State v. Bonnell - Fourth Amendment Facebook Search

1 STATE OF MINNESO TA IN SUPREME COUR T A24-1463 Saint Louis County Hudson, C.J. State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Filed: February 25, 20 26 Office of Appellate Co urts Deshon Israel Bonnell, Appellant. __________________ ______ Keith Ellison, Attorne y General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assi stant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Kimberly J. Maki, Sain t Louis County Attorne y, Duluth, Minnesota, for responde nt. Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant State Public Defe nder, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant. __________________ ______ SYLLA BUS 1. A sender of an electro nic message does not retain a reasonable exp ectation of privacy in the digital copy of t he received messa ge that is stor ed in the recipient’s separate and independe nt account or device. 2. Appellant’s Fourth A mendment and s tate constitutional protections w ere not triggered when the law enforcement officers se arched his accomplices’ Facebook account s because appellant claims no own ership interest in those accounts and he did n ot retain a

2 legitimate expecta tion of privacy in the electronic mess ages he sent to his accomplices after the messages were re ceived and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts. 3. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and sta te constitutional protections were violated by law enforce ment’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant authorizing the search es of his two Faceboo k accounts lacked any temporal or subject - matter limitations. 4. Although the district court erred when it fa iled to suppress the e vidence collected exclusively during the search of appellant’s two Facebook accounts and when it later admitted that evid ence at trial, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s verd ict was surely unattribu table to the errors. 5. Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the contents of constitutio nally obtained social media me ssages pursuant to the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rul e of Evidence 404(b), the errors were harmless b ecause they did not sig nificantly affect the ver dict. 6. When viewed in a light most fav orable to the verdict, t he corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore co nfidence in the truth of the accomplice’s eyewitness testimony that appellant fa tally shot the decedent, and the State presented sufficient evidence to s upport appellant’s conv iction. Affirmed.

3 OPINIO N HUDSON, Chief Justic e. Appellant Deshon Israel Bonnell directl y appeals his conviction o f first -degree premeditated murder for the shooting de ath of Joshua La V alley. On ap peal, Bonnell makes six arguments. First, he argues a sender of an electronic message retain s a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’ s s eparate and independen t account or device. Seco nd, he argues of ficers violated his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections when they searched the separate and independent Facebook accounts of his acc omplices, whi ch contained digital copies of electronic messages he sent to his acc omplices that were rece ived and stored in their accounts. Third, Bonnell argues officers violated his F ourth A mendment and state constitutional protections when they searched his two Facebook accounts. Fourth, he argues the dist rict court commit ted harmful er ror when it a dmitted the evidence collected from the accomplice’ s Facebook accounts an d his two Facebook accounts at trial. Fifth, he argues the distri ct court committed harmful error when it admitted evidence of pri or bad acts at his tri al in vio lation of Minnesota R ule of Evidence 404(b) (1). Sixth, Bonnell argues the direct eyewitness te stimony of his a ccomplice, who test ified that s he saw Bonnell shoot the victim, was not adequately c orroborated and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude, as a matt er of first impression, t hat a sender of an electronic messa ge does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message tha t is stored in the recipient’ s sep arate and inde pendent account or de vice. We

4 further conclu de that Bonnell’ s F ourth Amendment and state cons titutional protections were not triggered when an officer searched his accom plices’ Facebook accou nts because Bonnell clai ms no ownership interest in thos e accounts and because he did not retain a legitimate expecta tion of privacy in the electronic mess ages he sent to his accomplices after the messages wer e received and stored in his accomplices’ Faceboo k accounts. W e a lso conclude, however, that Bonnell had a rea sonable expectation of privacy in the digital copies of the sent messages that were stor ed in his two Facebook accoun ts, and therefore the search es of his tw o Faceboo k accou nts triggered his federal an d state constitutional protections. And Bonnell’ s Fourth Ame ndment and state constitutional prot ections were violated by the officer ’ s s earches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant authorizing the search es of his Facebook accounts lacked an y temporal or subject -matter limitations. Nevertheless, we concl ude that the district co urt ’s failure to suppress the evidence collected exclusively from the search es of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts and its erroneous admi ssion o f that evidence at trial were harmless beyon d a reasonable doubt because the jury’ s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors. In a ddition, although we assume without decidin g that the distr ict court err ed when it admitted the content s of social media messages — which were constituti onally obtained from accomplices’ Facebook accounts— pursuant to the immediate episode and Spr eigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude th at the error s were har mless because they did not significantly affect the verdict.

5 Finally, we conclude th at w hen viewed in a light most favora ble to the verdict, the corroborative evidence was weighty enou gh to restore confidenc e in the truth of the accomplice’ s eyewitnes s testimony that Bon nell fatally shot the decede nt, and therefore the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell ’ s conviction. Based on our conclusions, we affirm. FACTS On J anuary 6, 2019, a man sno wmobiling on t he Mesabi T rail in S aint Louis County found a dead body lyin g in the snow. The snowmobiler imme diately called 911, and the law enforcement officers who arrived on the scene identified th e decedent as Joshua LaV alley. When crime - scene analysts and officers from the Minnesota Bureau of Crim inal Apprehension (BCA) arrived at the scene, they found a shoe print in th e snow with a distinctive circular tread on the sole. 1 They also found one spent .22 - caliber bu llet casing near the body. A medical examiner determined that La V alley died from two bullet wo unds to the face, one to his ri ght jaw and one to the r ight side of his nose. The next day, officers f ound LaV alley’ s car parked outside Bailey Fr ench’ s house. After staking out the vehicle, officers observed a man enter the vehicle and drive it a short distance, at which p oint they approach ed the man and identi fied him as Anthony Hows on. 1 The distinctive circular tread is significant because accomplice Bailey French testified at trial that bef ore going out onto t he Mesabi trail wh ere she personally witnessed Bonnell fatally shoot La V alley twice in the face, she an d accomplice Anthony H owson switched shoes so she could walk more easily in the snow. In addition, a police officer testified that the distinctive circular tread in th e shoe print found at the scene matche d the sole of a pair of Osiris shoes found in Howson’ s house. Howson tes tified at trial that on the night of the murder he lent the Osiris shoe s to French so s he could walk with Bonnell in the snow.

6 The of ficers discovered La V alley’ s EBT card on Howson durin g a searc h. Officers returned to French ’s ho use and discovered tha t Bonnell and his girlfriend, Bailey French, were inside. The officers asked Bonnell and F rench to step outside. After Bonnell stepped outside, two officers directed him to sit in the passenger sea t of their squad car, where they con ducted an on - scene interview. At the start of the interview, the officers t old Bonnell that they did not know if he was connected to the cri me, but they did know he had “probably” bee n “speaking with. .. an individual,” Hows on, whom they suspected was involve d. As part of the interview, Bonnell confirmed that he and French were datin g. He also asserted that he was he avily intoxicated on the night of the murder and did n ot remember anyth ing that happen ed. The of ficers repeatedly told Bonnell that he was fre e to leave the car if he wanted to, and he e ventually did so. 2 While officers interviewed Bonne ll, two other officers interviewed Fr ench. French went into detail about the killing, i dentified Bonnell as “P ineapple,” and indicate d that she and Bonnell texted and sent messages through social media on the night of the mur der. In a separate interview with law enforc ement officers, Howson also admitted to taki ng part in the murder and to using Facebook Mess enger to communicate with Bonnell and Fren ch that night. After his on - scene int erview, Bonnell, who lived with his mother, went home. Thirty minutes later, officers arrived at his mo ther ’ s house, arrested him, and read him his 2 Immediately after Bon nell step ped o ut of the car, the agents seized Bonnell’ s cell phone without a warran t. Bonnell does not contest the seiz ure of his cell phone on appeal. Moreover, the police never tried to search t he contents of Bonnell’ s cell phone.

