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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Deangelo

Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: CAAP-24-0000509

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (875)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
27-FEB-2026
08:16 AM
Dkt. 108 MO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SCOTT DAVID DEANGELO, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NOS. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX and 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Scott David Deangelo appeals the

Circuit Court of the First Circuit's July 18, 2024 Judgments of

Conviction and Sentence, convicting Deangelo of Murder in the

Second Degree for causing the death of his roommate, Demond L.

Cox, and Arson in the First Degree for setting fire to Cox's

apartment. 1 On appeal, Deangelo alleges prosecutorial misconduct

1 The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.

Following a consolidated trial, Deangelo was convicted of Murder in the
Second Degree in case number 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX and Arson in the First Degree in
case number 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX.
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so egregious that his convictions should be reversed and

reprosecution barred. We vacate and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Cox's charred remains were recovered from his Pearl

City apartment, where he died of a knife wound to the neck.

Because there were no percipient witnesses to the events in the

apartment apart from Deangelo and Cox, the State relied on

circumstantial evidence to prove its case.

The State's theory was that on the evening of

February 7, 2022, Cox and Deangelo got into a physical

altercation because Cox wanted Deangelo to move out of the

apartment. Ultimately, Deangelo stabbed Cox in the throat and

torched the apartment to destroy evidence. Deangelo then fled

the scene by jumping out of the apartment's fourth-story window.

The day after the incident, Deangelo was apprehended

in Hauʻula with a handgun.

Deangelo, who testified as the sole witness in his

defense, admitted to killing Cox but claimed he acted in self-

defense after Cox set the apartment on fire and attacked him

with the handgun.

The jury found Deangelo guilty as charged. The

circuit court sentenced Deangelo to life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole in 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX and twenty years

imprisonment in 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX, to be served concurrently.

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II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Deangelo contends the Deputy Prosecuting

Attorney (DPA) committed prosecutorial misconduct by (1) making

improper statements during closing and rebuttal, and

(2) offering his personal opinion when repeatedly using the

phrase "we know." Deangelo also contends these improper

statements were not harmless, but were in fact so egregious that

the State should be barred from reprosecuting him. As discussed

below, three statements and the repeated use of "we know" in

these circumstances were improper.

A. Three Statements Were Improper

Deangelo contends the DPA's statements were improper

"because they were made without any basis in the evidentiary

record" or were misstatements of the law.

"Prosecutorial misconduct" is "a legal term of art

that refers to any improper action committed by a prosecutor,

however harmless or unintentional." State v. Willis, 156 Hawaiʻi

195, 204, 572 P.3d 668, 677 (2025) (quoting State v. Udo, 145

Hawaiʻi 519, 534, 454 P.3d 460, 475 (2019)). "Whenever a

defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, this court must

first decide: (1) whether the conduct was improper; and (2) if

the conduct was improper, whether the misconduct was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (internal quotation marks

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omitted) (quoting Udo, 145 Hawaiʻi at 534-35, 454 P.3d at 475 -

76).

"It is well-established that prosecutors are afforded

wide latitude in closing to discuss the evidence, and may state,

discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as to draw all

reasonable inferences from the evidence." Id. (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Udo, 145 Hawaiʻi at

536, 454 P.3d at 477). "An inference is reasonable when 'the

evidence bears a logical and proximate connection to the point

the prosecutor wishes to prove.'" Id. (quoting State v. Basham,

132 Hawaiʻi 97, 112, 319 P.3d 1105, 1120 (2014)).

In reviewing the challenged statements "in context of

the DPA's entire closing argument and the trial record as a

whole," the following three statements were improper. See id.

at 206, 572 P.3d at 679.

(1) "He gave the defendant a target move-out date.
And we know that that target move-out date should
have been that day."

Deangelo argues this statement was "pure speculation,

completely unattached from the evidence presented at trial," and

"there was no evidence that Cox told Deangelo to move out at

all, let alone that there was a date discussed."

