Maine Court Decision on Justice Catherine R. Connors Conduct

MAINE SUPRE ME JU DICI AL CO URT Reporter of De cisions Deci sion: 202 6 ME 21 Docket: Jud - 24 -3 Argued: December 1 5, 202 5 Decided: Februar y 26, 2026 Panel: DOW, J., MURRA Y, J., RAIMO NDI, A.R.J., STO KES, A.R.J., and WORTH, A.R.J. * Majority: DOW, J., MURRA Y, J., and STOKES, A.R.J. Concu rrence: RAIMONDI, A.R.J., and WO RTH, A.R.J. IN RE CA THE RINE R. CO NNORS DO W, J., MURRAY, J., and STOKES, A.R.J. [¶1] On October 11, 20 24, th e Commi ttee on Ju dicia l Cond uct su bmitted a Rep ort to the Supr eme Judicial Cour t containing numer ous f actual and l egal ass ertion s wit h r esp ect t o con duc t b y Associat e Justice Catherine R. Connors of th e Ma in e Sup reme Ju d ici al C our t. On November 14, 2024, the Court remanded the matter for f urther procee dings befo re the Comm ittee. On December 1 6, 2024, the Co mmittee sub mitted a new r eport, titled “ Amended R eport, ” which the Ex e cu ti v e C lerk of the Co urt dock ete d as a “ Second Report, ” r ecommending disciplinary action against Justice Catherine R. Connors for violation of M. Code Jud. Condu ct R. 2.11(A). O n June 24, 20 25, the S upre me Jud icial Co urt * Note by R eporter of Decision s: The members of the P anel for this matter w ere selected pur suant to M.R. C omm. Jud. C onduct & Jud. D isc. Pr ocs. 8 (B) b y the Chie f Justice of the Superior Court and t he Chief Judg e of t he Distri ct Court. T he memb ers of t he P anel a re Charles Do w, Judge of the Di strict Court; Ann M. Murr a y, Justice of the Sup erior Court; Barbar a Rai mondi, Acti v e R etired J udge of the Distr ict Court; William R. St okes, Act iv e Reti red Justice of th e Superior Court; and Patricia G. W orth, Acti ve R etire d Judge of the District Co urt.

2 promulg ated R ule 8(B) of the R ul es for the C ommittee on Judi cial Conduct and fo r Judicia l Dis ciplina ry P ro ceeding s, s etting forth th e procedur e for disc iplin ary proceed i ngs wh e n th e Supr eme Judicial Cour t r ecei ves a r eport concerning the conduct of one of its own j ustice s. The R u le r eq uires th at such matters be hear d by a panel composed of jurists fr om the Superior and D istrict Court s. On June 27, 2025, Chief Justice R obert Mullen of the Superior Court and Chief Judge Bren t Da vis of the Dis trict C ourt en tered an order select ing a ju r i st to serve as the “hear ing of�icer” and �iv e jurists to serv e as the panel to d eci de the ma tter. See M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Pr ocs. 8(B). [¶2 ] The parties — the Committee on Judicial Conduct an d Justice Connors — submitted a joint sta tement of fac ts. A s a resu l t, t here is no hearing of�icer report. The parties submitt ed briefs an d the matter w as submitted to the P anel f or consider at ion. On De c emb er 15, 2025, t he P an el heard the parties’ or al arguments. I. BAC KGROU N D [¶3 ] The fo llowing facts ar e dr awn from the parties’ joint statement of fa cts and the other mater ials in the st ipula te d reco rd. Cather ine Connors pr acticed law f or thir ty - fou r years at the �irm of Pierce A t woo d befo re becoming an Associate Justice of the Maine Supre me Judicial Court in earl y 2020. S he primaril y pra c ticed as an ap p ellate at torne y and repr esented clients in man y

3 areas of the law. T hese clients i ncluded bank s and banking inter est s, including t he Maine Bank ers Association (Maine Bank ers) and the National Mortgage Bankers Association. At the ti me o f h er con�irmat ion hearing, Attorney Connors had written and ar gu ed more th an one hundr ed appeals, mainl y before the Main e Sup re me J udicial Cour t sitting as the L aw Co urt. Attorney Connors nev er litigated a f oreclosur e c ase at t he trial lev el. [¶4 ] Befo re her appointment to the Supr eme Judicial Court, in the case of Pushard v. B ank of Am erica, N.A., 2 017 ME 2 30, 175 A.3d 103, w hich w as a for eclosure appeal befor e the Law Court, Attorne y Connors and A ttorney John J. Aro m a ndo wrot e, si gned, and �iled a brief dated Sep tember 14, 2016, on behalf of the lender and appellee Bank of America, N.A. On December 12, 2017, the L aw Co urt dec ided the P ushard appeal, v acatin g the tria l court’s j udgme nt in the Bank’s fa vor and remanding for j udg ment in f av or of the Pushards, the homeowners, due t o the bank’s f ailure to meet statutory noti ce requir ements. [¶5 ] Also befo re her appointment to the Su preme J udicial Court, in the for eclosure appeal F ederal Nationa l Mortgage Ass ’ n v. Desc haine, 2017 ME 190, 170 A.3d 230, A ttorney Connors and A ttorney Arom a ndo wrot e, signed, and � i l e d a n am i c u s cu r i ae br ief wi th the La w Court on beha lf of Main e B ankers and the National Mortg ag e Banker s Association. In De scha ine, on September 7, 2017, the Law Cou rt held that res j udicata principles barr ed a mortg age

