State v. Coffill III - Eluding Officer and Reckless Conduct Appeal

MAINE SUPRE ME JU DICI AL CO URT Reporter of De cisions Deci sion: 20 26 ME 18 Docket: Cum - 24 - 57 4 Argue d: September 9, 2 025 Decided: February 26, 20 26 Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LA WRENCE, DOUGLA S, and LIPEZ, JJ. STATE OF MAINE v. THOM AS G. COF FILL I II LIPEZ, J. [¶1] Thomas G. Coffill III appeals from a judgment of con viction of eluding an officer and reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon entered by the tr ial cour t (Cum berl and C oun ty, Cashman, J.) af ter a jury trial. Coffill asserts that t he Cum ber lan d Coun ty gr and j ury tha t in dicte d h im f or the se c harge s lacked the authority to do so because the conduct at issue occurred either entirely or partly within Sagadahoc Cou nty. He also argu e s that the ev iden ce was in suff icien t to suppo rt the conv ictio n for reck less con duct with a dangerous weapon. We d isagree wi th b oth of Cof fill ’s con te ntions and affirm the j udgm ent.

2 I. BACKGROUND A. Fact s [¶2 ] “Vie wing the e viden ce in the l ight mos t favo rabl e to the Sta te, the jury rationally could have f ound the f ollowing facts beyo nd a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hurd, 2010 ME 118, ¶ 4, 8 A. 3d 65 1. [¶3 ] On t he morning of Decembe r 4, 20 23, Cof fill had a disp ute with his girlfri end at the ir ho me in Br unsw ick, whi ch is in Cumberland Coun ty. A fe w hours later, he left the ho me in his gir lfrie nd’s car, wh ich he did no t have permission to use. The police were called, and an officer loc ated Coffill turning onto New Meadow s Road in West Bath, which i s in Sagadahoc County. Th e officer began to pursue Coffi ll with lights and siren a ctivated. Coffill did not stop. As the officer pursu ed him, Coffi ll drove erratic ally and w el l o ver t he speed limit, caus ing other drivers to slow down and swerve out of the way. 1 [¶4 ] At the on - ramp from New M eadow s Road to Route 1, Coff ill star ted to tu rn left. When the offic er followed, Coff ill e xten ded his turn to m ake a U- turn and dr o ve d irect ly a t the of fice r’s cruis er. The of ficer had to b r ak e quickly to avoid a head - on collision. Coffill then reversed and drove up the on - ramp onto Route 1. 1 The offi cer’s purs uit of C offill was cap tured on video and played fo r the jury at trial.

3 [¶5 ] Sh ortly after Coffill merg ed onto Route 1, he crossed back into Cumberl and Cou nty. The p olice p urs uit cont inu ed, with C offill drivin g approximately eig hty miles per hour in a sixt y - mile - per - hour zone in heavy traffic and swerv ing between lanes and ar ound vehicles. He then exi ted Route 1 and continued onto Route 196, crossing back into Sa gadahoc County as he entered Topsham. He persisted i n driving err atica lly throu gh hea vy tr aff ic. By this point, additional police cruisers from multiple agencies had joined the chase. [¶6 ] Coffill followed Route 19 6 thro ug h Tops ha m, eventually driving onto Interstate 295 southbound. He then used a crossover just south of the on - ramp to reverse direction and drive north on I nterstate 295. As he entered the northbound lane of t he hig hway, an oncoming car was forced to swerve to avoid a collis ion. Coffil l then ex ited I nters tate 295 and drove back o nto Rout e 196. He ran a red light and nearly collided with a sheriff’s deputy who was at temp ting to inter cep t him. [¶7 ] The chase fina lly ended when Coff ill entered a gas station parking lot, where he proceeded to drive aroun d the building several times. M ultiple police vehi cles arrived at the scene. As Coff ill circ led the build ing, he coll ided head - on with a pol ice cruiser at a speed of approximately fift een miles per hour.

4 The officer sustained wh iplash and was later diagnosed with a mild concussion. Another officer drove u p behind Co ffill ’s vehicle and bo xed him in. Th e p oli ce forcibly removed Coffill from his vehic le and arrested him. B. Procedure [¶8 ] Coffill w as char ged by criminal complaint on Decemb er 6, 2023, and indict ed by a Cumberland County grand jury on Janua ry 8, 202 4. He was charge d with n ine c rimes, including, as relevant h ere, eluding an officer (Class C), 29 - A M. R.S. § 2414 (3) (202 5) (Coun t 4), a nd r eck les s cond uct w ith a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17 - A M.R. S. §§ 211(1), 1604(5)(A) (2025) (Coun t 5). 2 The indictment alleged that all nine of the crimes occurred in Brunswick, Cumberland Count y. [¶9 ] The State subsequently discovered that some or all of the alleged cond uct that formed the basis of Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 of t he indictment occurred in Sagadahoc County, and it mov ed to am end the ind ictme nt to al leg e that Co unt 3 (aggr av ated crimin al m isc hief) oc curre d in T ops ham, Sagada ho c Cou nty, a nd that Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 (eluding an o fficer, reckl ess conduc t 2 He was also charged wi th domestic v iolence a ssault (C lass C), 1 7 - A M.R. S. § 207 - A(1)(B)(1) (2025) (Coun t 1); ob struct ing report of a cri me (Class D), 17 - A M.R. S. § 758(1)(A) (2025) (Count 2); aggravated cri minal misc hief (Class C), 17 - A M.R.S. § 805(1)(A) (2025) (Coun t 3); drivi ng to endanger (Class E), 29 - A M.R.S. § 2413(1) (2 025) (Count 6); theft by una uthorized use of prop erty (Cl ass D), 17 - A M.R.S. § 360(1)(A) (2025) (Count 7); violati on of cond ition of rele ase (Cla ss E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2025) (Count 8); and refusing to submit to arrest (Class D), 17 - A M.R.S. § 751 - B(1)(B) (2025) (Count 9).

