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Feb. 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

William Kiwanis Carroll v. State of Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CR-2024-0581

• Judges: Judge Cole

• Opinion

• Authorities (56)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [J William Cole](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6143/j-william-cole/)

Rel: February 6, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CR-2024-0581

---

William Kiwanis Carroll

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CC-22-692)

COLE, Judge.

William Kiwanis Carroll appeals his conviction for provocation

manslaughter, a violation of § 13A-6-3(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, as well as

his resulting sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. For the following

reasons, we reverse Carroll's conviction and sentence.
CR-2024-0581

Facts and Procedural History

On July 8, 2022, the Montgomery County grand jury issued a one-

count indictment against Carroll, charging him with the murder of Eric

Witcher, a violation of § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. Carroll pleaded

not guilty to the offense. Before trial, Carroll filed a motion in limine

seeking to exclude collateral-acts evidence from admission. The

Montgomery Circuit Court held a pretrial hearing. The State argued that

Carroll -- by previously firing a weapon at a woman whom he had briefly

dated, Rodneshia Harris, after she refused to have sexual relations with

him -- had demonstrated a predisposition to use gun violence against

women as a means of retaliation or control when his sexual advances are

rebuffed. The State further argued that such retaliation or desire to

control was Carroll's motivation to murder Witcher, the then-boyfriend

of Carroll's most recent ex-girlfriend. Carroll argued that the alleged

incident with Harris was completely unrelated to this case, involved

different purported victims, and that the evidence regarding the alleged

prior incident with Harris would be used solely to prove that Carroll

possessed the propensity to commit the crime charged. After hearing the

2
CR-2024-0581

arguments of the parties, the trial court denied the motion, stating as

follows:

"All right. And the Court has had a chance to review
some of that case law that was given to me yesterday. And
there's several cases that were given that said motive is
always admissible. I think I saw the newest case, 2023 case.
And I think that the Court always allows the State to have a
non-hearsay witness to prove anything.

"So based on that the Court will allow [Harris] to testify.
And I will give a standing objection to [Carroll]."

(R. 187.)

At trial, the evidence revealed that Witcher and Roshaun Steele

had been in an on-again/off-again relationship for approximately 15

years. During one of their breakups, Steele met Carroll, whose mother

lived in an adjacent apartment, and the two began dating. Their

relationship ended, however, after only a few months, and Steele then

resumed her relationship with Witcher. Steele testified that the breakup

did not sit well with Carroll and that he indicated to her multiple times

that he wanted to get back together with her. According to Steele, Carroll

attempted to sabotage her relationship with Witcher by sending Witcher

a pornographic video of Steele having sexual intercourse with Carroll

while they were dating.

3
CR-2024-0581

The evidence further revealed that, on April 30, 2020, Witcher

texted Steele on her cellular telephone, notifying her that he was going

to come over to her apartment. According to Steele, Witcher was visibly

angry when he arrived and told her that he had walked past Carroll, who

was standing outside of his mother's apartment, and that Carroll had

tried to "dap" him by giving him either a handshake or a fist-bump in

greeting as he passed. Witcher then remained in the apartment for a

short time but was too outraged to speak to Steele. Witcher then decided

to leave. As Steele opened the door for him, Witcher saw Carroll still

standing outside of his mother's apartment. Witcher then began walking

directly toward Carroll. According to Steele, Carroll uttered something

to Witcher as he approached, but Steele was not able to discern what was

said.1 Steele testified that Witcher then began "fighting, punching,

punching" Carroll as Carroll held his hands up and attempted to shield

himself from Witcher's blows. (R. 266.) Steele then saw Carroll start to

pull his jogging pants down and retrieve a revolver from the pocket of the

shorts he was wearing underneath his pants. Carroll then began

1According to Carroll's mother, who also testified at trial, she heard

Carroll say "I know you're not coming" just before the shooting. (R. 628.)
4
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shooting at Witcher. According to Steele, Witcher tried to flee but fell to

the ground as Carroll continued to fire. Witcher was shot twice -- once in

the left hand and once in the left arm -- and died when the bullet striking

his arm travelled into his chest. Carroll then fled the scene; however, he

flagged down a responding officer traveling to the scene and turned

himself in.

