Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Dec. 23, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

HALL (KENYA) v. WARDEN (CRIMINAL) C/W 90152

Court of Appeals of Nevada

• Citations: 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 70

• Docket Number: 90152-COA

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.9K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

141 Nev., Advance Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KENYA KEITA HALL, No. 90025-COA
Appellant,
vs.
RONALD OLIVER, WARDEN,
Respondent.

ANTHONY POSEY, No. 90152-COA
Appellant,
vs.
WARDEN OLIVER; OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT DIVISION; AND THE
FILED
STATE OF NEVADA, DEC 23 2025
Respondents. A. BR
RT
BY
DEPUIY x

Appeals from district court orders denying postconviction
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Erika D. Ballou, Judge.
Affirmed.

Kenya Keita Hall, Las Vegas,
Pro Se.

Anthony Posey, Indian Springs,
Pro Se.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Elsa Felgar, Deputy Attorney
General, Carson City,
for Respondent Ronald Oliver (Docket No. 90025-COA).

COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA

101 19178
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Michael R. Shaffer, Deputy Attorney
General, Carson City,
for Respondents Warden Oliver, Offender Management Division, and the
State of Nevada (Docket No. 90152-COA).

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, BULLA, C.J., and GIBBONS and
WESTBROOK, JJ.

OPINIOIV

PER CURIAM:
It has been the long-standing rule in Nevada that the
application of procedural bars to postconviction petitions for writs of habeas
corpus is mandatory. In this opinion, we consider whether recent legislative
changes to NRS Chapter 34 operate as a mandatory procedural bar in cases
where a petitioner seeks to challenge the computation of time served. As
amended, the statutes now require the district court to dismiss without
prejudice a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of
time served where the petitioner did not first exhaust all available
administrative remedies. Because the dismissal language was added to
NRS 34.810, where other procedural bars are outlined, and because the
dismissal language contains the word "shall" and mimics language from
another procedural bar, we conclude that the legislature intended the
exhaustion requirement to act as a procedural bar to a postconviction
habeas petition challenging the computation of time served. As such, a
court must consider whether a petitioner has exhausted all available
administrative remedies before considering the merits of a postconviction
habeas petition challenging the computation of time served.
In the two cases before us, the district court denied appellants'
postconviction habeas petitions challenging the computation of time served
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
2
(01 194713 calt.
without first addressing whether the petitioners had exhausted all
available administrative remedies before filing their petitions.' Although
we conclude the district court erred by failing to apply the mandatory
procedural bar and determine whether appellants had exhausted their
administrative remedies before filing their respective petitions, we
nevertheless affirm the district court's denial of the petitions because the
district court reached the correct result.
FACTS
Hall v. Oliver, Docket No. 90025
On November 17, 2023, and February 6, 2024, appellant Kenya
Keita Hall filed identical postconviction habeas petitions challenging a
prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the forfeiture of 60 days of
statutory good time credits. Hall's postconviction habeas petitions included
standard questions and spaces for Hall's answers to those questions. In
response to a question asking if he had appealed, Hall answered, "Appeal
Administrative Remedy" and indicated his appeal had been denied on June
5, 2023.2 Hall asserted that his "disciplinary conviction" had been appealed
to the operations warden by way of administrative grievances and that his
first-level appeal had been denied by the associate warden.
The district court ordered a response to the petitions, and the
Attorney General's Office argued Hall's petitions should be denied because
his claims were without merit. The district court denied Hall's petitions on

1 We elect to consolidate these appeals for disposition. See NRAP
3(b)(2).

Although the questions in the petitions appeared to refer to an
2
appeal from a judgment of conviction, Hall's responses suggest he
understood the questions to refer to the appeal of his prison disciplinary
hearing.
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
3
144713
the merits without first addressing whether Hall had exhausted all
available administrative remedies before filing them.
On the day the district court's order was filed, Hall filed a reply
to the response in support of his petitions and attached supporting
documents, including an inmate grievance report related to his disciplinary
hearing. The report indicated Hall's appeal had been denied and identified
the level as "1." No other grievance reports were included with his reply.
Because Hall's reply was filed on the day the district court's order denying
his petitions was filed and because the order does not mention Hall's reply,
it appears the district court did not consider Hall's reply or the attached
documents in its disposition of Hall's petitions.
Posey v. Oliver, Docket No. 90152
On December 3, 2024, appellant Anthony Posey filed a
postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served,
specifically the failure to award him credits for labor and study pursuant to
NRS 209.4465(2). In his petition, Posey alleged he had exhausted his
administrative remedies by sending kites3 to his caseworker, a letter to
"OMP,"4 and "several AR 740 grievances." Posey attached documents to his
petition in support of his exhaustion claim. Among those documents were
multiple inmate request forms, two informal grievances, and an improper
grievance memo addressing one of the informal grievances.
The district court ordered a response, and the Attorney
General's Office argued Posey's petition should be denied because his claim

3A kite is "a written request for services or other assistance within the
prison." Ybarra u. State, 127 Nev. 47, 59 n.9, 247 P.3d 269, 277 n.9 (2011).

