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Aug. 12, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Dustin Curtis Winter, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC100847

• Disposition: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

Combined Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Opinion issued August 12, 2025
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SC100847
)
DUSTIN CURTIS WINTER, )
)
Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY
The Honorable David C. Jones, Judge

Dustin Curtis Winter appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and

first-degree kidnapping. Winter argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for

judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

find him guilty of either charge. Winter also claims the circuit court plainly erred

because its written judgment differed materially from its oral pronouncement of

sentences. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 10, of the Missouri

Constitution. Winter’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence, and the matter is

remanded solely for the purpose of correcting nunc pro tunc the written judgment to

reflect the oral pronouncement of sentences.
BACKGROUND

In the second week of July 2019, Winter told two friends, A.S. and K.P., that

Winter wanted to “f**k [Victim] up” because Victim had allegedly robbed Winter and

raped Winter’s girlfriend, S.S. Winter asked A.S. to help him beat up Victim. Winter

rented a U-Haul van and agreed with A.S. and K.P. he would lure Victim to a house on

Central Avenue in Springfield by “play[ing] nice” so Victim would “agree to come help

him or hang out with him or do something.” On July 23, Winter told S.S. he was “going

after [Victim] and going to make sure he suffers slowly with pain and agony. At that

point 5-0 can come get some too [be]cause I’m down.” S.S. responded, asking Winter to

“stop this self-destructive pattern.” Winter said: “[L]ike I said, I’m going after [Victim]”

and “[g]uess I’ll be handling it by myself which is cool I guess.”

At 5:21 p.m. on July 26, 2019, Winter messaged Victim: “Hey, if you ain’t doing

sh*t, could I get your help possibly?” Winter claimed to need an “extra set of hands for a

couple of items and company so I ain’t so bored.” Victim responded: “K. What time?”

At 7:13, Winter replied: “just whenever you’d be available [be]cause obviously I’d pick

you up and drop you off wherever afterwards.” Fifteen minutes later, Winter texted K.P.

to remind her: “PVC pipe and zip ties, items not to forget lol.”

At 7:52 p.m., Winter spoke to Victim on the phone for nearly four minutes. He

then texted K.P.: “Just got off the phone with [Victim] and being told where to pick him

up. How’s it look on that end?” At 8:46 p.m., Winter texted K.P. that he was heading to

pick up Victim. He was driving the U-Haul van he had rented for this purpose. Then

minutes later, K.P. responded she and A.S. would meet Winter “where we talked

2
about[.]” At 9:07 p.m., Winter texted K.P. that he was “in [sic] route to get [Victim,]”

and K.P. responded: “K. we’re here,” meaning she and A.S. were at the house on Central

Avenue where they had agreed Winter would bring Victim.

At 9:21 p.m., while waiting for Victim to return from the grocery store, Winter

texted S.S.: “I love you and I miss you so much. I haven’t been ignoring you. I’ve been

overloading myself fulfilling my word to you. I’m about to call you though.” Winter

then had two phone conversations with S.S. lasting more than six minutes. GPS data

from Winter’s phone indicates he was near Victim’s apartment at the time of these calls.

Between 9:41 and 10:19 p.m., Winter and Victim exchanged texts and short phone

calls arranging for Winter to pick up Victim. At 10:41 p.m., GPS data showed Winter

and Victim had arrived at the Central Avenue house where K.P. and A.S. were waiting.

At 10:48 p.m., K.P. texted A.S. that Winter and Victim were “under the carport.” At

10:50 p.m., A.S. texted Winter: “Bro, wtf.” Winter responded with a question mark and,

at 10:52 p.m., A.S. replied: “Nothing id [sic] going as planned … We should have done

more planning.” Winter responded: “I just need the gate open so we can walk through.

That’s the only hold up.” A.S. replied: “I can just come open it, let yall [sic] through,

and just do the damn thing if you want.” Winter responded: “Sure. However works.”

At 11 p.m., A.S. texted Winter: “Look, bro, this f*king sht is stupid. Let’s just

f**king tell him what we are gonna do and then do it, you know.” Later, K.P. (who had

left the house briefly) returned to find Winter, Victim, and the van gone.