7 Miranda rights for the first time. Bonnell req uested an attorney, and the officers did not question him further. Bonnell’ s moth er, how ever, allowed the officers to enter and search the house. On top of the fridge, the officers located a brown paper ba g that had the words “.22 Ruger pistol” written on it. There was no gun inside the b ag, but there was .22 -ca liber ammunition. The officers also located spent .22 - caliber am munition in Bonnell’ s bedroom in the basement of the house. The officers later soug ht and received a warrant to search French’ s home, where they found a Ru ger.22- caliber pistol under the mattr ess in one of the bedrooms. B C A analysts subsequently tested the pist ol for fingerprints a nd DNA, and compare d the spent casing found at the scene to a casing test - fire d from the pistol f ound in Bonnell’ s hom e. The BCA fingerprint a nalyst testified that she found a fingerprint ab ove the trigger of the gun that ma tched French, but did not find fin gerprints matching Bonnell. The BCA DNA a nalyst testified, however, that she found a mixture of DNA profiles on the gun. On the magazine, she found a mixture of four or more people ’ s DNA, and t he major male pr ofile matched Bonnell’ s profile. On the trigger, she found a mixture of three or more people’ s DNA, and the maj or male profile al so matched Bo nnell ’s. She w as not provided w ith French’ s or Howson’ s DNA pr ofiles and was unable to conf irm whether th eir DNA matched the DNA o n the gun. The BCA fire arms analyst testified at trial that th e spen t cartridge found in Bon nell’ s base ment bedroom came fro m the pistol. In February 2019, a law enforcement officer applied for a single warra nt authorizing the officer to s earch 12 separate Facebook acc ounts, five of which are relevant here. T he first relevant account was owned by French, and the second and third relevant accounts

8 were owned by Howson. The fourth and fifth relevant accounts were purportedly owned by Bonnell (including an account name d “Pi neapple Man”). For each Facebook accou nt, t he warrant application sought “[a]ll contac t information,” “[a]ll Photos or videos,” “[a]l l Neoprints, including pr ofile contact informatio n,” “[a]ll activity logs,” “[a]ll other recor ds of communications made or received by the users or between users,” and “[a]ll IP logs.” The warrant did not provide time or dat e ranges for the records. The probable cau se statement in the warra nt application describe d the discovery of La V alley’ s bo dy and that LaV alley’ s personal effects were found in Howson’ s possession. It also stated the following: During the investigation, several cellular devices were secured from Howson, French and Bonnell. W ith statement s provided to Investigators it was discovered Howson, French and Bonnel l spoke amongst each other and others via phone calls, text messaging, Facebook and other social media accounts before, duri ng and after the murder of LaV alley. T wo weeks later, a gran d jury indicted Bon nell for first - degree premeditated murder, see Minn. Stat. § 609. 185 (a)(1), and first- degree intentiona l murder while committing a felony (aggravated rob bery), see Minn. St at. § 609.185(a)(3). In March 2 019, Facebook complie d with the warrant and provided copies of all 12 Facebook accounts. During his revie w of Howson’ s Facebook acco unts, the of ficer found a self -portrait photogr aph (aka “a selfie”) of Howson, French, Bonn el l, and La V alley that was taken the day before the murder. During the review of French ’s Facebook account, the officer disco vered digital copies of messages that Bonnell sent fro m his Pineapple Man Facebook account to French, which were received a nd stored in French’ s Facebook

9 account. 3 As relevant here, French received the followin g messages from the P ineapple Man Facebook account: January 2 and January 4, 2019 • A message asking French whether anythin g happened betwee n French and a man named K. • A message that said, “I know if I loose another person I’ma go on a rampage.” • A screenshot of an image (sent through Faceb ook) from Pineapple Man to an unknown man with a picture of Bonnell holding a gun with a caption that said, “Better stop t exting my chick before you get dropped b *.” • A message that said, “ Diff between me and o ther ns il actuall y do what I say I’m gonna d o.” • A message that said, “ I’m having the worst d ay. . . I just really wa nna shoot someone.” • A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive. .. I’m a terrible person.” January 5, 2019 (the d ay before the murder) • A message that said, “[LaValley] has a punc hable face.” 4 • A message that said, “I ght I’m down I still wa nna pop him.” 5 3 Bonnell does not contend that he had an own ership interest in French’ s Facebook account or any of the d evices on which her ac count was stored. 4 This message was a r esponse to several me ssages sent from Fren ch’ s Face book account to the Pineappl e Man Facebook accou nt. French initially sen t messages that read, “I have someone your gonna wanna ta ke care of. . . Who goes by t he name [LaV alley’ s nickname],” an d the n sent a message that included a screensh ot of an image (sent through Facebook) of French and LaV alley togethe r. 5 This message was a re sponse to messages sent from Fr ench’ s Facebook account to the Pineapple Man Facebook ac count, which r ead, “T rust me .. . we can . . . take his s*

10 • A message that said, “ Why not take him out now I can do it it’s not hard.” 6 • A message that sa id, “He [La V alle y] knows to much I gotta take him out . .. I need to take a video of me shootin g [LaV alley] to sen d to my crew there killers they love this s*** . .. I’m shooting him anyway y our not gonna tell me I’m n ot. You tell me no il sh oot him right here.” • A message that said, “No I’m shootin g someone tonight he knows too much . . . I need you to find a spot we can go t o dump.” 7 • A message that said, “ Damn ight well I’ m capping him tonight.” 8 January 6, 2019 (the d ay of the murder) • A message that said, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it cause I love you.” During the officer ’s review, the officer discovered digital copies of the electronic messages listed above stored in both Fre nch’ s and Bonnel l’ s Face book accounts. 9 In June 2019, Bonnell’ s attorney informed the district court that the defense had no omnibus issues and that Bonne ll wished to enter not guilty pleas to all the charges. Based on defense counsel’ s statements, the district court ma de a record of “the entr y of not guil ty n send him out witho ut a beating or w ith one dependin g on how he reacts and what he says.” 6 This message was a re sponse to messages sent from French’ s Facebo ok account to the Pineapple Man Fac ebook account, which r ead, “Not yet tonight w e scare him our next move is annihilation an d we gotta plan that out.” 7 This message was a re sponse to messages sent from French’ s Facebo ok account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “It’ s not a good ti me yet besides i ha ve a plan that will make hi m wish you did shoot h im.” 8 “Capping” can be used as a colloqu ial term for “shooting. ” 9 Because the officer obtained records containi ng copies of French’ s and Bonnell’ s Facebook accounts at the same time, the information obtained d uring the review of Bonnell’ s Facebook ac counts could not have been use d to justify t he request for t he warrant to search French’ s Face book account.