5 with a dangerous weapon, driving to endanger, violation of condition of r elease, and refusi ng to submit to arrest) o ccurred in B runswick, Cumb erland Count y, “and/or” Topsham, Saga dahoc County. The cou rt granted th e motio n over Coffill’s objection. 3 [¶10 ] The cour t hel d a t wo - day jury trial on September 1 0 and 11, 2024. After the State rested, Coffill moved for a judgment of ac quittal on several counts, including reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. The c ourt denied the mo tio n, and the jur y found Coffill gu ilty of the two co unts that fo rm the basis for this appeal — e ludin g an of ficer (C ount 4) an d r eckle ss cond uct with a dangerous weapon (Count 5). 4 Th is timely appeal followed the co urt’s entry of judgment. II. DISCUS SION A. Grand Jury Terr itorial Auth ority [¶11 ] Coffil l argues that the Cumberlan d County grand jury did no t have the aut hori ty to ind ict him for eludi ng an officer or reckle ss co ndu ct wit h a 3 On appeal, Coffill does not challenge the trial co urt’s authority to g rant the State’s motion to amend the indi ctment to add a referen ce to the crimes havin g been committe d in Cumberland “and/o r ” S ag adah oc C ou nty. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 7(e). Instead, he argue s that the amendment c ould not cure what he contends was a lack of territo rial authority of the Cumberl and County grand jury. 4 The jury als o returned g uilty verdict s on Count s 2, 6, 7, an d 9 (obstru cting report of a crime, driving to endan ger, theft by unauthori zed use of proper ty, and ref using to submit to arre st), and verdicts of not guilty on Counts 1 and 3 (domestic v iolence assault an d aggravated cri minal misch ief). Count 8 (vi olation of c ondit ion of relea se) was tr ied to t he court, wh ich foun d Coff ill guilty.

6 dangerous weapon because some or all of the co nd uct tha t f ormed the basis for the two char ges o ccur red in Sagad aho c Coun ty. H e furthe r co nten ds tha t in th e absence of a pr oper indictment, the trial cou rt lacked juri sdiction and the refore the convictions m ust be vacated and the charges dismissed. [¶12 ] This case requires us to interpret t he statute that gover ns a grand jury’s territorial authority. Our review is t herefore de novo. See, e.g., State v. Gess ner, 2021 ME 41, ¶ 9, 255 A.3 d 1041. When int erp reti ng a st atut e, “w e loo k firs t to the plain l ang uage of the sta tute to de term ine its mea ning if we can do so wh ile a void ing a bs urd, i llog ical, or inco nsiste nt r esu lts.” Id. (alteration and quot ation marks omitte d). “Only if the meaning of a statute is not clear will we look beyond the words of the s tatu te to examin e o ther pote ntia l indicia of t he Legis lat ure’s inte nt, su ch as the leg isl ative his tory.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶13 ] We begin our analysis with the Maine Consti tuti on, which provides: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, e xcept in cases of impeachment, or in such cases of offenses, as are usually cognizable by a justice of the peace, or in cases ar ising in the army or navy, or in the m ilitia when in ac tual service in time of war or public danger.

7 Me. Const. art. I, § 7. We have defined “ infamous c rime [s]” as those p unis hable by a period of confin ement of one year or more. O pinio n of the Just ic es, 3 38 A.2d 802, 808 (Me. 197 5). Becaus e th e two char ges at issue here — eluding an officer and reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon — are Class C crimes punishable by one year or more in prison, see 29 - A M.R.S. § 24 14(3); 17 - A M.R.S. §§ 211, 1604 (1)(C), (5)(A), the prosecution of these offenses could not lawfully proceed absent a p roperly returned indictme nt or a waiver of indict ment. See 17 - A M.R.S. § 9(1) (2025) (“A ll proceedings for Class A, B and C crimes must be prosecuted by indictment, un less indictment is waived . .. .”). [¶14 ] In th is cas e, the va lidi ty of t he indic tmen t turns o n wh ether the Cumberl and County grand ju ry had authority to re turn an i ndictme nt on th e disputed charges even though at least some of Coffill’s alleged con duct o ccurred in Sagadahoc County. In the absen ce of that a uthority, the tri al cou rt ha d no juris dic tion. See State v. True, 3 30 A. 2d 787, 790 (Me. 19 75) (“ An ind ict ment retur ned by a gran d j ury whic h ha s ac te d wi thout aut hori ty giv es the cour t no juris dic tion. . ..”); State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504, 50 7-0 8 (187 2) (con cludin g tha t the trial cour t lac ked juris dic tion wher e the gr and j ury a cte d wit hout s tatu tory authority; the indictment was therefore “ coram non j udic e, and voi d”). 5 5 The question of wheth er a trial court has jurisdiction over a charged crim e is dist inct fro m the question of w hether the c ourt has subj ect - matter juri sdiction over criminal proceedin g s in general.

