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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Dr. Tracy Smitherman, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District; and Robert Duke, Crissy Griffin, Gayla Caddell, and William McDowell, in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District Education Committee v. Derrick Roberts

Supreme Court of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC-2025-0500

• Judges: Shaw, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Greg Shaw](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/3661/greg-shaw/)

Rel: February 27, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

SC-2025-0500

---

Dr. Tracy Smitherman, in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the Alabama Department of Youth Services
School District; and Robert Duke, Crissy Griffin, Gayla Caddell,
and William McDowell, in their official capacities as members of
the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District
Education Committee

v.

Derrick Roberts

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-23-227)
SC-2025-0500

SHAW, Justice.

Dr. Tracy Smitherman, in her official capacity as Superintendent

of the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District ("DYS"),

and Robert Duke, Crissy Griffin, Gayla Caddell, and William McDowell,

in their official capacities as members of the DYS Education Committee

(referred to collectively as "the DYS defendants"), appeal from the

Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment in favor of Derrick Roberts, a

teacher formerly employed by DYS and the plaintiff in this employment

dispute. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In September 2019, Roberts, then a tenured teacher employed by

the Montgomery County public-school system, applied for and accepted a

probationary teaching position with DYS, which provides education to

the juvenile offenders in state custody. See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of

Youth Servs., 401 So. 3d 276 (Ala. 2024) ("Ex parte DYS"). According to

Roberts, he was hired by DYS effective September 17, 2019, when he

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received the following email message from Dr. Smitherman,1 stating, in

pertinent part:

"I am so excited about you joining our team. You will be
expected to report to the Washington Hall -- DYS Central
Office located at 1000 Industrial School Road on October 7,
2019[,] at 8 am. You will participate in training for the first
couple of weeks before you report [to] the L.B. Wallace School.
I need for you to contact your previous employers and request
verification of experience and accumulated leave
documentation and have it mailed to me. This information
will be used to ensure we credit your experience and make
sure your salary reflects such."

The following day, in response to a follow-up inquiry from Roberts asking

"when ... [he] need[ed] to come sign a contract," Dr. Smitherman further

replied via email as follows: "We don't sign contracts at DYS. Your

contract will run from 10/7/19 to 8/28/20." (Emphasis added.)

By letter dated September 19, 2019, Roberts officially resigned from

his position with the Montgomery County public-school system; his last

day of employment there was September 27, 2019. Thereafter, on

October 7, 2019, Roberts, as directed, attended the referenced mandatory

1As of the message date, Dr. Smitherman served as the "federal

programs coordinator" for DYS; she was later named its superintendent.
3
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training session; that training session was conducted from October 7,

2019, through October 25, 2019.2

Thereafter, Roberts continued his position with DYS but, in April

2023, received written notice from the DYS defendants indicating that

his employment as a teacher with DYS was not being renewed.3 As a

result, a dispute arose between DYS and Roberts as to the date Roberts

began his employment with DYS and whether he had, under the

Students First Act of 2011 ("the Act"), § 16-24C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,

been employed long enough to have attained tenure -- an occurrence that

would have entitled Roberts to certain due-process protections before

dismissal. Ex parte DYS, 401 So. 3d at 279-80. See generally §§ 16-24C-

5 and 16-24C-6, Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, if Roberts's effective date

of employment occurred before October 1, 2019, then, under the Act,

2The record suggests that DYS policy requires that all new
employees receive training -- consisting of a three-week orientation
session -- before having direct contact with the juvenile offenders housed
in a DYS facility.

3Roberts's last day of actual work with DYS following the
nonrenewal of his employment was June 27, 2023; however, he remained
on the DYS payroll until August 31, 2023. On July 31, 2023, Roberts
apparently accepted another teaching position with a nonparty
institution. Roberts also began, in September 2023, receiving retirement
benefits through the Alabama Teachers' Retirement System.
4
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Roberts attained tenure at the end of the 2021-2022 school year, before

the nonrenewal of his employment. If his employment began on or after

October 1, 2019, then he had not yet attained tenure. Roberts, relying on

the date of the above-quoted email message from Dr. Smitherman,

contended that he was hired on September 17, 2019 -- the date of the

email message. Id. at 280. The DYS defendants maintained that

Roberts's effective hire date was October 7, 2019, when he actually

reported for training and his salary and benefits began accruing.