At 11:30 p.m., Winter texted S.S. that he was on the highway. There was no

response. At 11:44 p.m., Winter texted S.S. again: “Call me please. Something ain’t

3
right.” At 12:36 a.m. July 27, S.S. texted, “Stop what you’re doing.” Winter replied at

12:38 a.m., “What do you mean? I’m out here driving circles waiting for you. Dude’s

already f**ked up.” At 12:40 a.m., Winter texted S.S. again, “Call me please. I don’t

know what I am doing now.” At 1:01 a.m., he again texted S.S., “Am I picking you up

still? You coming back? Or you sticking me with this?” At 1:39 a.m., Winter texted

S.S. again, “Great. Guess I’m f**ked and played on all this.” GPS data for Winter’s

phone during this period showed him driving through and making several stops in the

Mark Twain National Forest, in areas an officer described as “highly wooded, very rural,

with nobody around.”

At 11:33 a.m. July 27, nearly 10 hours after Winter’s last text, S.S. responded that

Winter “didn’t get played.” S.S. said Winter “kinda kept [S.S.] in the dark.” Winter

responded: “I suppose I did. Didn’t mean to but it may have been for the best.” Later

that afternoon, between 6:40 p.m. and 7:01 p.m., internet search records show Winter

searched for websites using the phrases “55 gallon drum,” “sulfuric acid,” “muriatic

acid,” “sulfuric acid or muriatic acid,” and “sulfuric acid on animals.” He also visited a

website titled: “Can acid dissolve a body?”

A few days later, Winter drove the U-Haul to T.C. and D.C.’s house. After Winter

spoke with T.C., she told D.C. he needed “to go get a bucket and some rags.” Then

Winter, T.C., and D.C. walked out of the house and looked in the back of the U-haul,

where D.C. saw a “bunch of blood.” Asked to describe the van further, D.C. said: “Like

a horror movie.” Winter was armed with a handgun, and D.C. testified Winter said: “[I]f

I [D.C.] don’t get in there and help clean it, that he [Winter] was going to kill me.” T.C.

4
told D.C. that Winter had hit a deer with the van and, if D.C. did not help clean up the

interior, D.C. would “end up like the deer.” Fearing for his life, D.C. cleaned the back of

the van with bleach and dish soap for two hours. While doing so, D.C. noticed a bloody

rope and a trash bag in the back of the van. D.C. watched Winter put the bloody rope and

trash bag into a barrel and burn them.

On August 13, 2019, D.C. contacted Springfield police, saying he had information

regarding a homicide involving a U-Haul van. Based on D.C.’s information, an officer

located Winter’s rental van in a grocery store parking lot four blocks from D.C.’s home.

As the officer watched, Winter entered the van and began to drive away. The officer

activated lights and siren in an effort to pull over Winter. Winter fled at high speed,

running stop signs and violating various other ordinances until he crossed the county line.

At that point, the highway patrol took over the chase. Eventually, Winter lost control of

the van, drove down a steep embankment, and was arrested. When the police later

searched the van, they identified and photographed 32 red stains in the back of the van

that appeared to the officers to be blood stains. A reactive agent (which acts as a

presumptive test for blood) revealed additional blood spots even though the red stain had

been washed away. Victim’s DNA profile matched blood found in the van.

In a recorded phone call from the jail, Winter told T.C. she would find a black

motorcycle bag in her closet and she was to “get rid of it.” Winter said he brought it to

her house when he brought the van to be cleaned. He said he had planned to retrieve it

but was arrested before he could do so. Later, T.C. asked D.C. to get rid of the bag.

5
Instead, D.C. gave it to the police. Inside the bag were a temporary state identification

card and several ATM and EBT cards, all in Victim’s name.

Victim, who had been in contact with his family at least once a week prior to July

26, 2019, and who was supposed to help empty a storage shed just days after that date,

was never heard from again. A missing person investigation produced no results. A

police canine indicated the presence of human remains under the Central Avenue house

where Winter first took Victim and in one of the areas of the Mark Twain National Forest

where Winter had stopped the van on the night of July 26 into 27. No other evidence of a

body was discovered, and Victim’s body has not been found.

