tell him me. . . too.” On September 6, 2017, police arrested Mr. Turner for Mr. McPh atter ’s murder. Ms. Jennings access ed the po lice report in Cobalt for Mr. McPhatter ’s shoo ting five times that day, all after Mr. Turner was arres ted. Ms. Hazelwo od a lso texted Ms. Jennings that day, asking, “C an you keep m e updated with anythi ng else?” Ms. Jennings responde d, “I sure will.”

14 E. Procedural Histor y Mr. Turner, Ms. Jennings, Ms. H azelwoo d, and another Wahler Pla ce resident named Du an Hill wer e indicted for their alleged involvement in the eve nts stretching from November 2016 to Se ptember 2017. 3 Mr. Turner was char ged with thirty - nine offenses. Ms. Jennings w as charged with forty - five offenses. Both Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings moved to suppress certain evidence. Mr. Turner moved to suppress the items gathere d in the search of his Lexus on the ground that the initial wa rrantless seizure of the car viola ted the Fourth Am endment. He argued, in relevant pa rt, that he was “not a suspec t, but a victim of a drive - by shooting,” and t hat police had no “ reason to belie ve the vehicle contained evide nce of criminality.” After a hearing, the trial c ourt denied the motion in a ruling from the bench. T he cou rt found that offic ers had probable cause to believe that evide nce related to the drive - by shootin g would be found in Mr. Turner ’s car, and that thi s 3 Ms. Hazelwood died before trial. Mr. Hill was charged with conspirac y to obstruct justic e and six counts of obstruct ion of justice, and the jury found him guil ty of the conspiracy a nd two obstruction o f justice counts. Mr. Hill initially appealed his convictions alongside Ms. Jennings and Mr. Turne r, but the gove rnment late r filed an unopp osed motion to va cate Mr. Hill’s c onvictions a nd remand for the dismissal of his indictment, which we granted. See Hill v. United States, No. 23 - CF - 255, Order at *1 - 2 (March 27, 2025) (per curi am). Accordingly, Mr. Hill is no longer involved in th is appeal. See id.

15 probable cause was sufficient for police to se ize the vehic le temporarily be fore obtaining a wa rrant to search it. Separately, Mr. Turner moved t o suppress evide nce gathered from the searches of his two c ell phones, c ontending that the March 2017 and Se ptember 2017 warrants were facially deficient. Citing Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758 (D.C. 2020), he argued that the warrants were overbroad and not base d on probable cause. The trial court de nied as moot the motion to suppress relating to the March phone warrants, because the searc h authorized by those warra nts yielded no data. It also denied the mot ion to suppress relating to the Sept ember warrants, finding that the affidavits atta ched to those warrant a pplications adequa tely establishe d probable cause and that th e warrant s wer e sufficiently particula rized. In the alt ernative, the trial court foun d that the good - fa ith exception to t he exclusiona ry rule applie d to evidence o btain ed through the sea rches authorized b y the Septembe r warrants. Ms. Jennings moved to suppress statements from a January 2018 interview with the police, along with the conte nts of a cell phone she handed over durin g that interview. After a hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Jennings ’s motions. The case proce eded to trial, whic h stretched for eleven weeks during the fall of 2022. The jury found Mr. Turner guilty of twenty - two offense s: conspiracy t o kill, assault, and destroy property of the Trenton Park crew; first - degree murde r,

16 possession of a firearm during a crim e of violence, and posse ssion of a fire arm by a convicted fel on for the Janua ry 7, 2017, killing of Devin Ha ll; three counts of a ssault with intent to kill, two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violenc e, and one count of possession o f a firearm by a convicte d felon for the February 17, 2017, assaults of Mr. Osborne, Mr. M cPhatter, and Mr. Tyler; first - degree murder, possession of a firearm during a crim e of violence, and posse ssion of a fire arm by a convicted fel on for the killing of Mr. McPhatter on March 1, 2017; possession of a firearm by a convic ted felon on March 8, 2017; obstruct ion conspiracy; and seven counts of obstructio n of justice. The jury found Ms. Jennings guilty of five offenses: three counts of AAF for Mr. Turner ’s Febru ary 17 assaults on Mr. Osborne, Mr. McPhat ter, and Mr. Tyler; one count of AAF for Mr. Turner ’s March 1 murde r of Mr. McPh atter; and one count of obstruc tion of justice. These appea ls followed. II. Standards of Review We review a chal lenge to the sufficienc y of the evidence de novo. Bailey v. United States, 257 A.3d 48 6, 492 (D.C. 2021). “The evidence is su fficient if any ration al fact - finder could have found the e lements of the c rime beyond a rea sonable doubt.” Sanders v. United Stat es, 330 A.3d 1013, 1 032 (D.C. 2025) (qu oting White v. United States, 207 A.3d 58 0, 587 (D.C. 2019)). In addre ssing a sufficienc y

17 challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdi ct, giving “full play” to jury de terminations a bout credibility, the weight of the evidenc e, and which reasonable i nferences to draw from the fac ts presented. Id. (quoting White, 207 A.3d at 587). “No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence” whe n reviewing a suffic iency claim. Mitchell v. United States, 64 A.3d 154, 157 (D.C. 2013). Although “t he government bears the burde n of presenting suffic ient evidence,” the government need not “ne gate every possible inf erence of innocence.” Cherry v. District of Columbia, 164 A. 3d 922, 929 (D.C. 201 7) (quoting Brooks v. United States, 130 A.3d 952, 959 (D.C. 2016)). E ven so, we “must consider all of the evidence, including that fav orable to the defendant.” Schools v. Unite d States, 84 A.3d 503, 508 (D. C. 2013). “We consider all evidence admit ted by the trial court,” even if it was admitted er roneously, “whe n conducting a sufficienc y review.” Ransom v. Unite d States, 322 A.3d 521, 527 (D.C. 2024) (quot ing Morales v. United States, 248 A.3d 161, 185 (D.C. 2021)). When reviewi ng a ruling on a moti on to suppress, “we acce pt the trial court’s findings of fac t unless they are cl early erroneous, and we review the facts and reasonable infe rences therefrom in the light most fa vorable to the pre vailing party.” United States v. Bumphus, 227 A.3d 559, 563 - 64 (D.C. 2020) (citation modifie d).

18 We review the trial court’s le gal conclusions de novo. Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606, 616 (D.C. 2024) (en banc). Although Mr. T urner and Ms. Jennings formall y challenge t he sufficiency of the evid ence for their obstruction of justi ce convictions, their arg uments act ually present “issue s of statutory c onstruction,” which are legal questions tha t we address de novo. Wynn v. Unite d States, 48 A. 3d 181, 188 (D.C. 2012). III. Issues Raised by Mr. Turner Mr. Turner challenges his convictions fo r the crimes of Ja nuary 7, February 17, and March 1, 2017, on several fronts. First, he a rgues that the governme nt presented insuff icient evide nce to convict him of these offenses. Second, he asserts that his conviction s should be vacat ed becaus e the March 8, 2017, seizure of his c ar violated the Fourth Amendm ent. Third, he claims that the w arrant authorizi ng the search of his two ce ll phones did not s atisfy the Fourth A mendment’s Warra nt Clause. We reject t hese a rguments and affirm these convi ctions. A. S ufficient E vide nce Supports Mr. Tur ner’s Convictions for the January 7, Febr uary 17, and March 1, 2017, O ffenses. Mr. Turner argues that the government prese nted insufficient e vidence with respect to the January 7, Fe bruary 17, and March 1 murder, assa ult with inte nt to kill, possession - of -a- firearm - during -a- crime - of - violence, and felon - in - possession

19 offenses. He primarily focuses on two aspects of th e government’s c ase. First, he argues that the governm ent did not place him at the scene of any of the c rimes because the eye witness testimony the gove rnment present ed was inconsistent and vague. Second, he argues that the government did not su fficiently link him to the gun found in his Lexus, and that because others may have ha d access to the gun, the government did not prove beyond a rea sonable doubt that he, ra ther than one of his compatriots, used th e gun to com mit the crimes for whi ch he was convict ed. He also suggests that the government’s “consciousness of gui lt” evidence was weak and that the evidence is insufficient e ven if considered c umulatively. Viewing the evide nce in the light most f avorable to the verdict, as we must, we conclude t hat there was suffic ient evidenc e to convict Mr. Turner for the offenses of January 7, Fe bruary 17, and March 1, 2017. We e xamine the evide nce for each incident in turn. 1. January 7 Shooting o f Devin Hall At trial, the government prese nted the following re levant evide nce. Witnesses describ ed the veh icle at t he scen e as a “white L exus with paper tag s” and a “whit e, tan - ish” “Pontiac - ish v ehicle.” Mr. Turner owned and drove a white Le xus in which a paper M aryland license p late was later f ound by the poli ce.