8 [¶15] Th e s tat ute g over ning the terri toria l a uthor ity of grand juries provides: Gran d jury ter ritor ia l autho rity to ind ict f or cr imes com ing within the j urisd icti on of the S uper ior C our t [6 ] must be exe rcis ed b y the grand ju ry serving the county wh ere the crime was committed. 15 M.R.S. § 1 255 - A(1) (2025). An ex ceptio n e xists when th e “Ch ief Jus tice o f the Supreme Judicial Court creates judicial regions for venue purposes,” in which case “each grand jury in a multicounty judicial region may share autho rity to indi ct f or cr ime s co mm itted in tha t jud icia l r egion. ” Id. § 1255 - A(2)(A). I n other words, a g ran d jury ’s te rrito ria l aut hori ty is generally It is undisputed that the trial court in this case h ad jurisd ict ion ov er cr iminal pro ceed ing s fil ed pursuant to Mai ne law. See 4 M.R.S. § 165(1) (2025) (setting out the jurisdi ction of Main e’ s Distr ict Court); 15 M.R.S. § 1(1) (2025) (setting out th e jurisdi ction of M aine’s Su perior Cou rt); infra n.6 (expla inin g that the d istin ctio n bet wee n the Di stri ct a nd Supe rior Cour ts is la rgely uni mpor tant for crimin al mat ter s beca use t he Stat e of Main e pro sec utes al l crim es with in th e singl e stat ewide U nif ied Criminal Docket). The Maine Constitution, h owever, makes a val id indictment a prerequi site to a trial court ’s exerc ise of jur isdi ction over a charged “capi tal or in famo us cr ime. ” See Me. Const. art. I, § 7. In addition to requirin g that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capi tal or infamous crime, unless on a presentm ent or indic tment of a grand jury,” th e Maine Con stituti on empow ers the Legislature to “ provid e by law a suitab le and impart ial mode of select ing juries ” for purpose s of bo th indictment and tri al. Id. Therefore, for the tri al court to hav e h ad jurisdi ction in t his ca se, Co ffill mu st firs t have been ch arged by an indi ctment th at complie d w ith the statutory requirements. In the absence o f a val id indictment i n any gi ven case wher e one is required, the tr ial court la ck s juri sdict ion over t hat ca se and defen dan t, regar dle ss of it s un derl yin g jurisd ict ion ove r cri minal pro ceedin g s generally. See Dohe rty, 60 Me. at 507 - 08. 6 Although the statute refers t o the S uperior Court, “[s] ince the creat ion of t he Unifie d Cr imin al Docket, the distinction between [the Distri ct and S uperior Court s] has be come largely unimport ant in most cr imin al ma tter s.” Gessner, 2021 ME 41, ¶ 15, 255 A.3d 1041; see also Ayotte v. Sta te, 2015 ME 158, ¶ 22 n.1, 129 A. 3d 285 (“Pursu ant to the Maine Rule s of Unified C riminal Pro cedure, the State of Ma ine p ros ecu tes crime s w ithin the sin gle stat ewid e Uni fie d Cr imin al D ocke t.”); M.R.U. Crim. P. 57(i) (“ ‘ Unifie d Cri min al Do cket’ mean s the sin gle cr imina l dock et f or ea ch coun ty result in g from the conso lida tion of what form erly were the tw o separa te a nd dist inct cr imina l docket s for the S uper ior a nd D istrict Cour ts. ”).