The state charged Winter with one count of first-degree murder and one count of

first-degree kidnapping. After trial, the jury found Winter guilty on both charges. At

sentencing, the circuit court announced Winter would be sentenced to life without parole

on the murder charge, life with the possibility of parole on the kidnapping charge, and the

latter to be served consecutively to the former. Winter appeals, arguing there was

insufficient evidence to prove either crime and claiming the written judgment did not

conform to the circuit court’s oral pronouncement of sentences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]his Court reviews whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charged

crime, based on the elements of the crime as set forth by statute and common law and the

evidence adduced at trial.” State v. Jackson-Bey, 690 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Mo. banc 2024)

(quotation omitted). The elements of a crime are found only in the statute creating that

crime. § 556.026, RSMo 2016 (“No conduct constitutes an offense or infraction unless

6
made so by this code or by other applicable statute.”). The reference to “common law” in

Jackson-Bey was merely to judicial constructions given those statutory elements when

necessary. See State v. McTush, 827 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo. banc 1992) (holding

elements of an offense are “gleaned from the statutes or common law definitions”); State

v. Hines, 377 S.W.3d 648, 655 (Mo. App. 2012) (holding “elements of an offense are

derived from the statute establishing the offense or, when relevant, common law

definitions” (quotation omitted)).

The standard of review for sufficiency claims has oft been repeated and remains

unchanged. “In considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s

verdict, we must look to the elements of the crime and consider each in turn.” State v.

Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993). “[T]he Court does not act as a ‘super

juror’ with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact.” State v. Chaney,

967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998) (citation omitted). Nor does this Court “weigh the

evidence but rather accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all

reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidences and

inferences.” State v. Gilmore, 537 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Mo. banc 2018) (alterations and

quotation omitted). In conducting such a review, however, this Court “may not supply

missing evidence, or give the State the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced

inferences.” Id. (alterations and quotation omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

7
State v. Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Mo. banc 2025) (alteration in original) (quotation

omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Winter’s Murder Conviction

Winter makes two arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his first-degree murder conviction. First, he claims there was insufficient evidence to

prove the corpus delicti, i.e., that Victim was killed and his death was caused by the

criminal agency of another. Second, Winter argues, if Victim was murdered, there was

insufficient evidence to prove the element of deliberation. This Court rejects both

arguments.

A. The corpus delicti doctrine has no application to Winter’s case

Winter claims the state failed to prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable

doubt. The term “corpus delicti” is Latin for “body of the crime.” Corpus Delecti,

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). It refers to the basic facts demonstrating a crime

has occurred. For example, in a homicide case, the corpus delicti is: (1) the victim is

dead; and (2) this death resulted from the criminal agency of some third party. State v.

Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 544 (Mo. banc 2003). Winter’s claim fails, however, because

the state is not obligated to prove the corpus delicti in every case and was not obligated to

do so in this case.

“The term [corpus delicti] is used in the context of criminal law to describe the

prosecutor’s burden of proving that a crime was committed by someone, independent

from a defendant’s extrajudicial statements.” State v. Madorie, 156 S.W.3d 351, 353

8
(Mo. banc 2005) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Thomas A. Mullen, Rule

Without Reason: Requiring Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of

Admitting an Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 385, 387 (1993). Corpus

delicti has nothing to do with the elements of a crime or the state’s constitutional burden

of proving those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted above, the state’s burden

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt begins and ends with the statutory elements of the

crime and applicable sentence.

The corpus delicti doctrine, on the other hand, is simply a rule of evidence. The

state may not offer a defendant’s extrajudicial inculpatory statement until evidence

independent of that statement corroborates the corpus delicti, i.e., that a crime in fact

occurred. Madorie, 156 S.W.3d at 353. Madorie traces the history of the doctrine,

summarizing its application as follows:

A [circuit] court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial.
This standard of review compels the reversal of a [circuit] court’s ruling on
the admission of evidence only if the court has clearly abused its discretion.

Extrajudicial admissions or statements of the defendant are not admissible
in the absence of independent proof of the commission of an offense, i.e.
the corpus delicti. Evidence, however, that the defendant was the criminal
agent is not required before the defendant’s statement or confession is
admitted. In addition, absolute proof independent of his statement or
confession that a crime was committed is not required. All that is required
is evidence of circumstances tending to prove the corpus delicti
corresponding with the confession. Slight corroborating facts are sufficient
to establish the corpus delicti. The determination of whether there is
sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti of an offense is fact
specific and requires a case-by-case evaluation. Under the facts of this
case, the [circuit] court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
corpus delicti was proven and admitting Appellant’s statements.

Madorie, 156 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).

9
Accordingly, Winter’s assertion the state was obligated to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the corpus delicti in his case is incorrect on two grounds. First, corpus

delicti never needs to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, only with slight

corroborating facts. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 544. Second, it is an evidentiary doctrine

only and does not apply where extrajudicial admissions are not at issue. Madorie, 156

S.W.3d at 355.