Cox's aunt, Nicole Richardson, testified that on

January 10, 2022, approximately one month before Cox's death,

Cox sent her an Instagram message to the effect that "he was

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living with another person[,]" "he intended to have that other

person move out[,]" and he was going to give "the other person

. . . "a target move-out date[.]" Additionally, Julian Rosario,

a friend of Cox, testified that he was visiting Hawaiʻi from

California with another friend, and that "[t]he plan was for me

to come over and possibly stay over with [Cox] . . . at his

house."

There was no evidence adduced to show that the "target

move-out date should have been that day," which was February 7,

1. And by using "we know," the DPA implied that the move-out

date was an uncontroverted fact — one that was known to the

prosecution and that explained why Deangelo killed Cox that day.

But there was no logical and proximate connection between the

evidence adduced and knowing that the move-out date was

February 7, 2022.

Thus, the DPA's statement that "we know that that

target move-out date should have been that day" was improper.

There was no objection and, thus, no curative instruction.

(2) "The defendant pulled a gun on Demond Cox, tried
to kill him."

Deangelo argues that "[n]o evidence supports the claim

that [he] possessed a gun prior to or during the incident, and

certainly not that he used the gun in an attempt to kill" Cox.

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The evidence showed that Deangelo had a gun in hand at

several points, including when Aubrey Barnes saw him in the

hallway, when Kevin Shim and others saw him exit the apartment

from the fourth-story window, and at the time of his arrest.

The evidence also showed that there was a physical fight and Cox

was killed with a knife. But there was no logical and proximate

connection between this evidence and the DPA's statement

inferring Deangelo tried to kill Cox with the gun. And by

inferring Deangelo tried to kill Cox with the gun prior to

stabbing Cox, the State provided evidence that could establish

Deangelo's state of mind for murder and tends to disprove

Deangelo's justification defense.

Thus, the DPA's statement that "[t]he defendant pulled

a gun on Demond Cox, tried to kill him" was improper. There was

no curative instruction.

(3) "The presumption of innocence is gone."

Deangelo argues that the DPA misstated the law during

rebuttal when the DPA argued, "The presumption of innocence is

gone":

[DPA:] At the beginning of [Defense Counsel]'s
closing arguments, he talked to you about the law and tried
to stress and appeal to your passion and prejudice or --
passion and pity for the defendant, talking about the oaths
that you took, the presumption of incident -- innocence.

The presumption of innocence is gone. It was gone
when the State produced the evidence that shows that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

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[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor, that's a
misstatement of the law.

THE COURT: Yeah. I -- um -- I understand it's
argument. I'm gonna sustain the objection, Mr. [DPA]. Um
-- I'm gonna strike your last portion of your argument.
The jury shall disregard that.

Perhaps if you wanna restate another way, sir.

(Emphasis added.)

"[A] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to

a presumption of innocence." State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai‘i 507,

518-19, 928 P.2d 1, 12 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by,

State v. Lavoie, 156 Hawaiʻi 250, 262, 573 P.3d 633, 645 (2025).

Prejudicial misstatements of law during closing arguments may

constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Espiritu, 117

Hawaiʻi 127, 142-44, 176 P.3d 885, 900-02 (2008).

Here, the DPA's statement that "[t]he presumption of

innocence is gone" was improper. Deangelo objected, and the

circuit court properly sustained the objection and struck the

misstatement. "We presume 'that jurors are reasonable and

generally follow the instructions they are given.'" State v.

Sing, 154 Hawaiʻi 377, 387, 550 P.3d 1235, 1245 (2024) (quoting

State v. Holbron, 80 Hawaiʻi 27, 46, 904 P.2d 912, 931 (1995)).

Deangelo has not rebutted that presumption. See id.

B. The Repeated Use of "We Know" Was Improper Under These
Circumstances

Deangelo also contends the DPA's repeated use of the

expression "we know" was improper, because it injected personal

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opinions not in evidence and "tell[s] the jury that the

conclusions have already been drawn by the DPA, and that jurors

can simply rely on the State's version of the facts."