4 company f rom bringing a second f oreclosure a c tion aga inst a mortgago r inv olv ing the same pr operty and based on the same not e and mortgage. [¶6 ] After her appointment to the S upreme Judicial Court, Ju stice Connors sat on the appeal of Finch v. U.S. Bank, N. A., 2024 M E 2, 307 A.3d 1049, which in vol ved Maine fore closure la w and cal led for the Law Court to re conside r the res judica ta issues that had pr eviousl y been decided in Deschai ne and Pushard, i.e., whether a note and mortgage wer e discharged in full b y a for eclosure judgment for a mortgagor follo wing a �inding that the mortgagee failed to g i ve the mor tgagor statutor ily eff ect i v e notice of default and r ig ht to cu re. On June 6, 20 22, Justice Connors part icipated in or al arguments on t h e Finch appeal. Also pend in g bef ore the La w Court a t that tim e w as the appeal o f J.P. Morg an Ch ase Ac quisition Gro up v. Moulto n, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134, whi ch consid er ed w hether a defecti ve notice of default and right to cu re re sulted in the disch arge i n fu ll o f th e note and mor tgage, i.e., the sam e issue as in Desch aine. In A ugust 2022, the La w Court inv ited amic us briefs i n Moulton and requeste d that counsel �il e supplemental b rie fs in Fin ch. [¶7 ] On September 27, 2022, Mai ne Bankers �i led an amicus brief in Moulton. [¶8 ] On September 30, 2022, Justice Co nnors wrote to the Judicial Ethics Ad visory Committee (Ad visory Committee) asking if she s h ould r ecuse herself

5 from par ticipation in the Fin ch and Moulton appeals. In her i nquiry, she noted that Maine Bank ers had �iled an amic us brief in M ou lt on and that she had pre viousl y �iled an amicus brief on behalf of Maine Bank ers in De schaine. In h er inqu iry to the A dv iso ry Com mittee, Just ice Conno rs sta ted that she beca me a Just ice o f the Ma ine Supr eme Jud icial Co urt in 2 020 and tha t al thoug h she did not think tha t she w as ethi call y r equir ed t o do so, s he had recus ed her self fr om eve ry mortgage for ecl osur e appeal for tw o y ears. On Oc tober 4, 2022, the Ad visory Commit tee informed Justice Connors that it did n ot belie ve that s he needed to r ecuse herself f r om the F inch and M oulton appeals, statin g that th e t wo pending cases befor e th e Law Court (Fin ch and Moulton) wer e “totally” separ ate from the Deschain e and Push ard matters d eci ded �i ve y ears earlier. [¶9 ] On No vember 1, 2 0 22, Justice C onnors participated in the or al argument i n M ou lton a nd conti nued to sit on F inch. In Finc h, Ju stice Connors voted with a 4 - 3 majority in the bank’s fa vor, ov ertu rning the Pushard an d Desc haine decisions. At no time during the pendency of the Finc h a nd Moulton cases did any par ty, litigant, or participant object to Justice Connors’s participation or �ile a motion for Justice Connors’s disquali�ication or r ecusal. [¶10 ] On January 1 8, 2024, after the Co urt publ ished the Fin ch dec ision, A ttor ne y T homas Co x wro te to the Co mmitt ee on J udicial Conduc t alle ging tha t Justice Connors had violated Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct b y

6 failing to r ecuse herself fr om t he Finc h and M oulton appeals. See M.R. Comm. Ju d. C ondu ct & Jud. Di sc. Procs. 1(A) (provi d ing fo r w ritten compla ints of judic ial misco nduct). [¶11 ] The Committee wr ote to J u stice Connors an d ask ed wh y she did not recuse herself from the Finch a nd M oulton appeals. Justic e Connors responded to the Committ ee, and th en the Committee asked furth er questions relating to Justice Connors’s January 2020 testimon y bef ore the l egis lati ve c ommittee the n considering her nominati on to the Court. Justice C onnors replied fr om memory without ha ving the tr ansc ript or audio r ec ordin g of her testimon y av ai lable to her. After ev aluating Justice Connors's response to t he Co mmittee’s questions, her e - m ail e xcha nge wi th the A dv isor y Comm ittee, and her testimon y at her j udici al c on �irmation h e aring, and examining Ru le 2.11(A), the Committee f ound that Justice Connor s had violated Can on 2, R ul e 2.11(A). The Committee �iled a report with the Court, which determined that it w as not clear that the fa c tual assertions and l egal conclusions in the report wer e those of the Committee and tha t the report conta ined no re comme ndation t hat the Court take any par t icular dis ciplin ary action. The Court r emanded the matter to the Committee, which �iled a second report in whi ch it recommended that Justic e Connors should recei ve a public r epri mand for cr eating and maintaini ng the appear ance of impr opri ety.

7 II. AN AL YSIS A. Leg al Standar d [¶12 ] The Comm ittee on Judicial Conduct bears the bur den of pro ving by a prepon der ance of the e vidence that Justice Connors violat ed R ule 2.11(A) as the Committee has alleged in its report. See M.R. C omm. Jud. Co nduc t & Ju d. Disc. Pr ocs. 8. 1 [¶13 ] The Comm ittee arg ues that Justice Connors violate d R ul e 2.11(A) of the Code by par ticipat ing in pr oceed ings in w hich her impar tialit y mig ht reasonabl y be questioned. Ru le 2.11(A) is found within Canon 2 of the Code. Canon 2 pro vides that “[a] ju dge shall perform t he duties of ju dicial of �ice impartially, c ompete nt l y, and diligentl y. ” R ule 2.11(A) pro vides: (A) A judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in an y proceedings in w h ich the judge’s impartiality might r easonabl y be questioned, including but not l imited t o the following circumst ances: 1 The Com mittee h as e mpha size d thr ougho ut its arg ument that J ustice C onnor s's answ ers t o questions rai sed at her con�irmation hearing befor e the Legislature 's Joint S tanding Committee on Judiciary suppo rts its contenti on that she violated R ule 2.11(A) b y not rec usi ng f rom the Finch and Moulton cases. The P anel ha s exa mined J ustice Connor s's t estimon y bef or e the Judiciary Com m ittee an d notes that at least one l eg islator ask ed her questions r elating to pot ential recus al issues with r espect to her r epr esentation of banking int erests and mort gage for eclosur e case s. In Maine, state judicial of� icers fun c tion unde r two separ ate sy s t ems of ac countab i lity: (1) th e lim i t e d t e n u r e o f j u d i ci al o f � i c e r s u n d e r A rt. V I, S e c. 4 of t h e M a i n e C o n st it u ti o n, c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e appointment pr ocess in Art. V, Sec. 8; and (2) the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct. This P anel's foc us is on the latter. The f act t hat memb ers of the Le gisl ature, in fu l�ill ing their re sponsib ilities under A rt. V, Sec. 8, explor ed issue s of potential r ecusal for Just i ce Connor s in future f oreclo s ur e cases does not res olv e the questi on of wheth er her inv olv ement in the Finch and M oul to n cases con stit uted a violation of R ule 2.11(A).

