In re Child of Danielle H. - Parental Rights Termination Appeal

MAINE SUPRE ME JU DICI AL CO URT Reporter of De cisions Deci sion: 20 26 ME 19 Docket: Yor - 24 - 355 Argued: November 13, 2 025 Decided: February 26, 20 26 Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, L AWRENCE, and DOU GLA S, JJ. IN RE CHILD OF DANI ELLE H. STANFI LL, C. J. [¶1] Danielle H. appeals from a j udgment of the D istrict Co urt (Spring vale, Moskow itz, J.) term inat ing her paren tal rig hts to her child. Duri ng the pendency of the case, the mother was in and out of jail and several treatm ent f acil ities f or op ioid us e disorder. She ass erts that the co urt misapprehended the nature of ad diction and recovery when it found th at she was unable to pro tect the child from jeo pardy, unable to take respons ibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and failed to make a good f aith effort to rehabilitate. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B) (2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv) (202 5). She also argue s that the cour t a buse d i ts discr etion in concl udin g that term ina tion was in the ch ild’s bes t inter es t because the guar dian ad litem (GAL) failed to file required repor ts, attend all o f the f amil y te am me etin gs, or m eet the mo ther face - to - face. Finally, she asserts that t he co urt abus ed its dis cret ion when it foun d term in ation to be in the

2 child ’s be st in teres t wi thou t expl icitly con sider ing a perman ency guardianship. Alth ough we are concerne d by the GAL’ s performance in this ca se, it did not prevent the court from independently determining that termination was in the child ’s bes t int eres t. Be cause we con clu de that the evid ence was suf fici ent to support a finding of parental unfi tness on at lea st on e basis a nd tha t the co urt did no t abuse its dis creti on in its best in teres t fin ding, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND [¶2 ] The child was born drug - affe cted in Februa ry 2023. Th e Department of Health an d Human Serv ices immediately petitioned for a c hild protection order and prel iminary protection order, and t he c h il d ha s b ee n in the Department’s c ustody ever since. The mother agreed to an order fin din g jeopardy based on h er chronic substance use disorder, includ ing su bs t anc e use during her preg nancy. [¶3 ] The Department filed a petition to terminate t he mother’s paren tal rights on Febr uary 28, 2024, an d a hearing was held on Ju ne 26 and 27, 20 24. Th e GAL testified at t he te rmin ation hearin g, an d the mother cro ss - examined her about her perf ormance throughout the case. The GAL testif ied t hat she ha d never met the m other in person or observed a vis it between the mot her and the child. She als o te stif ied tha t she had missed four out of nine famil y team

3 meetings and wrote only one report for the case. On July 13, 2024, the court entered a judgment terminating t he mother’s parental rights. The mo ther timely appealed. M.R. App. P. 2B(c). II. DISCUS SION A. Parent al Unfitnes s [¶4 ] We review the trial court’s findings of unfitness and bes t interest for clear error, and we upho ld thos e fin dings if t he y are s u pported by any competent record evidence. I n re C hild o f Reb e cca J., 201 9 ME 119, ¶ 5, 21 3 A.3d 108. “Proof of any one of the four statutory definitions of parental unfitness. . . is independently adequa te to justify term ination, if supported by clear and convin cing ev iden ce.” In r e Ch arles G., 2 001 ME 3, ¶ 6, 7 63 A. 2d 116 3. [¶5 ] During most of the sixte en mon ths betwe en the child ’s b irth an d the terminati on hearing, the mother was pa rticipatin g in the Ad ult Treatm ent an d Recovery Court. 1 The recover y court program required t hat she participat e in 1 The Adult Treat ment and Rec overy C ourt s, for merly known as A dult Drug Treatment Court s, are for “ indiv idual s whose invo lvem ent w ith t he cr iminal ju stice system h as b een fuele d by a seri ous substance use disord er.” Adult Treatment and Reco very Courts, State of Maine Judicial Branc h, https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treat ment/adult.html https://perma.cc/NP3Y - CJQU . Maine also offer s Family Recovery Cou rts, which are “ spe cialty civ il docket s that work wit h families w hose children are at risk o f abuse or ne glect due to paren tal substan ce use disorders and/or co - o ccu rring d isorder s.” Fami ly Reco very Court, State of Maine Judic ial Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treat ment/family.html https://perma.cc/6QP3 - FS4G . The moth er in this case was involved in the Adult Treatmen t and Recovery Court t hro ugh t he cr imina l system an d not in th e Family Re covery Cour t.