Ultimately, Roberts filed a verified "Complaint, Action for

Declaratory Judgment and Petition for Writ of Mandamus" against the

DYS defendants. His complaint asserted an estoppel claim and also

included a count seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief

based on the DYS defendants' alleged violation of the Act. Roberts

further requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus or related relief

requiring the DYS defendants' compliance with the Act, including the

following specific relief:

"A. A finding and holding that [the DYS] Defendants have
failed to comply with any and all mandatory statutory and/or
other requirements of law as set forth in this Complaint.

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" B. Compelling [the DYS] Defendants to comply with any and
all mandatory statutory and/or other requirements of law as
set forth in this Complaint.

" C. Rescinding [Roberts's] purported termination.

" D. Finding and holding that [Roberts] is entitled to such
other further and different relief as the Court may award in
its discretion."

Roberts's complaint also originally named, in addition to the DYS

defendants, various State agencies as defendants ("the agency

defendants"). All the named defendants in Roberts's complaint jointly

filed a motion seeking a dismissal of Roberts's action on State-immunity

grounds, which the trial court denied. In Ex parte DYS, however, this

Court concluded that "the agency defendants [were] 'absolutely immune

from suit' " under Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022. 401 So. 3d at 284

(citation omitted). As to the DYS defendants, however, this Court

determined that, under prior caselaw, Roberts's claims seeking a

judgment declaring his rights under § 16-24C-4, Ala. Code 1975, and

seeking injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement were not barred by

principles of State immunity and, thus, that the trial court had correctly

held that he was entitled to pursue those claims. Id. at 284-85.

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In accordance with our decision in Ex parte DYS, the trial court

subsequently vacated its order denying the joint dismissal motion filed

by all the named defendants and granted that motion as to the agency

defendants. Thereafter, proceedings on Roberts's claims against the DYS

defendants resumed, culminating in a bench trial. After trial, the trial

court "conclude[d] that Roberts was, in fact, tenured before [the DYS]

defendants purported to 'non-renew' him as though he were untenured."

Alternatively, the trial court found that because Roberts had relied on

Dr. Smitherman's email as proof that he was hired and had thereafter

resigned his prior tenured position in response, and because the

subsequent delay in Roberts's training was attributable to DYS, "it would

be a gross unfairness" to deny Roberts tenure and that DYS was,

therefore, estopped from doing so. The DYS defendants appeal.

Standard of Review

" ' " ' " [W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment
is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust." ' "
Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977
So. 2d 440, 443 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Fadalla v.
Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005), quoting
in turn Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala.

7
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2002)). " 'The presumption of correctness,
however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where
there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial
court to sustain its judgment.' " Waltman v.
Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting
Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).
"Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to
cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial
judge's conclusions of law or the incorrect
application of law to the facts." Waltman v.
Rowell, 913 So. 2d at 1086.'

"Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf
Club, Inc., 985 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 2007). 'Questions of law
are reviewed de novo.' Alabama Republican Party v.
McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)."

Moultrie v. Wall, 172 So. 3d 828, 839 (Ala. 2015). See also City of

Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. McGough, 232 So. 3d 838, 841 (Ala.

2017).

Discussion

On appeal, the DYS defendants first dispute that Roberts attained

tenure as provided for in § 16-24C-4(1) before he was notified that his

employment would not be renewed. The DYS defendants further dispute

the trial court's determination that, even assuming that Roberts did not

actually attain tenure under the Act, DYS was nonetheless estopped from

denying Roberts tenured status under the facts.

8
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I.

Section 16-24C-4(1), on which Roberts relies in asserting his claim

that he was employed a sufficient amount of time to attain tenure,

provides, in pertinent part:

"A teacher shall attain tenure, and a classified employee
shall attain nonprobationary status as follows:

"(1) Except as otherwise provided by Section
16-23-3, [Ala. Code 1975,] a teacher who is not an
employee of a two-year educational institution
operated under the authority and control of the
Department of Postsecondary Education, shall
attain tenure upon the completion of three
complete, consecutive school years of full-time
employment as a teacher with the same employer
unless the governing board approves and issues
written notice of termination to the teacher on or
before the last day of the teacher's third
consecutive, complete school year of employment.
For purposes of [the Act], a probationary teacher
whose employment or reemployment is effective
prior to October 1 of the school year and who
completes the school year shall be deemed to have
served a complete school year."