8 (1) Th e j udge has a personal bias or pr ejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawy er, or th e judge h as personal knowledge of facts that a re in dis pute in the pr oceedin g whe n the personal know ledge that wo uld for m the basis for disqu ali�ica tion has been ga ined outside the reg ular cour se of present or pri or judicial pr oceedings. (2) The judge kno ws that the judge, indi vidua lly o r a s a �idu ciary, the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, a person within the th ir d degr ee of relationship t o eith er of them, or an y other member of the j udge’ s f amil y r esiding in the ju dge’ s household (a) Is a party to t he proceeding, or an of�icer, direct or, gener al partner, managing member, or trust ee of a party; (b) Is act ing as a l awy er in the pr ocee ding; (c) Is a person who has mor e than a de minimis in tere st that could b e subs tantiall y a ffect ed b y the proceeding; or (d) Is likel y to be a material witness in the pro c eeding. (3) The judge, while a judge or a judici al candidate, h as made a public statement, other than in a court pro c eeding, judicial decis ion, jud icial op inion, or j udicial ad ministr ati ve m atte r, that commits or ap pears to commit th e judg e to reach a particular result or rule in a particular w ay in t h e procee ding or controv ers y. (4) Th e jud ge (a) Served as a la w y er i n the matter in contr over sy, or wa s associated with a la wyer w ho participated substantial l y as a la wyer in the matter duri ng such ass ociatio n;

9 (b) Serv ed in gov ernment emp loyment, and in such capacity participated pers onally an d substantiall y as a lawy er or public of�icial concerning the proceeding or has publicly expres sed in such capacity an opinion concer ning t he m er it of the pa rticul ar ma tter in controv ersy; or (c) W as a ma terial witness concerning the matter. M. Code Jud. Condu ct R. 2.11(A)(1) - (4). [¶14 ] T o determine whether a justice ha s vi olated R ule 2.11(A), we must appl y an obje c tiv e re asonableness test that asks whe ther a re asonabl e observ er of the judicial pro ceeding pres i ded o ver b y t he subject justice, inf ormed of all of the surro unding facts and cir cu mstances, w ou ld ha ve r easonable doubts as to the s ubje ct just ice’s im partiali ty in t hat procee ding. S ee M. Code Jud. Conduct Pr eamble; M. Code Jud. Cond uct R. 2.11(A); M. Co de J ud. Cond uct R. 2.11 advisory notes t o 2015 amend.; see al so A l lphi n v. United States, 758 F.3d 1336, 1343 - 44 (F ed. Cir. 201 4); Uni ted F arm W orkers of Am., AFL - CIO v. Super. C t., 216 Ca l. R p t r. 4, 9 - 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 19 85); Microsoft Corp. v. United St a tes, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2 000); Chen ey v. U.S. Dist. C t., 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004). Th e reasonable observe r is rega rded as a “thoughtful observ er rather than . . . a h y persensiti ve or u nduly suspic i ous person. ” In re S herwin Willi ams Co., 607 F.3d 474, 4 78 (7th Cir. 201 0).

10 [¶15 ] R ule 2.11(A) req u ires j u stices to r ecuse in matters where their parti cipation might reaso nabl y cre at e a ques tion as t o the ir impa rtiali ty. Howe ver, where there is “no reasonable basi s for recusal, a judge is obl iged not to rec use[.]” M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 a dv i sory notes to 2015 amend. The Code requ ires a justice to “hear and decide matters e xcept when disqu ali�ica tion or recus al is req uire d, ” M. Code Jud. Condu ct R. 2. 7, an d caution s that “a judge w ho dis quali�ies hims elf o r herself f or no reason other than an unfounded and meritless claim of partiality, has abused the judge’s discre tion. ” M. Code Jud. C onduct R. 2.1 1 ad visory notes to 2015 amend. (quoting In re Mich ael M., 20 00 ME 20 4, ¶ 15, 761 A.2d 865). [¶16 ] Ther e is also a presumption t hat judges will ful�ill their duty of impar tiality f aithf ull y. Bond v. Bond, 127 M e. 117, 141 A. 833, 836 (1 928) (“Our gov ernment is a ‘go vernment of laws and not of men. ’ In addition to t heir lega l learning, judges are pr esumably selecte d because of their ability to la y asid e personal prejudi ces and to hold the scales of justice ev enly. The pres umption is that t hey w ill do s o. ”); Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 928 (2024) (“Th e people must hav e con� iden ce in the in tegrity of the Jus tices, and tha t cann ot e xist in a s yst em t hat assumes them to be corruptible b y the slightes t friendship or f avor, and in an atmosphere w here the press will be eager to � i nd fo ot - fa ults. ”); Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc., v. C efes jian, 783 F. Supp. 2 d 78, 91 (D.D.C. 2011) (“ A

