James Carroll v. State of Mississippi - Criminal Appeal

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• Combined Opinion from the Court Add Note # James Carroll a/k/a James Malcolm Carroll, III a/k/a James M. Carroll v. State of Mississippi

Court of Appeals of Mississippi

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-KA-00481-COA

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

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Summary

James Carroll a/k/a James Malcolm Carroll, III a/k/a James M. Carroll v. State of Mississippi; Simpson Circuit Court; LC Case #: 64CI1:22-cr-00203-P2-1; Ruling Date: 04/01/2024; Ruling Judge: Matthew Sullivan; Majority Opinion: Barnes, C.J. Disposition: Affirmed. Simpson County taxed with costs of appeal. Votes: Carlton and Wilson, P.JJ., Westbrooks, McDonald, Lawrence, McCarty, Emfinger, Weddle and Lassitter St. Pé, JJ., Concur.

Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00481-COA

JAMES CARROLL A/K/A JAMES MALCOLM APPELLANT
CARROLL, III A/K/A JAMES M. CARROLL

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MATTHEW GORDON SULLIVAN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
JAMES CARROLL (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS HENNIS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/14/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Simpson County Circuit Court jury found James Carroll guilty of two counts of

child exploitation, and the trial court sentenced him to serve consecutive forty-year terms for

each count in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The circuit

court then denied Carroll’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a

new trial.

¶2. On appeal, Carroll’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Lindsey v. State,

939 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 2005), stating that after the “entire record and transcript were
scrupulously reviewed,” “counsel [was] unable to argue, in good faith, any prejudicial error.”

Carroll filed a pro se supplemental appellant’s brief, asserting several claims of error.1 Upon

review, we find no reversible error, and we affirm Carroll’s convictions and sentences.

Facts and Procedural History

¶3. In 2020, Carroll began working for the City of Braxton, Mississippi, performing

general building and water-system maintenance. In May 2021, the City issued Carroll a new

Apple iPhone for work because he was expected to be on call “24/7.” When Carroll’s

employment was terminated in December 2021, he returned the work-issued iPhone the

following day.

¶4. After city employees found suspicious text messages on the iPhone that appeared to

be related to “illegal activity,” the phone was turned over to the Simpson County Sheriff’s

Department. In addition to texts indicating “narcotics-related activity,” Investigator Adam

Scarborough discovered that the iPhone contained “some pornography”; so he took the phone

to the Mississippi Attorney General’s Cyber Crimes Division (Cyber Crimes Division) to

extract the iPhone’s contents forensically.

¶5. When the Cyber Crimes Division found images of child pornography on the iPhone,

law enforcement obtained an arrest warrant for Carroll and a search warrant for his residence.

Carroll was arrested during a traffic stop, and law enforcement seized an Android BLU View

cellphone that Carroll had purchased. Ashley Boldig, a digital forensic examiner with the

Attorney General’s Office, examined both phones (the work-issued iPhone and Carroll’s

1
Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(b) provides that “[a]n appellant in a
criminal appeal may file a pro se supplemental Brief of the Appellant.”

2
personal Android phone). Images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct were

found on both phones.

¶6. A grand jury indicted Carroll on October 14, 2022, on two counts of child

exploitation. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-33 (5) (Rev. 2020). A jury trial was held on March

27, 2024.

¶7. City clerk Pam Coward testified that the City had issued Carroll a “[b]rand-new”

iPhone in May 2021, which was “[j]ust for customers to call for after-hour emergencies or

during-the-day emergencies.” Coward said that when Carroll was terminated, he turned in

the phone to her the following day. His excuse for waiting a day to turn it in was that he “had

taken pictures of [the City’s] Christmas decorations . . . he wanted to retrieve off the phone.”

When she inspected the phone, “all the contacts had been deleted,” and “in the text messages,

there was some verbiage that [she] considered, like, illegal activity.”

¶8. Mayor Michael Arinder testified that Carroll had lost the first work-issued iPhone; so

the City installed Life360 on the new iPhone since “it belonged to the Town.” He said

Carroll was terminated for “[f]ailure to follow the drug-testing procedures accordingly.”

When Mayor Arinder inspected the phone, he discovered text messages of “potentially drug-

related activity”; so he gave the local sheriff’s department permission to search the phone.