"The prosecutor should not argue in terms of counsel's

personal opinion, and should not imply special or secret

knowledge of the truth or of witness credibility." State v.

Browder, 154 Hawaiʻi 237, 241, 549 P.3d 322, 326 (2024) (emphasis

omitted) (quoting A.B.A., Crim. Just. Standards for the

Prosecution Function, Standard 3-6.8(b) (4th ed. 2017)). "When

prosecutors imply secret knowledge, they imply extra facts not

in evidence." Id.

To its credit, the State readily acknowledges in its

answering brief "it is not the best practice to use the turn of

phrase 'we know' when discussing the evidence." See, e.g.,

United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1191 (9th Cir. 2005)

("We do not condone the prosecutors' use of 'we know' statements

in closing argument, because the use of 'we know' readily blurs

the line between improper vouching and legitimate summary. The

question for the jury is not what a prosecutor believes to be

true or what 'we know,' rather, the jury must decide what may be

inferred from the evidence."), abrogated on other grounds by,

United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024).

The occasional use of "we know" does not rise to the

level of prosecutorial misconduct where, "under the facts and

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circumstances of [each] case, [they are] permissible turns of

phrase uttered in sentences drawing reasonable inferences from

the trial evidence." State v. Brown, 157 Hawaiʻi 354, 382, 577

P.3d 1045, 1073 (2025); cf. Willis, 156 Hawaiʻi at 206-07, 572

P.3d at 679-80 (concluding DPA's argument that "we know" was not

improper because it was "based on reasonable inferences from the

evidence"); State v. Tran, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2026 WL 227043,

at *6 (Haw. App. Jan. 28, 2026) (SDO) ("We therefore conclude

that the prosecutor's usage of 'we' and 'us' was not improper

when considered within the context of the prosecutor's

statements, the evidence presented, and the reasonable

inferences that a jury could draw from the evidence.").

For example, in Brown, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court noted

the DPA used "we know" once at closing and several more times at

rebuttal. 157 Hawaiʻi at 364, 380, 557 P.3d at 1055, 1071.

There, the occasional use of "we know" was not improper, because

the DPA's argument neither "involved a prosecutor's significant

departure from the evidence presented" nor "use[d] the weight of

the office to go beyond the evidence adduced at trial into

irrelevant and novel opinions or personal experiences of the

DPA." Id. at 381, 577 P.3d at 1072 (distinguishing the facts of

that case from those in State v. Conroy, 148 Hawaiʻi 194, 202-06,

468 P.3d 208, 216-20 (2020)). Instead, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court

recognizes that "[j]urors have the commonsense ability to

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distinguish between an inartful choice of words and a blatant

misrepresentation of the record." Willis, 156 Hawaiʻi at 206,

572 P.3d at 679.

Here, however, the record shows the DPA used some form

of "we know" approximately twenty-five times during closing and

rebuttal for varying effects, including (1) characterizing

witness testimony; (2) drawing inferences therefrom; and

(3) arguing the State's theory of the case:

• "If you go to the system time of 19:54, 30 seconds,
you'll see the defendant walk through the garage.
We know from the testimony that the actual time is
approximately 13 to 14 minute difference. So that
puts us at 8:07 p.m." (Emphasis added.)

• "We don't know exactly what happened between 8:12
and 8:30, but we do know that there was an argument.
We heard that testimony from the Cambras."
(Emphases added.)

• "We know that at some point that argument escalated
and turned physical. We know that through the
testimony of Kyra Fong and Thomas Mills, who were in
unit 307, the unit directly below unit 407. . . .
And at that time, the State submits that that is
when the defendant pulled a gun on Demond Cox."
(Formatting altered and emphases added.)

• "That is what Kyra and Thomas heard. We know that
during that struggle it ended with what Thomas Mills
described as agonal screaming." (Emphasis added.)