11 reasonable observ er must assume that judges ar e ordinaril y capable of setting aside their own interes t and adhering to their sworn duties to ‘f aithfully and impartially d i scharge and per form al l the duties’ incumbent upon them. ”) B. Justic e Conn ors d id n o t v iolate R u le 2.11(A) b y s itti ng on the Finch and Moulton a ppe als [¶17 ] A complaint about a judge’s impartiality must be carefull y re viewed when the complaint is �iled after the case in question has been decided. See Samara M em’l Trust v. K ell y, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 M E 107, ¶¶ 25 - 27, 102 A. 3d 757. In this case, t h e complaint w as �iled by an adv ocate for housing issues and w as �iled only after Finch had been decided. The compl aina nt w as a f� iliated with an e ntity ent itled “M aine Att orney s S avin g Homes, ” and he had �iled an amicus curi a e brie f on be half of that en tity in Des chaine. The possibility of Fin ch and/or M oulton changin g the la w in Ma ine w as well known to the bar; the La w C ourt ask ed for amic us brie�ing in M ou lton and supplemental brie�ing in Finc h. [¶18 ] N one of the attorne ys in Fin ch or M oulton, and none of the lawy ers who �iled amic us br iefs in Moulton, r aised any issue about Justice Connors ’s impartiality. 2 2 In fa ct, there w ere se ver al attorne ys who appeared in Pusha rd and/or D escha ine who were a l so invo lved i n F inch and/or Moulton: Cl if ford a nd G old en (Pushard and Fi nch), the National Consumer Law Center (De schai ne thr ough L. Scott Goul d and Moulton throug h Andre a Bopp Stark), Doonan Law Of�ice (De sch aine and Mo ulto n), Fr ank D’ Ale ssandr o for Pine T ree Leg al Assi stance in Desch aine an d

12 [¶19 ] As noted abo ve, t he oper at i ve portion of R ule 2.11(A) pro vi des: “ A judge shall disqualify or r ecuse himself or herself in an y pr oceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonabl y be questioned” and th en speci� ies four e xamples of circumstances in w hich a judge’s impartiality migh t reasonabl y be questioned. There has been no suggestion by the Committ ee that Justice Connors had an y personal bi ases or pr eju dices concerning an y of the parties in F inch a nd Moulton or their attorne ys; nor does the e v idence support an y such �ind ing. Nor has ther e been an y sugg est ion that the Fin ch o r M oulton appeals inv ol ved an yone li ving in Justice C onnors ’s ho usehol d or wit hin a thir d degree of relation to her or her spous e. Nor does th is case inv olv e Justice Connors ’s making an y public statements that committed or a ppeared t o c ommit her to rule a c ertain w ay in the p ro ceedings. Upon r eview, it is readil y apparen t that the e viden ce in the stip ulat ed re co rd does not imp licate an y of the �irs t thr ee cir cums tances e xplicitl y ide nti� ied by R ule 2.1 1(A). The fo u rth special circumstance l isted in R ule 2.11(A), r equiring r ecusal when the judge “ser ved as a law yer in th e matter i n contro vers y, ” requir es more e x planation. [¶ 20 ] It is clear that Justice Connors did not participate in the trial court proceedings in Finc h o r Mou lton. While Justice Connors wrote and �iled a brief for Main e E qual Just ice in M oult on, and P ine T re e Legal A ssistance thr ough D’ Alessandr o i n Desch ai ne and Pine T ree Leg al Assistance thr oug h Jonathan Selk owitz in Moult on. None of these attorne ys or any oth er attorney s raised an y issues reg arding Jus ti ce Connor s ’s sitti ng on Fi nch and/or Moult on.

13 on behalf of appellee Bank of America, N.A. in Pus hard and wro te and �iled an amicus cu riae brief on behalf of Ma ine Bankers in De sch aine, De s chaine and Pusha rd w ere not the “ma tters in con tro vers y ” in Finch o r Moulton w ithi n the meaning of R ule 2.11(A)(4)(a). The matters in controv ersy in Pu sha rd, De s c haine, Finch, and Moulton al l concerned diffe rent prope rties and diffe ren t parties. 3 Each of the d efendants — Pushar d, Finch, Moulton, and Deschaine — had a separate agreement with a di f feren t p laintiff that he ld the mor tgag e on a separ ate piece of property. Maine Bank ers was not a party to an y of the abo ve litig ation a nd had no int er es t in the Lin coln, Wa l e s, Durh am, or Buck�ield real estate at issue in tho se matt ers. Rat her, Maine Bankers �iled an amicus brief in the Moulton cas e o n a subs tantia ll y sim ilar leg al iss ue t o tha t w hich then - A ttorney Connors had argue d for Bank of America in the Pus hard case and for Maine B ankers in an amicus brief i n Descha ine. 4 While the legal issues are substantially s imilar, the matters in contr ov ersy ar e not. [¶2 1] Moreo ver, the re c ord s hows t hat Justice Connors w as aw are of he r obligations under R ule 2.11(A) and made eff orts to addres s a possible question 3 The co ntroversy and issue in Push ard v. Bank of Am erica, N.A., 2017 ME 230, ¶ 1, 175 A.3d 103, relat ed to pr operty located in W ales. The co ntroversy and issu e in Fe d e ral Nat io nal M ortg ag e Ass oc iat io n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, 1 70 A.3d 230, rel ated to pr operty in Linc oln. On the other hand, the contro versy and issue in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, 30 7 A.3d 1049, r elated to property in D urh am, and t he co ntrov ersy and issu e i n J.P. M organ Mortgage Ac quisit ion Corp. v. Moult on, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134, relat ed to pr operty in Buck�iel d. 4 Maine Bank ers’ amicus b rief in Deschai ne is not in the r ecord bef ore the P anel.