4 treatme nt, and st ints in jail could be imposed as sanction s for her f ailure to abide by the rules of the pro gram. During the pendency of the protective custody case, the mother spen t a total of six mo nths in jail and spent m os t o f the r est of the tim e in resid en tial progr ams for subst ance use treatment. S he left one treatment facility after only two days and, before finishing an other program, was discharged from it, arrested, and returned to jail. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother was pa rtic ipating in a third resid en tial treatme nt program but had months remaining to complete it, had no long - t erm plan for her life af ter that, and was not sure when she would be able to care for the chi ld. [¶6 ] Th e mot her a rgues tha t the tria l co urt failed to a ccount f or the chronic natu re of substance use disorder and sho w ed “ a tragic misapprehension about the nature of ad diction and recovery, which may result in a relapse or a series of relapses, which are . . . an important part of the recovery process itself.” She argues that this misunders tanding undermines not only the finding that she failed to make a good fai th effort to rehabilitate hers elf bu t also t he f indin g tha t termin ation is in t he bes t inter est of th e child. [¶7 ] We acknowledge a po ssible inconsistency between Maine’s statutory child protection framew ork and the current underst anding o f the

5 time needed for recovery from opi oid use disorder. Section 4055(1 - A)(C) o f Title 22 provi des that the court may presume parental unfitness f or a child in depar tmental cus tody whe n “the paren t has a chron ic subs tance use d isord er, and the parent ’ s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the c ustod y of the pa rent w ithin a r easo nable pe rio d of time. ” Signif ican tly, the statute provides that there is chronic su bstance use whe n “ a parent has been unable to provide safe care of a child for a period of 9 months due to substance use. ” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1 - A)(C); s ee also 22 M.R.S. § 4052(2 - A)(A) (2 025) (generally requiring the Department to f ile a termination pe tition when a c hild has been in foster car e for fiftee n months). [¶8 ] In contr ast, the minim um time required to complete the Adult Treatment and Recovery C ourt is thirt een months — and it is fre quently muc h longer. See S tate o f Maine Jud icial Bra nc h, Maine Treat ment and Recov ery Court Partic ipant Handbook 15 - 19 (2022), available at https: //www.court s.maine.gov /courts/treatment /trc - participant - handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7X - 9B GU]. T his leng th of time is necessary partly because relapses, also known a s symptom recu rrence s, are an ex pec ted part of recovery f or many in divi dual s. See Al l Ris e, Adult Trea tment Court Best Practic e Sta ndard s 7-8 (20 25), av ailable at h ttps://allrise.org/wp -

6 conten t/upload s/2025/ 11/Adu lt - Treatment - Cou rt - Best - Pra ctice - Standa rds_11.7.2025.p df [http s://perma.cc /Q8MR - KQDC]. “[P]erso ns with serious mental health, substance use, and trauma disorders often remain vulnerable to seve re symptom recur rence over many years or decades. . . A ddre ssin g these reco very man ag em ent ne eds is critical to a void future symptom recu rrence. . ..” Id. at 7. The program’ s length also ensures th at indi vidua ls do n ot f all thr ough the crac ks a nd ar e given th e time to bu ild th e skills and support ne cessary to main tain s obriety once they “graduate” from t he treatme nt court. Id. at 7- 8, 67 - 74. [¶9 ] On the other hand, we have also said that “ permanency is th e cent ral tenet of the Chi ld and Fam ily Services and Child Prote ction Act, ” and the court views the timeframes f rom the perspective of the c hild and not the parent i n deter min ing whet her to ter m inate par enta l r ights. In re Chi ld of An gel a S., 2020 ME 60, ¶ 10, 23 2 A.3d 2 15 (qu otation marks omitt ed). Here, the tria l c ou r t found, with support in the record, th at the mother had a lo ng st and i ng su b st a nce use disorder, s he had an incon sist ent histor y wit h mu ltipl e treatment programs, her future sobrie ty was uncertain, and her future plans were un clear. The co urt co nclud ed that the mo ther was unw illing or un able to pro tect the child from jeopardy and those c ircumstances were unlikely to change within a

7 time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i). It als o foun d that she was unwil ling or una ble to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the chi ld’ s n eed s. Se e i d. § 4055 (1)(B)(2) (b)(i i). We conc lude that the cour t did no t clearly err bec ause there is competent evidence in th e record to support the court ’s find ing that th e mothe r is par ent ally unf it. B. Child’s Best Interest [¶10 ] W e rev iew for an abuse of discretion t he tria l cou rt’s conclusion concern ing the bes t interest of the child. In r e Child of Chri stian D., 2025 ME 16, ¶ 4, 331 A. 3d 409. We view “the facts, and the weig ht to b e given to them, thro ugh the tria l court’s lens.” Id. (a lter ation a nd quota tion m ark s om itted). [¶11 ] The mother ar gues that that the court was unable to make the best interest determination in t he absence of a meaningful and re liable investigation and report from the GAL. G ALs are required to submit wr itten reports, with recommenda tions, to the co urt reasonably in advance of e ach court hearing (except a summ ary preliminary hearing) and i n any event at l east every si x months. 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1) (B), (D) (202 5). A GAL is requir ed to “[c]omple te assignment s and written reports in a timely manner, and communicat e effectively with the court in motions, reports, recommendations, and