• "We know that the defendant panicked. He tried to
run. He left unit 407 -- or tried to leave unit
407, but got caught, by Aubrey Barnes." (Emphasis
added.)

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• "She closes the door -- or she goes back in and
closes the door. That's when we know the defendant
puts the mattress on the fire where Demond's body
is." (Emphasis added.)

• "The fire starts to get bigger. Because we know
that because right after Susan checks out her door,
she tells her husband. Eugene goes out, looks, and
now the fire is starting to go." (Emphasis added.)

• "At the same time, during the pop pop pops, Kyra is
texting Raymond Souza. And we know that text
occurred at 8:50 p.m. Again, all of this testimony
lines up with the physical evidence." (Emphasis
added.)

• "You see the store clerk, look, something across the
street. She looks to her right. We know from the
testimony that that's Pearlita Fuavai saying call
the police." (Emphasis added.)

• "And we know that the system time on the garage
surveillance from unit -- or from 906 Lehua Avenue
is accurate because you could line it up."
(Emphasis added.)

• "We know that Kevin Shim tries to help him. But
Kevin Shim walks away because he tells -- the
defendant tells him to get back, get back."
(Emphasis added.)

• "We may not know exactly what happened in unit 407,
but we know that the defendant knew what he did was
wrong. We know because all the evidence of
consciousness of guilt. We have the testimony of
Aubrey Barnes, when he interacted with the defendant
in the hall." (Emphases added.)

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• "We know from the testimony of Kevin Shim, who tried
to help the defendant when he jumped out of the
window. And after Kevin Shim yelled called the
police, what did the defendant do? Pulled out a
gun. Said get back, get back." (Emphasis added.)

• "One thing I'll point out here is we know that he
tried to get rid of the evidence on his right hand,
because as you can see here, there was one ring that
was recovered. And it came from his left hand."
(Emphasis added.)

• "Some other inconsistencies in defendant's
testimony. He said that Demond held the gun at him.
We know from the testimony of Shannon Klum that only
Scott DeAngelo's [sic] DNA profile matched the DNA
sample obtained from the trigger and that Demond Cox
was excluded." (Emphasis added.)

• "We know that Demond fell or jumped from unit 407.
If you look closely where he landed, you see all
these branches protruding out. I'll leave it to you
to decide whether those cuts on his arm look like
they're from a knife or from falling onto this
jagged bush." (Emphasis added.)

• "He says he doesn't grab his cell phone. Why? We -
- we don't know." (Formatting altered and emphasis
added.)

• "He comes here to get his bag. We know that his bag
was there [be]cause he said that's where he put it
on the dresser. And he expects you to believe that
he didn't see in Demond there." (Emphasis added.)

• "We know that didn't happen because there was no
evidence of it. Instead, the firefighter
investigator told you, and it was corroborated by
the medical examiner, that Demond must have been
dead by the time that the fire started." (Emphasis
added.)

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• "There was no smoke in his lungs. None -- no other
part except for his exterior was burned. We know
that his clothes, the back of his shirt, his shorts,
if you look through the photos, are preserved,
because he was laying down when that fire started."
(Emphasis added.)

• "We know that the area of origin was at Demond's
feet, and we know that the fire debris at Demond's
Feet was intertwined with Demond's legs." (Emphases
added.)

• "He gave the defendant a target move-out date. And
we know that that target move-out date should have
been that day." (Formatting altered and emphasis
added.)

Some of these "we know" statements were tied to the

evidence presented at trial, but others were not or were at best

tenuous inferences from the evidence presented. When taking

these numerous "we know" statements "in context of the DPA's

entire closing argument and the trial record as a whole," these

statements were improper because, as a whole, they impermissibly

used the weight of the office to bolster the State's case. See

Willis, 156 Hawaiʻi at 206, 572 P.3d at 679; Browder, 154 Hawaiʻi

at 241, 549 P.3d at 326 ("A prosecutor's assertions of personal

knowledge 'are apt to carry much weight against the accused when

they should properly carry none.'") (citation omitted); Brown,

157 Hawaiʻi at 381, 577 P.3d at 1072.

The main thrust of the State's argument at closing,

which was repeated throughout, was that they did not know

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exactly what happened in Cox's apartment, but that the

circumstantial evidence tended to show that Deangelo did not

kill Cox in self-defense:

We may know not -- we may not know exactly what
happened in unit 407, what the argument was -- was about,
but we knew -- we do know that the defendant knows. The
defendant knows that what he did was not self-defense. It
was murder. And it was arson to cover it up.