Carroll testified on his own behalf at trial. Carroll testified that he

has had major health problems ever since he was a child and that he

suffers greatly from seizures that render him quasi-unconscious. Carroll

further testified that his medical conditions have worsened ever since he

was in a motor-vehicle accident in 2017, in which he fractured his skull

and injured his neck and back, and now has limited mobility. According

to Carroll, he had to walk with a cane for approximately two years, and

the doctors warned him that, if he ever injured his head again, he could

die.

Carroll further testified that, although he had dated Steele, he had

no desire to mend their relationship after it ended and that, at the time

of the incident, he was in another relationship. Carroll also stated that

he had no animus toward Witcher.

5
CR-2024-0581

Regarding the incident, Carroll testified that, on April 30, 2020, he

was waiting on his mother outside her apartment to make sure she got

into her car safely and saw Witcher walking to Steele's adjacent

apartment. Carroll stated that he greeted Witcher and tried to "dap" him

as he walked past, but Witcher allegedly responded that he did not want

to speak to Carroll. Witcher then went into Steele's apartment, and

Carroll's mother walked to her car. While Carroll was watching his

mother, Witcher exited Steele's apartment and approached Carroll

unprompted, stating: "you F'd up." (R. 696-98.) Witcher then punched

Carroll twice on the left side of his head. Carroll testified that he did not

start the fight with Witcher, that he did not hit Witcher at all, and that

he raised his arms only to block Witcher's punches. According to Carroll,

he immediately felt "[d]azed, confused, [and] didn't know what was going

on" from the first punch and that he tried to shield himself. (R. 699.)

Carroll testified that he saw a "nickel-plated gun that [Witcher] had" and

"did what I had to do." (R. 700-01.) Carroll further testified that he fired

his gun and then ran from the scene because he feared for his life -- both

6
CR-2024-0581

from Witcher's gun 2 and from being beaten on the head. Carroll stated

that he ran to a nearby gas station where he told a clerk to call the police.

While at the gas station, Carroll saw police officers driving toward the

scene, so he flagged an officer down and turned himself in.

After the defense rested, the jury found Carroll guilty of the lesser-

included offense of provocation manslaughter. The trial court sentenced

Carroll on July 8, 2024, to 10 years' imprisonment. This appeal follows.

Analysis

On appeal, Carroll argues that the trial court erred when it allowed

the State to introduce, pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., evidence

tending to show that, a few months before the incident involving Witcher,

Carroll shot a weapon at Harris. The State contends that, under Rule

404(b), the evidence was admissible as proof of Carroll's motive to murder

Witcher because, it said, Witcher was in a relationship with Carroll's

most recent ex-girlfriend and Carroll's prior act against Harris

demonstrated that he possessed a general "willingness to use gun

violence to intimidate or control women when they do not accede to or act

2In Carroll's statement to police, he stated that he saw Witcher drop

his gun as he fell. (C. 317.) However, no gun was ever found. (R. 485.)
7
CR-2024-0581

against his desires." (State's brief, p. 21.) We agree with Carroll that the

trial court erred when it admitted the evidence over his objections.

Accordingly, Carroll's conviction and sentence are due to be reversed.

In Horton v. State, 217 So. 3d 27 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016), this Court

held the following regarding evidence admitted under Rule 404(b):

" ' "The admission or exclusion of evidence is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148, 1191 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala.
2001). "The question of admissibility of evidence
is generally left to the discretion of the trial court,
and the trial court's determination on that
question will not be reversed except upon a clear
showing of abuse of discretion." Ex parte Loggins,
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000). This is equally
true with regard to the admission of collateral-
bad-acts evidence. See Davis v. State, 740 So. 2d
1115, 1130 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). See also Irvin
v. State, 940 So. 2d 331, 344-46 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005).'