20 One witness testified that there was one shooter, while a nother testified there were two. Both witnes ses agre ed that there were at least two peop le in the car from which the sho ts originated. The w itness who saw two shooters t estified tha t one of them was brown - skinne d, of average buil d, and wore dreadloc ks. This description matched Mr. Turner ’s app earance at the ti me. Historical cell s ite location information (C SLI) showed that t he two cell phones la ter recovered from Mr. Turner were in t he cov erage ar ea of a cell tower located 0.2 miles from t he scen e of th e shooting mere minutes afte r the shooting took plac e. Police recovere d .40 calibe r and 10 millimet er shell casings fr om the scene of the murder, and a forensics expert la ter testified that, in his opinion, the 10 millimeter cartridges were fire d from the Glock found in the locked glove box of Mr. Turner ’s Lexus. The Lexus contai ned evidence that Mr. Turner used the ca r regularly. B eyond the fact that the car was titled to him, police found, in the c enter console, mail addressed to him, insurance informa tion with his name on it, a nd credit cards in his name, all within e asy reach of the driver. In addition, the government presente d evidence tha t Mr. Turner contact ed Ms. Jennings the da y after the m urder, and again on J anuary 12, 15, 17, and 23. On January 17, afte r Ms. Jennings ran additional searches for Mr. Turner, she texted

21 him, “You still good”; Mr. Turner replied, “Ok, tha nk you”; and Ms. Jennings responded, “ LMAO.” In all, the government presented evide nce that a person with Mr. Turner ’s hairstyle and buil d, who was in a car resembli ng Mr. Turner ’s, and who was using a gun that, in the opinion of the government ’s forensic expert, matched t he one found in the locked glove box of Mr. Turner ’s car, c ommitted the January 7, 20 17, shooting of Devin Hall. Moreover, the evidence show ed that Mr. Turner ’s cell phones we re near the loc ation of the shootin g shortly after it took place. A jury could further inf er from Mr. Turne r ’s contact with Ms. Jennings in the days after the murder, and particularly the ir text exc hange on January 17, that he was i nterest ed in his status as a suspect in the cr ime. Cf. Ferguson v. United States, 977 A.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. 2009) (holding t hat post - crime ev idence of steps defendant t ook to avoid detection was admissib le to show consciousness of guilt); Moore v. Uni ted St ates, 757 A.2d 78, 83 (D.C. 2000) (concluding tha t defendant’s “suspici ous denial tha t he was not driving a stolen c ar” supported a n inference of consciousness of gui lt). From this constellation of e vidence, the jury could re asonably concl ude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Turner, a nd not someone else, committed the m urder and the associate d firearm offenses. See Sanders, 330 A.3d at 1032.

22 Mr. Turner attempts to undermine se veral key pillars of the gove rnment’s case. First, he points to evidence that his GPS moni toring device was loca ted at his home when the shoo ting took plac e. But the governm ent present ed evidence that Mr. Turner ha d seemingly slipped the restraints of his G PS tracking device on another occa sion. More importa ntly, it prese nted historical CSLI eviden ce placing Mr. Turner ’s two phones nea r the shooting around t he time it took plac e. Mr. Turner also attacks the vehicle identification, arguing that one witn ess’s descrip tion of t he vehicl e as “tan - ish” and “Pontiac - ish” fatally unde rmines an inferen ce that Mr. Turner ’s white Lexu s was pres ent at th e scene. But th e other witness describe d the car as a white Lexus with paper t ags, and the description of the vehi cle as “ white,” “tan - ish,” and “Pontiac - ish” is not inconsistent with a white Lexus with paper tags beca use that witness used the word “w hite” and qualified the other descripto rs (“ - ish”). Finally, Mr. Turner argues tha t the government pre sented insuffic ient evidence linking him to the gun because, on the day the gun was rec overed from the car, other individuals were seen in the c ar. But the government pre sented evidenc e, in the form of mail, parking tic kets, and financial documents in Mr. Turner ’s name, that Mr. Turner regularly used the car, which he ow ned. And no evidence suggeste d that a pe rson other than Mr. Turner had access to the l ocked glove box. Cf. Rivas v.

23 United States, 783 A.2d 125, 131 (D.C. 200 1) (explaining that a non - owner passenger’s physica l proximity to c ontraband is of lim ited probative v alue when determining whe ther they constructi vely possessed tha t contraband). In essen ce, Mr. Turner argues that the jury shoul d have focused its at tention on supposed inc onsistencie s and gaps in the govern ment’s case. But as long as the government offere d “some probati ve evidence on each essential ele ment of the crime,” Rollerson v. United States, 127 A. 3 d 1220, 1232 (D.C. 2015), minor inconsistenc ies or differe nces in testimon y “generally affe ct only the we ight of the evidence, not i ts suffici ency, and are. . . for the [jury ] to resolve, ” Ransom, 322 A. 3d at 527 (citation modifie d). Put another way, the jury coul d reasonably have resolve d each of these supposed i nconsistencies i n the government’s favor by draw ing “justifiable inferences” from the evidenc e presented. Cherry, 164 A.3d at 929 (quoting Brooks, 130 A.3d at 95 5). The se could include, for exam ple: crediting the government’s test imony about Mr. T urner ’s ability to “ defeat” his GPS device; concluding tha t Mr. Turner used the 10 millimeter gun in th e January 7 shootin g because that gun was found in the locke d glove box of the car he regula rly used; and conclud ing that t he vehicl e describ ed as “whi te” (twi ce), “tan - ish,” and “Pontiac - ish” was Mr. Turner ’s white Le xus. Because the jury could permissibl y draw each of these inference s, and because the cumulative force of the circumstantial evidence viewed in this m anner was enough fo r the jury to fi nd that Mr. Turner committed the

24 January 7 shooting, we conclude th at the evidence was sufficient for a j ury to find Mr. Turner guilty of murder, possession of a firea rm during a crime of violenc e, and possession of a firearm by a convicted fe lon beyond a reasonabl e doubt. See id. 4 2. February 17 Shootings of Raheem Osborne, Andrew McPhat ter, and Joseph Tyler T he government prese nted evidence that Mr. McPhatter and Mr. Osborne were ambushed by a person wea ring dreadlocks and a mask who eme rged from a white car and bega n shooting at them. Mr. Osborne d escrib ed the car as a “white Honda - style vehicle, two - door, with pap er tags,” w hich he al so charact erized as a 4 After oral argument, Mr. Turner file d a letter with the court invok ing D.C. Court of Appea ls Rule 28(k), whic h permits a pa rty to advise th e court of “pe rtinent or significant a uthorities” tha t have “come to a party’s attent ion after. . . oral argument but before decision.” D.C. App. R. 28(k). The rule require s a party to “state without a rgument the re asons for the supple mental c itations, referring e ither to the page of the brief or to a point arg ued orally.” Id. In his filing, Mr. T urner raised a new a rgument prompted by a question at o ral argum ent: that the tria l court should not ha ve admitted the b allistics evidence at trial. But “we generally do not consider argume nts raised for the first tim e at oral argument,” Bare v. Rainforest All., Inc., 336 A.3d 619, 62 4 n.1 (D.C. 2025) (citation m odified); see Fort Myer Constr. Corp. v. Briscoe, 298 A.3d 770, 778 - 79 (D. C. 2023) (per curiam), much les s arguments raise d for the first t ime in a Rule 28 (k) l etter filed after argument, see Keerikkattil v. United States, 313 A. 3d 591, 611 (D.C. 2024) (“I n g eneral, part ies may not exploit R ule 28(k) by raisi ng new arguments outsi de their briefs, particularly w hen those arguments do not re ly on subsequent le gal authority. ”) (citation modifie d). Therefore, we dec line to consider this argume nt. We note, in any event, that w e consider erroneousl y a dmitted e vidence for sufficienc y purposes, see Ransom, 322 A.3d at 527, so Mr. Turner’s argument would no t alter our resolution of his suffi ciency claim.

25 “Honda Acc ord.” Historical CSLI showed that minutes befor e the shooting, one of Mr. Turner ’s cell phones pinge d a cell tower in the area. Poli ce recovered ca sings from 10 millimet er bullets at the scene, a nd a forensic expert testified tha t, in his opinion, those bullets were fired from t he gun found in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus. Three days after the shooti ng, Mr. Turner cal led Ms. Jennings, and he ca lled her again on February 23 and 26 a fter she searc hed in Cobalt for the shooti ng. This evidence is sufficient to support Mr. Turner ’s convict ions for the offenses on Februa ry 17 because it showed that a person wea ring a mask, w ith a hairstyle similar to Mr. Turner’s, w ho was driving a car like Mr. Turner ’s, who likely carried one of Mr. Turner ’s ce ll phones, and who was usi ng the gun an expert opined was the sa me as the o ne found in the locked glove bo x of Mr. Turner ’s car committe d the February 17 sho otings. A mask w ith Mr. Turner ’s DNA on it was found i n Mr. Turner ’s Lexus. In addi ti on, Mr. Turner ’s contact with Ms. Jennings in the days after the crimes suggests he was interested in the investigation into these shootings. See Fergu son, 977 A.2d at 1001. From this evidence, the jury could reasonabl y conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Turner committed the assaults with intent to kill a nd associate d firearm offenses. See Ch erry, 164 A.3d at 929. As with th e Hill shooting, Mr. Turner r aises similar ly unpersua sive arguments in response to this e vidence. He highlights Mr. Osborne ’s characterizat ion of the