Winter did not object at trial that his many texts and other electronic messages

could not be admitted without proof of the corpus delicti, nor does he argue on appeal

that the circuit court erred in admitting this evidence without such a showing. 1 Instead,

he seeks to convert this evidentiary rule into additional elements of the crime the state

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is rejected as clearly incorrect,

and Winter’s first point is denied. 2

1
Even if Winter had raised a corpus delicti objection to the state’s use of his electronic
messages, the evidence independent of those messages discussed below, including the
bloody rope and gruesome state of the van, more than “slightly” corroborate that Victim
had been killed by the criminal agency of another.
2
In the end, it is not clear what Winter’s claim would have profited him even if he had
been correct. The corpus delicti normally is subsumed in the statutory elements such that
proof of the latter necessarily proves the former. For example, proof Winter killed
Victim, knowingly and after deliberation, necessarily proves Victim died and his death
resulted from the criminal agency of another. As discussed below, there was sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt;
therefore, there is no question but that the corpus delicti was shown. This is why the
corpus delicti doctrine is confined to the very limited role of ensuring the state cannot
rest its proof entirely on the defendant’s extrajudicial admissions unless and until it
shows with independent evidence some slight corroboration that a crime in fact occurred.
10
B. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Winter
deliberated before murdering Victim

In his second point, Winter argues there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable

juror to find him guilty of first-degree murder and, in particular, that he murdered Victim

after deliberation. As noted above, the only relevant question is whether the

evidence – viewed in the light most favorable to the state – could persuade any

reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Winter committed the statutory elements

of first-degree murder. Tate, 708 S.W.3d at 489. The statute defining first-degree

murder provides: “A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if he or

she knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.”

§565.020.1, RSMo 2016. The elements, therefore, are “(1) knowingly (2) causing the

death of another person (3) after deliberation upon the matter[.]” State v. Tisius, 92

S.W.3d 751, 764 (Mo. banc 2002).

Deliberation is the element that distinguishes first-degree murder from

second-degree murder. Id. It is defined as “cool reflection for any length of time no

matter how brief[.]” §565.002(5), RSMo Supp. 2017. “Deliberation is not a question of

time – an instant is sufficient – and the reference to ‘cool reflection’ does not require that

the defendant be detached or disinterested.” State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Mo.

banc 2013). “Deliberation includes a free act of the will done in furtherance of a formed

design to gratify a feeling of revenge.” State v. Fielder, 706 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Mo. App.

2025) (quotation omitted).

11
Deliberation, like any other element, can be proved by circumstantial evidence,

i.e., evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of guilt. See State v. Lehman, 617

S.W.2d 843, 847 (Mo. banc 2021) (holding “[c]ircumstantial rather than direct evidence

of a fact is sufficient to support a verdict”).

Evidence of conduct that is relevant to the issue of deliberation in a
first[-]degree murder case falls into a least four broad categories. First,
there may be direct evidence that the defendant did or said certain things in
advance of the act to facilitate the crime. This is “planning evidence.”
Second, there may be evidence of a pre-existing relationship between the
victim and the defendant prior to the murder that provides a motive for the
killing. This is “bad-blood evidence.” Third, there may be no direct
evidence of planning, but the complicated manner in which the defendant
carried out the crime shows that the murder could not have been committed
as a result of a spur-of-the-moment decision to act. This is “complicated-
design evidence.” Fourth, there may be evidence that the defendant failed
to take action that a person who did not possess a guilty mind would be
expected to take. Most often this conduct occurs after the crime is
committed. This is “failure-to-act” evidence.

State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 589 (Mo. banc 1997). Evidence from all four of these

categories, and others, is present in this case. When that evidence is viewed in the light

most favorable to the state, it is sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer Winter deliberated

before knowingly killing Victim.

Winter spent weeks planning and preparing to torture and then murder Victim. He

rented a U-Haul van for this purpose. He explained his motive to K.P. and A.S., i.e., he

believed Victim had robbed Winter and raped his girlfriend. Winter told A.S. he wanted

him to help “f**k [Victim] up” and told his girlfriend, S.S., he would “make sure

[Victim] suffers slowly with pain and agony.” Winter told K.P. and A.S. they were to

meet him at the Central Avenue house on July 26, and he would bring Victim there. He

12
reminded K.P. to bring zip ties and PVC pipe to use on Victim. All of this evidence

supports a reasonable inference of deliberation.