"Windsor v. State, 110 So. 3d 876, 880 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

"Generally, '[e]vidence of any offense other than that
specifically charged is prima facie inadmissible.' Bush v.
State, 695 So. 2d 70, 85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), aff'd, 695 So.
2d 138 (Ala. 1997). '[T]he exclusionary rule prevents the State
from using evidence of a defendant's prior [or subsequent] bad
acts to prove the defendant's bad character and, thereby,
protects the defendant's right to a fair trial.' Ex parte
Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295, 302 (Ala. 2000). '[T]he purpose of
the rule is to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial by
preventing convictions based on the jury's belief that the

8
CR-2024-0581

defendant is a "bad" person or one prone to commit criminal
acts.' Ex parte Arthur, 472 So. 2d 665, 668 (Ala. 1985). ' "The
basis for the rule lies in the belief that the prejudicial effect of
prior crimes will far outweigh any probative value that might
be gained from them. Most agree that such evidence of prior
crimes has almost an irreversible impact upon the minds of
the jurors." ' Ex parte Cofer, 440 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Ala. 1983)
(quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1)
(3d ed. 1977)).

"However, '[t]he State is not prohibited from ever
presenting evidence of a defendant's prior [or subsequent] bad
acts.' Moore v. State, 49 So. 3d 228, 232 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009). '[E]vidence of collateral crimes or bad acts is
admissible as part of the prosecutor's case if the defendant's
collateral misconduct is relevant to show his guilt other than
by suggesting that he is more likely to be guilty of the charged
offense because of his past misdeeds.' Bush, 695 So. 2d at 85.

" ' "In all instances, the question is
whether the proposed evidence is
primarily to prove the commission of
another disconnected crime, or
whether it is material to some issue in
the case. If it is material and logically
relevant to an issue in the case,
whether to prove an element of the
crime, or to controvert a material
contention of defendant, it is not
inadmissible because in making the
proof the commission of an
independent disconnected crime is an
inseparable feature of it." '

"Bradley v. State, 577 So. 2d 541, 547 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(quoting Snead v. State, 243 Ala. 23, 24, 8 So. 2d 269, 270
(1942)). Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides:

9
CR-2024-0581

" 'Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident, provided that upon request
by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice
on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.'

" ' "Rule 404(b) is a principle of limited admissibility.
This means that the offered evidence is inadmissible for one
broad, impermissible purpose, but is admissible for one or
more other limited purposes." ' Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d
1148, 1165 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala.
2001) (quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence §
69.01 (5th ed. 1996)). Moreover:

" 'Rule 404(b) is a test of relevancy. Rule 401,
Ala. R. Evid., defines "relevant evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
As this Court noted in Hayes v. State, 717 So. 2d
30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997): "Alabama recognizes a
liberal test of relevancy, which states that
evidence is admissible 'if it has any tendency to
lead in logic to make the existence of the fact for
which it is offered more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.' " 717 So. 2d at 36,
quoting C. Gamble, [McElroy's] Alabama Evidence
§ 401(b). "[A] fact is admissible against a
relevancy challenge if it has any probative value,
however[] slight, upon a matter in the case."

10
CR-2024-0581

Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 468 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995), aff'd, 686 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1996).'

"Draper v. State, 886 So. 2d 105, 119 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
Because the question of the admissibility of collateral-act
evidence is whether the evidence is relevant for a limited
purpose other than bad character, 'the list of traditionally
recognized exceptions [to the exclusionary rule] is not
exhaustive and fixed.' Bradley, 577 So. 2d at 547. However,

" '[t]he State has no absolute right to use evidence
of prior acts to prove the elements of an offense or
to buttress inferences created by other evidence.
Evidence of prior bad acts of a criminal defendant
is presumptively prejudicial. It interjects a
collateral issue into the case which may divert the
minds of the jury from the main issue.'

"Ex parte Cofer, 440 So. 2d at 1124. Therefore, '[f]or
collateral-act evidence to be admissible for one of the "other
purposes" in Rule 404(b), there must be a " 'real and open
issue as to one or more of those "other purposes." ' " ' Draper,
886 So. 2d at 117 (quoting Gillespie v. State, 549 So. 2d 640,
645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), quoting in turn, Bowden v. State,
538 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Ala. 1988)). When the question of the
admissibility of collateral-acts evidence is 'extremely close, we
conclude that any doubt about the admissibility of the
testimony should, given the highly prejudicial nature of the
evidence, be resolved in favor of the accused.' Brewer v. State,
440 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).