9 limite d to indicting for crimes that a re “ comm itte d ” in t he m ult icoun ty j udic ial region i n which the grand jury sits. Id. § 1255 - A(1) - (2)(A). 7 Notab ly, alt hough Cumberland and Sagadahoc Counties ar e contiguous, they are not part of the same multicounty judicial region. 8 Coff ill a ccord ing ly a rgues tha t the Cumberl and County grand jury had no legal author ity to indi ct him fo r cond uct that o ccur red in Sa gad aho c Coun ty. [¶16 ] Coffill’ s argument, however, misstates the limits on a grand jury’s autho rity. P ursuan t to s ect ion 1 25 5 - A, a grand ju ry may indict for “cri mes committe d ” wi thin the judi cial reg ion it s erv es. 15 M.R.S. § 1 255 - A(2)(A) (emphasis added). We accord ingly focus not on Coffill’s conduct generally but 7 Title 15 M.R.S. § 1255 -A (2) (B) also provid es for a grand jury’s exer cise of t erritor ial author ity “as otherwise provided b y law, ” and there are several statutory exceptions to th e general rule, none of which are applicable in thi s case. Se e, e.g., 15 M.R.S. § 3 (2025) (w hen a crime i s commi tted “o n the boundar y between 2 counties or w ithin 100 r ods th ereof,” or when a victi m is harmed in one county and dies in another, a g rand jury in eithe r county may indic t the defenda nt); 17 - A M.R.S. § 3 52(5)(E) (2025) (m ul tipl e the fts co nstit utin g a singl e “sche me or co urse of cond uct ” may be ag gregat ed an d charged as a singl e theft in any venue where on e of the thefts was c ommitted); 17 - A M.R.S. § 703(3) (2025) (m ul tipl e for gerie s con stit utin g a sin gle “ schem e or c ourse of con du ct” may be a ggr egate d and charged a s a single crime in any venue wh ere o ne of the fo rgeries wa s committed); 17 - A M.R.S. § 708(3 - A) (2025) (m ulti ple a cts o f ne gotiat ing a w orthle ss in str umen t con st itutin g a s ing le “s chem e or course of condu ct” may be aggre gated and charged as a singl e crime in any venue where one of the act s wa s com mitt ed); 17 - A M.R. S. § 805(1 - B) (2025) (m u ltipl e act s of cr imina l mis chie f constituting a sin gle “scheme or course of condu ct” may be aggregat ed and charged as aggravat ed criminal mi schief in any v enue wh ere one of th e acts was committ ed); 17 - A M.R.S. § 1106 - A (2025) (p ermittin g aggregation of mult iple in stan ces of poss essi on of s ched uled dr ug s with in a forty - eight - hour period or distribution of schedule d drugs within a six - month period when eit her is part o f a s ingl e “s chem e or cours e of cond uct” a nd per mittin g pr ose cutio n in any ven ue wher e on e of the vio lat ions w as co mmi tted). 8 Cumberland Cou nty is in Judici al Region II and Sagadahoc Cou nty is in Judici al Region VI. See 4 M.R.S. § 19 (2025); Estab lishment of Judic ial Region s, Me. Ad min. Order JB - 08 - 1 (ef fecti ve July 1, 2008).

10 instead on determining w here, as a legal matter, his crimes of el uding an officer and reckless conduc t with a dangerous weapon were committed. For reasons that we will expla in, we co nclude that each of these crim es involved one cont inuo us co urse of condu ct in b oth C umberland and Sagadahoc Counties; the crimes were therefore “ commit ted ” in bot h counties and could be ind icte d in either. [¶17 ] To reach this concl usion, we d ra w from our precedent recogni zing that some crimes under Maine law ar e continuing offenses that may b e comm itted in mor e tha n one p l ace. Se e, e.g., Ge ss ne r, 2021 ME 41, ¶ 22, 255 A.3d 1041 (es cape); State v. M oulton, 481 A.2d 155, 158 - 5 9 (Me. 1984) (theft); Clewley v. Sta te, 28 8 A.2d 468, 474 (Me. 19 72) (larcen y). For instan ce, i n Moulton we stated t hat the crime of th eft 9 “ has a co ntin uing natur e.” 481 A.2 d at 1 58. W e explained that when “goods are stolen in one county and carried by the t hief into anoth er county, he may be prosecuted for the crime in either coun ty” be cause “[i] n s uch cir cums tance s, the c rime of the ft is committe d in both 9 See 17 - A M.R.S. A. § 35 3 (1983). This stat ute has sin ce been amended. See P.L 2001, ch. 383, § 33 (effective Janu ary 31, 20 03) (cod ified as subsequ ently amended at 1 7 - A M.R. S. § 353 (2025)). The statutory lan guage we interpreted in Moult on is substantially the s ame as the current statutory language. See Moulton, 4 81 A.2d at 1 58. C ompare 17 - A M.R.S. A. § 353(1) (1983), with 17 - A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A) (2025).

11 count ies. ” Id. at 159 (e mphasis added) (quotation marks omi tted). Therefore, we concluded that venue was proper in either cou nty. Id. [¶18 ] Coffill argues that o ur reasoning in Mo ulton is inapplicable to th e present case because M oulton con cerned a question of v enue rather than grand jury t erritorial authorit y. We do not f in d this arg umen t con vinc ing. Until t he enactment of section 1255 - A in 2008, 10 grand jury te rritorial authority a nd venue were coexten sive. See True, 33 0 A. 2d at 790 (“The s ame factors which will bear on venue will also determine the grand jury’s territorial authority.”); L.D. 219 7, Summar y (123d Leg is. 2008) (e nacted as P.L. 200 7, ch. 526, § 1 (effective June 30, 2 008) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 1255 - A)) (stat in g tha t one of the purposes of the bill was t o “define [] grand jury territorial aut hority expressly, rather than in terms of trial venue for the [court ]”). Although they are now formally distinct concepts, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 21(a), 11 bot h conce r n where a crime should be prosecuted. And importantly, in each case, that question is answer ed by determining w here the cr ime was “committed.” 10 Section 12 55 - A wa s e nacted as part of An Ac t to Comprehen sively Address Grand Jury Terr itor ial Aut hor ity T o I ndict for Crime s, P.L. 200 7, ch. 526, § 1 (effe ctive June 30, 2008) (c odifie d at 15 M.R.S. § 1255 - A). 11 U nlike grand jury territorial author ity, which con c er ns the co urt’s jur isdict ion, v enue is a procedural issue that is waived if not ra ised by moti on before trial. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 12 (b)(2); S t ate v. Newell, 638 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Me. 1994) (e xplaini ng that “failure to call the att ention of the [c] ourt, prior to trial, t o improper venue res ults in a waiv er” (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. B aldwin, 305 A.2d 555, 55 9 (Me. 1 973))).