8 testimony.” M.R.G. A.L. 1(b) (9). The GAL must have fa ce - to - fa ce con tact wi th the ch ild a t leas t once every three mon t hs. 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1) (B). A GA L’s inves tiga tion must include intervie w s of th e parent s and other persons involv ed in carin g f or the ch ild. M.R.G. A.L. 4(c) (2)(E). A GA L is su bject t o the over sig ht of the cour t. See I n re Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 17, 87 A. 3d 726. I ndeed, if a GAL fa ils t o perform the duties that are required, the co urt may remove the GAL from the case. M.R.G.A.L. 6(a), (d). [¶12 ] GAL reports, if reliable, can be critical to a court’s determination of the child’s best interest. The GAL is a “disinterested party and an agent of the court ” and “ possesses competence and experience to make reasoned judgments about the reliability of i nformati on” beca use o f the GAL’s un ique abil ity to rev iew all r eleva nt r eco rds an d inte rvie w t he ch ild a nd invo lved persons. In re Chelsea C., 200 5 ME 1 05, ¶ 14, 88 4 A.2d 97. Given the GAL’ s central role in child protection proceedin gs, it is the res ponsibility of ev eryone involv ed, incl uding the court, to ad dres s any deficie ncie s in the GA L’s performance. [¶13 ] Here, the GAL did not interview the mother before the termination hearing, did not observe any of t he visits, did not visit the child as required, and failed to attend four out of n ine family t eam meetings. The GAL filed only one

9 report, a year after the case began and well before the termination hearing. T h e mother argues t hat the GAL “fa iled in her s tat utory a nd cour t - ordered obliga tions t o con duct a thoro ugh inves tigat ion of t he facts and cir cum stanc es of th is ca se in ‘ pursu it of the child ’s be st i nter est. ’ ” [¶14 ] As we have explained, t he GA L’s compl iance wi th her s tatu tory du tie s “d oes not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in a parenta l rights t ermination heari ng. ” In re Auro ra M., 2018 ME 4, ¶ 10, 177 A.3d 61 7. The mother c ross - examin e d the G A L an d highligh ted the defic ienc ies in the GAL’s p er for mance throug h that cross - exa mina tion. See A doption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 A.3d 72 6 (“[O] ften the most effective chall enge to the qua lity, completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem’s work will be accom plis hed throu gh cro ss - examinatio n of the GAL at trial.”). It i s u p to t he court to d eter mine how muc h weight, if any, to g ive to th e GA L’s tes timon y an d recommenda tions. See i d. [¶15 ] In this case, the cour t did not indica te that it rel ie d on t h e GA L’ s recommenda tions or report in concl uding th at terminati on of the moth er’s parental rights was in the c hild’s best interest. Ins tea d, the court co nsi dere d the relevant factors based on th e othe r evidence it hea rd, in cluding the ch ild’s age, need for permanency, and the mother’s inability to parent, i n reaching its

10 concl usion. The GAL’s lack of involvement, while unacce pta ble, d id not prevent the court from making it s own independent d etermination, based on competent evidence, that termination of the mo ther ’s pa ren tal r igh ts is in th e child’ s best interest. [¶16 ] Fin al ly, the cour t did not abus e i ts dis cre tion by fa ilin g to expl icit ly consider a permanency guardianship when deciding whether termination was in the chil d’s be st in teres t. The court co ns ider ed the child’s need for permanency and specifically fou nd tha t, beca use of tha t need, i t was “un will ing to pro vide [the m ot her] wit h any additi onal t ime to a ttempt reun ificatio n.” See In re Ch ild of C hrist ian D., 2 025 ME 1 6, ¶¶ 8- 11, 331 A.3d 40 9 (holding tha t there was no abuse of d iscretion in ordering ter mination of parental rights instead of permanency guardians hip when the tr ial court made spe cific, independent findin gs that te rmin ation was in the chil d’s bes t interes t). Although th e court did not explain why it rejec ted a permanency guardianship, in the absen ce of a motion for furthe r findings pu rsuant to M.R. Civ. P. 5 2(b), we assume the court made the findings necessary to support the judgment. In re Childre n of Quin cy A., 2023 ME 49, ¶ 26, 300 A. 3d 832. W e con clude tha t the cour t di d not abuse its dis creti on when it te rmin ate d the m othe r’s p aren tal rig hts.

11 The ent ry is: Judg ment affirmed. Sara A. Murphy, Es q. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Por t land, for appellant Mother Aaron M. Frey, Attorney Gene ral, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Att y. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services Sprin gvale Distr ict Cour t docke t nu mber P C - 2023 - 10 F OR C LERK R EF ERENC E O NLU