26 car as a “H onda Acco rd” to suggest th at Mr. Turner ’s car could not ha ve been on the scene that day. But the record, whe n viewed in the light most fa vorable to the verdict, permit s a different conc lusion. See Sanders, 330 A. 3d at 1032. Mr. Osborne first stated that the car was “a white Honda - style vehicle, two - door with pape r tags,” which he later firmed up a s a “Honda Accord.” True, these are inconsistent descriptions: a “Honda - style vehicle ” can include vehicle s of different makes, whi le a “Honda Acco r d” is just that. But in light of the rest of the description — white, two doors, paper tags — a nd consi dering the rest of the circumstantial e vidence connecting Mr. Turner to these c rimes, a reasonable jury could concl ude that Mr. Osborne described Mr. Turner ’s white Lexus. See Gray v. United States, 147 A.3d 791, 805 n.12 (D.C. 2016) (expla ining that the jury w as permitte d to “resolve any discrepancie s” about an accomplice’s identity “in favor of the government” where two witnesses testified that the a ccomplice’s shirt was dark in color and one testified it was light blue). Mr. Turner also takes issue with the gun - related identification e vidence, making the same argument he does for t he January 7 shoot ing. That argument is unsuccessful for the reasons discusse d above. S upra Pa rt II.A.2.a. Mr. Turner further argues that the government presente d insufficie nt evidence that Mr. Tyler was actually harmed by the Februa ry 16 shooting beca use

27 Mr. Osborne did not identify Mr. Tyler as a vi ctim an d becaus e Mr. Tyler was found only l ater, by p olice, away from th e scene of t he crime. Vi ewing t he eviden ce in the light most favora ble to the verdict, we find this argument unconvincing. Police identified Mr. Tyl er as a victim of the February 1 7 shooting by following a t rail of blood leading a way from the crime scene into a nearby house, where they found him sitting in the bathroom with a n untreated gunshot w ound. A reasonabl e jury could conclude, be y ond a reasonable doubt, that a person who wa s found shortl y after a shooting suffering from an untrea ted gunshot wound in a house nearby, a nd who was tied to the sce ne of the crime by a t rail of blood, was w ounded in that very s ame shooting. See Sanders, 330 A. 3d at 1032. 3. March 1 Shooting of Andre w McPhatter The evidence for the Ma rch 1 shooting of Mr. McP hatter follows a familiar pattern. Securi ty footage showed a white vehicle driving dow n the street c lose behind Mr. M cPhatter ’s vehicle. After the shooting, a white car left the area at a “high rate of speed.” Historical CSLI showed that Mr. Turner ’s cell phones pinged a cell tower nearby a t around the time the shooting took place. The police rec overed 10 millimete r bullet casings from the scene, w hich a forensic exa miner later concluded matched the gun found in Mr. Turner ’s white Lexus. Minutes after Mr. McPhat ter was s hot, Mr. Turner called Ms. Jennings, and the two exchange d

28 calls that day a nd in the five days t hat follow ed. Ms. J ennings searched for the offense reports corre sponding to Mr. McP hatter ’s murder in Cobalt the day after the shooting. Viewed in the light most favo rable to the verdict, this evidence is sufficient to support Mr. Turner ’s convictions for the March 1 offe nses. See Sanders, 330 A.3d at 1032. A white vehicle t hat match e d the description of Mr. Turne r ’s Lexus was seen entering and l eaving the sc ene around the time the shooti ng took place, and the car’s speedy exit supports an inferen ce th at it was the getaway vehicle. See Gray, 147 A.3d at 805 - 06; Cherry, 164 A.3d at 929. In addition, h istorical CSLI showed that Mr. Turner ’ s cell phones w er e in the are a near the tim e the shooting took p lace, and the government’s expe rt forensic testimony permit ted a jury to conclude that the bullets fired a t the scene matched the gun foun d in Mr. Turner ’s car. T he fact th at Mr. Turner contact ed Ms. Jennings on the day of the shooti ng and appears to ha ve been inter ested in the March 1 incide nt further support s the verdict. Tak ing this evidence together, a reasonable jury could conc lude, beyond a reasona ble doubt, that the person in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus, carryi ng Mr. Turner ’s cell phones, a nd using the gun found in Mr. Turner ’s car was, in fact, Mr. Turner. S ee Sanders, 330 A.3d at 1032.

29 Mr. Turner raises the sam e gener al eviden tiary ar guments discussed and rejected above: that the gun was not definitively linked to Mr. Turner a nd that eyewitness acc ounts did not pla ce Mr. Turner o r his car at the sc ene. He d oes no t make any argument s regarding the Ma rch 1 - speci fic eviden ce. For t hese reaso ns, we reject Mr. Turner ’s c hallenges to the suffic iency of the evidence supporting his convictions of the crimes of January 7, February 17, a nd March 1, 2017. B. T he Fourth Amendm ent’s A utomobile E xce ption P ermitted t he P olic e to Tempor arily S eiz e Mr. Turner’ s C ar. Mr. Turner argues that the warrantless seizure of hi s car from the scene of the March 8 drive - by shooting vio lated the Fourth Ame ndment and that the evidenc e flowing from t his seizure shou ld have be en suppressed. 5 The governme nt argues 5 Mr. Turner does not challe nge on appeal eith er of th e sear ch warran ts issu ed after the car wa s seized. To the ext ent he suggeste d for the first ti me at oral argum ent that one of the wa rrants may have be en overbroad, w e decline to addre ss th is argument because “ we generally do not consider a rguments raise d for the first time at oral argument.” Bare, 336 A.3d at 624 n. 1 (citation modified).

30 that the automobile exception to the wa rrant requireme nt permitted the seizure. We agree with the gove rnment. The Fourth Amendme nt protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ffects, aga inst unreasonable searches and se izures.” U.S. Const. ame nd. IV. A warrantless se arch or seizure “is per se unrea sonable under the Fou rth A mendment unless it falls within a few spec ific and well - established exceptions.” Beachum v. United States, 19 A.3d 311, 319 (D.C. 2011) (citation modifie d). The “automobile exception” is one suc h “specifically establis hed and w ell del ineated ” carve - out. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (198 2) (quoting Minc ey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 39 0 (1978)). The poli ce may search or seiz e an automobile without a warrant if the po lice have “ p robable cau se to b elieve th at the car con tain [s] contraband or evide nce of criminal activity. ” Miller v. United States, 346 A.3d 166, 177 (D. C. 2025); see Chambers v. Maron ey, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (expla ining that the automobile exception permi ts police to “seiz[e] and hold[] a ca r before presenting the proba ble cause issu e to a m agistr ate [or] carr y[] out an immediate sea rch without a wa rrant” as long as the re is “prob able cause to search”); Arrington v. United States, 382 A.2d 14, 17 (D.C. 1978) (“Where probable cause exists to se arch an automob ile when it is stopped on a highwa y, police may remove the vehi cle to a more secure loca tion,

31 such as a police sta tion, before conducti ng such a search a nd they need not first obtain a searc h warrant.”); United States v. Bum phus, 227 A.3d 559, 564 (D.C. 2020) (acknowledging t hat the automobil e exception perm its the warrantless seizure of an automobile if the police “have probable c ause”). Probable cause exist s “when a reasonable polic e officer c onsidering the t otal circumstanc es confronting him and drawing from his experie nce would be warrante d in the belief that an offense has been or is being c om mitted. ” Miller, 346 A. 3d at 177 (citation m odified). T here can b e little question that the police had probable ca use to believe that Mr. Turner ’s car containe d evidence of a crime. Four cars parked along the street, including Mr. Turner ’s Lexus, were struck by bulle ts in a drive - by shooting. At the very leas t, police h ad probab le cause to believe th at Mr. Turner’s bul let - riddl ed car might contain bull et fragments fr om the shooting. D uring oral argument, Mr. Turner ’s counsel a greed that there li kely was probable c ause to believe t hat the car contained e vidence of the shooti ng in the form of “ballistics evide nce.” This alone satisfie s the automobi le excepti on to the Fourth Amendment’s warra nt requirement. See Tu ckson v. United States, 77 A.3d 357, 366 (D.C. 2013) (“ In order for the automobile exception to apply, the police must have probable ca use to believe that a car will contai n either contraband or e vidence of a crime.”); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (concludi ng that “[the finding] that the car contained cont raband. .. alone satisfies the automobile e xception to the Fourth

32 Amendment ’ s warra nt requirement ”). As a result, the Fourth A mendment permitte d this “warrant less seizure of a n automobile on a public roa dway.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9. In arguing to the contrary, Mr. Turner focuses on distinguishi ng cases c ited by the trial c ourt in its opinion denying his mot ion to suppress, but he does not full y grapple with the legal principle s governing when the Fourth Ame ndment permit s the police to tem porarily seize a vehicle without a wa rrant. H e argues that the automobile exception cannot a pply here beca use there were no “circ umstances indicating ” he com mitted a cri me when the police seized the vehicle. But the automobile exception does not require police to have probable cause to believe tha t the owner or operato r of the vehicle has committed a crime. Rather, as the Suprem e Court expla ined in Ross, the “scope of the” automobile exception “is no broader and no narrower tha n a magistrate c ould legitimate ly authorize by w arrant.” 456 U.S. at 825. B ecause polic e had probable ca use to believe Mr. Turner ’s white Le xus contained evide nce of the drive - by shooting, the Fourth Amendment did not ba r police from t emporarily seizi ng his vehicle. See id. Accordingly, w e reject this challeng e to Mr. Turner ’s convictions.