14 about her impartiality b y seeking inp ut from the Ad visory Committee on Judic ial Eth ics (A dvi sory Co mmi tte e). Justice Connors’s request to the A dv i sory Committee reg arding the Moulton and Finc h mat ter s ide nti�ied the most important underl ying circ u mstances and ask ed whether she had a duty u nd e r Rule 2.11 to recuse herself from t he matters. The Ad v isory Co mmittee responded that it unanimously belie ved that r ecusal was not necessary in either case. [¶ 22 ] Ther e is no question that Justice C onnors did not viol ate any of t he four en umerat ed cir cumstances set for th in R ule 2.11(A), an d the Committee has n ot claim ed othe rwise. Ra ther, the Committee argues that Justice Connors’ s conduct violated the gener al catchall pr ovision in R u le 2.11(A): that based on the t otali ty of the c ir cumstanc es, Finch and Mou lt on wer e proceedings i n w hich Justice Connors’s impartiality might reasonabl y be questioned. See M. Co de Ju d. Conduct R. 2.11(A). [¶ 23 ] W e ar e not persuaded b y the Committee’s gener al contention that a reasonable observ er might question w hether Justice Connors w as biased or prejudiced in f av or of banking inter ests because of her pre v ious adv ocacy for bank ing inte res ts an d ad voca cy fo r tho se inte rests in De s chaine and Pusha rd. [¶ 24 ] When R ule 2.11(A) w as written, the dr afters clearl y had four circumstances i n mind w hen a judge’s impartiality might r easonably be

15 questioned. The dr afters did not identify the cir cumstance of a prior client coming befor e a jud ge as requiring recus al — other than in the same matter in controv ersy. A judge must r ecuse only i f the judge serv ed as a lawy er for a client “in t he matter in c ontro versy. ” Ru le 2.11(A)(4)(a). By no t expli citl y r equir ing recusal of a judge w hen the judge serv ed as a la wyer on an y matter for that clien t, but carv ing out the cir cums tances of t he j udge hav ing se rv ed as a la wyer for the client in “the matter in contro vers y ” as req uiring r ecusal, it is cle ar tha t the r ule does not re qu ire recusal when the judge w as a la wyer for a client on some other case. See gen erally Musk v. Nelso n, 647 A.2d 11 98, 1201 (Me. 19 94) (“[A] we ll - settled rule of statutory int erpr etation states that e x press ment ion of one concept implies the e x clusion of others n ot listed. ”); W esc ott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 169 (Me. 1979) (“T he maxim — expr essio uni us est ex c lusio alterius — is w el l re cogni zed in Maine as in other sta tes. It is a hand y tool to be used a t time s in asc er tainin g the in tentio n of the lawm ak ing b od y. ”) There is no suggestion that Justice Connors possessed any con�idential information as a result of r epresen ting Maine Bank ers that she used i n deciding Finch or Moulton, and tha t is logi cal gi ven that M aine Ba nk ers did no t hav e an y interest in an y of the real estate in vol ved in Finch or M oulton. [¶ 25 ] Nor d id the dr afters of R u le 2.11(A) i dentify as a c ircum stan ce requiring rec u sal a ju dg e ’s h a ving pre viously litig ated a particular legal issue a s

16 an attorney. Moreo ver, case la w from other juris dictions is clear t hat a la wy er’s adv ocacy for a c lient on particular issues does not r equire r ecusal on those issues if the la w yer bec omes a judge. See Hoke Cnty. Bd. O f Educ. v. Sta te, 896 S.E.2d 72 0, 723 (N.C. 2022) (colle cting cases). Moreov er, the El ev e nth Circuit Court of Appeals has remark ed, “C ourts ha ve u nifor ml y r ejected t he notion that a judge’s prev i ous ad vocacy f or a legal, constitutional, or policy position is a bar to adjudicating a case, eve n when that po sition is dir ectl y impl icat ed in the ca se befor e th e court. ” C arter v. W. P ub. Co., 1999 WL 994997, at *9 (1 1th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999) (citing numer ous cases). The Comm ittee has not submitted an y case la w to the contrary. [¶ 26 ] The dr afters of R ul e 2.11(A) could easil y ha ve included the circumst ance s of (1) a prior client appe aring befo re a jud ge on an y matter or (2) a lega l issue the judge previousl y litigated com i ng bef ore the judge as speci�ic ex amples r eq uiring the judge to recuse, but di d not. Th es e cir cumstan ces do n ot r equir e r ecusal. [¶ 27 ] A r easonably w ell - informed observ er would understand that law �irms repr esent a var iety of clients and that lawy ers ad vocat e for clients ev en whe n their clie nts’ belief s or inter ests co n�lic t with the law yer s ’ own personal beliefs or inter ests. See Ph ilip Morris USA Inc. v. U nited States F ood & Drug Admin., 156 F. Supp. 3d 36 (D.D.C. 2016). A reasonabl y well - in formed observ er

17 would also recogn ize that the posi tions f or whi ch a la wyer ad voca tes w h en repr esenting c lients do not ne c essaril y r e�lect t he lawy er’s own p ersonal bel i efs. No reasonable person, f or instance, would think that because a lawy er has repr esented def endants in criminal cases that the la wye r fa vors b reaking the la w. P hilip Morris U SA Inc. v. United States F ood & D rug Admin., 156 F. Supp. 3d 36, 5 0 (D. D.C. 2016). The same is true here — it is not r easonable for a wel l - informed person to question Justice Connors’ s impar tiality in Finc h a nd Moulto n merel y because she adv ocated f or particular banking i nter ests in for eclosure cases in her pr evious wo rk as a la wyer. [¶ 28 ] Clearl y there was a similarity bet ween th e lega l i ssues in Pushar d and Descha ine and the legal issues in Finch and M oulton. However, bec au se (1) a judge is not requi red to recuse in ma tters in vol v ing prior clients unless the repr esentation was on t he same “matter i n contro ver sy, ” and (2) a jud g e is not requir ed to recuse in matters in vol ving prior legal issues she litiga ted, a well - informed p erson should n ot believ e that the judge’s impartiality mig ht reasonabl y be questioned on either of these tw o bases. A w el l - i nformed observ er is a person w h o believ es that, gener ally, ju dges follo w th eir obliga tion to perform their duties impartiall y. A we ll - informed person could not reasonabl y question a judge’s impartiality when she is f ollowing the law w hich does not require h er recusal. While a person mig ht reas onabl y question