"Furthermore, 'even though evidence of collateral
crimes or acts may be relevant to an issue other than the
defendant's character, it should be excluded if "it would serve
comparatively little or no purpose except to arouse the
passion, prejudice, or sympathy of the jury," … or put another
way, "unless its probative value is 'substantially outweighed
by its undue prejudice.' " ' Bradley, 577 So. 2d at 547 -48

11
CR-2024-0581

(citations omitted). 'Before its probative value will be held to
outweigh its potential prejudicial effect, the evidence of a
collateral crime must not only be relevant, it must also be
reasonably necessary to the state's case, and it must be plain
and conclusive.' Bush, 695 So. 2d at 85. See also Thompson
v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 136 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) ('The
[Alabama Supreme] Court [has] cautioned that Rule 404(b)
evidence must be "reasonably necessary to [the State's] case."
[Ex parte Jackson,] 33 So. 3d [1279,] 1286 [(Ala. 2009) ].').

"As this Court explained in Woodard v. State, 846 So. 2d
1102 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002):

" 'Evidence of collateral crimes is "presumptively
prejudicial because it could cause the jury to infer
that, because the defendant has committed crimes
in the past, it is more likely that he committed the
particular crime with which he is charged -- thus,
it draws the jurors' minds away from the main
issue." Ex parte Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295, 296
(Ala. 2000). In Robinson v. State, 528 So. 2d 343
(Ala. Crim. App. 1986), this Court explained the
exclusionary rule as follows:

" ' " ' "On the trial of a person for the
alleged commission of a particular
crime, evidence of his doing another
act, which itself is a crime, is not
admissible if the only probative
function of such evidence is to show his
bad character, inclination or
propensity to commit the type of crime
for which he is being tried. This is a
general exclusionary rule which
prevents the introduction of prior
criminal acts for the sole purpose of
suggesting that the accused is more
likely to be guilty of the crime in

12
CR-2024-0581

question." ' Pope v. State, 365 So. 2d
369, 371 (Ala. [Crim.] App. 1978),
quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama
Evidence § 69.01 (3d ed. 1977). ' "This
exclusionary rule is simply an
application of the character rule which
forbids the State to prove the accused's
bad character by particular deeds. The
basis for the rule lies in the belief that
the prejudicial effect of prior crimes
will far outweigh any probative value
that might be gained from them. Most
agree that such evidence of prior
crimes has almost an irreversible
impact upon the minds of the jurors." '
Ex parte Arthur, 472 So. 2d 665, 668
(Ala. 1985), quoting [C. Gamble,]
McElroy's [Alabama Evidence], §
69.01(1) [(3d ed. 1977)]. Thus, the
exclusionary rule serves to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial. ' "The
jury's determination of guilt or
innocence should be based on evidence
relevant to the crime charged." ' Ex
parte Cofer, 440 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Ala.
1983); Terrell v. State, 397 So. 2d 232,
234 (Ala. [Crim.] App. 1981), cert.
denied, 397 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1981);
United States v. Turquitt, 557 F.2d
464, 468 (5th Cir.1977).

" ' " 'If the defendant's commission
of another crime or misdeed is an
element of guilt, or tends to prove his
guilt otherwise than by showing of bad
character, then proof of such other act
is admissible.' Saffold v. State, 494 So.
2d 164 (Ala. [Crim.] App. 1986). The

13
CR-2024-0581

well-established exceptions to the
exclusionary rule include: (1) relevancy
to prove identity; (2) relevancy to prove
res gestae; (3) relevancy to prove
scienter; (4) relevancy to prove intent;
(5) relevancy to show motive; (6)
relevancy to prove system; (7)
relevancy to prove malice; (8) relevancy
to rebut special defenses; and (9)
relevancy in various particular crimes.
Willis v. State, 449 So. 2d 1258, 1260
(Ala. [Crim.] App. 1984); Scott v. State,
353 So. 2d 36 (Ala. [Crim.] App. 1977).
However, the fact that evidence of a
prior bad act may fit into one of these
exceptions will not alone justify its
admission. ' "Judicial inquiry does not
end with a determination that the
evidence of another crime is relevant
and probative of a necessary element of
the charged offense. It does not suffice
simply to see if the evidence is capable
of being fitted within an exception to
the rule. Rather, a balancing test must
be applied. The evidence of another
similar crime must not only be
relevant, it must also be reasonably
necessary to the government's case,
and it must be plain, clear, and
conclusive, before its probative value
will be held to outweigh its potential
prejudicial effects." ' Averette v. State,
469 So. 2d 1371, 1374 (Ala. [Crim.]
App. 1985), quoting United States v.
Turquitt, supra at 468-69.
' " 'Prejudicial' is used in this phrase to
limit the introduction of probative
evidence of prior misconduct only when