12 Compa re 15 M.R.S. § 1255 -A, wi th M.R. U. Crim. P. 21(a) (“The tria l sha ll be in the coun ty in whi ch the cr ime was al lege dly com mitte d, except as other wise provided by law. ”). Therefore, we find our caselaw addressing issues of venue, particular ly as it pertains to the concept of a continuing off ense, instruct ive in deter min ing the ex ten t of gr and jur y ter r itoria l a uthor ity in the pr esen t cas e. 12 [¶19 ] A lthoug h we ha ve id en tifie d s peci fic crime s a s co ntin uing o ffe nses for the purposes of determin ing whe re they were committed, se e Moulton, 481 A.2 d at 158 - 59; Gessn er, 2021 ME 41, ¶ 22, 25 5 A.3d 1041, and whe n they were comm itted, see State v. J ones, 115 M e. 200, 2 0 1- 02, 98 A. 659, 6 59 - 60 (1916) (hold ing tha t the sa le of in toxi catin g l iqu ors was a co ntin uing off ens e whe n t he defendant engaged in sales over a period of t ime), we have never had the opportunity to set out the general defin ition of a “continuing offense” under Maine law. T he United States Supreme Court, in address ing the ques tion of the proper venue for a federal prosecution, has state d t hat “[a ] co ntin uing o ffe nse is a co ntinuo us, unla wful a ct or ser ies of acts set on foo t by a single impulse and operated by an uninter mittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Wh ere such an act or s eries of a cts runs t hrough several jurisdiction s, the offense is 12 Although we need n ot deter mine for p urposes of this case whether venue and grand jury territorial a uthority re main coe xtensive after the passage of s ect ion 12 55 - A, we not e that the statut e conti nues to link the conce pts by expa nding a grand jur y’s authority to cover any multicou nty region that the Chief Ju stice creat es “for venue p urposes.” 15 M.R.S. § 1255 - A(2)(A).

13 committed and c ognizable in each. ” 13 United State s v. M idstat e Ho rticult ur al Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (qu ota tio n marks omitted). [¶ 20 ] Several jur isdic tions have adopted this formu lation. 14 We h av e not explicitly done so, but our cases ident ify ing co ntin uin g off ens es hew closely to this approach by focusing on the continuous and ongoing u nlawfulness of the defendant’s actions. For ins tan ce, in c onclu ding tha t es cap e is a co ntin uing offense, we consider ed that an es caped prisoner is criminally liable not j ust for his in it ial es cape fr om c ustod y but a lso for his ongoing failure to retu rn to custody. See Gessner, 2021 ME 41, ¶ 2 2, 255 A.3d 1041. Similar ly, we have explained that theft is a continuing offense because when a person commits a 13 Like thi s Court, th e Unit ed States S upreme Court has al so con sidered whet her certa in crime s are continuing offen ses for the purpose of deter mining when they were co mmitted. See, e. g., Smith v. United S tates, 5 68 U.S. 10 6, 111 (2013) (noting th at “conspir acy is a contin uing offen se”); Toussie v. United S tates, 397 U.S. 112, 114 - 24 (1970) (hold ing that failure to register for the draft is not a contin uin g offen se fo r as l ong as th e fail ure t o regi ste r persi sts). This a naly sis typ ically a rise s when determinin g whether a s tatute of li mitations bar s prosecut ion, and thus involve s co nsiderations absent here. For instance, the Sup reme Court sta ted in Toussie that “the doctrine of continuing offenses sho uld be applie d in only limited circ umstance s since . . . the tension between the purpos e of a statute of limitation s and the continu ing offense doctrin e is apparent; the latter, for all practica l purposes, extend s the sta tute beyond its stated t erm.” 397 U.S. at 115 (alteration and q uotation marks omitte d). The Cour t reasoned that t herefore an offe nse sho uld be con sidere d continu ous only if “th e expl icit lan guag e of the sub sta ntive cri mina l sta tute comp els such a co nclu sion, or t he nat ure of the crime involved is su ch that Congress must assuredly have intend ed that it be treated as a conti nui ng on e. ” I d. We do not find th is reasonin g applicable in t he present case. 14 See State v. Gray, 505 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Ark. 2016); State v. Licari, 43 A.2d 450, 452 (C onn. 1945); S tate v. Decoi te, 323 P.3d 80, 82 (Haw. 2 014); Bo yle v. State, 170 N.E.2d 80 2, 808 n.4 (Ind. 1960); Stat e v. Nuss, 454 N.W.2d 482, 4 85 (Ne b. 1990); State v. Amerigas Propane LP, Inc., 769 A.2d 401, 403 (N.H. 2001); State v. J ohnso n, 194 S.E. 319, 321 - 22 (N. C. 1937); State v. Mc Donal d, 3 65 P.2d 494, 496 (Or. 1961); Sta te v. Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614, 62 0 (S.D. 1992).