18 whether the la w is appropria te, a wel l - informed r easonable person must accept the l aw w hen d eter mining whet her a ju dge has commit ted an ethica l viola tion. When a judge f ollows the la w on recusal, she cannot be found to ha ve committed an ethical violation. [¶ 29 ] F or all of the above r easons, we �in d th at the Committee f ailed to meet its bur den of pr oof and therefor e dismiss the R eport. The ent ry is: Report d ism i ssed. RAIMON DI, A.R.J., and W ORTH, A.R.J., concu rring [¶30] Alth ough we agree w ith the Panel that the report should be dismissed, we c onclude th at Justi ce Conno rs vi o lat ed the Code of Judicial Cond uct. I. BA CK GROUND [¶ 31 ] W e agree with the Panel’s d escription of the backgr ound, wit h changes for the p urposes of this discussion set out below. [¶ 32 ] Be fore join ing the Ma ine Supr eme Judic ial Court in 2020, Catherin e Connors pr ac ticed law for t hirty - fou r year s with Pierce A twood. In 20 16, she and an associate la wyer wrote, signed, and �iled a brief on behalf of appellee

19 Bank of Americ a in Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 201 7 ME 2 30, 175 A.3d 103. I n 2017, the Maine Sup reme Judicial Court, sit ting as the L aw Co urt, v ac ated the trial co urt’s judgment in fa v or of Bank of America and r emanded for judgment in fa vor of the homeowner, Pushard. [¶ 33 ] During that same t ime, Attorne y Connors represented am ic us participants the Maine Bank ers Association and the National Mort gage Bank ers Asso ciation in F ederal Nati onal M ortgag e Ass ’ n v. Desch aine, 2017 ME 190, 170 A.3d 230. She an d an associate wr ote, signed, an d �ile d an a mici curia e brief on behalf of those ass ociatio ns. In 2017, the Law Cou rt ru le d i n favor o f th e homeowner and against th e mortgag ee. [¶ 34 ] In 2020, Attorney Connors w as nominated to the Maine Supr eme Judicial Court to serv e as an associate justice. Dur ing her con �irmation hearin g befor e th e Legislatur e’s Joi nt Standing Comm ittee on the Judiciary, statements by legislators and questions ask ed of her made it clear tha t some legislators — reasonable, w el l - informed persons — we re concerned about the appear ance of impropr iety were sh e, once con�irmed, to participate in cases in her a reas of expe rtise. S he sa id to the Com mit tee that “ [t] hen as to cl ient, clie nts of P ier ce Atw ood, any P ierce A twood case that co mes, I believ e it’s appr opriate t o r ecuse m yself ” for the ter m of se ven y ears. She said that “w hen the re ’s an y doubt” she would “def er on the side of recusal. ” She also said t hat “if it’s somebody who

20 w as once (her) client, ” there wou l d be a recusal for a signi�icant period of time. She made ref erence to r epresenting par ties on amic us briefs in f oreclosure litig ation appeals and s ai d, “S o I’d pr obabl y be recused fr om, well, certainl y from t hose particular clients. ” T ran script of Con�irmat ion Hearing of Catherine R. Connors, Esq., Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary 31 - 36 (Jan. 30, 2020), availabl e a t https://perma. cc/6YN9 - Q LDS. [¶ 35 ] Attorney Co nnors was c on�irmed to the Maine Supreme Judic ial Court i n, and has serv ed si nce, 2020. She retains a �inancia l i nte rest i n a n unknown a mount in h er former �irm, Pierce Atwood. Pi erce Atwood is an af�iliate member of t he Maine Bank ers Association, Justice Connors’s former clien t. [¶ 36 ] The foreclosu re case of Finch v. U.S. B ank, N.A., 202 4 ME 2, 30 7 A.3d 1049, c alled for the Law Cour t t o r econ sider t he re s jud icata iss ue decid ed in Desc haine and Pusha rd: w hether a note and m ortga ge we re discha rged in f ull by a fore closure judgment for a mortg agor following a �inding that th e mortgagee fa i led to gi ve the mortgagor the statuto rily re quired notice of defa u lt and rig ht to cure. In June 2022, Justice C onnors participated in or al arguments on F inch. Th e c as e of Morg an Chase Ac quisition Group v. Moul ton, 202 4 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134, bef or e the Court at about the same t ime as Finch, called for the Court to cons ider whether a d efe ctiv e notice of def ault and rig ht t o cu re res u lted

21 in the full discharge of a note and mor tgage, the same issue as in Desc haine. I n A ugust 202 2, the La w Court in vit ed am icus br i efs in Moulton and requested t hat the a tto rne ys in Finc h �i le supplemen t al bri efs. Th e Maine Bank ers Association, repr esented by new counsel, �iled an amicus brief in Mo ulton. [¶ 37 ] In Septem ber 2022, Justice Connors wrot e to the Ad visory Committee on Judicial Et hics asking for its inf ormal opinion about w hether she should recuse herself fr om participation in F inch and Mou l ton. Sh e dire cted the Ad visory Committee’s attent i on to the pr ovision in R ule 2.11 mandati ng r ecusal when “the judge ser ved as a la wyer in the matter in contro ver sy.” In response, in October 2022, the Ad visory Committe e gav e its opinion that she did not need to re c use herself fro m th e Finch and Moulton appea ls based on its conclusion that the two pendi ng cases we re sepa r ate from the De sch aine and Pushard matters decided �i ve years earlier. [¶ 38 ] In Nov ember 2022, Justice Connor s participated in or al argument in the Moulton appeal and con tinue d t o sit on bo th the Finc h an d Moulto n appeals. On January 11, 2024, the L aw Court is sue d its de cision in Fin ch. Ju stic e Connors vo ted with a 4 - 3 majorit y in the bank’s fa vor, ov erturning Pusha rd an d Desc haine. 5 5 No pa rty or pa rticip ant i n Finch and Moulton filed a motion for Justice Connors’s disqualification or recusal.