14
CR-2024-0581

it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial."
[Citation omitted.] "Of course,
'prejudice, in this context, means more
than simply damage to the opponent's
cause. A party's case is always
damaged by evidence that the facts are
contrary to his contention; but that
cannot be ground for exclusion. What
is meant here is an undue tendency to
move the tribunal to decide on an
improper basis, commonly, though not
always, an emotional one.' " ' Averette
v. State, supra, at 1374."

" ' 528 So. 2d at 347.'

" 846 So. 2d at 1106-07."

Horton, 217 So. 3d at 45-48.

In this case, Harris testified that she met Carroll in 2019 and went

on a few dates with him. On one occasion, they met at a motel. At some

point during the night, Carroll attempted to initiate sexual intercourse

with Harris; however, she rejected his advances and told him that she

wanted to leave. According to Harris, Carroll became very angry and

offered to pay her for sexual intercourse. When Harris continued to

refuse, Carroll stood up and laid a revolver on the hotel nightstand.

Harris testified that, after she saw the weapon, she became quiet and

began to shake. Carroll then berated her for approximately an hour

15
CR-2024-0581

before he eventually started to fall asleep. Once Carroll fell asleep,

Harris ran from the room, and when she started her car, she saw Carroll

running toward her from the motel room and heard a gunshot. Harris,

however, drove away before Carroll reached her. Harris reported the

incident to the police, and charges were filed; however, all charges

against Carroll were later dismissed when Harris failed to appear to

testify as the complaining witness.

The State argues that this evidence was properly admitted at trial

to demonstrate Carroll's motive in killing Witcher. Regarding motive,

the Alabama Supreme Court has held that

" ' "[m]otive is an inducement, or that which leads
or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime
charged." Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 26, 65 So.
972, 977 (1914). Motive is "that state of mind
which works to 'supply the reason that nudges the
will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal
intent.' " C. Gamble, Character Evidence[: A
Comprehensive Approach], at 42 [(1987)].
"Furthermore, testimony offered for the purpose of
showing motive is always admissible. It is
permissible in every criminal case to show that
there was an influence, an inducement, operating
on the accused, which may have led or tempted
him to commit the offense." (Emphasis in original,
citations omitted.) Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d
1226, 1235 (Ala. 1988).'

"Ex parte Register, 680 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1994)."

16
CR-2024-0581

Towles v. State, 168 So. 3d 133, 143 (Ala. 2014).

" 'The prosecution may prove former acts of hostility by the accused

toward the victim for the purpose of showing motive and malice.' " Scott

v. State, 163 So. 3d 389, 436 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Carroll v.

State, 370 So. 2d 749, 759 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (emphasis added)).

Here, however, the disputed testimony did not involve any evidence

regarding a former act of hostility toward the victim in this case. Rather,

the evidence concerned Carroll's alleged acts of hostility toward Harris,

who was wholly irrelevant to the alleged "love triangle" involving Carroll,

Witcher, and Steele and to the crime charged here.

This Court has long held that a prior act of hostility or violence is

admissible against the accused to prove motive only when it pertains to

the victim of the crime charged. As this Court held in Caylor v. State,

353 So. 2d 8 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977):

"It is a basic and fundamental principle of evidence that
in a murder prosecution, it is not permissible to show a
difficulty between the accused and a third person not
connected with the victim or the offense. Johnson v. State,
265 Ala. 360, 91 So. 2d 476 (1957); Stain v. State, 273 Ala.
262, 138 So. 2d 703 (1962); Mainor v. State, [348 So. 2d 1083
(Ala. Crim. App. 1977)]....