¶9. Scarborough, a narcotics investigator with the Simpson County Sheriff’s Department,

was contacted by Mayor Arinder about “a phone from a past employee that had some

questionable statements on it.” Mayor Arinder gave Scarborough permission to search the

iPhone, and Scarborough found that the phone contained “some pornography.” Scarborough

3
contacted the Cyber Crimes Division “to do a phone extraction,” which found that the phone

contained child pornography. Scarborough obtained an arrest warrant for Carroll on

February 7, 2022, as well as “a search warrant for his residence” to see if “there was any

more child pornography.” The following day, law enforcement stopped Carroll in his truck

and took him into custody. Another phone (an Android) was seized from the truck. Two

“busted cell phones . . . of no evidential value” were also found at Carroll’s residence.

Carroll admitted to Scarborough he had looked at pornography on his work iPhone, but

Carroll insisted that “there shouldn’t be any child pornography on the phone.” The

investigator acknowledged that he found no pornography at Carroll’s residence.

¶10. Boldig was accepted as an expert in the field of digital forensics. Boldig discovered

“child sexual abuse material” on the iPhone, in addition to internet search terms for child

pornography from August 2021 to December 2021 (e.g., “naked teen boys” and “tweens

stripping”). She also found child sexual-abuse material (e.g., “depict[ing] teen boys exposing

their genitalia and in compromising positions”) on the Android phone. Boldig admitted that

while it was clear child pornography had been downloaded and accessed, it was unclear who

had downloaded the material. However, her testimony did indicate there were work-related

calls and texts coming into the iPhone at or near the same time that the child pornography

was being viewed.

¶11. The State rested, and the trial court denied Carroll’s motion for a directed verdict.

Carroll testified on his own behalf. Carroll said he had moved to Braxton in 2020 to live

with a platonic female friend after his limousine business in Jackson closed during the

4
COVID-19 pandemic. His friend’s adult son, “Trey,” moved in with them shortly thereafter.

Carroll helped his friend with maintenance on her house, which prompted the former mayor

of Braxton to ask Carroll to be a part-time maintenance worker for the City. Three months

later, he was asked to take over the City’s water department as well, and he was assigned a

work phone.

¶12. Carroll acknowledged that he used the work iPhone for “personal stuff.” His bedroom

did not have outlets in it because it was added on to the house; so Carroll would plug his

iPhone into an outlet outside his door “and leave it there.” He claimed Trey would

“sometimes” borrow the iPhone, but Carroll said he never felt the need to put a passcode on

the phone.

¶13. Carroll thought law enforcement pulled him over because his truck did not have a

license plate; he was “floored” when they informed him he was being charged with child

pornography. He waived his Miranda rights,2 and he signed a form for his consent to search.

When asked about the content on his phones, Carroll insinuated that Trey had drug issues and

past criminal issues, and Carroll claimed that some of the search terms were “a clear-cut sign

[Trey was] using my phone.” However, Scarborough provided rebuttal testimony that Trey

was incarcerated from November 26, 2021, to December 11, 2021. Boldig also testified on

rebuttal that child pornographic images had been accessed from Carroll’s work iPhone during

that period when Trey had been incarcerated.

¶14. The jury found Carroll guilty of both counts of child exploitation. On April 1, 2024,

2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 439 (1966).

5
the trial court sentenced Carroll to forty years for each count, with the sentences to run

consecutively. He was also ordered to register as a sex offender. Carroll filed a motion for

a JNOV or, alternatively, for a new trial on April 3, 2024, which the trial court denied after

a hearing on the matter.

¶15. Carroll filed a timely appeal. His appointed appellate counsel, finding no arguable

issues or prejudicial error, filed a Lindsey brief. See Lindsey, 939 So. 2d at 748 (¶18).

Carroll timely filed a pro se supplemental brief in accordance with Rule 28(b) of the

Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Discussion

¶16. Appellate counsel filed a Lindsey brief, representing that the case presents no arguable

issues for appeal. Lindsey establishes the “procedure to govern cases where appellate

counsel represents an indigent criminal defendant and does not believe his or her client’s case

presents any arguable issues on appeal.” Lindsey, 939 So. 2d at 748 (¶18). Counsel must file

a brief in compliance with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), as well as

certify that there are no arguable issues supporting the client’s appeal, and he
or she has reached this conclusion after scouring the record thoroughly,
specifically examining: (a) the reason for the arrest and the circumstances
surrounding arrest; (b) any possible violations of the client’s right to counsel;
(c) the entire trial transcript; (d) all rulings of the trial court; (e) possible
prosecutorial misconduct; (f) all jury instructions; (g) all exhibits, whether
admitted into evidence or not; and (h) possible misapplication of the law in
sentencing.