33 C. The E vidence S eized fro m Mr. Turner’s C ell P hones W as A dmissible U nder the G ood -F aith E xce ption to the Fourth Amendme nt’s Warrant Clause. Mr. Turner a rgues that the September 2017 wa rrants to search hi s cell phon es were deficient unde r the Fourth Amendment. He further contends that the evidence seized from his phones should have be en excluded, a nd that the good - fait h exception to the exclusionary r ule does not apply. The governme nt argues that the warrants and affida vits satisfi ed the probable cause st andard as delin eated in Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758 (D.C. 2020). In the alternative, the government argue s that, ev en if t he war rants wer e defi cient, the eviden ce was not excludable because the good - faith exce ption applie d. Because we agree that the evidence was adm issible under the good - fa ith exception, we do not address whether the warrants satisfie d the Fourth Amendm ent’s Warrant Cla use. 1. Additional B ackground: t he Warrants and Affidavits at Issue The warrant applic ations were submitted with three attached docume nts: a description of the cell phone in question, a de scription of the informa tion sought, and an affidavit laying out the case for probable cause. The warrants were approve d without modifica tion of their scope. The two war rant app lication s are id entical except for desc riptions of the spe cific phone e ach seeks to sea rch. The warrants

34 approved searches of the two phone s fo r a wide swath of information po tentially related to the Wa hler Place and Trenton Pa rk feud, including Mr. Turner’s conta cts, Mr. Turner’s communicat ions, other digi tal records (l ike social media an d search history), witness information, photographs, a nd information per taining to Mr. Turner’s vehicle. The two probable cause affidavits, written by Detective J effrey W eber, described the fe ud between the Wahler Place and Trenton Park ne ighborhoods and recited the ste ps police took to investigate, with a focus on t he March 8 drive - by shooting and the e vidence polic e obtained from Mr. Turner ’s L exus. The affida vits described the bal listics analysis support ing a conclusion that the gun found in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus fired the 10 millimeter bullets at the crime scenes for shooting s on January 7, February 16, February 17, February 22, and March 1, 2017, and they also noted vide o evidence of a car matching the description o f Mr. Turner ’s Lexus driving away from two of the crime sce nes. T he affidavits then expla ined why Mr. Turner ’s phones we re likely to contain evidence related to these violent crimes. This section of the affidavits le an ed heavily on Detec tive Weber’s tra ining and expe rience to tie the phone to the sh ootings. For example:

35 Based on my training and e xperience, I know that people who commit crime s in Washington, D.C., often use thei r cell phones in ways tha t reveal their loca tion and/or activities before, after, or while e ngaging in crimina l activity. For example, this ma y include location information (e.g., GPS data), app usage information (e. g., Internet sea rch inquiries), a nd images or video rec ordings relevant to the criminal activity. . . . Based on my training and e xperience, I know that peopl e who possess guns, ill egal drugs, unlaw fully obtained money, and other c ontraband in Washington, D.C., often use their cel l phones to capt ure and store ima ges or video recordings of suc h contraband – s ometime s called “t rophy photos.” The y also frequently share thes e images or vide o recordings wit h associates using email, text messaging, or other forms of com munication on their cell pho ne such as online social ne tworking service s. Similarly, they ofte n refer to the ir guns, illegal drugs, and other contraband in text messages, emails, or other written communications that are carrie d out by and store d on their cell phone.. . . Based on my training and experie nce, I know that victim s, witnesses, and pe rpetrators of crime in Washing ton, D.C., often communic ate between and among the mselves before, during, and after t he crime. They co mmunicat e using text me ssaging, apps, soc ial media, photog raphs, audio and/or vide o recordings, etc. In my training a nd experience, such communications ha ve reveal ed the identities and re lationships be tween and among the involved individuals, as we ll as their motive, hostility, knowledge, a nd intent re lating to the crime. Moreover, such communica tions have also re vealed conscious ness of guilt and efforts to i mpede police investigation. In this section, De tective Weber also attempte d to link the phones to specific facts uncovered in the investigation. For exa mple, he noted that “ [a] lthough an Instagram account ha s yet to be identified for De rek Turner, Instagram acc ounts for

36 associates of M r. Turner have been identified, ” and that “a Google account be lieved to belong to Dere k Turner was used to search for media websit es for informatio n related to shootings on Wheeler Road and South Capitol Stree t.” 2. Discussion “[N]o Warrants shal l issue, but upon pro bable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, a nd particularly describing the place to be searched, a nd the persons or things to be seize d.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. T he Fourth Amendment g enerally does not permit police to c onduct a warrantless searc h of a person’s cell phone incident to their arrest. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 4 01 - 02 (2 014). Applying th ese c onstitutional requirement s i n Burns, we explained that (1) a warrant application a nd supporting affida vit must demonstra te probable cause to be lieve that the phone wil l contain evide nce related to spec ific crimina l activity, and (2) the warrant may authoriz e a search only for the pa rticular item s of evidence reasona bly within the scope of that probable cause showing. See 235 A.3d at 771 -73. Th e warrant s here were issued prior to Burns. E ve n if they did not satisfy the probable cause standard for ce ll phone warrants as articulated i n Burns, w e suppress evidence sei zed through an invali d warrant only “if t he police could not re asonably have relied up on the judic ial officer’s approval of [tha t] warra nt,” a princ iple otherwise known as the “ good faith exception.” Abney v. Unite d States, 273 A.3d

37 852, 862 (D.C. 2022); see In re J.F.S., 300 A.3d 748, 758 (D.C. 2023). T wo of our recent c ases, Abney v. United States and In re J.F.S., guide our application of the good - faith excep tion her e. In Abney, we exam ined a warrant where the affidavit pro vided probable c ause to believe that the owner of the cell phone had commi tted a crime, and, like here, relied heav ily on the affiant ’s training and e xperience. See 273 A.3d at 863 - 64. Th at warrant sought a si milar array of inf ormation tied s pecifica lly to the offenses for which the defenda nt was under investiga tion. See id. at 863. Because we had “not yet addressed w hether probabl e cause to searc h a cell phone exists in ci rcumstances analogous to t hose of the present case” in 2018, we concl uded that “ no decision of this court would ha ve provided c lear guidanc e in 2018, when the se arch warrant in this case was issu ed and execut ed.” Id. at 864. There fore, we held that the good - faith exception a pplied. Id. Similarly, in In re J.F.S., we examined a warra nt issued before B urns that “supplied strong re ason to believe tha t J.F.S. was involved in [the dece dent’s] murder and deta iled with partic ularity the t ypes of evidenc e officers could e xpect to find on his phone. ” 300 A.3d at 758. We described the affida vit as follows: [It] explaine d why the office rs had probable cause to believe tha t J.F.S. was involve d in the murder and why a broad swath of data on the phone might contain re levant

38 evidence. For instance, the affidavit stat ed that, based on Detective Jordan’s experienc e investigati ng these kinds of crimes, he would e xpect to find messages about pla nning the crime in the phone’s messa ging apps; “ trophy photos ” of weapons in photo storage apps; and searches of police investigations into the crime in the internet se arch history. Id. We concluded the warrant was “on all fours” w ith the one in Abney and thus applied the good - faith exce ption, noting tha t the warrant “ limited the office rs to searching for evi dence perta ining to the murde r, for which J.F.S. was a suspect, in keeping with the pa rticularity standa rd as it was generally unde rstood before Burns.” Id. at 758 - 59. As in those cases, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for police to re ly on judicial approva l of th e w arrant s for Mr. Turner ’s cell phones wh en they were issued in 2017. To begin with, the se warrants predat ed our opinion in Burns, so “the law at the time of the warrant’s issuanc e and execution” ha d not yet clari fied, in this jurisdiction, “ the proper scope of a searc h warrant for a ce ll phone.” Abney, 273 A.3d at 862, 865. As Abney ex plained, and In re J.F.S. r eiterated, at th at time, “[a] number of courts had held. . . that a warr ant to sea rch a sus pect ’ s cell phone was sufficiently pa rticular and/or not overbro ad because the warrant limite d the officers to searching for a nd seizing evide nce of a specific crime. ” Id. (citing cases); see I n re J.F.S., 300 A.3d at 758.

39 Viewed in light of this pre - Burns precedent, the affidavits here were not “ so lacking in indic ia of probable cause as to re nder official belief i n its existence entirely unrea sonable,” and the warrants themse lves were not “ so facially deficien t. . . in failing to partic ularize the pla ce to be searc hed or the things to be seized that the executing office rs could not reasonably presume them to be valid. ” Abney, 273 A.3d a t 862 (citation modifi ed). Significantly, the affidavits “est ablished probable cause that [Mr. Turner] participated in” the shootings tha t took place on Janua ry 7, February 16, February 17, February 22, and March 1, 2017. Abney, 273 A.3d at 863; see I n re J.F.S., 30 0 A.3d at 758 (“The searc h warrant here was supported by a detailed affidavit, which explained why the officers had proba ble cause to be lieve that J.F.S. was involved in the murder. ”). The affidavits pr ovided a timeline of the fe ud between Wahler Place and Trenton Park (including the fact that Mr. Turner was a victim of one of the previous inc idents), and they situate d the January, February, and March 2017 shootings as pa rt of this pattern of violent c onduct. They described how the ballistics evidence rec overed from scene s of those shooting s matched the gun foun d in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus, and t hey stat ed that video evi dence showed a ve hicle matc hing the Lexus arrivi ng at or leavi ng the scene s (other than the sce ne of the February 1 6 shooting).