(Emphasis added.) Further, § 16-24C-4(3)a. specifies that "[o]nly

complete school years of service as defined in [the Act] ... may be credited

to the attainment of tenure or nonprobationary status." (Emphasis

added.)

9
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Roberts's claims were tried, in large part, on facts stipulated by the

parties, including that Roberts considered himself " hired" when he

agreed to accept employment with DYS on September 17, 2019, and that

Roberts first reported to work on site for DYS on October 7, 2019, on

which day his salary and all related benefits as a DYS teacher began to

accrue. The trial court also received numerous items of documentary

evidence, including, among others, the email communications between

Roberts and Dr. Smitherman in September 2019, as discussed above;

Roberts's resignation letter to his then-employer, also in September 2019;

and the nonrenewal letter that Roberts received from DYS in March

2023, which terminated his employment effective August 31, 2023. In

addition, the trial court also received limited testimony.

Roberts first testified at trial. He explained that since 1996, he had

been employed with the Montgomery County public-school system and

that he had resigned from his positions as both a schoolteacher and a

school-bus driver "when [he] took the job [with DYS]." He explained that

he submitted his resignation letter to the Montgomery County public-

school system "in reliance on having received the position with DYS" and

that his resignation was accepted "effective September 27th of 2019."

10
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Roberts specifically testified that he had "already been hired by" DYS at

the time he resigned. He further indicated that the job offer was

extended to him through the email message he received from Dr.

Smitherman, which "instructed [him] to carry out certain ... tasks for

DYS," including providing verification of his years of experience and

accumulated leave. According to Roberts, he did as instructed and, upon

receiving Dr. Smitherman's email, "considered [himself] hired at DYS."

He indicated, however, that his actual first day on the job was when he

attended the required training session on October 7, 2019. Roberts also

explained that he would have attended training when he accepted the job

offer in September had he been asked to do so at that time.

Upon completing the training session, Roberts assumed his position

as a teacher for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year. Thereafter,

he continued in that position as a teacher for the 2020-2021, the 2021-

2022, and the 2022-2023 school years. It was during the 2022-2023

school year that, he testified, he received notification from DYS of his

nonrenewal. Roberts explained that he was not provided a hearing,

which he believed he was entitled to. He also indicated that he believed

he was tenured after having worked for DYS for almost four years.

11
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On cross-examination, Roberts conceded that an appointment letter

he received from DYS appointed him effective October 7, 2019, which was

also the date his insurance coverage became effective. According to

Roberts, he had no knowledge of and was not informed that the last day

of September "was an ending date under the tenure statute for that year

to count." He did, however, concede that he was aware upon starting

with DYS that "[he] had to start over with tenure," which, he was aware,

required three years of employment. Although Roberts admittedly did

not discuss the DYS tenure process with anyone during the application-

hiring process or while employed by DYS, he stated that to his knowledge

he was automatically tenured three years after being hired. Roberts

deemed his hiring date to be the date he received the email from Dr.

Smitherman rather than the subsequent date on which he began

training. Accordingly, Roberts explained that, because he had already

worked for DYS for more than three and one-half years, "[he] was under

the impression that [he] was already tenured long before [receiving] the

[nonrenewal] letter."

Roberts also presented testimony from Ethel Greene, a retired

schoolteacher and school principal, who was serving as principal of the

12
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Montgomery County public school from which Roberts resigned to accept

employment with DYS. Greene confirmed that Roberts resigned during

the 2019 school year because he had accepted a position with DYS. She

also confirmed that, in connection with his resignation, Roberts worked

out a two-week notice period and that September 27, 2019, was his final

day of employment with the Montgomery County public-school system.

Ann Carol Sippial, the human-resources director for the

Montgomery County public-school system, also testified. Regarding the

process of hiring new teachers for the school system, Sippial explained

that, "once they complete the paperwork, we process them in the system,

and they're employed" even though "[i]t's not official until it goes through

[the school] board minutes, [and] the board only meets once a month."