Lindsey, 939 So. 2d at 748 (¶18). Counsel must then send a copy of the brief to the

defendant, informing him or her “that counsel could find no arguable issues in the record,

and advise the client of his or her right to file a pro se brief.” Id.

6
¶17. Carroll exercised his right to file a supplemental pro se brief. See M.R.A.P. 28(b).

In his brief, Carroll raises several arguments, many of which allege matters not in the trial

court’s record. Furthermore, although Carroll cites some legal authority, we agree with the

State that his brief does not “adequately cite the record or make meaningful arguments based

on authority to support his claims.” See Reading v. Reading, 350 So. 3d 1195, 1199 (¶19)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that Rule 28(a)(7) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate

Procedure “does not simply require a party to mention authority; the authority must be used

to develop the argument in a meaningful way”).

¶18. Nevertheless, although the State argues we should “decline to address” the issues

raised in Carroll’s pro se brief, appellate courts have a “role under Lindsey . . . to review the

record and the pro se brief to determine whether arguable issues exist that warrant

supplemental briefing by appellate counsel.” Hollis v. State, 320 So. 3d 518, 522-23 (¶8)

(Miss. 2021) (citing Lindsey, 939 So. 2d at 748 (¶18)). We will therefore review those

arguments Carroll raised.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶19. Carroll asserts several claims of ineffective assistance. Generally, a defendant’s

claims that his defense counsel was ineffective “are more appropriately brought during post-

conviction proceedings.” Murray v. State, 345 So. 3d 610, 621 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)

(quoting Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020)). Such claims are addressed

on direct appeal “when [1] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional

dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines

7
that the findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are

not needed.” Id. We may also address ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims “on direct

appeal when the record affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit.” Id. The State

has not stipulated the record is sufficient to review Carroll’s claim and asserts that we

“should decline to address” this issue. We agree.

¶20. Some of Carroll’s allegations of ineffective assistance refer to matters that cannot be

determined from the court’s record.3 “Review on direct appeal of an ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claim is confined strictly to the record.” Jackson v. State, 73 So. 3d 1176, 1181

(¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). As the State notes, “[m]ost of Carroll’s complaints about

counsel’s omissions fall into the category of trial strategy” (e.g., counsel’s failure to conduct

investigations, hire an expert witness, or make certain objections to testimony). In Brown

v. State, 282 So. 3d 1192, 1200 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), our Court declined to address

a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because it “involve[d] our

consideration of defense counsel’s trial strategy,” and “[t]his point is beyond the contents and

face of the record.”

¶21. Because this issue involves consideration of matters outside the record’s contents, we

dismiss Carroll’s claims of ineffective assistance without prejudice to his right to assert these

claims in a properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR).

3
For example, Carroll argues that his attorney “lacked the time to put the effort into
[his] case” because his attorney was the city prosecutor for Ridgeland, Mississippi. Carroll
also claims defense counsel “never brings up about Trey’s . . . roommate who moved in
October 2021.” At no time did Carroll or any witness mention another person living in the
home (other than Trey and Trey’s mother) during the trial.

8
II. Grossly Disproportionate Sentencing

¶22. Noting he was a “first-time offender,” Carroll contends his sentences are grossly

disproportionate, as they exceed his life expectancy. “By statute, any person who violates

any provision of section 97-5-33 may be fined a maximum of $500,000 and a minimum of

$50,000, and the person may be imprisoned for a maximum of forty years and a minimum

of five years.” Matheny v. State, 289 So. 3d 328, 335 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citing

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-35 (Rev. 2006)). Because Carroll made no objection at his

sentencing nor raised this issue in his posttrial motion, we are “under no obligation to address

the issue.” Triplett v. State, 207 So. 3d 1288, 1291 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶23. Regardless, “[s]entencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court and not

subject to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute.” Id. at (¶7). In