40 Moreover, like the affidavits in Abney and In r e J.F.S., the affidavits here sought to link the phones t o the shootings in January, February, and March 2017 through “gene ral information in the affidavit a bout cellphone use in simil ar circumst ances ” based on the affiant’s traini ng and experienc e. Abney, 273 A.3d at 863, 865 (“ [B]ased on his training and e xperience, the affiant sta ted that persons committing crime in the District of Columbia (1) oft en use cell phone s in ways tha t reveal their loc ation and a ctivities bef ore, during, a nd after crimi nal activity, includ ing GPS data, intern et searches, and tex ts and email s to ass ociates; an d (2) often store and share ima ges or recordings o f weapons or othe r contraband. ”); In re J.F.S., 300 A.3d at 758 (“ [T] he affidavit sta ted that, based on Detec tive Jordan ’ s experience i nvestigating these kinds of crimes, he would expect to find m essages about planning the crime in the phone ’ s messaging apps; ‘ trophy photos ’ of weapons in photo storage a pps; and searches of police investigations into the crime in the internet search history. ”). Because Abney and In re J.F.S. concluded that “training and exper ience” sta tements like these supported application of the good - faith exception to pre - Burns cell phone search warrants, we draw the same conclusion here. This probable cause showing linki ng Mr. T urner’s cell phones to his participation i n the Ja nuary, February, and March 2017 shootings satisfies t he good - faith exception bec ause, as both Abney and In re J.F.S. explained, prior to Burns,

41 “ courts had gene rally held ce ll phone search warra nts to be sufficiently t ailored and particulariz ed where they ‘ limited t he officers to searching for and se izing evidence of a speci fic crime. ’” In re J.F.S., 300 A.3d a t 758 (quoting Abne y, 273 A.3d at 865). The wa rrants here a uthorized a search for “[a]ll records on the Devic e. . . that relate to the suspec ted feud between Wahler/W heeler and Trenton Park neighborhoods, tha t involved n umerous shooti ngs and severa l homicides, believed to s tem from shootings tha t began on May 10, 2016.” Cf. Abney, 273 A.3d at 863 (applying the good - fa ith exception to a warrant authorizing a search for “ data, in whatever form.. . that is evidence of the carjac king / robbery and / or the location, motive, i ntent, or associates of the owner of the ph one at the ti me of the ca rjacking / robbery”). W hen read in referenc e to the probable ca use showing describin g the feud’s relations hip to the shootings fo r which Mr. Turner had been arrest ed, and in light of the “training and exper ience” s ection s linking the cell p hone to these event s, the affidavits and warrants in this case were not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” or “so facially deficient” that it was “ unreasonable” for a n officer to rely on judicial approval of them at that time. Abney, 273 A.3d at 862 (citation modified). We emphasize, however, tha t nothing in thi s analysis su ggests how the probable cause and particularity showing s in these affidavits would fa re if scrutini zed under Burns and sub sequent cas e law.

42 In sum, the warrants here ar e on par with th e warrants in Abney and In re J.F.S. b ecause (1) the y were issued prior to Burns, (2) the supporting affidavits established proba ble cause to believe that the owner of the phone was involve d in specific cr imes, (3) the supporting affidavits linked those events to the cell phones in question using generaliz ed observations about c ell phone use by c riminals based on the “training a nd experienc e” of the affiant, and (4) the warrant s aut horized t he search of the phone for data re lated to the c rimes for which the ow ner of the phone was a sus pect. See Abney, 273 A.3d at 863 - 64; In r e J.F.S., 300 A.3d at 758. As a result, it was “reasonable” for officers to rely on judicial issuanc e of the warrants, and the warrants were not “so fac ially deficient” tha t officers could not presume the y were vali d. See Abney, 273 A.3d at 863. We again emp hasize “ th e narrowness of our ruling [:] ” we express no opinion whether these warrants satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Abney, 273 A.3d at 864. C onsistent with Abney and In re J.F.S., we conclude only that the evidence se ized from Mr. Turner ’s cell phones is admissible under the good - faith excepti on. See id. at 862. IV. Issues Raised by Ms. Jennings Like Mr. Turner, Ms. Jennings challenges her c onvictions on several fronts. Ms. Jennings challenges the sufficie ncy of the evidence to support her AAF convictions. Relatedly, she argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to

43 instruct the jury on the common - law meaning of “assisted” for purposes of the AAF statute. Ms. Jennings also argues that the stat ements she gave during her pol ice interview should have been suppressed because her understa nding that she woul d be fired if she did no t participate in the questioni ng rendered t hose st atements involuntary in vi olation of the F ifth Amendment. Because we agree th at the gov ernment f ailed to present su fficient ev idence that Ms. Jennings actual ly knew Mr. Turner committed any of the relevant offenses at the time she allegedly offered him ma terial assistance, we vacate Ms. Jennings ’s AAF convictions. We do not reach any other pote ntial ground for reversal of those convictions. Ms. Jennings argues that none of her four AAF convictions can stand bec ause the governme nt presented ins ufficient evide nce that she knew that Mr. Turner committed the February 17 or March 1 crimes. In addition, she contends that the government failed to show that she provided material assistance to Mr. Turner. The government argue s th at Ms. Jennings materially assisted Mr. Turner by providing him nonpublic inf ormation about the status of the police investigations into these crimes, and that the ev idence s howing the pattern of phone c alls and other communications b etween Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings, combined with

44 Ms. Jennings ’s searc hes in Cobalt and WALES, was suffici ent to prove tha t she knew Mr. Turner commi tted the February 17 a nd March 1 shootings. The D.C. Code c riminalizes “be ing accessory aft er the fac t to any crime punishable by im prisonment.” D.C. Code § 22 - 1806. T his statute, first adopted in 1901 and not ame nded since, does not d efine “acce ssory after the fa ct.” Little v. United States, 709 A.2d 708, 711 (D.C. 1998). So we look to the common law, which “encom passes all common law in force in Maryland in 1801, unless expressly repealed o r modi fied.” Id. T his court has followe d Maryland case law in ide ntifying the four substantiv e elements of AAF: (1) A completed felony m ust have been com pleted by another prior to the accessoryshi p; (2) The acce ssory must not be a princi pal in the commission of the fe lony; (3) The accessory must ha ve knowledge of the fe lony; and (4) The acce ssory must act persona lly to ai d or assist the felon to avoid detecti on or apprehension for the crime or crimes. Id. (quoting Outlaw v. United States, 632 A.2d 408, 411 (D.C. 1993)). “T o sustain a conviction of accessory after the fact, the government ’ s eviden ce must establish tha t a defenda nt had knowledge of the principa l’s participa tion in the

45 crime.” Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 443 - 44 (D. C. 1984) (citati on modified); accord B utler v. State, 643 A.2d 389, 400 (Md. 1994) (“The t erm ‘knowledge’ mea ns that at that time the relief or assistanc e was given the defendan t must have had actual knowledge that the person assisted was the one who committed the felony.”) (emphasis in original). “Mere suspicion is not enough.” W ayne LaFave & A ustin Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.6(a) (Oct. 2025 Update); a ccord Lewis Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes and Crim inal Procedure § 26 (2d ed. 1904) (“It is essential t hat the commission of th e felony should be know n to, not merely suspect ed b y, the person aiding the principal. . . . ”); 4 William Blackstone, Commentarie s *37 (“[T]o make an accessary ex post facto, it is in the first place requisite that he knows of the felony comm itted. ”); cf. Robinson v. United States, 100 A.3d 95, 106 n.21 (D. C. 2014) (expla ining that a pe rson may not be convic ted for aiding a nd abetting a cri me when he is merely “ aware of a substanti al and unjustifiable risk ” of an el ement of that crime) (citation modifi ed). “Guilty knowledg e [of an accessory] may be infe rred from the circumst ances.” Robinson v. State, 249 A.2d 504, 507 (Md. Ct. Spe c. App. 1969); accord But ler, 643 A.2d at 1000 (noting that guilty knowl edge “ can be inferred from all the surroundin g facts a nd circumstances in t he case ”). But th e accesso r y must have actu al, personal knowledge that “the [offense ] had be en completed” by the person they hel ped “prior to [the ] accessoryship.” McClain v. State, 268 A.2d 572,

46 577 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); see Clark v. United States, 418 A.2d 1059, 1061 (D.C. 1980) (“[P]ers onal knowledge, while often no t susceptible to direct proof, is required for a c onviction of being an a ccessory after the fact. ”). T he government at trial framed, and continues on appe al to frame, the evidence related to Ms. Jennings ’s AAF offenses as one long chain of assistive behavior from January to Se ptember 2017. But an AAF conviction require s proof beyond a reasona ble doubt that a defendant had actua l knowledge tha t a specific felony had been committ ed by a particular person at the time the acces sor y offered the pri ncipal material assist ance in evading appre hension or dete ction. See McClain, 268 A.2d at 577 (explaining that “ [w] hile [the defendant] kne w at that time that [the victim] had be en shot in the he ad, such knowledge, without more, is not the equivalent of le gally sufficient proof that he knew, prior to his acce ssoryship, that the felony had bee n completed”); Clark, 418 A.2d at 1061 (reversing the defendant’s conviction for AAF when the governm ent failed t o present “[a ]dequate proof o f [the defendant’s] guilt y knowledge”). Ms. Jennings was convicted of three counts of AAF based on the February 17 assaults (one for each victim) for assistance provi ded between February 21 a nd 23. She was convicted o f one count of AAF base d on the March 1 murder for assistance provided between March 1 and Septem ber 6. W e examin e the eviden ce the