11 plea[s] and the waiver of any omnibus issues. ” Three months later, in Septem ber 2019, Bonnell entered a guilty plea to first- degree in tentional murder while committin g a felony (aggravated robbery). Bonnell subsequently f iled a postconviction petition, alleging that the factual basis f or his guilty plea was inaccurate. The distri ct court denied t he postconviction pe tition. In December 2022, we reversed the d istrict court’ s order a nd remanded for trial on the charges pending when Bonnell pleaded guilty. See Bonnell v. State, 984 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 2022) (holding that “the evidenc e in the plea colloquy record is inadequate to show that Bonnell ‘cause[d] the de ath’ of La V alley ‘while committing . .. aggra vated robbery ’ ” (alteration in original) (q uoting Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3))). Co ncurrently, Hows on and French pleade d guilty and were con victed of second- degree inten tional murder in connection with La V alley’ s d eath under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. S ee Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (1) (second- degree intentional mur der); Minn. Stat. § 609. 05, subd. 1 (aiding and abetting liability). In May 2023, Bonnell filed a motion to reope n the omnibus hearing. His motion listed nine different iss ues that he sought to litigate at the hearing, in cluding suppression of “ any information obtained as a result of the February 12, 2 019, Search W arra nt for Facebook data as the w arrant lacks specificit y.” The district court grant ed Bonnell’ s motion a nd held a contested omnibus hearin g in September 2023. When the district cour t asked defense counsel to identify the issues that would be litigate d at the hearing, defense counsel made a general referenc e to the issues raise d in the May 2023 motion to reopen the omnibu s hearing. The State called several witnesses. In a ddition, the parties stipulated to the admission of several do cuments,

12 including the search w arrant application, the search warrant, and th e officer’ s “receipt, inventory and return” f orm, in which the officer averred t hat he obtained, pursuant to the search warrant, records containing c opies of all five of the rele vant Facebook accounts i n March 20 19. After al l the evidence was presented, the parties ag reed to submit thei r arguments in writing. In October 2023, Bonnell filed h i s written argument. 10 As part of Bonnell’ s argument, defense counsel wrote, “At issue is the validity of the search wa rrant for M r. Bonnell’ s Facebook recor ds and whether probable cause was established to support the warrant.” (Emphasis added.) In descr ibing the State’ s burd en, defense counsel wrote, “Th e State must therefore prove the following: (1) [the officer ’ s] affidavit established probable cause to seize all of the data on Mr. B onnell’ s Facebook accounts, and (2) the authorizat ion for the extraction of the data was sufficiently particular to limit the area subject to search and the items subje ct to seizure.” (Emphasis a dded.) On the issue of particularity, defense coun sel ar gued, “[T]he warrant allo wed officers to search Mr. Bonnell’ s tw o Facebook accounts without pr oviding any time frame. It also allowed officers to cond uct a wholesale review of everyt hing and anything on 10 As part of his written argument, Bonnell erroneously aske d the district court to “suppress” the “searc h warrant.” The legal principle underlying Fourth Amend ment suppression motions is “a ‘pr udential’ doctrin e that requires the suppression of il legally obtained evidenc e.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W. 3 d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024) (emphasis adde d) (quoting Davis v. United State s, 564 U. S. 229, 236 (201 1)). Searc h warrants that lack particularity are not “suppressed,” in stead they are deemed “ invalid.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 672 – 73 (Mi nn. 1990) (concl uding that the sea rch warrant wa s “invalid” because it lacked par ticularity); see also S tate v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 7 11 –13 (Minn. 2003) (concludi ng that the language of the warrant was sufficiently particular and therefore rejecting app ellant’ s clai m that the search warrant was “invalid”).

13 M r. Bonnell’ s Facebook accounts.” (Emp hase s added.) In summari zing his particularity argument, defense counsel wrote, “The failur e to place or ob serve any limits on the search or seizure of data from Mr. Bonnell’ s Facebook accoun ts independently requires suppression of all evid ence obtained during t he search. ” (Emp hasis added.) Bonn ell’ s written argument never acknowledged, much less addressed, the issue of whether the searches of his accomplice’ s Face book accounts trigger ed Bonnell’ s Fourth Amendment p rotections. Instead, defense counsel si mply included a single sentence in the concluding paragraph of hi s written argument, which read, “The wholesale r eview of the twelve Facebook accounts — and specifically Mr. Bo nnell’ s two (2) Facebo ok accounts —violated the Fourth Amendmen t of the United States C onstitution and Article I, Section 1 0 of the Minnesota Constitution.” In November 2023, th e State filed its written argument. The Stat e ar gued that despite Bonnell’ s as sertion to the contrary, the l anguage of the war rant established probable cause and was sufficiently particular t o justify the searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts. T he State also observe d that Bonnell lacked st anding to challenge the searches of the Facebook accou nts owned by French and Howson bec ause he made “no showing of a reasonable expectatio n of privacy in another person’ s s ocial media account.” In March 2024, t h e dist rict court denied Bonnell’ s suppression motio n. On the issue of probab le cause, it stated, “ Considering the totality of the circums tances as it relat es to the Bonnell Faceboo k accounts, the Application for Search W arrant establishes a su f ficient nexus between the property to be searched — Bonnell’ s Face book account — and the crime that was under investigation at the time— an apparent homicide. ” On the issue of

14 particularity, the court wrote, “Considering the totality o f the circumstances, giving deference to the iss uing judge, and con sidering the stage of the investigatio n, a more precise description of the information to be ob tained from Bonnell’ s Facebook data wo uld not be available in this instance.” The court did not discuss the searches of the accomplice’ s Facebook accounts, w hich is not surprising because Bonnell’ s w ritten ar gument can reasonabl y be read as narrowing the foc us of his argument to the searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts. Bo nnell did not file a moti on for reconsideration c hallenging the scope of the district court’ s a nalysis. In April 2 024, the State filed a m otion in limine seeki ng to admit evidence of Bonnell’ s prior bad acts — as desc ribed in Facebook me ssages fro m Bonnell stored in French’ s Facebook account — un der the immediate e pisode and Spr eigl exceptions t o Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Bonn ell ar gued the evidence of his prior bad acts was inadmissible. O n April 2 6, 2024, the district court granted the State’ s motion, concluding that the evidence was a dmissible under both e xceptions. A fter the district court granted the State ’ s mot ion in limine, the case proceeded to trial. At the jury trial, French te stified that she personally witnessed Bonnell fatally shoot La Va lley twice in the face. During her testimony, the State introduc ed messages between French’ s and Bonnell’ s Facebook accounts as trial exhibi ts. 11 Each exhibit includ ed a chart with the date, time, an d contents of electronic messages Bonnel l sent to French that were received and stored in her Facebook acc ount, along with copi es of the relevant messages 11 Complete copies of the Facebook records ob tained from the accounts owned by Bonnell, French, and H owson were also admit ted as trial exhibits.

15 from French’ s Faceboo k account. 12 Howson al so testified about t he facts surrounding t he murder. During his te stimony, the State intr oduced the photograph of Howson, French, Bonnell, and La V alley that was tak en the day before the m urder, alon g with copies of the relevant messages fr om Howson ’ s Facebook account. Officers a lso testified about th eir investigation, and the State introduced an exhibit of a call Bonnell made from jail in which Bonnell says he needs to delete the Pineapple Man Facebook account. In total, three trial exhibits were admitted that consisted of Fa cebook records obtain ed exclu sively from Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts. Finally, BCA firearms and DNA an alysts testified about the results of their testi ng. In its closing argument, the State focused on the messages sent from Bonnell’ s Pineapple Man Facebook account to French’ s Facebook account, a rg u ing that Bonnell was planning to kill La V alley that night, t hat he had a motive to kill La V alley for flirting with his girlfriend, and that Bonnell, French, and Howson made a c oncrete plan for the murder through Facebook mess ages. In cont rast, defense counsel a r gued that th e Facebook messages showed tha t French was “an absolutely w ickedly manip ulative person who craves attention and wants to feel li ke she can control the people in her life, ” and that the plan was “to scare Mr. LaV alley— perhaps bea t him up and leave him somewhere without his car.” D efense counsel also argued that the testimony of French a nd Howson was not 12 The exhibits also conta ined copies of the rele vant pages from the re cords obtaine d from Bon nell ’ s F acebook account. Althoug h the electronic messa ges were identical, the y appeared on different pages of the records obtained from the accounts ow ned by French and Bonnell.