She confirmed that, "after June, even though school hadn't started, [she]

would consider them employed with the school system" despite the fact

that the employee's first day of actual work might not be until August

when the school year begins. She later clarified: "Even though they

haven't started work yet, we have employed them." Also according to

Sippial, the employee would have "signed all the paperwork prior to"

entering the classroom but the "first day of work" would be the "beginning

13
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time" for payroll and retirement purposes. If the employee later reneged

on the employment agreement by accepting another job offer, the school

system would notify the appropriate State oversight department for

consideration of appropriate consequences because "[e]ven though they

haven't started work yet, [the school system has] employed them."

In this case, Sippial indicated that she considered Roberts as

having resigned from the Montgomery County public-school system

effective September 27, 2019. The school system had already begun

looking for Roberts's replacement upon receiving his resignation letter

two weeks prior. Sippial agreed, on cross-examination, that tenure

depends upon completed school years within the same school system and

that the first year of employment does not count under the Act if the

effective date of employment was on or after October 1.

DYS's only witness in response to Roberts's claims was Melody

Nelson, who was, in 2019, employed as DYS's director of training. She

indicated that she provided the training that DYS required every new

employee to receive before beginning work in a DYS facility. According

to Nelson, DYS offered new-employee training "every other month"

rather than offering immediate training for a single new employee. As a

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result, a prospective new teacher or employee could have to wait two

months before completing the training session. Given that schedule,

Nelson testified that, in 2019, for any prospective new employee "hired

after the orientation began in August, then they would not be able to

come [until] the October [training] date."4 Thus, because the first

available training session began on October 7, it would have been

impossible for any prospective new DYS employee purportedly "hired"

after the training session began in August to actually begin work before

October 7.

As demonstrated by the foregoing testimony and by the parties'

documentary evidence, both the DYS defendants and Roberts appear to

agree that Roberts accepted, in September 2019, a job having a clear

effective start date, i.e., a "contract" date, beginning after October 1,

1. The parties' dispute turns on which of the foregoing was the date

Roberts's "employment" was "effective" for tenure purposes under the

plain language of § 16-24C-4(1): in order to have achieved three complete

school years of employment as a teacher with DYS before his employment

4We attach no legal significance to Nelson's use of the word "hired."

15
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was nonrenewed in 2023, Roberts would have had to have been effectively

employed under the Act before October 1, 2019.

The Act does not define the word "effective" as used in § 16-24C-

4(1). See § 16-24C-3, Ala. Code 1975 (defining certain terms for purposes

of the Act). In that absence, the DYS defendants contend that the

ordinary dictionary definitions of the terms "employment" and "effective"

apply and that, when combined, those definitions establish that

" 'employment' is 'effective' when the employer-employee relationship, in

which the employer has control over the employee and pays him a wage,

is operative." DYS defendants' brief at 33.

Roberts counters that his "employment" became "effective" under

the Act once a binding agreement was reached between the parties:

"[A] teacher's 'employment … is effective' … on the day the
employment agreement is reached -- even if the teacher does
not begin work until some time later. A thing is 'effective,'
under the law, when it is binding or enforceable -- when it has
effect. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019),
'Effective Date' ('The date on which a statute, contract,
insurance policy, or other such instrument becomes
enforceable or otherwise takes effect. This date sometimes
differs from the date on which the instrument was enacted or
signed.'), quoted in GE Med. Sys. S.C.S. v. SYMX Healthcare
Corp., Case No. 18-CV-20922-BLOOM/Louis, Mar. 4, 2021."

Roberts's brief at 24.
16
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"Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain,

ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language

is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what

it says." IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346

(Ala. 1992). See also Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d 1072, 1076 (Ala.

2024). Further, "this Court regularly looks to dictionary definitions to

ascertain the plain meaning of words used in a statute." State v. City of

Birmingham, 299 So. 3d 220, 226 (Ala. 2019).

As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, "employment" is commonly

understood to mean: "1. The relationship between master and servant.

... 2. The act of employing. 3. The quality, state, or condition of being

employed; the condition of having a paying job. 4. Work for which one

has been hired and is being paid by an employer." Black's Law

Dictionary 663 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). See also Merriam-

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 408 (11th ed. 2020) (defining

"employment" as "activity in which one engages or is employed"

(emphasis added)). The ordinary meaning of "effective" is as follows: "1

... producing a decided, decisive, or desired effect ... 2: ready for service

or action ... 3: actual ... 4: being in effect: operative ...." Merriam-

17
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Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 397 (capitalization omitted). See also

Black's Law Dictionary 650 (defining "effective" as "[p]erforming within

the range of normal and expected standards" and as "[p]roductive;

achieving a result" (emphasis added)).