47 government present ed at trial to support the proposition that when Ms. Jennings provided Mr. Turner with material assistance during the relevant time periods, she actually k new that Mr. Turner shot at three individuals on Februa ry 17, 2017, an d killed an individua l on March 1, 2017. We conclud e that this evidence was insufficient to supp ort any of Ms. Jennings’s four AAF convictions. A. Knowledge of the February 17 Assaults Three days afte r the shooting s, Ms. Jennings called Mr. Turner for about a minute and thirt y seconds. The day after that, on February 21, Ms. Jennings viewed a police report for the shootin gs in Cobalt. Ms. Jennings called Mr. Turner on February 22 for thirty - three se conds. Ms. Jennings searched Cobalt for the police reports perta ining to the Fe bruary 17 and 22 sh ootings the ne xt morning. T he two spoke by phone that aft ernoon in three quick c alls, for 16 seconds, 6 sec onds, and 26 seconds, respectiv ely. During this period, the Cobalt report did not ide ntify Mr. Turner as a suspect in the February 1 7 shootings. From February 21 to 23, the period dur ing which Ms. Jennings allegedly provided ma terial assistanc e to Mr. Turner, the rec ord evidence shows t wo possible sources from whic h Ms. Jennings could have th eoretically gaine d actual knowle dge that Mr. Turner committed the February 17 sho otings: the Coba lt report and Mr. Turner himself during their brie f phone calls. The Cobalt report at that time

48 contain ed no information identifyi ng Mr. Turner, and the governme nt does not suggest that Ms. Jennings could have inferre d Mr. Turner ’s involvement from t he Cobalt report. The government points to no direct e vidence of what e ither party said or heard during these phone calls. Inste ad, it suggests that the jury could have inferred from these f acts that, at some point before materially assisting Mr. Turner by providing him information about the police investigation into the February 17 shootings, Ms. Jennings gained actual knowledge that Mr. Turner had committed th ose offenses. T he evidence permits the conclusion tha t Mr. Turner raised the subject of the February 17 shootin gs during at least one of the calls. But “ where a case is built solely on circ umstantial e vidence and the infere nces drawn from that evidence, ” we must be es pecially “ mindful of the high, demanding sta ndard of proof i n a criminal cas e.” James v. Un ited S tates, 39 A.3d 1262, 12 70 (D.C. 2012). For a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Turner informed Ms. Jennings during one of these bri ef call s that he committed the shootings would “cross the bounds of permissible inference and ente r the forbidden territory of conj ecture and speculation.” In re D.P., 996 A.2d 1286, 1288 (D. C. 2010) (quoti ng Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134). Even if it is “ more likely than not ” that Mr. Turner mentione d somet hing to Ms. Jennings raising her suspicion a bout Mr. Turner’s involvement in thes e shootings, tha t is not enough to e stablish beyond a reasonable doubt that she had

49 actual knowledge and provided Mr. Turner w ith material assistance while possessing that knowledge. Rivas, 783 A.2d at 135 (emphasis in ori ginal). She m ust have actually known tha t Mr. Turner did it — and not “merely susp[ecte d]” it. LaFave & Scott, supra, § 13.6(a). Our case law on the knowledge prong of AAF supports this outcom e. Take Clark, where we found the evidence insuffi cient. There, the defendant “ knew [the principal]; w as with him the night of the robbery; was obvio usly waiting for him to return to the ca r while the robbery wa s in progress; drove the car which [the principal] entered after the robbery; and de nied knowing [the principal] when questioned a t the scene of the arrest.” 418 A.2d at 1061. W e acknowledge d that the evidence o f a gui lty consci ence —t he defendant’s denial tha t he knew the pri ncipal — could perhaps c ontribute to an “inferenc e. . . that the appella nt had some persona l knowledge of [the principal’s] guilt a nd wanted to avoid assoc iation.” Id. But the degree of “persona l knowledge” suggested by this evide nce was “too sket chy and tentative,” in combination with the other fac ts, to show that t he defendant had a ctual, personal knowledge that the person whom he helpe d to escape committed the underlying robbery. Id. S o too here: the fa ct that Ms. J ennings searched for the February 17 shooti ng shortly afte r her call with Mr. T urner supports the inferen ce that she suspec ted his involvem ent based on the informa tion relaye d to her during

50 the call. It does not support t he conclusion, beyon d a reasonable doubt, tha t she actually k new, at that time, that Mr. Turner committed these crimes. See id. Butler ref lects a simi lar prin ciple. Ther e, we explained that th e defend ant’s “visit to [t he principal] a t the D.C. Ja il does not support any inferenc e as to the content of the ir conversation, ” where the gove rnment did not offer any addit ional evidence to shed light on w hat the two talked about. 481 A.2d at 443 - 44. We also concluded tha t the defendant di d not gain knowledg e of the principa l’s participati on in the murder at issue merely by reading newspaper a rticles that “identified” the principal as bein g involved. Id. at 443. The evidence in this case travels a little farther, because Ms. Jennings ’s Cobalt sear ch suppo rts the i nference th at Mr. Turner mentioned the February 17 sho otings. But on this re cord, it would still be “ pure speculation” for the jury to conc lude that Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings discussed the details of Mr. Turner ’s commission of th e crime. See i d. at 444. And t hat Cob alt report, like the newspaper in Butler, did not sufficie ntly identify Mr. Turner to permit the jury to c onclud e that it gave Ms. Jennings actual knowledge that he committed those crimes. See id. a t 443. We have drawn simila r lines in our case s— bet ween a defendant’s mere suspicion and actual knowledge, and betw een a jury’s permiss ible inf erence of knowledge a nd impermissible s peculation a bout a person’s m ental state — outsi de of

51 the AAF context. We have held, for e xample, that a reasonable jury could not conclude tha t a minor who fled from a car wi th a “punched” ignition actua lly knew that the ca r was sto len, becau se there was no evidence that the minor saw that the ignition was “ punched.” In re D.P., 996 A.2d at 1288 - 89. Sitting en banc, we held that it would be “pure s peculation” for a jury to conclude tha t a cocaine deale r would permit someone to sit close to a bag of cocaine only if they were “part of his criminal operations,” rather than due to “careless [ness].” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 136. We have held that an inference tha t the defendant “knew the drugs we re in his Mustang ” solely “ because he was the owner of the car,” often left his valuables in the car, gave no one else perm ission to drive the car, and drove the car the morning it w as seized could not “bear the weight of proof be yond a reasonable doubt ” required to establ ish constructive possession. James, 39 A.3d at 1270 -72. And we have explaine d that the fact that a defendant cashed a check with a forged signa ture, without more, did not establish be yond a reasonable doubt that he knew or sho uld have known tha t he had no right to the che ck. Nowlin v. United States, 782 A.2d 288, 291 - 92 (D.C. 2001). T he pattern of call - search - call between February 21 and 23 presented by the government in this case is consistent with the possibilit y that Ms. Jennings knew Mr. Turner committed the Fe bruary 17 shootings. But it is “ just as consistent with the hypothesis” that Ms. Jennings merely suspected that he committed these crimes.

52 Roy v. United State s, 652 A.2d 1098, 1104 (D.C. 1995). B ecause the gove rnment bore the burden of provi ng Ms. Jennings ’s actual, “personal knowledge,” Butler, 481 A.2d at 443 n.21 (quoting Clark, 418 A.2d at 106 1), and not mere suspicion that Mr. Turner committe d the February 17 s hootings, the e vidence was insu fficient to support her convic tions for AAF base d on these offenses. B. Knowledge of the March 1 Murder Minutes after Mr. McPhatter was shot, Mr. Turner cal led Ms. Jennings and they spoke on the phone for one minute a nd thirty - five seconds. The two exchange d calls over the next several hour s ranging in length from four se conds to one minute and twenty - seve n seconds. On Marc h 2, Ms. Jennings searc hed Cobalt for the poli ce report corres ponding to the Mr. McPhatte r shooting, and they spoke later that day for two minutes and seve n seconds. At this point, th e Cobalt report for Mr. McPhat ter ’s shooting did not identify Mr. Turner as a susp ect. McPhatt er died on March 5. 6 On March 6, Ms. Jennings called Mr. Turner and the two spoke for 6 Ms. Jennings also argues that she could not have been c onvicted of AAF to murder for any a ction taken be fore Mr. McPhatte r’s death on Marc h 5, because AA F requires a com pleted offense, a nd the offense of m urder was not complet e until Mr. McPhatter died. See Little v. United States, 70 9 A.2d 708, 712 - 14 (D. C. 1998) (holding that a defendant coul d not be convicted o f AAF to murder because, at the time he provided material assistance, the victim was still alive). Because we conclude below that the governm ent failed to pre sent sufficie nt evidence that Ms. Jennings had actua l, personal knowle dge that Mr. Turner comm itted the March 1 shooting prior to M r. McPhatter ’s death, we need not address thi s point.