On July 26, Winter carried out his plan. He invented a story to lure Victim into

the van and delivered him to the Central Avenue house. Though there are gaps in the

virtual play-by-play record of the events via electronic messages, the evidence is

sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer Winter restrained, tortured, and then killed

Victim over the next three hours or more. He deceived Victim into going with him to the

Central Avenue house, where A.S. was to help make him “suffer.” This, and the bloody

rope later seen in the back of the van, support a reasonable inference that, when Winter

drove away with Victim shortly before 11:30 p.m., Victim was both bound and injured. 3

Winter then texted his girlfriend, S.S., whom he expected to join him, and told her

he was on the highway. More than an hour went by, however, as Winter drove around

waiting to hear from her. When she finally responded, telling Winter in no uncertain

terms to stop what he was doing, Winter replied: “I’m out here driving circles waiting

3
Despite Winter’s reminder, K.P. did not bring the zip ties or the PVC pipe. This
required Winter to improvise, using rope he either had with him or found at the Central
Avenue house. The inference Victim was bound before Winter drove away with him in
the back of the van is based in part on the text he sent his girlfriend, S.S., an hour later
that Victim was “already fked up.” In that hour between leaving the house and sending
this text, nothing suggests Winter took time to stop, beat Victim, and tie him up. Instead,
the only reasonable inference is Victim was bound and injured before Winter left the
Central Avenue house. This inference is strengthened by the fact Winter texted S.S.
shortly after he left the house and told her he was on the highway. It is unreasonable to
believe Winter was driving and texting for more than an hour, all the while being
vulnerable to an attempted escape by an unrestrained Victim. Finally, the bloody rope
strengthens the inference Victim was alive when he was put into the van. Had he already
been dead, the rope would not have been necessary. And he remained alive long enough
to produce the “horror film” amount of blood D.C. later saw.
13
for you. Dude’s already fked up.” This strongly suggests Victim was injured, but still

alive. As a result, not only do the bloody rope and large amount of blood (like a “horror

film”) in the back of the van support the reasonable inference Victim was bound and

injured when Winter drove away from Central Avenue with Victim, that evidence and the

timing of the foregoing texts also supports the reasonable inference Victim remained

alive and bound for at least an hour before dying. Yet, with all this time to abandon his

nefarious plan and either help or seek help for Victim, Winter did nothing to help him.

This failure supports an inference of deliberation. See State v. Emery, 701 S.W.3d 585,

596-97 (Mo. banc 2024) (holding evidence defendant chose not to deviate from the

planned action and provide or seek aid for a victim who was injured but not yet dead

supported an inference of deliberation); State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Mo. banc

2002) (holding deliberation “may be inferred from the fact that a defendant had the

opportunity to terminate an attack after it began”).

Finally, Winter’s actions after the murder also support a reasonable inference of

deliberation prior to the murder. See Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 764 (holding “conduct after the

murders can also support a finding of deliberation”). He researched how to dispose of a

body, he got T.C. and D.C. to help him (unsuccessfully) clean the blood out of the van

while Winter burned the bloody ropes and a trash bag of other presumably incriminating

material. Winter was in possession of (and asked T.C. to help him get rid of) Victim’s

temporary identification, ATM and EBT cards, and he led law enforcement officers on a

high-speed chase when they tried to arrest him. Individually and collectively, this

14
evidence overwhelmingly supports a reasonable inference of deliberation. Winter’s

second point is denied. 4

II. Winter’s Kidnapping Conviction

In his third point, Winter argues there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to find him guilty of first-degree kidnapping. Again, the only relevant question is

whether the evidence – viewed in the light most favorable to the state – could persuade

any reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Winter committed the statutory

elements of first-degree kidnapping. Tate, 708 S.W.3d at 489. As relevant to this case,

section 565.110.1(4)-(5), RSMo 2016, defines first-degree kidnapping as follows:

unlawfully confin[ing] another person without his or her consent for a
substantial period, for the purpose of … (4) [f]acilitating the commission of
any felony or flight thereafter; or (5) [i]nflicting physical injury on or
terrorizing the victim or another.

In other words, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Winter committed the

following elements: (1) he unlawfully confined Victim; (2) without Victim’s consent;

(3) for a substantial period; and (4) for the purpose of either (a) facilitating commission

of a felony or flight thereafter, or (b) inflicting physical injury or terrorizing Victim.