16 credible, that Bonnel l never walked down the Mesabi T rail, a nd that Howson was the actual shooter. On the charge of first- degree premeditated murder, the jury was instructed on bo th principal and aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. The jury found Bonnell guilty as charged. The district court con victed Bonnell of first - degree premedi t ated murder and sentenced him to li fe in prison without the possibility of release. 13 This direct appeal follo ws. ANALYSIS W e be gin our analysi s by addressing an is sue of first impr ession, specifically whether a sen der of an electronic me ssage retain s a reasonable expe ctation of privacy i n the digital copy of th e received message th at is stored in the rec ipient’ s se parate and independent account or device. Next, we dete rmine whether t he search es of French’ s and other individuals’ Fac ebook account s triggered Bonn ell’ s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protectio ns after the messages Bonnell sent were rece ived and stored in the recipient’ s ac count or device. Then, we consider whether the search es of Bonnell’ s tw o Facebook accounts violated his Fourth Ame ndment and state cons titutional protections based on his assertion that the searche s of his accounts were conducted pursu ant to a warrant that was not sufficiently particular, and if so, whether the district court’ s admis sion 13 On the charge of first- degree murder while committing or attempting to c ommit a kidnapping, the jury was also instructed on bo th principal and aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. Al though the jury found Bonnell guilt y of this charge and the district court entered a conviction, the district court later vacate d th e con viction in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (p recluding adjudications of conviction for lesse r included offenses), in light of State v. Pflep sen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 7 65–67 (Minn. 1999).

17 at trial of the di gital messages and data collected durin g the search es was har mless beyond a reasonable doubt. W e also consid er whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting, under the immediate episo de and Spreigl exceptio ns to Minnes ota Rule of Evidence 404(b) (1), constitutionally obtain ed Facebook messa ges that describ ed Bonnell’ s prior bad acts, an d if so, whet her t he erroneous ad mission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we consid er whether, when viewed in a light m ost favorable to the verdi ct, the corroborative evidence was weighty e nough to restore confide nce in the truth of French’ s direct eyewitness testi mony that she saw Bonne ll shoot La V alley, and if the State presented sufficient evidence to support B onnell’ s convic tion. I. Bonnell contends that the sender of an electronic mes sage retains a reasonab le expectation of privacy under the Fourth Ame ndment in the digital c opy of the received message that i s stored in the r ecipient’ s separa te and independent ac count or device. This is an issue of first impr ession for our court. The protections of the Fourth Amend ment a re “ personal right [s]” that may be invoked when an individual “per sonally has an expe ctation of privacy in the place sear ched ” and that “ex pectation is reasonable.” In r e W elfar e of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) (emphasis added). In State v. Perkins, we explained that the Fo urth Amendment’ s “protect ions are not trigg er e d unless an indiv idual has a le gitimate expectation of privac y in the invaded space.” 588 N.W.2d 49 1, 492 (Minn. 199 9)

18 (emphase s added). Put differently, “a defe ndant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the ar ea searched. . . may not contest the l egality of the search or seizure.” Sta te v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis added). Although we have never considered the is sue presented, other sta te and federal courts have addressed t he issue. For exampl e, in State v. Patino, the Rhode Islan d Supreme Court co ncluded that t he sender of a text message does not have a reasonable e xpectation of privacy in the digital copy of a text message contained on the recipi ent’ s device becaus e after the messa ge is received by the recipient, the sender can n o longer control wh at the recipient does with the message. 93 A.3 d 40, 56 –57 (R.I. 2014). Similarly, in Guest v. Leis, the Sixth Circuit conclud ed that an email sender loses a legitimate expec tation of privacy in an email that has already reac hed its recipient beca use at that moment, “the e- mailer would be analogous to a letter - writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy or dinarily terminates upon delivery’ of the letter.” 255 F. 3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2 001) (quoting United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1 193, 1 196 (6th Cir. 19 95)). The reasoning in Patino and Guest is consiste nt with the rule that the federal circuit courts of appeal have uniformly applied to physical letters. For example, in United States v. Dunning, the First Circuit concluded that “if a letter is sent to another, the sender ’ s expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates u pon delivery.” 312 F.3d 528, 53 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitte d); see also United States v. Gor don, 168 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999); King, 55 F.3d at 1196; United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1994); Ray v. U.S. Dep’ t of Just., 658 F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 19 81).

19 W e agre e that when a n electronic message or physical letter is received by the recipient, the sender n o longer has a reasona ble expectation of privacy in the message or letter because the sender cannot cont rol what the recipient does with the message or letter. Consequently, we con clude that the sender of an electronic messa ge does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received m essage that is stored in the recipient’ s separ ate and independent ac count or device. 14 In urging us to adopt a different rule of law, Bon nell cites to obi ter dicta in Carpente r v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 319 (201 8). Carpenter “pres ent[ed] t he question whether the Government condu cts a search under the F ourth Amendme nt when it accesses historic al cell phone records that provide a comprehensi ve chronicle of the user ’ s past movement s,” id. at 300, and he ld that “[t]he Government ’ s a cquisition of the cell - site records here was a search under th[e] [Fourth] Amendmen t,” i d. at 320. In th at case, Justice Kenned y remarked in dissent th at the third - party doctr ine “ may not apply w hen the Government obtains the modern - da y equivalents of an individual’ s ow n ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ ” when held by a third party. Id. at 332 (Kenn edy, J., dissenting). The Carpenter majorit y 14 In support of his view, Bonnell cites seve ral federal and state cases that involved a search of the defendant ’ s Faceboo k account, device, or computer. See, e.g., Un ited States v. Zelaya -V eliz, 94 F.4th 321, 333 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 45 S. Ct. 571 (2024) (holding that the defendant s ha d standing to challenge the searches of Fac ebook accounts that belonged to them, whil e observing that defense counsel co nceded that appellants lacked standing to challeng e the searches of Facebook accounts “belonging to two co -conspira tors who [were] not parties in this appeal”); People v. Joly, 970 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 2021) (involvin g a search of th e defendant’ s tablet com puter which contai ned an email that the defendant had sent to his attorney); St ate v. Jer ecze k, 961 N.W.2d 70, 72 (W is. Ct. App. 20 21) (involving a search of the defenda nt’ s family computer). Bonnell’ s reli ance on these cases is misplace d because they do not involve searches of se parate and independent accounts or device s belonging to t he recipient of the electro nic message.