Here, in September 2019, Roberts and DYS reached an agreement

for Roberts to undertake future employment as a teacher for DYS.

Roberts was, at that time, specifically informed that his "contract" would

not be effective until October 7, 2019. He was not required to perform

any employment-related responsibilities or to produce any results in his

role as a teacher for DYS until reporting on October 7, 2019, to undergo

mandatory training in preparation for assuming his employment

responsibilities. Not only did Roberts's pay as a teacher not begin until

October 7, but his insurance, retirement, and other related employment

benefits also did not start accruing until that time. In fact, Roberts was

not even qualified to engage in employment with DYS before October 7,

2019, because he had not, before that time, completed employment-

related prerequisites. See note 2 and accompanying text, supra.

Furthermore, Roberts remained employed with the Montgomery County

public-school system for a period after accepting Dr. Smitherman's offer

18
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of employment -- his resignation was not effective until September 27.

Therefore, Roberts did not begin full-time employment as a teacher with

DYS until October 7, 2019.

As the DYS defendants note, it appears that, in concluding

otherwise, the trial court, like Roberts, deemed the word "effective" as

used in the Act to mean legally enforceable. In entering its judgment for

Roberts below based on its reading of § 16-24C-4, the trial court held:

"Roberts's employment was legally and factually 'effective'
when, in September 2019, he and DYS agreed that he would
take the position offered. An agreement is 'effective' when it
has legal force and enforceability. With teachers in
particular, an agreement to come to work for a school system
has monumental legal force and enforceability as soon as the
agreement is made, even if the agreement is made some days
or weeks before the start of work. ... This was, in fact, the
whole point of the 2018 amendment to Ala. Code § 16 -24C-11
-- to ensure that an initially non-tenured teacher such as
Roberts who has agreed to come to work for a school system is
immediately bound by a legally effective employment
agreement (effective and enforceable even through
cancellation of the certificate of a teacher who tries to break
that legally-effective employment relationship). It is quite
common for school systems to hire new teachers over the
summer well before the start of the next school year; the law
makes such agreements to teach in the future enforceable as
soon [as] the agreement exists. As soon as Roberts agreed to
work for DYS, he was bound by an effective employment
agreement. As this occurred prior to October 1, 2019, his work
during that school year constituted his first year towards

19
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tenure, and he was tenured before defendants attempted to
non-renew him."

(Emphasis added.)

In so concluding, the trial court appears to have conflated the legal

effectiveness of an offer of employment, i.e., reaching an agreement to be

employed in the future that could give rise to legal repercussions if

breached, with the effectiveness of employment for the purpose of

determining a start date for calculating tenure under the Act. Contrary

to that interpretation, we hold that, under the facts of this case, Roberts's

employment was "effective," as that term is used in § 16-24C-4(1), when

he was actually required to report and to perform and was being paid for

that work. As the DYS defendants urge, this comports with the

commonly accepted usage -- as opposed to any specialized legal

significance -- of the words "effective" and "employment" as denoting

performing services for which one is paid wages as a result. See State v.

City of Birmingham, supra. It also appears to comport with the language

of the Act itself, see Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Green, 409 So. 2d

850, 851 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) ("[O]ne who serves as a 'teacher' for three

consecutive school years and is reemployed (within the statutory

definition of 'teacher') for the succeeding year by the same school system
20
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attains continuing service status."). See § 16-24C-2, Ala. Code 1975. We

thus hold that Roberts's "employment" was not "effective prior to October

1," 2019, for the purpose of determining tenure under § 16-24C-4(1).

Accordingly, Roberts was also not effectively employed for tenure

purposes for the 2019-2020 school year; thus, that year did not count as

a "complete" school year. Because Roberts did not have three "complete,

consecutive school years of full-time employment" with DYS before the

nonrenewal of his employment, he did not attain tenure. Id.

Our holding is not impacted by the language of § 16-24C-11, Ala.