22 [¶ 39 ] On January 18, 2024, Attorne y Thomas Cox wro te to the Committee on Judicial Conduct alleging that Justice Connors v i olated R ule 2.11(A) of t he Code of Judicial Con du ct b y failing to r ecuse herself fr om the Finc h appeal a nd b y contin uing her in vol v emen t in the compa nion appeal in Moult on, de c ided b y the La w Court on Ja nuary 3 0, 2024. [¶ 40 ] In response t o A t torne y C o x’ s complaint, the Committe e on Judicial Conduct wro te to Justice Connor s asking wh y she did not r ec use herself fr om the F inch and Moulton cases. After J ustice Connors’s initial and subsequent response, the Com mi ttee on Judicial Conduct fo u nd that Justice Connors violat ed Can on 2, R ule 2.11 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The C ommi tte e on Judic ial Conduct th en sub mitted a report to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Court reman ded the matter back to the Committee be cause th e report did not make clear whether �indings and conclusions in the report were those of the Committee and di d not mak e a recommendation on the discipline to be imposed. The C ommittee � iled an “ Amended R eport, ” whi ch the E xe cuti v e Cl erk o f th e Cou rt forward ed to th e Chie f Justi ce of the Su perior Court a nd the Chie f Judge o f the Distr ict Cour t pursuant to M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduc t & Jud.

23 Disc. Pr ocs. 8 (B). T he Chief Justice of the Superior Court and Chief Judge of the Distr ict Cour t selec ted the Pan el. II. DISCUS SION A. Violati on of Rule 2.11(A) [¶4 1] The C ommitt ee bears the burden of provin g by a prep onderance of the e vidence that J ustice C onno rs viola ted R ule 2.11 (A). [¶ 42 ] The Comm i ttee ar gues that Justice Connors violate d Rule 2.11(A) of the Code by par ticipat ing in pr oceed ings in w hich her impar tialit y mig ht reasonabl y be questioned. T h e oper ativ e portion of t he rule pro vides tha t “a judge shall disqualify or r ecuse himself or herself in an y pr oceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasona bl y be questioned ” (emphasis added). The R ule’s use of the w ord “migh t” sets a low standar d. [¶ 43 ] R ule 2.11(A) prov ides that four speci�ic circumstances require recusal. The Committ ee does not allege, nor does the evidence support, t ha t an y of the fo ur speci�ic cir cumstan ces set out in R ule 2.11(A) wer e present. [¶ 44 ] I n a s k i n g w h e t h e r a j u d i c i a l o f � i c e r h a s v i o l a t e d R u l e 2. 1 1 (A), t h e ex aminer must appl y an objectiv e re asonableness test, asking whether a reasonable o bserver of the judicial pro ceeding, informed of all the surrounding facts and c ircumst ances, would h av e r easonabl e doubts as to the jud icial of� icer’s impart iality. As the P anel has pointed out, Panel’s Opinion ¶ 14, t he

24 reasonable observe r is rega rded as a “thoughtful observ er rather than . . . a h y persensiti ve or u nduly suspic i ous person. ” In re S herwin Williams C o., 607 F.3d 474, 4 78 (7th Cir. 201 0). [¶ 45 ] Neverth el ess, the evidence demonstr ates that Justice Connors’s conduct violated the gener al catchall pr ovision: based on t he totality of the circumst ances, Fin ch and Moulton w ere proceedings in which Justice Connors’s impartiality might r easonably be q uestioned. [¶ 46 ] The e vidence is str aightforw ard. A r easonable observer might question whether J u stice Connors w as biased in fa vor of banking inter ests because of her pre viou s ad vo c acy for banki ng interests and speci �ic adv ocacy for those interes ts in Descha ine a nd Pu sha rd, in light of the pa rticip ation of her former client, the Mai ne Bankers Associati on, i n which h er former �i rm maintains a membership. [¶ 47 ] It is corre ct that, as t he P anel has noted, a reas onabl y well - informed observer would understand that lawy ers and law �irms repr esent a v ariet y of clients an d ad vocate f or clients e ven w hen their clients’ beliefs or inte rests con� lict with their own perso nal belief s or inte rest s. P anel’s Opi nion ¶ 27. The P an el ha s also co rr ectl y poin ted out that cas e la w ad vises t hat a lawy er’s ad voca cy fo r a client on an issue does not m andate recusal on that issue if the la wyer be comes a judge. Panel’s O pi nion ¶ 25.