17
CR-2024-0581

"The state is not allowed to supply the intent to kill one
victim by showing that the defendant had assaulted a third
party on another unrelated occasion. While proof of other
offenses is sometimes admissible as exceptions to the general
rule barring admissibility, this is not one of the exceptions.
Proof that the appellant shot at another in no way shows plan,
scheme, or intent to kill the deceased or any of the other
exceptions to the general rule.

"In cases where the evidence presents an issue of self-
defense, the defendant as well as the state may prove the fact
of a prior difficulty between the defendant and the deceased.
Wright v. State, 252 Ala. 46, 39 So. 2d 395 (1949). However
this rule of evidence does not embrace a prior difficulty
between the appellant and a third party. The admission of
this testimony constitutes reversible error."

353 So. 2d at 10 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Horton, 217 So. 3d at 56

(holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow the

introduction of evidence of threats and assaults made toward third

parties in a murder trial when the only connection between the victims

was that the incidents occurred within several weeks of each other);

Moore v. State, 878 So. 2d 328, 336 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) ("[T]he State

should not have been allowed to supply Moore's intent to kill in the

present case, or an apparent motive for the murder, by showing that he

had assaulted and killed other persons on unrelated occasions under

what appear to be wholly unrelated circumstances."); Aaron v. State, 596

So. 2d 29, 30-31 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Caylor, 353 So. 2d at 10)

18
CR-2024-0581

(stating the same). But see Terry v. State, 397 So. 2d 217 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1981) (holding that, in a crime established through the doctrine of

transferred intent, collateral acts of the defendant were admissible to

demonstrate that he possessed the motive to murder the intended victim

but killed a third party instead).

These two incidents were completely independent of one another,

occurred at different times and places, were allegedly committed under

dissimilar circumstances, and involved entirely different sets of facts and

types of victim. Carroll did not shoot at Steele after being spurned from

her affection, as allegedly happened with Harris. Rather, Carroll shot

Witcher. And, Harris had nothing to do with Witcher or Steele.

Accordingly, the State failed to establish a sufficient "logical link,"

Brewer v. State, 440 So. 2d 1155, 1160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), to connect

the acts. There was simply no nexus between the collateral act of

shooting at Harris and the shooting of Witcher. Thus, the trial court

erred when it allowed the State to admit evidence of Carroll's "prior bad

act" which showed his "bad character, inclination or propensity … to

commit the type of crime for which he [was] being prosecuted." Brewer,

440 So. 2d at 1159.

19
CR-2024-0581

Moreover, Harris's testimony was not reasonably necessary to the

State's case because the State had already attributed to Carroll a

different, but sufficient, motivation to commit the crime charged. Steele

testified that Carroll had told her many times that he wanted her to get

back together with him and that Carroll had attempted to get Witcher to

leave Steele. Specifically, the State, under Rule 404(b), introduced

evidence regarding one incident wherein Carroll previously attempted to

sabotage Steele and Witcher's relationship by sending Witcher a

pornographic video of him and Steele having sexual intercourse. Steele

testified that Witcher, upon receiving the pornographic video of Carroll

and Steele, told her what Carroll had done and that she confronted

Carroll, who did not deny sending Witcher the video and told her that he

sent it to hurt Witcher so that "he would get mad enough to where he'[d]

leave [her] so [she] and [Carroll] can be back together." (R. 259-60, 274.)

This evidence was properly admitted collateral-act evidence that

demonstrated that Carroll was induced to commit the murder to rid

himself of a romantic rival. Based on this evidence alone, the State could

argue that Carroll's motive to commit the murder was because he wanted

to end Witcher and Steele's relationship and date Steele himself. The

20
CR-2024-0581

additional collateral-act evidence indicating that Carroll had previously

shot at Harris, a female who had refused his sexual advances, was both

unnecessary and irrelevant. In short, because the State had already

introduced evidence demonstrating a direct link between Carroll's motive

and Witcher's murder, the evidence indicating that he had previously

shot at Harris was not reasonably necessary to prove the State's case.

Additionally, the trial court's jury instruction did nothing to cure

the error. After Harris testified, the trial court issued the following

instruction to the jury:

"All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I want to
reiterate something.[3] The jury shall disregard from the
testimony -- the last witness's testimony any testimony
regarding [other collateral 'shootouts' not involving Harris],
incidents of having beef [with other third parties not involving
Harris], marijuana, schizophrenia and mental disease or
defect."