4
Though Winter’s claim is focused on whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, his argument rests in part on his assertion there
was insufficient evidence to prove Victim actually died because his body was never
found. This argument fails, however, because there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Victim died and Winter
killed him. The evidence of planning beforehand and attempts at evasion afterward
contribute to this inference, as does the bloody rope, the state of the van after the murder,
and the fact Victim – who had regular interaction with family and others before July
26 – has not been seen or heard from since he left the Central Avenue house, bound and
injured, in Winter’s van on the evening of July 26, 2019.
15
Winter focuses his claim on the third element 5 and argues the state failed to

adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Winter confined Victim for a “substantial period.” Winter argues the

“substantial period” element requires proof the confinement was not “merely incidental”

to some other charged crime. The state, on the other hand, argues this element merely

requires confinement that exposed Victim to an “increased risk of danger or harm.” Both

are wrong.

Nothing in section 565.110.1(4)-(5) expressly requires the state to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the confinement was not “merely incidental” to some other charged

crime and/or that the confinement “increased the risk of harm or danger” to the victim;

nor can either (or both) of these would-be elements fairly be said to be implied by the

plain and unambiguous statutory element that the confinement was for a “substantial

period.” Accordingly, because the state was under no burden to prove the confinement

was not “merely incidental” to some other charged crime or that the confinement

“increased the risk of harm or danger” to the victim, and because the evidence was more

5
Evidence of the first, second and fourth elements was so overwhelming Winter invests
little effort challenging it. As discussed above, there is no question the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Victim was bound and injured
when Winter drove away from the Central Avenue house with Victim in the back of the
van. Accordingly, a reasonable juror would have a sufficient basis from which to infer
Winter unlawfully confined Victim without Victim’s consent. Similarly, Winter’s
announced plan to assault Victim and make “sure he suffers slowly with pain and agony”
was sufficient to prove Winter’s confinement of Victim was for the purpose of
facilitating Winter’s assault of Victim and/or injuring or terrorizing Victim. As a result,
Winter’s claim in this Court focuses on the third element, i.e., that the confinement be for
a “substantial period.”
16
than sufficient for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Winter

confined Victim for a “substantial period” as this plain and unambiguous phrase

ordinarily is understood, Winter’s third claim is rejected.

Both Winter and the state base their arguments on State v. Sistrunk, 414 S.W.3d

592 (Mo. App. 2013). This case erroneously includes in a sufficiency of the evidence

analysis, either as part of or in addition to the plain and simple “substantial period”

element, an obligation for the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the confinement

was “more than incidental” to another charged crime and/or that it “increased risk of

harm or danger to the victim.” Id. at 600. Sistrunk correctly notes the legislature has not

defined “substantial period” and “no Missouri court has expressly addressed the length of

time a victim must be confined [] for there to be a submissible case of kidnapping

pursuant to [s]ection 565.110.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

Rather than confine the analysis to the plain language of the statute, however, and

simply analyze whether a reasonable juror could conclude the confinement lasted for a

“substantial period,” Sistrunk erroneously concludes “the offense of kidnapping can only

be sustained whe[n] the movement or confinement of the victim is more than ‘merely

incidental’ to another offense.” Id. Sistrunk then compounds this error by holding:

Determining whether a defendant’s movement or confinement of his victim
is merely incidental to another offense or is sufficient to constitute the
offense of kidnapping requires this Court to focus upon whether there was
any increased risk of harm or danger to the victim from the movement or
confinement that was not present as the result of the other offense.

Id. (quotation omitted). Neither of these requirements, however, has any foundation in

the text of the statute.

17
Sistrunk was not the first to make these mistakes. It relies on State v. Williams,

860 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Mo. App. 1993), for both erroneous statements. Williams, in turn,

relies on State v. Jackson, 703 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. App. 1985), and this is where the

analytical train left the tracks. Jackson states:

In determining whether a defendant’s actions of moving and confining his
victim are incidental to another offense or are sufficient by themselves to
constitute the offense of kidnapping, we must look to see if there was any
increased risk of harm or danger to the victim from the movement or
confinement that was not present as a result of the other offense.

Id. at 33. But Jackson was not evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Instead, it

was evaluating a claim that the “convictions for both rape and kidnapping constituted

double jeopardy and subjected defendant to multiple punishment for merged offenses

which is in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth [a]mendments to the United States

Constitution and Article I, § 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.” Id. at 32.