14 theft, that person “continually violates the statute as long as he or she exercises unauthorized control over t he item with the intent to depri ve the owner of t he property.” Ayotte v. State, 2015 ME 1 58, ¶ 1 8, 129 A.3d 2 85. [¶21 ] App lyi ng the Supreme Court’s definition to the charges at issue, we have no troub le co nclu din g tha t eludin g an of fice r, like escape, is a con tinuin g offense. 15 There was evidence presented at trial that Coffi ll first e ncount ered and began to flee f rom police of ficers on Ne w Meadow s Road in West Bath, Sagadahoc County, continued to flee from police officer s on R ou te 1 in Brunswick, Cumberl and County, and was ultimately apprehended by police in Topsham, Sagadahoc Count y. There wa s also evidence that for the ent irety of this f lig ht, p oli ce of fice rs were in contin uous clos e p ursu it o f Co ffill wi th the ir light s and sirens on. Coffil l engaged in one continuous unlawful act of eluding an officer that bega n in Sagad aho c Co unty and con tinue d witho ut in terr upti on through Cumberland County and back into Sagadahoc Co unty. Therefore, the offense was “ committed and cognizable ” in both Cumberla nd and Sagadahoc Counties. 16 See Midstat e Ho rticult ur al Co., 306 U.S. at 166. 15 A person commits the o ffense of eluding an off icer “if th at person, after b eing requested or signaled to stop, attempt s to elude a law enf orcement officer by operatin g a motor vehi cle at a reckle ss r ate o f spe ed th at result s in a hig h - speed chase between th e operato r ’ s motor vehicle and a law enforce ment vehicle us ing a blue light and siren.” 29 - A M.R.S. § 2 414(3). 16 In add ition to ad hering to the rea sonin g of Gessner rega rdin g wha t con stit utes a co ntinu in g offense, o ur conclu sion is also cons istent with t he app roach of sev eral feder al court s to analo gous

15 [¶22 ] Turni ng to the charg e of reckles s condu ct with a da ngerou s weapon, we conc lud e tha t on the facts of this case it is also a contin uing offense, although it is a closer call. 17 The cri me of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon implicates two statutes: the crime of reckless conduct, 17 - A M.R.S. § 211(1), and an elevating - circ umstan ce s sta tute, 17 - A M.R.S. § 1 604(5)(A). A crime s. See, e.g., Unite d States v. Merino, 44 F.3d 749, 754 (9t h Cir. 19 94) (holding t hat the crime o f unauthor ized flig ht to avoid p rosecuti on is a cont inuing offense); United States v. Santana - Cast ellan o, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996) (holdin g that the crime of illegal re - entry into the United States is a continuin g offense becau se “[w]her e a deported ali en enters the United State s and remains here w ith the knowledge that his en try is illegal, his rema in ing he re unt il he is ‘ found ’ is a con tinu ing offe ns e because it is ‘an unlaw ful act set on foot by a single impulse and operat ed by an unintermitt ent force,’ to use the Supreme Court ’s langua ge” (quot ing Mid state Ho rticultu ral Co., 3 06 U.S. at 1 66)); Uni te d States v. C ovarr ubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225 - 26 (9th Cir. 1999) (notin g that “[t]he federal c rime of tran sport ing illega l imm igr ants wa s a c ontin uing off ense ” for a s lon g as t he cr imin al de fend ant s wer e tran sport ing th e ind ividu al). 17 We have defin ed cr ime s su ch as t heft a nd escap e a s cont inu ing of fen ses as a matter of l aw. See, e.g., Moulton, 481 A.2 d at 158 - 59; G essner, 202 1 ME 41, ¶ 22, 255 A.3d 1041. However, we d o not find it necessary to speak as broadl y regard ing reckle ss conduct with a da ngerous w eapon, who se continuin g nature may d epend on th e partic ular facts of the case. O t her juri sdict ions have con clud ed that cer ta in crime s may be cont inu ing off ense s o nly in certain circu msta nces. See, e.g., St ate v. D ennis, 607 S.E.2d 43 7, 451 - 52 (W. Va. 2004) (“Severa l states have found sexual assault. . . to be a continui ng offen se in cir cu mstan ces su ch as the ca se bef ore us. On a whol e these c our ts have concl uded th at when the element s of an offense oc cur sequentiall y, are repeated or c ontinue over a lim ited span o f time or const itute a singl e chain of eve nts, th en the offen se is a co nt inuin g crime b y which venue lie s both in the place wh ere the d efendant c aused the v ictim to be fearf ul throu gh use of for ce or t hreats of force and the plac e where the defend ant enga ged in the prohibited sexual act. . . . Accord ingly we hold that the off enses of sexual a ssault . . . and r obbery may con stitute continuin g offenses fo r purpo ses o f crim inal pro secut ion w ithin the ter rit orial juri sdict ion o f the state of West Vi rgi nia. I n order to be con sidered a continuin g offense, th e facts must d emonstrat e that at least on e substanti al or material element of th e alleged sexual as sault or robbery occurred with in this state as par t of a sequential chain of ev ents.” (footnote omitted)); Stat e v. Far r, 7 A.3d 1276, 1279 - 83 (N.H. 2010) (c oncludin g that, for t he purp ose of a d oub le j eopar dy analysi s, charges of p ossession and del ivery o f child porno graphy were duplicative b ecause the criminal cond uct at issue was a continu ing offense in circumstan ces wher e the defen dant contin uously possessed t he video cl ip at iss ue before, during, an d after deliv ering it t o an under cover pol ice detect ive); People v. Ok afor e, 527 N.E.2d 2 45, 246 - 249 (N.Y. 1988) (c on cludin g that, for the purp ose of a d ouble j eopardy analy sis, cri mina l poss ession of a weapon was not a contin uing offense when the defendant’ s possession of t he firearm at issue was uninterrupt ed, but he for med two separ ate crimin al intents d uring the period in w hich he po sses sed the firear m).