Triplett, we addressed this argument when sixty-one-year-old Robert Triplett argued that his

forty-year sentence for child exploitation “amount[ed] to a life sentence.” Id. Noting

Mississippi’s “general rule . . . that a sentence cannot be disturbed on appeal so long as it

does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute,” our Court found the trial court’s

sentence was not an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Alexander v. State, 406 So. 3d 774,

804-05 (¶¶79-81) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (finding the trial court’s sentencing of the defendant

to serve the maximum forty-year sentence on six counts (240 years) for child exploitation

was within the statutory limits and not grossly disproportionate).4

4
The majority opinion in this case was divided into two parts, with Judge McCarty
authoring this holding in Part Two, joined by five other judges. Judge Emfinger dissented
in part to Part Two of the majority as to the trial court’s jurisdiction in three of the counts.

9
¶24. Carroll’s sentences do not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute, and he has

not shown that his sentences are grossly disproportionate or unconstitutional. See Mapp v.

State, 310 So. 3d 335, 338 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (“Generally, sentences that do not

exceed the maximum punishment allowed by statute will not be considered grossly

disproportionate.” (quoting Smith v. State, 291 So. 3d 1, 6 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019))).5

Furthermore, the evidence showed that Carroll’s work iPhone contained approximately

twenty-seven images of child pornography (Count I) and his Android contained seven images

and one video (Count II), and the trial judge may have taken that evidence into consideration

in sentencing Carroll to the maximum terms. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s

sentencing.

III. Jury Instruction S-3 and Jury Selection

¶25. The trial court gave Jury Instruction S-3, which defined “sexually explicit conduct,”

one of the elements of the crime of child exploitation (i.e., the “visual depiction of an actual

child engaging in sexually explicit conduct”). The jury instruction defined “sexually explicit

conduct” as “actual or simulated”:

(i) Oral genital contact, oral anal contact, or sexual intercourse whether
between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(ii) Bestiality:
(iii) Masturbation;
(iv) Sadistic or masochistic abuse;

5
Carroll also claims he had been offered a plea deal for a thirty-year sentence, with
only ten years to be served in MDOC’s custody and twenty years suspended, which he
declined. This plea agreement is not contained in the trial court’s record. “[T]his Court may
not act upon or consider matters which do not appear in the record and must confine itself
to what actually does appear in the record.” Brown v. State, 54 So. 3d 882, 884 (¶10) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2011).

10
(v) Lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person; or
(vi) Fondling or other erotic touching of the genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
anus or breast.

Carroll claims there was no evidentiary basis for Jury Instruction S-3 because “there was no

explicit sexual contact with anyone”; so the instruction was “irrelevant to [his] case.”

¶26. Carroll’s attorney did not object to this instruction. “[A] defendant’s failure to object

to a jury instruction at trial bars that issue on appeal.” Spiers v. State, 361 So. 3d 643, 654

(¶36) (Miss. 2023). Carroll also failed to raise this issue in his posttrial motion. Thus,

because this issue was not raised before the trial court, the issue “is procedurally barred from

consideration on appeal.” See Fox v. State, 412 So. 3d 426, 443-44 (¶61) (Miss. Ct. App.

2024) (finding defendant’s failure to challenge a juror during trial, or to “raise any concerns

about” the juror in his posttrial motion, waived the issue on appeal). Waiver

notwithstanding, Boldig expressly testified that both phones contained images of a child

engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and those images were admitted into evidence.

Therefore, we find this claim is not supported by the record.

¶27. Carroll further contends that the “jurors should have been asked if they can be

unbias[ed] and fair in trial proceedings.” Specifically, he refers to “any prejudice toward[]

people with a different sexual orientation,” as Carroll testified that he is “gay.” We find

Carroll has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the voir dire process.

Furthermore, the record indicates that the trial court expressly told potential jurors that they

were to “base their decision on . . . two things, the law and the evidence,” and that the

purpose of the voir dire process was “to get a fair and impartial jury.” Several venire

11
members were also asked by the prosecution if they could be fair and impartial, and they

responded affirmatively.6

¶28. Finally, Carroll claims that the jurors did not follow instructions. However, Carroll

has failed to cite any facts in the record or specify which instruction(s) he alleges that the

jurors failed to follow. This Court “must ‘decide each case by the facts shown in the record,

not assertions in the brief.’” Scott v. State, 24 So. 3d 1039, 1041 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)

(quoting Oakwood Homes Corp. v. Randall, 824 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (¶3) (Miss. 2002)). We

find this issue is waived and without merit.