53 two minutes and eight seconds. Two days later, after the drive - by sho oting at the CSOSA office, Mr. Turner cal led Ms. Jennings and the two spo ke on the phone for tw e nty - four minutes. On May 13, 2017, a fter Mr. Turner and Ms. H azelwoo d had alr eady begun plann ing their sch eme to hav e Ms. Ha zelwood claim ownership of the firea rm found in Mr. Turner ’s Lexus, Mr. Turner, Ms. Hazel wood, and Ms. Jennings spoke on a three - way call. Mr. Turner told Ms. Jennings that he want ed Ms. Haz elwood to meet her and that Ms. Jennings should “just let he r know.” On May 31, Mr. Turner and Ms. Hazel wood spoke over the phone, a nd Ms. Hazelwo od represented that Ms. Jennings told her that Mr. Turner “ain’t never come up.” Ms. Hazel wood texted Ms. Jennings, “ H e said he sen t his lo ve,” and Ms. Jennings re plied, “ T ell him me. . . too.” Three months late r, o n the day poli ce arrested Mr. Turner for Mr. McPhat ter ’s murder, Ms. Jennings accessed the police report i n Cobalt for Mr. McPhat ter ’s shooting five times. Also that day, Ms. Hazelwood texted Ms. Jennings, “ C an you keep me updated with anything else?” Ms. Jennings responded, “ I sure will.” This evidenc e spans a broade r time period, a nd it indicate s, more strongly t han the evidence re lated to the February 17 AAF offenses, that Ms. Jennings sought to help Mr. Turner. Nevertheless, this evidence is insufficient for a jury to conclude,

54 beyond a reasona ble doubt, that Ms. Jennings actu ally k new that Mr. Turner committed the Ma rch 1 murder of Mr. McPhatter when she provided him with material as sist ance. First, conside r that the governme nt had the burden to prove th at Ms. Jennings knew that Mr. Turner committed the Ma rch 1 murder at the t ime she helped him by purportedly providing him with inform ation about the police inve stigation. See Clark, 418 A.2d at 1061. V iewing the evi dence in the li ght most favor able to the government, we think Ms. Jennings co uld conceiv ably h ave assisted Mr. Turner on five occasions: March 2 (the call after Ms. Jennings searched for t he McPhatter shooting in Cobalt), March 6 (the call on the da y after Andrew McPh atter ’s d eath), March 8 (the call on the day Mr. Turner ’s car w as seized afte r the CSOSA drive - by shooting), May 31 (when Ms. Jennings relayed to Ms. Hazel wood that Mr. Turner “ain’t never c ome up”), and Septe mber 6 (when, afte r Ms. Hazelwood asked Ms. Jennings to “keep [her] updated with anyt hing else,” Ms. Je nnings responded, “I sure wi ll”). The closest the government come s to satisfying it s burden is the March 2 phone call that occurre d aft er Mr. Turner spoke with Ms. Jennings the day of the shooting and a fter Ms. Jennings vie wed the Cobalt report fo r that inci dent. But this is the same “call - search - call” pattern evidence that the governm ent offered to

55 support Ms. Jennings ’s knowledge th at Mr. Turner committed the February 17 offenses. Consistent with our conclusion above, Ms. Jennings ’s choice to view th e Cobalt report for the Ma rch 1 shooting appears to have been prompted by her calls with Mr. Turner the previous day. But just like the Februa ry 17 AAF evidenc e, this evidence is insufficient to show Ms. Jennings ’s actual and personal knowledge, because the Coba lt report contai ned no indication that Mr. Turner committed the offense and the c ontent of the phone c alls is otherw ise unknown. See id.; Butler, 481 A.2d at 4 43 - 44 & n.21. The t hree possible acts of assista nce prior to September 6 similarly lack a factual ba sis from which a reasona ble jury could c onclude that Ms. Jennings knew Mr. Turner committed the March 1 offenses. The content of the calls o n March 6 and March 8 is unkno wn. At first glanc e, the timing a nd circumstanc es of the March 6 call might suggest a c onnection with the fac t that Mr. Mc Phatter died the day before. But no other record evidenc e suggests that Ms. Jennings learn ed of Mr. McPhat ter ’s death that day. M oreover, she did not take any ac tion after speaking with Mr. Turner that day suggesting that the two discussed the March 1 murder at all (such as looking at the Cobalt report for the offense). The fact that Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings spoke on Mar ch 8, on its own, likewise provides little indication that Ms. Jennings gained any additional knowledge related to the Marc h 1 murder. Further, give n the seizure of Mr. Turner ’s ca r that day, that call is “just as consistent

56 with” the infere nce that Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings ’s le ngthy conversation focused on the car sei zure r ather than on anything to do with the March 1 murder. Roy, 652 A.2d at 1104. Next, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the governme nt, we agree that Ms. Jennings ’s May 31 statement to Mr. Turner, communic ated through Ms. Hazelwood, could be interpret ed as a reassurance tha t Mr. Turner was not under suspicion for the murder of Mr. McP hatter. But at th at point, it had bee n over two months since Ms. Jennings had viewed the Coba lt report for the March 1 murder. And there is no othe r evidence that Ms. Jennings gaine d information about Mr. Turner ’s involvem ent in the Ma rch 1 murder of Mr. McPhatter from any other source during this tim e period. Cf. Butler, 481 A. 2d at 443 (evidence that newspapers “ide ntified” the principal as be ing involved in a murder, com bined with the defendant’s testimony that he “read the papers just like anybody else, ” did not suffice to prove a ctual knowledge). Therefore, the evidenc e does not permit the inferen ce that Ms. Jennings actually knew Mr. Turner committed the March 1 murder when she communicated to him that he was not under inve stigation for it. Finally, on September 6, the day Mr. Turne r was arrested for M r. McPhat ter’s murder, Ms. Hazel wood asked Ms. Jen nings to “keep me u pdated with anyt hing else, ” and Ms. Jennings responde d, “I sure will.” We assume, without deciding, that

57 Ms. Jennings possessed actual, personal know ledge of Mr. T urner’s partici pation in this murder on September 6 after viewing the Cobalt report informing her tha t Mr. Turner had been arre sted for the cri me, al though this is a c lose question. We also a ssum e, without de ciding, that disclosing nonpublic police information can constitute a id or assistanc e for purposes o f an AAF convict ion. Even so, there is no evidence t hat Ms. Jennings provided Mr. Turner with materia l assistance on September 6 after viewing the C obalt report: because h er text mess age to Ms. Hazel wood merel y promises the disclosure of informati on in the future, it was not aid or assistance “designed to hinder [M r. Turner’s] apprehensi on, trial or punishment. ” Butler, 481 A.2d at 443 - 44. And even though a rea sonable jury could read Ms. Hazelwood’s refere nce to “anything e lse ” to mean that Ms. J ennings had provided “updat es” prior to th e transmission of Ms. Hazelwood ’ s Septe mber 6 text message, th is gener alized ref erence to previous conduct does not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, t hat Ms. Jennings provided material assistance to Mr. Turner while she possessed actual, personal knowledge that he committed the March 1 murder. In all, t he government’s e vidence did not p rovide a factua l basis for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Jennings p rovided material assistan ce to Mr. Turner while she possess ed the re quisite level of knowledge. See Butler, 481 A.2d at 4 43 - 44 & n.21; Clark, 418 A.2d at 1061.

58 Contrast this ca se with one where we found sufficient evi dence of actual knowledge. In Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570 (D.C. 1984), we c oncluded that the government pre sented enough ev idence that the defendant ac tually knew of a second robbery tak ing place at a pa rticular restaura nt because t he defendant and the principal fe lon had robbed that same resta urant ten days before and ha d not obtained the money they had expected to obtain. 484 A.2d at 576 - 77. Moreover, the defendant sat outside th e restaurant in the getaway car while hi s compatriot robbed it a second tim e, and immediately after t he robbery, the defendant observed another occupant of the car hurriedly hiding the clothes worn by the principal w hen committing the second robbery. Id. W e held t hat the jury could infer ac tual knowledge beca use it heard testimony a bout specific informa tion to which the accessor y was exposed that would cause a reasonable person to know that his compatriot wa s robbing the same restaurant for a sec ond time. See id; see a lso Downing v. Unite d States, 434 A.2d 409, 412 (D.C. 1981) (exp laining, for purpos es of an aiding - and - abetting convictio n, that th ere was su fficien t evidence th at the defendant actually knew that the prin cipal crim e took pl ace where th e assail ants go t out of the car drive n by the defendant an d committed the assault, then returned to the car, and the victim ra n past the car with a “bloodied fa ce” moments late r); c f. Robinson, 249 A.2d at 507 (reversing a convicti on for AAF where the only evidenc e of knowledge w as that the de fendant was see n in the car outsid e the location w here

59 the robbery took place and was a pprehended with the robbers in that sa me car). Here, the jury hea rd testimony permitting only an inference th at Ms. Jennings knew that particular c rimes had occurred. As explained a bove, however, t he jur y heard no evidence perm itting the infe rence that she kne w Mr. Turner himself committed t he offense s. The government emph asizes “ Jennings ’s and Turner ’s close relationship a nd frequent contac t,” “ Jennings’s e agerness to help Mr. Turne r in the months followi ng his arrest, ” and “ Jennings’s false denial of having run C obalt searc hes or warrant checks on behalf of Turne r.” To be sure, this evidence shows that Ms. Jennings intended to a id or reas sure Mr. Turner in some fashion. It ce rtainly supports a general impression that Ms. Jennings was on Mr. Turner ’s “side, ” rather than the “side” of the MPD. But the fact that Ms. Jennings ma y have allowed her friendship with Mr. Turner to supplant her professi onal obligati ons as an employe e of the police department does not fill t he gap in the evidence for purpose s of an AA F conviction. There is simply insuffi cient evidence i n the record for a rational jury to find — beyon d a reasonable doubt — that Ms. Jennings actua lly knew Mr. Turner co mmitted the February 17 or March 1 offe nses at the time she supposedly provided him with material assista nce in the for m of informat ion about the sta tus of the police investigations into those crime s. For these rea sons, we reverse each o f