20 acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’ s position would be a “sensible ex ception” to the third - party doctrine. Id. at 3 19. Bonnell’ s reliance on Carpenter is mispla ced for two reasons. First, we are not b ound by a dissent nor by the obiter dicta in the majority. Sheehy Lee v. Kalis, 19 N.W.3d. 186, 1 93 n.9 (Mi nn. 2025) (explaining that “ obiter dicta” is generally “ considered to be expressions in a court ’ s opinion which go beyo nd the facts before the court and th erefore are the individu al views of the author o f the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases ”) (citation omitted) (internal quotatio n marks omitted); City of Duluth v. W endlin g, 237 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1975) (explainin g that we were not boun d by dicta in He ller v. New Y ork, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)). Neither the ex ception proposed by Justice Kennedy in diss ent, nor its passing refe rence by the majority, is binding here. 15 Second, t he t ype of third party contemplated b y Kennedy in pro posing his excepti on was an intermediary handling messa ges in transit such as a mail carrier or an internet company that provide s email account s, not th e end recipient of a message as is the case here. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissent ing) (citin g Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (letters held by mail carrier) and Unite d States v. W arshak, 631 F.3 d 266, 283 – 88 (6 th Cir. 2010) (perso nal emails held by the defendant’ s in ternet service provider)). In sum, the non-bindi ng dissent and obiter d icta in Carpenter does not 15 The majority in Ca rpenter was clear that its “decision today is a narrow one” and that it did “not express a view on matter s not before us.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. a t 316. And the issue before the Supreme Court in Carpenter involved “a d etailed log of a person’ s movements over sever al years,” id. at 3 19, not the modern - day equivalent o f a person’ s “papers” or “effects.” Thus, the majority opinion’ s state ment regarding Justice Kennedy’ s proposed exception is obiter dicta because it went beyond the facts before the Court and was not necessary or es sential to the Court’ s a nalysis.

21 support Bonnell’ s clai m that the sender of an electronic message retain s a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’ s s eparate and independen t account or device. Because t he rule adopted in Patino and Guest is sound an d the case law cited b y Bonnell do es not call that rule of law into question or support a different rule of law, we hold that the sende r of an electronic messa ge does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital c opy of the receive d message that is stored in the recipient ’ s separate and independent accou nt or device. II. Next, we apply the newly articulate d rule of law to the facts of Bonnell’ s case. Bonnell sent electronic Facebook messages to French and Howson th at were received and stored in French ’s and Howson’ s Faceboo k accounts. Bonnell does not claim that he had any ownership interest in French ’s and Howson’ s Faceb ook account s, or that h e has any other claim to privilege in his communicatio ns with French or Howson. Moreover, under the newly articulated rule of law, Bonnell did not retain a reasonable e xpectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message s that were stored in French ’s and Howso n ’s separate and independe nt account s or device s. Consequ ently, the sear ches of French ’s and Howson’ s sep arate and independent Facebook accounts did not trigg er Bonnell’ s Fourt h Amendment or state co nstitutional protections. III. Next, we consider Bo nnell ’ s argument that the searches of his two Facebook accounts violated his F ourth Amendment pr otections because the warrant authorizing the

22 searches of his two ac counts lacked particul arity and was therefore invalid. The State argues that the warrant was valid because it was sufficiently particular, and therefore the searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook account s did not violate his Fourth Amendment protections. Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Co nstitution and article I, section 10, of the Mi nnesota Constitution r equire that a search warrant describe the evidence to be seized with particularity. Th is particularity requirement “prohi bits law enforcement from engaging in general or e xploratory searches.” State v. Bradfor d, 618 N.W.2d 782, 79 5 (Minn. 2000). “ If a sear ch is conducted pursuant to a warrant that i s not particular — in othe r words, does not adequately describe the places or things to be searched with specificity — the search is unco nstitutional. ” State v. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d 1, 21 n.9 (Minn. 2024). Determining whether a warrant is sufficiently particular requires a “case -by- case examina tion.” State v. Sar dina -Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 5 85, 601 (Minn. 2024). In conducting this a nalysis, we consi der “the circumstance s of the ca se . . . , as well as the nature of the crime under investigati on and whether a more precise de scription is possible under the circumsta nces. ” State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2003). When reviewing the denial of a pretrial mot ion to suppress evidenc e, “we review the district court’ s factual findings for clear error and its legal deter minations de novo.” State v. Leonar d, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020). “Under the de novo standar d, we do not defer to the anal ysis of the court s below, but instead we exercise i ndependent review.” Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).

23 Bonnell c ontends that the warrant author iz ing the searc hes of his two Facebo ok accounts was invalid because it lacked part icularity as to both subject- matter and ti me limitations. W e addres s his particularity arguments in turn. When a search warrant seeks to search an electronic account or device, the subject matter is defined b y the scope and type of dat a that the investiga tors would like t o access. See Sar din a-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 600 (noting that the subject matter of the search warrant at issue was the defendant’ s entire Facebook account). Here, the war rant authorizing the searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accoun ts sought “[a]ll contact information,” “[a]ll Photos or videos,” “[a]ll Neoprints, in cluding profile co ntact informa tion,” “[a]ll activity logs,” “[a]ll other records of communications made or received by the users or between users,” and “[a]ll IP l ogs. ” Critically, the warrant was not subj ect to any temporal limitations. In other words, the warrant au thorized acce ss to the entirety of both of Bonnell’ s Facebook accounts. In Sar dina-Padilla, we “addressed whet her a warrant authorizi ng a search of all content on a social me dia account for a limited time perio d meets minimal constituti onal requirements for particularity.” Id. at 599. In that case, of ficers applied for a warrant to search “[a]ll content” of two Facebook acco unts associated with Sardina - Padil la for an approximately three - m onth period. Id. at 591. Although we conclud ed that the warrant in Sar dina-P adilla was va lid based on its temporal limitation, we said “that the portion of the warrant authorizing law enforcemen t to search ‘[a]ll content’ asso ciated with Sardina - Padilla’ s Facebook accounts — sta nding on its own [with out a temporal limitatio n] —would be ‘clearly impermissib le.’ ” Id. at 599. We also stated that “[a] warrant permitti ng a broad

24 search can be sufficiently particular if greater specificity is not possible because officers do not know all the cir cumstances surroundin g the alleged crime.” I d. (emphasis added). “A warrant whic h describes things in broad or generic terms may be valid ‘when the description is as spec ific as the circumstan ces and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’ ” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 19 90) (quoting United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 6 09, 614 (1 1th Cir. 1985)). Here, it cannot be said that a search of all inf ormation and messages fr om Bonnell’ s two Facebook account s is “as specific” as it could be. In Hannuks ela, the extent of the police’ s kno wledge of the crime was “that [th e subject of the warrant] was the victim of foul play and that appe llant was involved.” I d. W e therefore uphel d a somewhat vague warrant because it specifically descri bed searching personal propert y that might contain items belonging to the victim. Id. In contra st, the warrant au thorizing the searches of Bonnell’ s t wo Facebook accounts was not tailor ed to, fo r example, messages shared between Bonnell and the co - conspirator s in the crime, which woul d be likely to s how evidence of a crime. S ee State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Min n. 1999) (stating that “probable cause to se arch exists [if]. .. there is a fair prob ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found i n a particular place” (citatio n omitted) (internal quotation marks omitte d)). The Eleventh Circuit — in a case that we affirmatively cited in Sa r dina-Padi lla, 7 N.W.3d at 60 1 — considered whether a warrant authorizing access to all of the defe ndant’ s Facebook data was sufficiently particular. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 9 74

25 (1 1th Cir. 2017). 16 The Eleventh Circuit concl uded tha t the warrant was invalid, noting that if the police had wanted to make the warrant sufficiently particular, “[w]ith respect to private instant messag es, for example, the warrants could ha ve limited the request to messages sent to or from persons suspected at that time of being prost itutes or customers.” Id. A sim ilar subject-matter limitat ion applies here. In the Fourth Circuit — in a case discussed by both parties — the court upheld a search warrant seeking “a ll private communicati ons” from Facebook accou nt s that belonged to the appellants. United States v. Zelaya -V eliz, 94 F.4th 321, 33 7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 571 (2024). But that case is materi ally distinguishable because the warrants at issue were two - step wa rrants: “w hile the warrants author ized the government to search all of the information disclosed by Facebo ok, they only permitted the subsequent sei zur e of the fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of vio lations of enumerated federal statutes.” Id. (emphasis added). Her e, by contrast, the warrant authorizing the sear ch of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts wa s a one - step warrant that allowed the of ficer to both search and seize 16 As here, the search warrant in Blake required Facebook to “disclose” to the gover nment virtually every t ype of data that could be located in a Fac ebook account, in cluding every private instant message Moore had ever sent or received, every IP address s he had ever logged in from, every photograph she had ever uploaded or be en “tagged” in, every private or public group she had ever been a member of, every search on the we bsite she had ever cond ucted, and every pur chase she had ever made through “ Facebook Marketplace, ” as w ell as her entire contact list. 868 F.3 d at 966– 67 (footnotes om itted).