Because Jackson was evaluating a double jeopardy, multiple punishment claim,

the analysis properly focuses on whether the legislature intended multiple punishments

for the conduct at issue. State v. Hollowell, 643 S.W.3d 329, 342 (Mo. banc 2022). And,

to that end, it is reasonable for Jackson to look to the Comment to the 1973 Proposed

Code, which stated: “Kidnapping is not meant to cover the confinement or movement

which is merely incidental to the commission of another offense .... To take such

incidental confinement or movement and punish it as kidnapping would be making two

crimes out of what is basically one offense.” Jackson, 703 S.W.2d at 32-33 (emphasis

added) (quoting § 565.110, Comment to the 1973 Proposed Code); see also State v.

Tomlin, 864 S.W.2d 364, 366-67 (Mo. App. 1993) (conducting a similar double jeopardy,

18
multiple punishments analysis). Accordingly, if a defendant claims a charge of

first-degree kidnapping is so necessarily subsumed within another charge that

punishments for both will violate double jeopardy, that defendant may well argue the

legislature did not intend multiple punishments when the confinement conduct underlying

the charge of kidnapping was merely incidental to the conduct underlying the other

charge and did not expose the victim to any new or increased risk of harm or danger.

This issue is not decided here, however, because – as in Sistrunk and Williams – that

issue is not before the Court.

Sistrunk and Williams were not analyzing double jeopardy, multiple punishment

claims, and Winter raises no such claim in this case. Instead, Sistrunk, Williams and the

present case involve only sufficiency of the evidence claims. Accordingly, the analysis

used in Jackson and Tomlin simply does not apply.

As set forth above, this Court reviews only “whether there is sufficient evidence to

support the charged crime, based on the elements of the crime as set forth by statute and

common law [constructions of those elements] and the evidence adduced at trial.”

Jackson-Bey, 690 S.W.3d at 186 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). The elements of

first-degree kidnapping are set forth in section 565.110.1, and these elements do not

require the state to prove the confinement exposed the victim to “increased risk of harm

or danger” or the confinement was not “merely incidental” to another charged crime.

Instead, the relevant element in section 565.110.1 simply requires the state to prove the

confinement was for a “substantial period.” Because there is nothing ambiguous about

this word or the phrase in which it is used, there is no excuse for importing the “merely

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incidental” or “increased risk of harm” concepts under the guise of construction. Smith v.

St. Louis Cnty. Police, 659 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Mo. banc 2023) (“If the intent of the

legislature is clear and unambiguous, by giving the language used in the statute its plain

and ordinary meaning, then [this Court is] bound by that intent and cannot resort to any

statutory construction in interpreting the statute.” (alteration in original) (quotation

omitted)).

This is a textbook example of a common mistake, and an object lesson in the

mischief that can ensue when lawyers and judges confuse construction and application.

Construction may occur only when there is an ambiguity. Id. A statute is

ambiguous – and, therefore, requires construction – only when there is an “uncertainty of

meaning based not on the scope of a word or phrase but on a semantic dichotomy that

gives rise to any of two or more quite different but almost equally plausible

interpretations.” Ambiguity, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added);

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 425

(2012) (same); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §45.2 (7th ed.) (“[T]he inquiry,

when evaluating whether a statute is ambiguous, is not whether the scope of a statute is

ambiguous, but rather whether the statutory language itself is ambiguous.”).

On the other hand, when the difficulty or uncertainty is based on the scope of the

word rather than its meaning, this merely requires application, not construction. The

criminal law is replete with words such as “substantial,” “reasonable,” and many others

demanding much from judges and juries in terms of application. But such is the

day-to-day work of circuit judges evaluating the submissibility of the state’s cases and

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jurors bearing the ultimate responsibility for applying such laws to the facts of each case.

So long as there is no genuine debate as to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory

word or phrase, difficulty in applying that word or phrase cannot justify grafting

judicially constructed requirements onto that otherwise unambiguous statute.

The element that confinement in first-degree kidnapping must be for a “substantial

period” is not ambiguous. “Substantial” means “not seeming or imaginary : not illusive,”

“being of moment : important, essential,” and “considerable in amount.” Substantial,

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966); Substantial, Black’s Law

Dictionary, (10th ed. 2014) (same). Accordingly, the word “substantial” (and, therefore,

the phrase “substantial period”) has a plain, ordinary meaning easily understood by

persons of ordinary intelligence. See, e.g., State v. Mahurin, 799 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo.

banc 1990) (holding the “words ‘substantial risk’ have a plain and ordinary meaning

cognizable by a person of ordinary intelligence”).