IV. Denial of the Motion for a Continuance

¶29. On March 25, 2024, two days before the trial date, Carroll’s defense counsel filed a

motion for continuance, noting the State had recently provided more discovery (i.e., printouts

from the phone extraction) and requesting more time to review those materials. Defense

counsel renewed the motion at trial but acknowledged that the defense had prior access to

the phone. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance.7 Carroll argues that the

denial of the motion put the defense “at a distinct disadvantage,” rendering the trial “unfair.”

6
To the extent Carroll is arguing his defense counsel was ineffective by failing to
question jurors regarding potential bias, this is a matter that cannot be determined from the
record; so Carroll may raise this argument in a separately filed PCR motion.
7
Although denying the motion, the trial court did assure defense counsel:

Well, if something comes up about it during trial, you believe it’s that hasn’t
been provided in discovery or some kind of new evidence that you weren’t
aware of, you’re welcome to bring up some sort of objection or motion during
trial, outside the presence of the jury and inform me again that this new
information has prejudiced you in some way, and elaborate on it on the record
when it does – if it does arise.

12
¶30. Carroll failed to raise this issue in his posttrial motion for a JNOV or a new trial. “[I]n

order to preserve the denial of a continuance for appeal, the issue must be raised in a post-

trial motion for a new trial.” Williamson v. State, 375 So. 3d 1158, 1173 (¶44) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2023). This issue is waived.

¶31. Notwithstanding the waiver, “[i]t is hornbook law that the grant or denial of a

continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 1173-74 (¶45). We will

not reverse a trial court’s denial of a continuance “unless manifest injustice results.” Id. at

1174 (¶46) (quoting Jackson v. State, 231 So. 3d 257, 260 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).

“The burden of showing manifest injustice is not satisfied by conclusory arguments alone;

rather[,] the defendant is required to show concrete facts that demonstrate the particular

prejudice to the defense.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 231 So. 3d at 264 (¶34)). We find Carroll

has failed to demonstrate in any “concrete” way how he was prejudiced by the denial of the

continuance. Particularly, since his defense counsel acknowledged that the 213 pages of

material in question were merely printouts from the “phone dump,” which had been made

available to the defense since January 2023, as acknowledged by Carroll’s attorney.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling to deny a continuance.

V. Illegal Search and Seizure

¶32. Carroll claims his home was illegally searched because the justice court judge signed

the search warrant on February 10, 2022, but his residence was searched two days prior.

Scarborough testified that he obtained the search warrant for Carroll’s residence on February

7, 2022, and executed the search on February 8.

13
¶33. Because the copy of the search warrant is attached only to Carroll’s brief, it is not part

of the court’s record. See Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 1038, 1042 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App.

2013) (holding that we “cannot accept evidence asserted in or attached to a brief”). In any

event, we find no error, as no evidence obtained from Carroll’s residence was submitted at

trial. Additionally, both the City and Carroll gave Scarborough permission to search the

relevant phones containing the images of child pornography. Accordingly, this issue is

without merit.

VI. Lack of Technical Expert

¶34. Carroll summarily asserts that the lack of a technical expert for the defense caused

“profound damage and harm to [his] ability to defend the case.” However, Carroll never

sought to retain an expert to assist with his defense; nor did Carroll request funds to hire an

expert to aid in his defense. “The well-recognized rule is that a trial court will not be put in

error on appeal for a matter not presented to it for decision.” Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073,

1088 (¶41) (Miss. 2010). Furthermore, Carroll does not allege with specificity nor

demonstrate how a “technical expert” would have assisted his defense.8

Conclusion

¶35. Our Court has “conducted an independent and thorough review of the record, and we

conclude that there are no issues that warrant reversal.” Taylor v. State, 162 So. 3d 780, 787

(¶18) (Miss. 2015). Accordingly, we affirm Carroll’s convictions and sentences. However,

8
Should Carroll wish to argue that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to hire
an expert, as we have already discussed, he is entitled to do so in a properly filed PCR
motion.

14
we dismiss Carroll’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice, allowing

him to raise that issue in PCR proceedings if he so chooses.

¶36. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

15