Code 1975, on which the trial court explicitly relied in ruling in favor of

Roberts regarding the effective date of his employment with DYS. That

section, which is entitled "Termination of employment by teacher,"

provides, in pertinent part:

"No public K-12 teacher shall be permitted to terminate
his or her employment within 30 calendar days before the first
day of the next school term for students, unless the
termination is mutually agreed upon. ... Any public K-12
teacher terminating his or her employment in violation of this
section is guilty of unprofessional conduct, and the State
Superintendent of Education may revoke or suspend the
certificate of the violating teacher."

§ 16-24C-11. As the DYS defendants note, that Code section does not

appear to impose any corresponding limitation on the hiring school
21
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system. Instead, it appears to carry out the stated "[l]egislative intent"

of "improv[ing] the quality of public education in the State of Alabama"

and ensuring that our public schools are able to "maintain[] a competent

educational workforce" by preventing a teacher who has entered a legal

agreement to undertake employment with that school system from

withdrawing at the last minute and leaving the school system with a

personnel void. § 16-24C-2.

II.

We also reject the trial court's alternate conclusion that estoppel

principles apply to afford Roberts tenure under the present facts. As

noted, the trial court concluded that it would be manifestly unjust, in

light of Roberts's testimony as to his reliance on the September 19 email

from Dr. Smitherman and the fact that DYS provided the effective start

date of Roberts's employment, to deny him tenure. Specifically, on this

issue, it held:

"[The DYS] defendants are estopped from denying that
Roberts was tenured. To allow [the DYS] defendants to claim
otherwise would be a manifest injustice in light of the facts.
As a matter of fact, Roberts relied on the September 2019
communication from DYS that he was hired. He took action
in reliance on that communication, leaving his prior tenured
position with another school system, prior to October 1, 2019.
The choice of what date he would start his paid work (in this
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case, his initial training period which began on October 7) was
not up to Roberts; it was, instead, a choice made by DYS
through its agents. No one communicated to Roberts that, by
virtue of that decision by DYS, DYS would take the position
that his first nearly-full-year of work would not count towards
tenure at all. No one communicated to Roberts that, even
when he had put in substantially more months of teaching
than is required for nearly all teachers to attain tenure in
Alabama's schools, Roberts would still remain untenured. It
would be a gross unfairness to allow defendants to take
advantage of Roberts in this way. The Court finds that this is
an appropriate application of estoppel, and that defendants
should in equity be prohibited from denying that Roberts was
tenured."

Again, we disagree.

As the DYS defendants maintain on appeal, there is nothing

suggesting that they either misrepresented the circumstances under

which Roberts could attain tenure or that Roberts, already a tenured

teacher in another school system, was ignorant of the pertinent

provisions of the Act and the October 1 cutoff date for tenure purposes

when he accepted employment effective October 7. See Allen v. Bennett,

823 So. 2d 679, 685 (Ala. 2001) (" ' "Under the settled law, equitable

estoppel ... must be predicated upon the conduct, language, or the silence

of the party against whom it is sought to be invoked." ' " (citations

omitted)). See also BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt, 893 So. 2d 1184, 1187

(Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (" 'The party asserting the doctrine of equitable
23
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estoppel may not predicate his claim on his own dereliction of duty ....' "

(citations omitted)). There are simply no facts in the record before us

suggesting that Roberts relied on any incorrect information received from

the DYS defendants to his detriment. See Talladega City Bd. of Educ. v.

Yancy, 682 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala. 1996) (" ' "An estoppel ... has three

important elements. The actor, who usually must have knowledge of the

true facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by

words, conduct or silence. The other relies upon that communication. And

the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to

assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct." ' " (citations

omitted)). Compare Boutwell v. State, 988 So. 2d 1015, 1026 (Ala. 2007).

Instead, to the contrary, DYS at all times represented to Roberts that his

employment with DYS would become effective as of October 7, 2019, and

nothing suggests that Roberts undertook or was required to undertake

any employment duties as a teacher with DYS before that time.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in

concluding that Roberts was, either under the Act or applying principles

of equitable estoppel, a tenured DYS employee before the nonrenewal of

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his employment by DYS. The trial court's judgment concluding otherwise

is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, McCool,

and Parker, JJ., concur.

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