26 all data in Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts. 17 The warrant applicat ion did not tailor its search to data or me ssages that would be likely to show Bonnell’ s partici pation in LaV alley’ s murder or another viola tion of Minnesota law. W e have state d, however, “that a temporal limitation may make a warrant sufficiently particular, e ven if the authoriz ed search is other wise broad as to subject matt er.” Sar dina-P adilla, 7 N. W.3d at 600. Bonnell points out that the warrant authorizing the searches of his two Facebook accounts lacke d any temporal li mitations, while th e State asserts that the undefi ned timeframe wa s necessary to establi sh that Bonnell owne d the Pineapple Man accou nt. In Sardina-Padilla, we cauti ously upheld t he warrant but no ted that the “warrant’ s broa d scope raises a close question.” Id. at 602. Our decision to uphold the warrant in that case hinged in large part on the temporal q ualifier, which limited the search to data generate d within a three - mo nth period. Id. W e also affirmatively cited a case from the United S tates District Court for the District of Minne sota, which uphel d a warrant that was tailored to “ ‘a specif i ed, fairly narrow period of time close’ t o the alleged criminal activity.” I d. at 600 (quoting Un ited States v. Charles, No. 16 - 065 (JNE/FL N), 2016 WL 5 939333, at *3 (D. Mi nn. Oct. 12, 2016), aff ’d 895 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2018)). Here, there is no temporal limita tion. The warrant auth orizing the searches of Bonnell’ s two Faceboo k accounts allowed the collection of informati on from the moment the accounts were created until the warrants were issued, a span of m any years. But at the time they sought the warrant, officers ha d already interviewed Fre nch and Howson and 17 Indeed, the entirety of Bonnell’ s Faceb ook account da ta — more than 8,000 pages — was entered into evide nce as a court exhibit a t trial.

27 thus had some s ense of the events leading up to La V alley’ s mu rder. The warrant application stated that the officer k new from French’ s initial interview th at the incident precipitating the murder had occurre d when La V alley tried to physically touch Fr ench at the apart ment on January 5, 2019. B ecause officers must b e “as specific as the ci rcumstances and the nature of the activity under investi gation per mit,” Hann uksela, 452 N.W.2d at 674, they should have tailored the application to t he weeks leading up to the murder —t o ascertain whether there was any evidence of inten t or planning — t o the date w hen Bonnell and his co -conspirators were ar rested and thus no long er had access to their a ccounts. 18 The warrant authorizing the searc hes of Bonnell’ s two Faceboo k accounts goes far beyond the three - month temporal limit ation in Sar di na-Padilla and lacks any subject matter or time limitati ons to meet the partic ularity requirement. 7 N.W.3d at 602 (“[A] search warrant permitt ing police to seize ‘[a]ll content’ ass ociated with a social media account for a period of almost three month s comes ‘perilously cl ose to violating the requirement of particul arity.’ ”). 18 T o the extent that the State argues that law enforcement should be able to seek a broader search warrant for the purposes of establishing foundation a nd authenticity of the ownership of a social media accoun t, we disagree. In State v. Z anter, the police sought three search warrants f or the defendant’ s hom e, each time seeking to do additiona l forensic testing in the house that they had not performed during the preceding searches. 535 N.W.2d 624, 628 – 29 (Minn. 1 995). In finding that the third and fina l search warrant lacked probable cause, we wr ote, “the police faile d to provide the issuing judge with sufficient new information tha t could ha ve led the judg e to conclude that a fair probabi lity existed that other enumerated items not discovered du ring the two previous, exhaustive searches of the Zanter home would no w be disc overed during a third search.” Id. at 63 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, if t he police receive data from a properly tailore d search warrant and discover that it is insufficient to establish the authenticity of the account, police must s eek another warrant to broa den the scope.

28 Therefore, we conclude that the searches o f Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts violated his Fourth Am endment and state constitutional protectio ns because the searches were conducted pursu ant to a warrant that lacked parti cularity and t herefore was invalid. Because the searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts vi olated his constitutional protections against un lawful searches, the district cou rt erred when it denied Bonnell’ s motion to suppress the evidence obt ained during th e two searche s, and when it later admitted at trial exhibit s containing the pages f rom Bonnell’ s two Fac ebook accounts. 19 19 Bonnell also argues that the Facebo ok searches were unconstitution al because the evidence was derived f rom Bonn ell’ s provisio n of his phone number during the interview with the special agents in the squad car. Officers asked for Bonnel l’ s p hone number within the first four minutes of the interview, and Bo nnell provided it witho ut reluctance. During the interview, officers also learned that Bonnell had recently tur ned eighteen, and that he did not have a high school diplom a or a GED. After Bonne ll stated numerous times that he lived with his mother and wanted to call her, one of the officers told Bonnell that he did not need to talk to his mother because he was an adult. Bonnell argues that the interview was unduly coercive, and the results of the interview should be suppressed as fruit of t he poisonous tree. See W ong Sun v. United State s, 371 U.S. 471, 4 87– 88 (1963) (explaini ng d erivative evidence is entitled to suppre ssion as “fruit of the poisonous tree” if “wheth er, granting establishment of the primar y illegality, the evidenc e to which instan t objection is made has been come at by exploitatio n of that illegalit y or instead b y means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary ta int.”). Because we conclude that the search of Bonnell’ s Facebook accounts violated F ourth Amen dment and state constitu tion al protections based o n a lack of particularity, we do not consider Bonnell’ s alternative argument. Similarly, Bonnell argues for the first time on appeal that the a dmission into evidence of the p ortion of his squad car interview where h e provided the agents with hi s phone number was error and was entitled to suppression. Becau se the evidence was unobjected- to, we revi ew the district court’ s decision for plain error. See State v. G riller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under plain error review, the appellant m ust show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect s the appellant’s s ubstantial rights. Id. An error affects a defenda nt’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood tha t it had a significant effect on th e jury’s verdict. Id. at 741. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude there is sufficient admissible evid ence tying Bonnel l to La V alley’s deat h, and the recording entered into evidence of Bo nnell providing his p hone number to law

29 IV. W e turn now to the issu e of whether the district court committed harmful error when it failed to suppress the evidence obtained duri ng the unconstitutional searches of Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts and when it later ad mitted at trial exhibits containing messages from those account s. “ When an error implicates a constitutional right, we will award a new trial unless the e rror is harmless beyo nd a reasonable doub t.” State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 5 25, 533 (Minn. 2012). “ An err or is harmless beyond a reason able doubt if the jury ’ s verdict was ‘ surely unattrib utable ’ to the error. ” Id. (citation omitted). In considering whether erroneously ad mitted evidence is harmles s beyon d a reasonable doubt, we have said, “ [i] mpr operly admitted evidence is harmless . . . when the evidence is cumulative.” State v. McDonald -Ri char ds, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013). Other releva nt factors include “ the m anner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whethe r it was ef fectively countered by the defendant.” Id. (citation o mitted) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Although overwhelmin g evidence of guilt is also a n importa nt consideration, a court cannot focus on the evidence o f guilt alone. Id. Here, the Facebook messages that were obtained as a result of the se izure of Bonnell’ s tw o Facebook accounts and included in the challenge d trial exhibits are enforcement is unlikely to have had a signifi cant effect on the verdict of the jury. Thus, even if the district c ourt committed pl ain error in ad mitting this evide nce, the error did n ot affect Bonnell’s substa ntial rights, and h e is not entitled to any relief based on this alle ged error. See State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1998) (explaining that a court will not reverse a conviction based on unobject ed - to error unless the appe llant shows all three prongs of the plain erro r test are met).