By repeatedly using "we know" to show what could and

could not be known under the unique circumstances of this case,

the DPA implied that those statements using "we know" amounted

to statements of uncontroverted fact, including in instances

where those statements were not supported by the evidence

presented.

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court explained in Conroy,

In light of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's
office and the significant persuasive force the
prosecutor's argument is likely to have on the jury, this
court has repeatedly recognized that the prosecutor has a
duty to seek justice, to exercise the highest good faith in
the interest of the public and to avoid even the appearance
of unfair advantage over the accused.

148 Hawaiʻi at 203, 468 P.3d at 217 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Basham, 132 Hawaiʻi at 116, 319 P.3d at 1124).

There, the court further noted that "use of the inclusive

pronoun, 'we,' implied that the jury and the State had similar

interests and were working together in convicting" the

defendant. Id. at 202, 468 P.3d at 216. "This implication of

unity, and the suggestion of an alliance between the State and

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the jury against [the defendant], was improper." Id. at 202-03,

468 P.3d at 216-17.

Admittedly, the facts of Conroy differ materially from

the facts of this case, and the case at bar presents a closer

question. Nonetheless, although some individual uses of "we

know" may appear acceptable when viewed in isolation, when

viewed in the context of the entire closing argument, we are

left with the firm belief that the cumulative effect of the

DPA's overreliance on "we know" improperly bolstered the State's

case. See id.

C. Misconduct Requires Vacatur and Warrants Remand

Finally, because there was misconduct, we must

determine whether the misconduct was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt by looking at "the nature of the alleged

misconduct, the promptness or lack of a curative instruction,

and the strength or weakness of the evidence against the

defendant." Udo, 145 Hawaiʻi at 538, 454 P.3d at 479 (citation

omitted).

While the statement that "[t]he presumption of

innocence is gone" may have been harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because the circuit court immediately struck the

statement, the other improper statements were not harmless. For

the other improper statements, there were no curative

instructions and the evidence against Deangelo was

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circumstantial. Additionally, the use of "we know" was

pervasive. Thus, we cannot say that there was no reasonable

possibility that the improper statements may have contributed to

Deangelo's convictions. Accordingly, Deangelo's convictions

must be vacated. See State v. Williams, 149 Hawaiʻi 381, 392,

491 P.3d 592, 604 (2021).

Deangelo further argues that the improper statements

were so egregious that it warrants this court barring

reprosecution on remand. They do not.

The bar to reprosecution is only appropriate in the

exceptional case:

We note and emphasize that the standard adopted for
purposes of determining whether double jeopardy principles
bar a retrial caused by prosecutorial misconduct requires a
much higher standard than that used to determine whether a
defendant is entitled to a new trial as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct. Double jeopardy principles will
bar reprosecution that is caused by prosecutorial
misconduct only where there is a highly prejudicial error
affecting a defendant's right to a fair trial and will be
applied only in exceptional circumstances such as the
instant case. By contrast, prosecutorial misconduct will
entitle the defendant to a new trial where there is a
reasonable possibility that the error complained of might
have contributed to the conviction" sic.

State v. Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi 405, 423 n.11, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249

n.11 (1999) (first emphasis added).

This is not that case.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's

July 18, 2024 Judgments of Conviction and Sentence in 1CPC-22-

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0001357 and 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX and remand the cases for a new

trial.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, February 27, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Presiding Judge
Seth Patek,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge

Brian R. Vincent, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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