16 pers on is guil ty of r eck less cond uct “ if he r eckles sly crea tes a sub stant ial risk of serious bodily injury to another person.” 17 - A M.R.S. § 211(1). If the S tate proves tha t the r eck less c ondu ct w as “committed with the use of a dangerous weapon,” then section 1604(5)(A) elevates the offense by one class. 17 - A M.R.S. § 1604 (5) (A). “A motor ve hicle can be used as a dan gerous weapon.” St ate v. York, 2006 ME 65, ¶ 8, 899 A.2d 780. [¶23 ] Coffi ll co nce des that he com mit ted the crim e o f re ckl ess cond uct, and we agree that the e viden ce s hows tha t he engaged in reckless cond uct thr oughout the entirety of the police chas e in both Cumberland and Sa gadahoc Count ies: he drove at an excessive spee d, swerved around other veh icles, ran red lights, and in general “recklessly create[d] a s ubstantial risk of serious bodily injury” to other dr ivers and law enf orcement officers. See 17 - A M.R.S. § 211(1). And Coffill was u sing the dangerous w eapon at issue, hi s car, f or t he duration of the chas e. Put another way, h is e ntir e co urse of con duct in dr ivin g recklessly and aggressively in his f light from police was one “continuous, unlawf ul. . . series of acts ” th at was “set on foot” on New Meadow s Road when he first encount ered law enforcement and “opera ted by an unintermittent force” until he was ultimately appr ehended at the gas station in Tops ham. See Midstat e Hort icul tur al Co., 306 U.S. at 166. Because thi s single course o f

17 conduct took place in both Sagadaho c and Cumberland Coun ties, we conc lude that the crime of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon was “committe d and co gniz able ” in bo th co untie s. See i d. [¶24 ] R ecogn izin g tha t h is cr imin al co nd uct cr oss ed coun ty line s, Coff il l suggested at oral ar gument that in such an instance, s ection 1255 - A requires the S tate to d ivide th e und erl ying con duc t in t wo a nd se ek s epa rate in di ctmen ts in ea ch re levant county. Bu t t his appr oa ch, in a ddit ion to la ckin g s tat utory support, would run afoul of o ur precedent declar ing that the State violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy when it prosecutes a cont inuin g off ens e “m ultip le t imes in diff eren t v enues of the same co urt.” Ayotte, 2015 ME 158, ¶¶ 11 - 13, 18 - 19, 129 A.3d 2 8 5 (citing Ma yo v. Sta te, 2 58 A.2d 269, 270 (Me. 1969)). Although a “cr ime that spans multiple counties may be prosecuted in any one of th ose counties, this does not permit the repeated prosecution of a crim inal offense in multiple counties in ou r single statewide court. . . . ” Id. ¶ 22 (ci tation s om itte d); see als o Mode l Penal Code § 1.07(1)(e) (A m. L aw I nst., Proposed Offi cial Draft 1962), W estlaw (database updated 202 5) (“[A defendan t] may not . . . be convic t ed of more than one offense if . . . the offense is defin ed as a continuing course of conduct a nd the defendant ’ s cours e of cond uct was un in terr upted, unl ess t he l aw pr ov ides that s pe cific