(R. 395.) Thus, even if Harris's testimony had been properly admitted

for the jury to consider as evidence of Carroll's motive, this jury

instruction did not apply to testimony about the prior incident with

Harris, and "the jury was free to use this evidence for the broad --

3Previously, the trial court had instructed the jury to disregard
Harris's testimony regarding Carroll's engaging in "multiple shootouts."
(R. 331.)
21
CR-2024-0581

inadmissible -- purpose prohibited by Rule 404(b) -- as indicating that

because [Carroll] committed other crimes, he was more likely to have

committed the murder." Horton, 217 So. 3d at 58. Thus, even if the

collateral-act evidence had been admissible for the limited purpose of

showing motive, because the evidence was not reasonably necessary to

the State's case and the use of the evidence was not limited to motive, we

hold that the prejudicial effect of the evidence regarding Carroll's

shooting at Harris far outweighed its probative value.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that the

harmless-error rule, see Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P., should apply. The State

unconvincingly argues that Harris's testimony "actually worked to

Carroll's benefit rather than to his detriment" when the jury convicted

him of the lesser-included offense of provocation manslaughter but

rejected his claim of self-defense. (State's brief, p. 24.) Specifically, the

State contends that the jury could have found that Carroll did not

intentionally commit murder because it, instead, found that "he acted as

he did because that is how Carroll acts -- violent displays involving guns

-- when he is rejected by a woman," which the State says renders any

error harmless. (State's brief, pp. 24-25.)

22
CR-2024-0581

First, the " 'undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide [Carroll's

guilt] on an improper basis,' " Averette v. State, 469 So. 2d 1371, 1374

(Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (citation omitted) (quoted with approval in

Horton, supra) -- i.e., that he killed Witcher because he acted in

conformity with his bad character -- is exactly the type of prejudice that

rendered the trial court's error in this case reversible. Second, the jury

-- by rejecting Carroll's claims of self-defense and convicting him of

provocation manslaughter -- implicitly found that he formed the requisite

intent to commit murder. Therefore, the State's argument that the

complained-of-evidence may have made the jury believe that Carroll did

not have an intent to kill Witcher is baseless.

Although it is true that "[a] person does not commit murder under

[§ 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975,] if he or she was moved to act by a

sudden heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law, and

before there had been a reasonable time for the passion to cool and for

reason to reassert itself," § 13A-6-2(b), Ala. Code 1975, it is not because

the defendant lacked the intent to kill. Rather, § 13A-6-3(a)(2) provides,

in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits the crime of manslaughter if he:

23
CR-2024-0581

"....

"(2) Causes the death of another person
under circumstances that would constitute
murder under Section 13A-6-2[, Ala. Code 1975];
except, that he causes the death due to a sudden
heat of passion caused by provocation recognized
by law, and before a reasonable time for the
passion to cool and for reason to reassert itself."

(Emphasis added.) "A person commits the crime of murder if[,] … [w]ith

intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of

that person or of another person." § 13A-6-2(a)(1). Thus, by finding that

Carroll committed the offense of provocation manslaughter, the jury

necessarily found that Carroll intentionally murdered Witcher. See

Crayton v. State, 392 So. 3d 104, 117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Carter

v. State, 843 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. 2002) (recognizing that provocation

manslaughter is an intentional killing)).

Furthermore, regarding the second prong of § 13A-6-3(a)(2) -- that

Carroll "cause[d] the death due to a sudden heat of passion caused by

provocation recognized by law, and before a reasonable time for the

passion to cool and for reason to reassert itself" (emphasis added) --

Harris's testimony did not provide any factual basis for the jury to find

that a sufficient, legal provocation existed.

24
CR-2024-0581

" ' "[P]rovocation can, in no case,
be less than assault, either actually
committed, or menaced under such
pending circumstances as reasonable
to convince the mind that the accused
has cause for believing, and did believe,
he would be presently assaulted, and
that he struck, not in consequence of a
previously formed design, general or
special, but in consequence of the
passion suddenly aroused by the blow
given, or apparently about to be given
...." '

"Easley v. State, 246 Ala. 359, 362, 20 So. 2d 519, 522 (1944),
quoting Reeves v. State, 186 Ala. 14, 16-17, 65 So. 160 (1914).