30 undoubtedly cumulativ e. E ach of those exhibits also included duplica tive records obtained from French’ s Face book account contain ing identical infor mation to that obtained from Bonnell’ s Fac ebook accounts. Consequently, the jury’ s verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneo us ad mission of Bon nell’ s Facebook messages as part of these exhib its, and therefore the error was harmless be yond a reas onable doubt. This does not end our analysis, howe ver, because the district court admitted three additional trial ex hibits that consisted entirel y of Facebook records obtained only in the unconstitutional se izure of Bo nnell’ s two Facebook acc ounts. W e conclude that the jury’ s verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of these records, for the following reasons. The manner in which these three exhibits w ere present ed suggests that the jury would not have unduly focused on th e evidenc e. One of the exhibits was used to establish the dates, times, and duration o f calls to the Pineapple Man a ccount during the State’ s case. Because th e exhibit was referenced infrequent ly and not in the State ’ s opening statem ent or closing argument, it was unli kely to be a fo cus for the jury. The St ate partially relied on the other two exhibits to establish Bonne ll as the owner of the Pineapple Man Facebook account in its opening statement, direct examination s, and closin g argument. R eferring to one of the exhib its at closing, which inclu ded pictures of Bonnell, the State expla ined tha t the photos “are of Mr. Bonnell and Mr. Bonnell only” and thus establ ish him as the owner of the Pineapple Ma n account. The State also cited to the other exhibit at closin g, which included verifie d phone numb er data, to expla in that “the phone num ber tied to Pinea pple Man’ s Fa cebook account. .. [was] [i]n that same rec orded statement” that he gave to

31 officers in the squad car. While referenced in closing argument, the State presented multiple additiona l pieces of evidence lin king Bonnell to the Pineapple M an account a nd thus these two exhibits were unlikely to pull th e jury’ s foc us. Furthermore, the information in these three exhibits was cumulati ve to the vast amount of evidence tying Bonnell to the crime. There were numerous incriminating Facebook messages d erived from French’ s account that we ha ve determined were admissible at trial, inc luding multiple messages from Bon nell to French saying that he wanted to shoot La V alley, messages des cribing a plan for where to t ake La V alle y’ s b ody, and messages after the murder indic ating that Bonnell co mmitted the crime because of his love for French. Moreover, DNA matching Bonnell’ s profile was fo und on the magazine and trigger of the murder weapon, and police found bullets in Bonn ell’ s bedroom that were fired by the same gun as the mur der weapon. Suppress ing the messages and da ta derived from Bonnell’ s account would not obviate the incriminator y nature of the other admissible evidence. Moreover, a ny persuasi ve value in these three exhibits was likewise undermine d by the overwhelming e vidence of guilt. W e als o observe that de fense counsel generally countered during ope ning state ments and closing arguments that informatio n from the Facebook accounts should be considered less persuasive than the physical evidence. Ultimately, o f the three exhibits that came excl usively from Bonnell’ s two Facebook accounts, the two exhibits referen ced in opening and closing p rovided information duplicative from other admissible t rial evidence, and the thir d exhib it was not a foc us of the State’ s case. O n this record, we conclude that the jury’ s verdict was surel y

32 unattributable to the erroneous admiss ion of these thre e additional e xhibits, and therefore the error was harmle ss beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 V. Next we consider Bonnell’ s argument that th e district court co mmitted reversible error when it admitted into evidence, under th e immediate episode an d Spr eigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), co nstitutionally obtained Facebook messages contained in French’ s account that described Bonnell’ s pr ior bad acts. The State argues that the district court did not err because the challenged messages satisfied both the immediate episode a nd Spr eigl exc eptions to Rule 404(b). 21 Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) generally pr ohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of another crime, wron g, or act. .. to prove the character of a person in order to show action in c onformity therewith.” As relevant here, there are two except ions to this general prohibition. First, eviden ce of a prior bad act is admissible a s immediate -episode evidence “w here two or more [crimes, wro ngs, or acts] are linked together in point of time or circumstances so th at one cannot be fully shown without proving the other. ” State v. W offor d, 1 14 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 1962). Evidence of a prior bad act satisfies the immediate episode exception if “ there is a clo se causal and temporal connection betwe en 20 Because we find that the error was har mless, we do not address the State’ s arguments that the messages w ould have been inevita bly discovered in th e recipients’ accounts or that the go od-faith exception to th e exclusionary rule sho uld apply. 21 In one of the c hallenged messages, Bo nnell identifies hi mself as “Deshon Bon nell.” This message does not constitute an “act,” mu ch less a prior bad act, because it is si mply a message of identificati on. It therefore doe s not fall within the purvi ew of Minnesota R ule of Evidence 404(b)(1) and need not satisf y the immediate episode or Spr eigl exce ptions.

33 the prior bad act and the charged crime. ” State v. Riddley, 77 6 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009). Second, under the Spr eigl exception, evide nce of past crimes may be admissible when releva nt to show motive, inte nt, absence of mistake, i dentity, or a common scheme or plan. State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Spr eigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)). W e re view a district court’ s evidentiar y rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). “A defendant appeali ng the admission of evidence has the b urden to show the admission wa s both err oneous and prejudicial.” Riddley, 776 N.W. 2d at 424. Bonnell argues the district court erred in ad mitting the following mess ages sent from the Pineapple Man F acebook account and r eceived and stored in French’ s Fa cebook account between Janua ry 2 and January 4, 201 9, a few days before La V alley’ s m urder: • A message asking French whether anything happened between Fr ench and a man named K. • A message saying “I know if I loose anot her person I’ ma go on a rampage.” • A screenshot of an image (sent through Facebook) from Pineapp le Man to an unknown man with a picture of Bonnell holding a gun with a caption that said, “Better stop t exting my chick before you get dropped b*** *.” • A message that said, “I’m having the worst day. .. I just really wa nna shoot someone.” • A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive. .. I’m a terr ible person.” Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the challenge d statements under the immediate episode and Spr eigl exceptions to

34 Minnesota Rule of Ev idence 404(b)(1), we conclude that Bonnell failed to satis fy his burden to show tha t the erroneous ad mission of the c hallenged state ments was prejudicial. T o demonstrate prejudice, a defendant m ust show that “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admi tted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (inter nal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (“T o warrant a new trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitt ed evidence significan tly affected the verdict.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). W e have previously identified a list of nonexclusive factors that may be consider ed in deter mining whether the defend ant has satisfied his burden of demonstrating prejudice, including “(1) the manner in whic h the party presented the evidence, (2) whet her the evidence was h ighly persuasive, (3) w hether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing ar gume nt, and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. In addition, “[s]trong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wr ongly admitted evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 50 5 (Minn. 2020)). These factors may not be releva nt or persuasive in every case b ecause determining whet her the defendant satisfied his burden is a “fact -specific” analys is. Id. at 55. Here, the challe nged messages were read in to the record by a police officer. The challenged messages were not highly pers uasive because their persuasive value wa s undermined by the large amount of other admissible evidence that established Bonnell’ s ownership of the Pineapple Man acco unt, his participation in the cri me, his relationship to