18 periods of such con duct constitute separate offenses.”). T he State’s chargin g pract ice in th is cas e — in dic ting Co ffil l wit h one coun t ea ch o f elud ing a n of fice r and reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon based on t he entirety of his condu ct dur ing t he poli ce chas e, ra ther than m ultip le coun ts based on discr ete actio ns in eac h coun ty — ad hered to these requirements. 18 [¶25 ] In sum, we co nclu de tha t each of Coffill’s crimes was a continuing offense for which h e could be indicted in either Cumberland or Sagadaho c Cou nty. As su ch, the Cumberlan d County grand jury did not exceed its terr itor ial a uthor ity when it in dicte d him, and t he tr ial co ur t had juris di ction over the charges. B. Reckl ess Condu ct with a Da nge rous Wea pon [¶26 ] Nex t, Co ffill challenges the s ufficiency of the ev idence supporting his conviction for re ckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. H e concedes t hat 18 We observe that t he rul es of criminal procedur e also req uire thi s approach. Sp ecif ical ly, th e rules pr ovide t hat “[a]ll ch arges a gain st a de fen dan t aris ing fro m th e same incid ent or cou rse of conduct should be all eged in one indictment or inf ormation, ” M.R.U. Crim. P. 7(c), and that “[t]wo o r more cr imes sho uld be charged in the sa me indi ctme nt . . . in a separate co unt for each cri me if the crimes char ged . . . are of t he same or similar chara cter or are b ased on t he same act or tr ansacti on,” M.R.U. Crim P. 8(a). See also M.R.U. Crim. P. 21(b)(4) (acknowled ging that a crime may b y committe d in two or more count ies and p roviding for t ransfer of v enue between these countie s when “in th e inter est of ju stice ”). R ule s of c rimin al p roce dure do not su per sede sub stan tive crim inal laws, see, e.g., Eaton v. State, 302 A.2d 588, 592 (Me. 1973), an d accord ingly they d o not form t he basis for ou r decis ion in this case. Nonethele ss, our interpretat ion of grand jury territorial authority as it pertains to the offense s at issue in this case is cons istent with the way that t hese crimes are to be char ged under the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Proced ure, s ee M.R.U. Crim. P. 7(c), 8(a), 21(b)(4), a desirable result that serv es the purp ose s of cla rity, con siste ncy, and ju di cial ef fic iency.

19 he engaged in reckle ss conduct but arg ues that there was insufficient evidence that he used h is vehicle as a dangerous weapon. [¶27 ] “When rev iewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the ev idence supporting a conviction, we view the evidence presen ted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determ ine whether any trier of fact rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the of fense charged.” State v. Des Rosiers, 2024 ME 77, ¶ 21, 32 7 A.3d 6 4 (quotation marks omi tted). [¶28 ] As we noted in our analysis of whether reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon can be a contin u ing offe nse, a person is guilty of the crime of reckless conduct “if he recklessly cre ates a substantial risk of ser ious bodily injury to another person, ” 17 - A M.R.S. § 211(1), and the off ense i s elevated by one class if the State proves that it was “committed with the use of a dangerous weapon, ” 17 - A M.R. S. § 1 604(5)(A). For the pur pose s of s ect ion 16 04(5)(A), “use of a dangerous weapon,” which may i n cl ud e u se o f a m otor veh icle, Yor k, 2006 ME 65, ¶ 8, 899 A.2d 7 80, is defined as “the use of a firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which, in the manner it is used or threatened to be u sed is capable of producing death or ser ious bodily injury, ” 17 - A M.R.S. § 2(9)(A) (202 5).

20 [¶29 ] Because Coffill concedes that h e engaged in reckless conduct during the police chase, the narrow issue we must decide is whe the r, vie win g the evidence presen ted at trial in the light most favorable t o the verdict, a jury rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Coffill used or threatened to use his veh icle in a manner capable of pro ducing death or seri ous b odi ly injury. See 17 - A M.R.S. §§ 2(9)(A), 1604 (5)(A). [¶ 30 ] We concl ude that the j ury coul d s o find and identify two spe cif ic incid ents that suppor t this f ind ing. Fir st, early in the chase, Coffill made a U- turn and drove directly at a pursuing officer, requiring the officer to brake quick ly to avo id a co llis ion. Second, at t he end of the chase, Coffill drove into a poli ce cru iser, res ulting in in jur ies to the off icer. Either of these events, w hen viewe d in the lig ht m ost f avor able to the verd ict, was sufficient for the jury to find tha t Coff ill use d his vehicle in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily i njury. Cf. York, 2006 ME 65, ¶ 9, 899 A. 2d 78 0 (con cluding t hat evidence that the defendant “us ed h is van to p ush the v ictim ’s v ehic le in to heavy o nco min g tr aff ic, and made co ntac t with that v eh icle a t lea st o nce” supported a finding that the defendant used his van as a dangerous weapon); State v. Jones, 405 A.2d 149, 150 - 51 (Me. 1 979) (reasoning that th ere was suffi cien t evide nce to s usta in a c onvic tion for re ckles s co ndu ct w ith a

21 dangerous weapon where the defendant “attempted to block the road” with his car, “overtook [another ve hicle] at a high rate of speed, cut in b efore he had completed passing,” and then c aused a collision). The ent ry is: Judg ment affirmed. Sanders Womma ck, Esq. (oral ly), No rth Yarmouth, and Rory A. McNama ra, Esq., Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Thomas G. Coffill III Jacqueli ne Sartoris, Dist rict Attorney, and Kris ten M. Hu ghe s, As st. Dist. Att y. (orall y), Cumberla nd County Distr ict A tto rne y, for appellee State of M aine Cumberl and County U nified Crimi nal Docke t docket num ber CR - 2023 - 4984 F OR C LERK R EF ERENC E O NLY