" 'Alabama courts have, in fact, recognized
three legal provocations sufficient to reduce
murder to manslaughter: (1) when the accused
witnesses his or her spouse in the act of adultery;
(2) when the accused is assaulted or faced with an
imminent assault on himself; and (3) when the
accused witnesses an assault on a family member
or close relative.'

"Spencer v. State, 58 So. 3d 215, 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)."

Bohannon v. State, 222 So. 3d 457, 510-11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)

(emphasis added), aff'd, 222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016). Thus, because the

jury found that reasonable provocation existed because of Witcher's

assault upon Carroll, Harris's testimony (which contributed nothing

regarding Witcher's actions) could not have affected the jury's decision to

25
CR-2024-0581

find Carroll guilty of provocation manslaughter and acquit him of

murder.

However, Harris's testimony certainly could have influenced the

jury's decision to find that Carroll did not act in self-defense and that he

formed the intent necessary to commit murder -- and thereby provocation

manslaughter. Indeed, although the State introduced other evidence

tending to demonstrate Carroll's motive to commit the crime and the jury

rejected Carroll's self-defense claim, the jury found Carroll guilty of

provocation manslaughter, " 'which is designed to cover those situations

where the jury does not believe a defendant is guilty of murder but also

does not believe the killing was totally justified by self-defense.' " Johnson

v. State, 571 So. 2d 375, 377 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Shultz v.

State, 480 So. 2d 73, 76 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)).

Section 13A-3-23, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in relevant part:

"(a) A person is justified in using physical force upon
another person in order to defend himself … from what he …
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force by that other person, and he … may use a
degree of force which he … reasonably believes to be necessary
for the purpose. A person may use deadly physical force … if
the person reasonably believes that another person is:

"(1) Using or about to use unlawful deadly
physical force.

26
CR-2024-0581

"....

"(3) Committing or about to commit …
assault in the first or second degree ...."

(Emphasis added.)

At trial, it was disputed whether Witcher was armed with a gun,

yet it was undisputed that Witcher was the first aggressor. Carroll also

testified at trial that he was in fear for his own life and provided

testimony that even a simple assault could have placed his life in

jeopardy based on his prior accident. Carroll even called one of his

physicians, Dr. Diane Counce, to testify in his defense, and she testified

that Carroll suffered from the effects of a "[f]ractured temporal bone,

cervical strain, low back strain, and paresthesia" from a motor-vehicle

accident that occurred in 2017. (R. 400.) Dr. Counce also testified that a

person with a head injury such as Carroll's could suffer from seizures if

reinjured and confirmed that seizures "can lead to death or serious

physical injury" (R. 406) and that, in some cases, "reinjury does lead to

permanent disability and symptoms." (R. 408.)

Clearly, there was evidence before the jury indicating both that

Witcher's assault on Carroll led Carroll to act in self-defense based upon

27
CR-2024-0581

a reasonable belief that he was at risk of death or serious physical injury

and that Carroll committed murder or provocation manslaughter.

Carroll's motivation to commit the crime was, therefore, a crucial factor

for the jury to consider in making this determination. Cf. Chavers v.

State, 714 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (recognizing that " '[t]he

purpose of the harmless error rule is to avoid setting aside a conviction

or sentence for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood

of changing the result of the trial' " and that the harmless-error rule

applied because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was "ironclad")

(quoting Davis v. State, 718 So. 2d 1148, 1164 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995),

aff'd, 718 So. 2d 1166 (Ala. 1998)) (emphasis added)). Accordingly,

because this Court cannot say with certainty " 'that the trial court's error

did not affect the outcome of the trial or otherwise prejudice a substantial

right of the defendant,' " Chapman v. State, 196 So. 3d 322, 331-32 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Gracie v. State, 92 So. 3d 806, 813 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2011)), we decline to hold that the trial court's error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the admission of the collateral-act

evidence constituted reversible error, and Carroll is entitled to a new

trial.

28
CR-2024-0581

Conclusion

For these reasons, Carroll's conviction for provocation

manslaughter is reversed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Anderson, JJ., concur. Minor, J.,

concurs in the result.

29