35 the crime, and his des ire to hurt La V alley. The prosecutor re fere nced the c hallenged messages twice in hi s closing argument. Defense cou nsel countered the cha llenged messages in his closing ar gument by tel ling the jury, “ W e saw several [messages ] in whic h there was a discussion about shooting these guys and of course, it ne ver happened. Thi s was an eighteen - year - old kid at the time, Mr. Bonnell. He has a new girlfriend. He’ s try ing to impr ess a nd to appea r to be a big tough guy and she loved it.” (Emp hase s added.) Bas ed on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that Bonnell fai led to show that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully ad mitted evidence signif icantly affected the verdict, especially w hen the challen ged messages were outweighed by the strong evidence of guilt from other admissible evid ence establish ing Bonnell as the owner of the Pineapple Man account, demonst rating Bonnell’ s partic ipation in and relatio nship to the cri me, and his motivation to hurt LaV alley. In sum, even assuming that the district court a bused its discretion wh en it admitted the challenged messages under the im mediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), we conclu de that Bonnell failed to show t here is a reasonable possibility that the wro ngfully admitted evide nce significantly affected the verdic t. VI. Finally, we consider Bonnell’ s argument th at there was insufficient evidence to support his convicti on because the State presented only accomplice test imony and circumstantial evidence. 22 This presents two i ntertwined issues. First, we must cons ider 22 There is no dispute that French is an a ccomplice whose testim ony requires corroboration under Mi nn. Stat. § 634.04.

36 whether the corroborative evidence, when viewed in a light most fav orable to the verdict, was weighty enough t o restore confidence in the truth of Fre nch’ s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell fatally shot LaV alley such that it c an be considered as part of our examination of the sufficiency of th e State’ s evid ence. See State v. F o rd, 539 N.W.2d 2 14, 225 (Minn. 1995). Second, we must co nsider whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’ s conv iction. W e fir st consider w hether the presented evidence was wei ghty enough t o corroborate French’ s te stimony. Pursuan t to Minnesota Statute s section 634.04, [a] conviction canno t be had upon the testimo ny of an accomp lice, unless it is corroborated by su ch other evidence as ten ds to convict the d efendant of the commission of the offense, and the corro boration is not sufficient if it merely shows the com mission of the offense or the circu mstances thereof. Minn. Stat. § 634.04. A witness is an accomplice if the witness “could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the defendant i s char ged. ” State v. P endelton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 9 07 (Minn. 200 9) (citat ion omitted) (internal q uotation marks omitte d). In such circumstances, corroboratio n of the accomplice’ s testimon y is required to sustain a conviction. “The rationale for this ru le is that the credibility of an acc omplice is inherently untrustworthy.” State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Minn. 2008). Evidence to corroborate accomplic e testimony is sufficient “ when it is weighty enough to re store confidence in the trut h of the accompli ce’ s te stimony.” State v. Gilleyl en, 993 N.W.2 d 2 66, 282 (Minn. 2023) (ci tation omitted) (intern al quotation marks omitted). But accomplice testimony “does not need to be corroborate d on every point or eleme nt of the crime. ” Id. (citation omitted) (inter nal quotation marks om itted). T h e corro boration is complete w hen

37 a defendan t is linked t o the alleged crime with evidence that “a ffirm[s] the truth of th e accomplice’ s testimony and point [s] to the guilt of the defendant in some substantia l degree.” Id. a t 281 (citation omitted). The cor roborating evidence ma y consist of physica l evidence associated wit h the crime, the testimony of eyewitn esses and experts at trial, and suspicious and unexpl ained conduct of an accused before or after the crime. State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2 d 724, 732 (Minn. 2000); State v. Mathiasen, 127 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Minn. 1964). Moreover, the corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstant ial. State v. Thor esen, 921 N.W. 2d 547, 551– 52 (Min n. 2019); State v. Rasmussen, 63 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1954) (explaining that circumsta ntial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accom plice). The sufficiency requirement f or corroboratin g evidence is les s stringent than t he sufficiency requirement for sustainin g a conviction. State v. Clar k, 755 N.W.2 d 241, 253– 54 (Minn. 2008) (“The precise quantum of corroborati ve evidence needed necessarily depends on the circums tances of each case, but corroborative evidence does not need to be sufficient to. . . sustain a c onviction.” (citation o mitted) (internal quotat ion marks omitted)). Conseq uently, the circumstantial evi dence analysis that we apply i n determinin g whether the circumsta nces proved are suf ficient to support a co nviction does not govern our review of whether the corroborating evide nce is weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’ s tes timony. Instead, we simply view c i rcumstantial evidence corroborating an acco mplice’ s testimony in t he light most fav orable to the ver dict. For d, 539 N.W.2d at 225; Sta te v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 93 (stating that we “ view corr oborative evidence in the light m ost favorable to the ver dict”).

38 French testified that Bonnell shot LaV alley. Here, the following physical evidence and expert testimony corroborates French’ s testimony a nd establishes Bonnell’ s involvement in the cr ime: La V alley was shot twice in the face with a .22 Ruger pistol; DNA matching Bonnell’ s profile was found on the pistol used in the crime; and a bullet casing found at the scene matched bo th the pistol and other bullet casing s found in Bonnell’ s bedroom. In addition, the foll owing evidence from before the murder is incriminating: Bonnell converses with French on Facebook about where to take La V alley to dispose of him; and Bonnell messages French repeatedly ab out how he is going to shoot LaV alley and fi lm the killing. After the murder, the following a ctivity is suspicious: Bonnell messages Fr ench, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it ca use I love you”; and B onnell says on a jail call that he needs to delet e his Pineapple Man Faceboo k account. V iewed in the light most favorabl e to the verdict, the abo ve-described evidence i s weighty enough to restore confidence in t he truth of French’ s ey ewitness testimon y that Bonnell brought his pistol to the scene and fatally shot LaV alley. Having conclude d the evidence corro borates French’ s eyewitness testimony, we turn to whether the Stat e presented sufficient direct evidence, inclu ding French’ s testim ony, to support Bonnell’ s co nviction. Direct evidence is “[e]videnc e that is based on per sonal knowledge or observation and that, if true, prov es a fact without inference or presumption.” See State v. Clar k, 739 N.W.2d 4 12, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). When a disputed element is proven by direct evidence, we apply the traditional standard of review. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). “Under the traditional standard, we limit our review to a ‘ pa instaking anal ysis of the rec ord to determine wh ether the evidence, when

39 viewed in a light most favorable to the c onviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did. ’ ” Id. at 40 (quoting State v. W ebb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)). Here, French testified, based on her persona l knowledge and observations, that Bonnell brought his pistol to the scene and fata lly shot La V alley twice in the face on Mesabi T rail. M oreover, t he statements Bonnell made in the messages that he sent French provide direct evidence that he intentionally fired the s hots with premeditation. V iewed in a light most favorable to the c onviction, this dire ct evidence was sufficient to permit th e jurors to find Bonnell guilty of first - degree premed itated murder. Consequently, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evide nce to support Bonnel l’ s convictio n. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reaso ns, we affirm the dec ision of the district court. Affirmed.