60 Ms. Jennings ’s AAF convic tions. See Butler, 481 A.2d at 4 44; Clark, 418 A.2d at 1061 - 62. V. Obstruction of Just ice Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings both argue tha t the government pre sented insufficient e vidence to convict the m of obstruction of jus tice because the acts they committed did not i mpede or obstruct an “official proc eeding” unde r D.C. Code § 22 - 722(a)(6). The gove rnment agrees in pa rt, arguing that Mr. Turner’s and Ms. Jennings ’s individua l obstruction of just ice convicti ons should be va cated because neithe r of them im peded or obstructe d an “officia l proceeding,” and that Mr. Turner ’s consp iracy - to - obstruct - justi ce convicti on shou ld be vacated becau se it is not clear whethe r the jury convicted him of conduc t cognizable under D.C. Code § 22 - 722(a)(6). A. Additional B ackground Under D.C. C ode § 22 - 722(a)(6), “ [a] person com mits the offens e of obstruction of justice if that person[] . . . [c]orruptly, or by threa ts of force, any way obstructs or impe des or endeavors to ob struct or impede the due administra tion of justice in any of ficial proce eding.” The D.C. Code de fines “officia l proceeding” as “any trial, hea ring, investigat ion, or other proceeding in a court of the Distri ct of Columbia or conduct ed by the Council of the Distric t of Columbia or an age ncy or

61 department of the D istrict of Columbi a governme nt, or a grand jury pro ceeding.” D.C. Code § 22 - 721(4). Section 22 - 721(1), in turn, defines “court of the District of Columbia” t o include only “ the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the District of Colum bia Court of Appeals. ” D.C. Code § 22 - 721(1). Mr. Turner and Ms. Jennings were charge d with violating Section 22 - 722(a)(6) and c onspiring to do so. Each of the indivi dual obstructio n of justice counts charged each defenda nt with obstruc ting “the due administration of justice in an official proc eeding then pending i n the Distric t of Columbia” on a particular date. As for the conspirac y, the Second Superseding In dictme nt stated: “[t] he object of the conspirac y was to corruptly impede the due adminis tration of justice in the case of U.S. v. Dere k Turner, 1:17 - cr - 055 (CRC) (D.D.C), in whic h Derek B. Turner, was charged with a fede ral firearms offense, and in the proce ss corruptly impede investigations into ” the shootings taking place from Nove mber 2016 through Ma rch of 2017. During its closing, the governme nt argued that the defendants had c onspired “to obstruct just ice in an official proceeding pending in t he District of Columbia,. . . the offic ial procee ding being the Unite d States versus Dere k Turner, U.S. Distric t Court, federa l firearms charge, ” explaining that “ [t]he byprod uct of that conspiracy. . . wa s to impede the investigation int o two murders and four other

62 crimes of violenc e” and that “ [t] he focus of the obstructio n conspiracy was to distance Dere k Turner from the murde r weapon.” When instru cting the jury on the conspiracy count, the trial court desc ribed the elements of the underlying obstruc tion of justice cha rge as: “one, the defendant endea vored to obstruct or im pede the due administration of jus tice in a pending criminal case in a court of the District of Columbia and related inv estigations c onducted by the M etropolitan Police Department and U nited Stat es Attorney ’s Office,” and “two, the de fendant did so with the intent to u ndermine the integrity of the pe nding proceedi ng and related investigation.” When instructing th e jury on the individua l obstruction of j ustice charges, however, the tria l court defined the e lements as: (1) the de fendant “endeavore d to obstruct or im pede the due administ ration of justice in a proceeding in a court of the District of C olumbia,” and (2) the defendant “ did so with the intent to undermine the integrity of the pending procee ding.” The court did not mention the investigations into the Novembe r 2016 through March 2017 shootings. B. Discussion The parties agre e that a case pending in the United Sta tes District Court for the District of C olumbia is not an “ official procee ding” under Section 22 - 722(a)(6) and that a person c annot be convicted u nder D.C.’s obstr uction of justi ce statute

63 solely for obstr ucting a c riminal procee ding pending in fede ral court. T hey part ways, to an e xtent, over why that lega l conclusion require s the vacat ur of Mr. Turner’s and Ms. Jennings ’s obstr uction of justice convictions. T he government concedes that Ms. Jennings and Mr. Turner ar e legally innocent of the individual ob struction of jus tice offense s for which the y were convicted “be cause the jury inst ructions on the subst antive counts (43 - 47 and 49 - 51) rested exclusively o n obstructing the pe nding district c ourt case.” But the go vernment see s the conspiracy - to - obstruct - justice count, for whi ch only Mr. Turner was convicted, diffe rently. It argues that the jury was presented with two theories of Mr. Turner ’s culpability: (1) his ac tions interfered w ith his pending district court case or (2) his actions interfe red with the ongoin g investigat ion into the violent events of Nove mber 2016 t hrough March 2017, for w hich he was ultim ately indict ed in this case. In the government ’s view, a police investigation ca n constitute an “official proce eding” under Section 22 - 722(a)(6), eve n if a pending federal distric t court case ca nnot. Ms. Jennings, who highl ighted this aspect of the government’s argument in her re ply brief, insists that sh e could not hav e been charged w ith obstruction of just ice under Section 22 - 722(a)(6) merely for int erfering with a police investigation, because “obstruc tion must be of a court proc eeding, not a police investigation. ” Despite disagree ing over whether a person can be convict ed of obstructing just ice for interfering w ith a pol ice investigation, the government

64 concedes t hat “the conviction shoul d nonethele ss be vacated beca use the record does not disclose on w hich theory the jury c onvicted.” We agree that each o f Ms. Jennings ’s and Mr. Turner ’ s obstruction of ju stice and conspiracy t o obstruct justice convict ions must be vacated. First, the parties are correct that a criminal case in federa l district court doe s not qualify as an “ official proceeding” unde r D.C.’s obstruction of j ustice statute. We interpret a statute to effectuat e “the legi slature’ s intent, ” which, as a “gener al r ule. . . is to be found in the language tha t [the lawmaker] has used. ” Wynn v. United States, 48 A.3d 181, 188 (D.C. 2012) (qu oting Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc)). Accordingly, “[w]e will gi ve effect to the pla in meaning of a statute ‘when the language is unam biguous and does not produce an absurd result. ’” Facebook, Inc. v. Wint, 199 A.3d 625, 628 (D.C. 2019) (quotin g McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 387 (D.C. 2005)). In a ddition, “whe re the context shows that the draftsm en’s mention of one t hing. . . reasonably[] impl[ies] the preclusion of a lternatives, ” we will apply that “com mon - sense principle” — also known as expressio uniu s est exclusio alterius — to discern a statute’s meaning. Odeniran v. Hanley W ood, LLC, 985 A.2d 421, 427 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Inde p. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawk e, 211 F.3d 638, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

65 Section 22 - 721(4) de fines “officia l proceeding,” for purposes of Section 22 - 722(a)(6), to inc lude a procee ding in a “court of the D istrict of Columbia.” “[C]ourt of the Dist rict of Columbia,” in turn, “means the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia or the Dist rict of Columbia C ourt of Appeal s.” D.C. Code § 22 - 721(1). None of these provisions mention s the United States District Court for the District of C olumbia. The existence of the federal courts “ must have bee n familiar” to the drafters of D. C.’s obstruction of j ustice statute. Odenira n, 985 A.2d at 427. As a result, “it is a fair surmise that the drafters of the regulations deliberately excluded” the United States District C ourt for the District of Columbia from the list of entities encom passed by the definition of “offic ial proceeding” in S ection s 22 - 721(4) and (1). Id. Therefore, S ection 22 - 722(a)(6) does not prohi bit obstructing or impeding, or endeavorin g to obstruct or impede, a proceeding in the United Sta tes District Court for the District of Columbia. B eca use the government conc edes that the “official proc eeding” liste d in each of Mr. Turner’s and Ms. Jennings ’s individual obstruction of justice convictions was Mr. Turner ’s federa l district court case, each of Mr. Turner’s and Ms. Jennings ’s individual obstruction of justice convict ions mus t be vacat ed. As for Mr. Turner ’s c onviction for conspirac y to commit obstructio n of justice, we decline to decide whether a person ca n be convicted of obst ructing justi ce for interfering w ith a police investiga tion and agree with the government tha t vacatur

66 is warranted bec ause the jury might have convicted him on the legally impermissible theory that he interfer ed with a proceeding in the United Sta tes District Court for the District of Columbia. “[W]hene ver various alterna tive theories of li ability are submitted to a jury, any one of which is la ter determine d to be improper, the conviction c annot be sustaine d. . . because of the po ssibility tha t the verdict m ight have rested ent irely upon the improper t heory.” Jones v. United States, 16 A.3d 966, 970 (D.C. 2011) (qu oting Barkley v. United States, 455 A.2d 412, 414 (D.C. 1983)). Neither Mr. Turner nor Ms. Jennings contests t he governm ent ’s conces sion that “t he record does not disc lose” whether t he jury convicted Mr. Turner based on a finding about his interfe rence with hi s pending federa l court case or base d on a finding abo ut his interfere nce with the MPD ’s investigation of t he shootings. We agree that the record does not ind icate on which the ory of liability the jury convicte d, because the government, in its closing argument, and the trial c ourt, in its jury instructions, mentioned both theories. The refore, Mr. Turner ’s convi ction for c onspiracy to commit obstruction of justice must also be vacated. S ee id. VI. Conclusion For the foregoing re asons, we v acate each of Mr. Turner’s and Ms. Jennings ’s convictions for obst ruction of just ice, and we va cate Mr. Turner ’s conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice. We also vac ate each o f Ms. Jennings ’s convictions

67 for being an accessory after the fact. We affirm Mr. Turner ’s convictio ns for assault, murder, and rela ted firearm possession offe nses. We remand to the trial court for further procee dings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.