Because the phrase “substantial period” is not ambiguous, courts have no authority

to use that phrase as justification for requiring the state to prove elements that have no

basis in the text of the statute, including elements that the confinement was more than

“merely incidental” to another charged crime or that the confinement “increased risk of

harm” to the victim. Accordingly, Sistrunk, Williams, and all similar cases requiring such

proof in conducting sufficiency of the evidence reviews of first-degree kidnapping

convictions are overruled. 6

6
Such overruled cases include, e.g., State v. Sims, 700 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Mo. App.
2024); State v. Taylor, 317 S.W.3d 89, 92-93 (Mo. App. 2010); State v. Brock, 113
21
Shorn of the distracting notions of “merely incidental” and “increased risk,”

Winter’s third claim is reduced to the simple question of whether there was sufficient

evidence for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt Winter confined

Victim for a “substantial period.” Plainly there was. As explained above, Winter left the

Central Avenue house with Victim already bound (not to mentioned gravely injured). He

drove “in circles” for more than an hour as he tried to reach his girlfriend. Somewhere in

the ensuing hours, Winter killed Victim.

It does not matter precisely when the murder occurred and, therefore, when the

confinement ended. 7 Winter’s confinement of Victim started no later than 11:30 p.m.,

when he left the Central Avenue house, and continued at least through Winter’s text

exchanges with S.S. ending no earlier than 1:39 a.m. As previously explained, the

S.W.3d 227, 231-32 (Mo. App. 2003); State v. Shelton, 78 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Mo. App.
2002); State v. Lyles, 996 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. App. 1999).
7
Winter takes issue with the circumstantial nature of the evidence against him and the
fact there is no evidence of the exact time Victim was killed and, therefore, the exact
length of his confinement. Winter’s argument, however, ignores the standard of review
and the fact that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold a conviction. The
standard of review when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim requires this
Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and all contrary
inferences must be ignored. “If that evidence supports equally valid inferences, it is up to
the factfinder to determine which inference to believe, as the factfinder is permitted to
draw such reasonable inferences from the evidence as the evidence will permit.”
Lehman, 617 S.W.3d at 847 (quotation omitted); see also Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 406 (“If a
jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, so long as the evidence meets the minimal
appellate standard required by due process, we need not disturb the result simply because
the case depended wholly, mostly, or partially upon circumstantial proof.”). The Court
does not hold the inferences on which the Court rejects each of Winter’s first three claims
are mandatory. The Court merely holds these inferences are reasonable and supported by
the evidence. The responsibility for deciding whether to draw a reasonable inference that
is supported by the evidence rests solely with the jury, and, here, the jury chose to do so.

22
bloody rope, the amount of blood in the van, and the timing and content of Winter’s texts

to and from S.S. support a reasonable inference that Victim was bound, but alive, this

entire period and probably much longer before Winter stopped and killed him.

Accordingly, there is no question the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to

find beyond a reasonable doubt Winter confined Victim illegally, without Victim’s

consent, for a “substantial period,” and for both of the alternative purposes set forth in

section 565.110.1(4)-(5). Winter’s third claim is denied.

III. Nunc Pro Tunc

In his final point, Winter argues, and the state agrees, the circuit court plainly

erred because its written judgment differs materially from its oral pronouncement of

sentences. At sentencing, the circuit court announced Winter would be sentenced to life

without parole for the first-degree murder count, life with the possibility of parole for the

first-degree kidnapping count, and the latter sentence was to be served consecutively to

the former. The circuit court’s written judgment, however, indicated Winter was

sentenced to 999 days’ imprisonment for each of the murder and kidnapping counts.

When there is a material difference between the written judgment and the oral

pronouncement of sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. State ex rel. Zinna v.

Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Mo. banc 2010), overruled on other grounds by Branson v.

Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. banc 2025). Accordingly, this Court remands the case

to the circuit court solely for the purpose of the circuit court correcting nunc pro tunc the

written judgment to conform with its oral pronouncement of consecutive life sentences

23
for the kidnapping and murder counts, with and without the possibility of parole

respectively.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part

and vacated and remanded in part for the limited purpose of the circuit court correcting

nunc pro tunc its written judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement of sentences made on

January 20, 2023.

---

Paul C. Wilson, Judge

All concur.

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