25 [¶ 48 ] The f acts her e, ho we ver, she d a dif fe re nt lig ht on w hat a n ord inary, reasonable person mi ght per c ei ve. [¶ 49 ] As a partner at P i erce A twood, then - A t torney Con nors wro te, signed, and �iled a brief before the L aw Court on behalf of Bank of America in the Pusha rd case and wrote, signed, and �iled an amicus b r ief b efo re t he Cou rt on behalf of the Mai ne Bankers Association in Deschain e. [¶ 50 ] Justi ce Connors knew from h er con�irmati on h earing t hat reasonable persons wer e concerned a bout the appear ance of impropr iety should she participat e in appeals implicating her ar eas of e xpertise and her former clients. [¶5 1] Once the Maine Bank ers Association �iled i ts amicus br ief in Moulton, a reasonable observ er might h av e reasonabl y question ed the j ustice ’s impartiality. 6 Finch an d Moulton implicat ed one key d ispute: w h ether the 2017 Pusha rd a nd Desch aine decisions should be o verturned. See n in this lig ht, the 6 Indeed, so me of the argument s that the Ma ine Ban kers A ssociat ion r aised in it s amicus b rief in Moult on are substant ially the same ar guments that Justi ce Connors r aised on behalf of the Assoc iation in De scha ine. Compare Ami ci Brie f of t he Main e Ban kers A ss ’n and t he Natl Mortg. Bankers Ass ’n at 19 - 22, F ederal Natio nal Mortgage Associat ion v. Desc haine, 2017 ME 190, 170 A.3d 230 (No. P en - 16 - 316) (argui ng that barring a se c ond f oreclo s ur e action bas ed on subsequent defaults i s bad publ ic policy and would be unf ai r), with Brief of A micus Curia e Maine Bankers As s ociation at 17 - 21, J. P. Morg an A cquisi tion C orp. v. Moulton, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 1 34 (No. O xf - 21 - 412) (arguing that barring a second foreclosure action bas ed on subseque nt defaults is bad publi c polic y and would be un fai r). In such a situ ation, confr ont ed with her o wn ar gument s and ask ed t o vot e fo r the po sition fa voring the leg al inte rest s she ad vocated f or as a priv ate attorne y, a reasonable p erson might doub t whether Ju s tice Conn ors w ould be able to anal yze the Mou l ton app eal impartiall y.

26 fa ct that a l aw yer w ho had r epr esent ed the losing s ide in P ushard and who had argued f or the Maine Bank ers Association in its amicu s brief in D eschain e wa s now sitt ing as a justi ce on the Finch and Moulto n appeals migh t cause a reasonable person t o question that justice’s impartiality. [¶ 52 ] In sum, we conclude that Justice Connors violated R ule 2.11(A) by parti cipatin g in the Finch and Mou lton appeals, proceedin gs in which her impartiality might r easonably be q uestioned. B. Disciplin ary a cti on [¶ 53 ] Rule 8 (C)(iii) o f t he Rules for the Committee on Judic ial Conduct and for J u dicial Disciplinary Pr oceedings prov i d e s: (iii) If the panel concludes tha t no violation of the Code has been pro ved b y a prep onderance of the e v idence, or that the violation is not of a suf�icientl y serious nature as to warr ant formal disciplinary action, the panel shall dismiss the repo rt and ma y also ref er the matter to the Comm i ttee f or informal correction if appr opriate. If the panel concludes t hat a violation w arr ants formal disciplinary action, the panel may i mpose upon th e ju dicial of�icer who is the subject of the repor t any one or mo re o f the fo rms of d isciplin e permitted by law, such a s admonishment, reprimand, su spension, �ine and probation. A div ided decision need not i dentify how panel members voted. [¶ 54 ] Th e determin ation of an y appro priate sanction mu st b e b as ed on “multiple factors, including the judge’s prof essional history, the conte xt within whi ch the vio latio ns occur red, the harm t o the lit igants and p ublic, the seriousness of the violations, the judge’s acknow ledgement of the violations

27 and understanding of the impa ct on the litigants, and the pros pect s f or ensuring publ ic trus t an d con �iden ce in the judge ’s w ork in the futu re. ” In re Hol mes, 2011 ME 119, ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1 011 (citing M. Code Jud. Condu ct Pream ble). [¶ 55 ] As dis cussed abo ve, Justice Connors w as aw are of her obligations under R ul e 2.11(A) an d made eff orts to addres s a poss ible appear ance of impropr iety by asking t he Ad visory Committee on Judicial Ethic s for a dvice. [¶ 56 ] As importantl y, th e eff ec t of the impr oper acti vit y upon the judicial sys tem or ot hers has not been shown to be substantial. Finch w as decided by a 4- 3 vote and M ou lt on by a 5 -2 vo t e. It is not possible to pre dict the outcome in Finch were Just ic e Con nor s to h av e rec use d h ers el f bec au se t here i s no way of knowing whether the Court would ha ve replaced her, in t he usual manner, with an acti ve r etired ju stice. In Moulton, the Law Cou rt noted that i t was guid ed by its dec ision in F inch. Justice Connors w as not a determinati ve v ote; it is not possible to pr edict how the C ourt wo uld ha v e proceeded, and ruled, wer e Justice Connors to hav e recused herself in Finch and M oulton. Ac cordin gly, because Finch o ver turned the hold ings in Desch aine a nd Pushard, Justice Connors’s recusal in M oulton would not ha ve r esulted in a change in Maine for eclosure law. [¶ 57 ] In sum, th e e vi dence demonstr ates b y a preponde r ance of the evid en ce that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A) b y not r ecus ing fr om the

28 Finch a nd Moulton appeals. How ev er, in lig ht of the ci rcum stan ces and the sta te of the l aw, this v iolation d oes n ot w arr ant for mal discip linar y action. H aving fo und a violatio n but �ind ing tha t no dis ciplina ry a ction is w arr anted fo r the viola tion, we agree tha t dismissal of the Committee’s r eport is th e pr oper disposition of the matter. See M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Pro cs. 8(C)(iii). John A. McAr dl e, III, Esq. (orall y), Maine Committee on Judicial Conduct, Augusta, f or the Comm ittee on Judicial Conduct James M. Bowie, Esq. (or ally), Benjam in J. W ahrer, Esq., and Caitlin R oss W ahrer, Esq., Norma n, Hanson & DeT ro y, LLC, P ortla nd, for Catherine R. Connors