4 Itappears Posey was referring to the Nevada Department of
Corrections Offender Management Division.
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
4
101 1947B oa14,9
for additional credits was without merit. The district court entered an order
denying the petition on the merits. The district court's order did not address
whether Posey had exhausted all available administrative remedies before
filing his petition.
DISCUSSION
Hall challenges the loss of statutory credits following a
disciplinary hearing, and Posey alleges he was entitled to additional
statutory credits toward his sentence. Accordingly, both challenge the
computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction, and a
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus "[i]s the only remedy
available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation of time
that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction." NRS
34.724(2)(c); see also Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737, 742-43, 137 P.3d 1165,
1168-69 (2006) (interpreting the language of NRS 34.724(2)(c) as logically
referring to "credit earned after a petitioner has begun to serve the sentence
specified in the judgment of conviction").
In 2019, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 34.724 in two
nearly identical ways. To the language identifying who can file a
postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served,
the legislature added the caveat "after exhausting all available
administrative remedies." 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 500, § 1, at 3008. To the
language identifying such a petition as the only remedy for computation
challenges, the legislature added "after all available administrative
remedies have been exhausted." Id. The current version of the statute
provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person convicted of a crime and under
sentence of death or imprisonment . . . who, after exhausting all available
administrative remedies, claims that the tirne the person has served
pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed may
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
5
1947B ..eaa
file a petition" to challenge the computation of time served and that such a
petition "Ns the only remedy to an incarcerated person to challenge the
computation of time that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of
conviction, after all available administrative remedies have been
exhausted." NRS 34.724(1), (2)(c).
The legislature also amended NRS 34.810, a statute detailing
various procedural bars to postconviction habeas petitions and outlining
bars regarding scope and waiver in NRS 34.810(1). The legislature added
language to NRS 34.810(4) that required the dismissal without prejudice of
a petition challenging computation if a petitioner did not exhaust all
available administrative remedies for such a challenge. See 2019 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 500, § 3, at 3010. The resulting language resembled NRS 34.810(1) in
that both stated the court "shall" dismiss a petition if certain conditions
were not met. Compare 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 500, § 3, at 3010 ("(4) The court
shall dismiss a petition without prejudice if . . . [t]he petitioner challenges
the computation of time that the petitioner has served . . . and . . . [t]he
court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available
administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge . . . ."), with id. at 3009-
10 ("(1) The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that" the
petitioner pleaded guilty and the claims do not relate to the voluntary or
knowing nature of the plea or to the effective assistance of counsel in
entering the plea or the petitioner was convicted after a trial and the claims
could have been previously raised or presented). Minor changes and
movement to the statute occurred in 2023, see 2023 Nev. Stat., ch. 249, § 19,
at 1631-32, and the current version of the statute provides that "Whe court
shall dismiss a petition that challenges the computation of time served
pursuant to a judgment of conviction without prejudice if the court

COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
6
101 1937B e
determines that the petitioner did not exhaust1all available administrative
remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724." NRS
34.810(2).
As amended in 2019, the plain language of NRS 34.724 and
34.810(2) mandates that a postconviction habeas petitioner challenging the
computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction must
exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing their petition.
Otherwise, the district court must dismiss the petition without prejudice.
Further, because the language regarding dismissal was placed in a statute
outlining procedural bars, uses the word "shall," and mimics language
regarding another procedural bar, we hold 'that the exhaustion of all
available administrative remedies is a procedural bar to such a petition
being considered on the merits. And the application of procedural bars is
mandatory. See State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct: (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231,
112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005); see also Thomas u.:State, 88 Nev. 382, 384, 498
P.2d 1314, 1315 (1972) (providing that "shall" is generally construed as
mandatory). Therefore, a court must determine whether a petitioner has
exhausted all available administrative remedies before considering the
merits of any claim in a postconviction habeas petition challenging the
computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction. Cf. Riker,
121 Nev. at 234, 112 P.3d at 1076 (concluding that extraordinary relief was
warranted because "the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider
whether any or all of Riker's claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS
34.810, and NRS. 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by
this court").
Here, the district court orders made no mention of whether Hall
and Posey had exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing

COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
7
101 190B e
their petitions challenging the computation for time served. Rather, the
court proceeded to directly address the merits of Hall's and Posey's
petitions. The district court's apparent failure to consider the procedural
bar in NRS 34.810(2) and determine whether Hall and Posey overcame that
bar was in error. Because application of procedural bars is mandatory, we
must consider whether Hall and Posey overcame this procedural bar by
exhausting all available administrative remedies before filing their
petitions.
Generally, in order to exhaust administrative remedies, "Nile
prison's grievance process requires an inmate to first file an informal
grievance, followed by first- and second-level formal grievances." Abarra u.
State, 131 Nev. 20, 22 n.1, 342 P.3d 994, 995 n.1 (2015); see generally NDOC
AR 740. As relevant here, NRS 34.733 provides that a postconviction
habeas petition challenging the computation of time served "must be in
substantially" the form outlined in the statute. To help a petitioner
demonstrate the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the mandatory
form includes a question as to whether the petitioner has "filed a grievance
raising the same computation of time issue as you are raising in this
petition." If so, the form asks the "[n]umber assigned to your grievance,"
the result, whether the petitioner "complete[d] all levels of the grievance
procedure," and if not, why. Id. The form instructs a petitioner that they
f` must include facts which support your grounds for relief' and may "submit
additional pages if necessary with this form."
In determining whether Hall and Posey exhausted all available
administrative remedies, we are obliged to consider whether they made
specific factual allegations regarding the exhaustion of all available
administrative remedies that, if true, would entitle them to consideration

COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
8
(0) 194713 0)
of their petitions on the merits. See Riker, 121 Nev. at 232, 112 P.3d at 1075
(holding that a postconviction habeas petitioner must plead specific facts to
overcome the procedural bars and "cannot rely on conclusory claims for
relief but must provide supporting specific factual allegations that if true
would entitle him to relief'); see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28
P.3d 498, 507 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Lisle u. State, 131 Nev.
356, 366 n.5, 351 P.3d 725, 732 n.5 (2015). Such allegations must be on the
face of the petition. See Chappell u. State, 137 Nev. 780, 788, 501 P.3d 935,
949 (2021) (holding that a petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural bar
when challenging the validity of a judgment or sentence in a postconviction
habeas petition must, on the face of the petition. "identify the applicable
procedural bars for each claim" and allege "specific factual allegations, not
belied or repelled by the record, that would entitle him or her to relief if
true" (emphasis omitted)).
In his petitions, Hall alleged he had appealed the result of his
disciplinary hearing to an operations warden using the administrative
grievance procedure. He further alleged that his "first level appeal" had
been denied by an associate warden. We conclude these allegations alone
were not sufficient to demonstrate Hall overcame the procedural bar in NRS
34.810(2) because Hall alleged no facts related to a second-level grievance.
Even considering information that was not presented on the face of the
petitions, namely Hall's reply and supporting documents,5 there was no
allegation about a second-level grievance. Rather, the documents support
the conclusion that Hall's grievance process stopped at the first level.
Therefore, we conclude Hall did not make specific factual allegations

5 NRS 34.750(5) disallows further pleadings "except as ordered by the
court."
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
9
(C) 1947B 0,
regarding the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies that, if
true, would entitle him to consideration of his petitions on the merits. Cf.
Plummer u. State, No. 90155-COA, 2025 WL 3170996 (Nev. Ct. App.
Nov. 12, 2025) (Order of Affirmance) (concluding the district court properly
considered the merits of a postconviction habeas petition challenging the
computation of time served where the petitioner alleged in his petition that
he had exhausted all administrative remedies and attached to the petition
his informal, first-level grievance, and second-level grievance for statutory
credits and where the record supported the petitioner's allegation regarding
exhaustion).
As for Posey, he alleged in his petition that he exhausted his
administrative remedies by sending kites, a letter, and "AR 740
grievance [s]." But Posey's exhibits only showed two informal grievances
submitted by Posey, one of which received an improper grievance memo in
return. Posey did not allege any facts related to a first- or second-level
grievance." Therefore, we conclude Posey did not make specific factual
allegations regarding the exhaustion of all available administrative
remedies that, if true, would entitle him to consideration of his petition on
the merits. Cf. id.
In light of the above, we conclude Hall's and Posey's petitions
should have been dismissed without prejudice because of the procedural bar
outlined in NRS 34.810(2)—the exhaustion of all available administrative
remedies before filing a petition challenging the computation of time served
pursuant to a judgment of conviction. Although the district court

GWe note neither Posey nor Hall argued that exhaustion of all
available administrative remedies was futile. Cf. Abarra, 131 Nev. at 23,
342 P.3d at 996.
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
10
101 1947B cea
erroneously denied the petitions on the merits without first determining
whether Hall and Posey had exhausted all available administrative
remedies, we nevertheless conclude the district court properly denied the
requested relief because the petitions should have been dismissed without
prejudice. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970)
(holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on
the wrong reason). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders.7

eitemoswil"Assmes ,,, , C.J.
Bulla

J.
Westbrook

7As concluded above, the district court should have dismissed Hall's
and Posey's petitions without prejudice. Nothing in this opinion should be
construed as precluding Hall or Posey from filing a postconviction habeas
petition challenging the computation of time served after the exhaustion of
all available administrative remedies.
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
11
(0) 19470 cOMOD