Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Angela K. Paton](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10800196/in-re-term-of-parental-rights-as-to-hk/about:blank#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.K.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0131

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Angela K. Paton

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0131
FILED 02-25-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015SV202400044
The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert. K., Lake Havasu City
Appellant

The Law Offices of Robert Casey, Phoenix
By Robert Ian Casey
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Genesis Legal Group, Glendale
By Alyssa N. Oubre
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Robert K. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to H.K. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s termination order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223
Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

¶3 H.K., who was born in July 2019, is Father’s biological child.
After H.K.’s birth, Angela B. (“Mother”) and H.K. moved to California to
live with Angela’s father and stepmother. Mother subsequently petitioned
for parenting time and legal decision-making for H.K. In October of that
year, the superior court ordered Father to undergo urinalysis testing, which
returned positive results for THC and amphetamines. The court ordered
Father to complete a hair follicle test, but he failed to comply.

¶4 In December 2020, the court adopted the parties’ agreement
that Mother have sole legal decision-making authority as to H.K., granted
Father parenting time every other weekend contingent upon his sobriety
proven by compliance with drug testing, and ordered Father to pay Mother
$300 per month in child support. Father, however, did not regularly test,
and Mother declined to allow him parenting time with H.K. as a result.

¶5 Father saw H.K. nine times between September 2023 and
August 2024 and did not see H.K. at all between August 2024 and December
2024. During the summer of 2024, Mother offered to let Father watch H.K.
while she worked, but Father consistently declined. And Father regularly
failed to pay child support. He paid for H.K.’s daycare until H.K. stopped
attending around July 2024. His final child support payment was $100 in
August 2024; after that, he paid no more.

¶6 In December 2024, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights as to H.K. based on abandonment and chronic substance
abuse grounds. The juvenile court appointed an investigator who
interviewed Mother, Father, and H.K., documented the family history, and
prepared a social study. During Father’s interview with the investigator,
he admitted he had not seen H.K. for the prior eight months and that he
was not paying child support on a regular basis. He reported he should not
have to pay child support because he was not seeing H.K.

2
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

¶7 Father initially told the investigator he had no drug charges
and no problems with probation but later admitted to being charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia. Father also claimed he had never tested
positive for drugs while on probation, which was false. Mother reported
that Father’s probation was revoked in 2024 after he tested positive for
methamphetamine and cocaine. The investigator concluded that Mother
appropriately denied visitation based on Father’s failure to drug test and
recommended termination based on Father’s abandonment of H.K.

¶8 The juvenile court set a contested termination trial for June 16,
2025, at 8:30 a.m. Father was informed of the date and time while present
at a scheduling conference on May 8, 2025. Father, however, failed to
appear in person or virtually on the trial date. Father’s attorney told the
court she mistakenly told Father the trial began at 9:00 a.m. and asked the
court to waive his appearance during the beginning of testimony and not
find him in default. She also said she had been communicating with Father
via email that morning “on at least four occasions.” The court delayed the
trial start time until a few minutes after 9:00 a.m. at which time Father still
had not appeared. It found no good cause for his failure to appear, found
him in default, and proceeded in his absence.

¶9 After hearing from Mother, the social study investigator, and
Mother’s fiancé Christopher M. (“Fiancé”), the juvenile court found Mother
had proven the abandonment ground by clear and convincing evidence but
not the chronic substance abuse ground. The court then found it was in
H.K.’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues (1) the juvenile court improperly found Father
failed to appear without good cause and held him in default, (2) Mother
improperly prevented him from seeing H.K., excusing his abandonment,
and (3) termination was not in H.K.’s best interests.

¶12 We note at the outset Father failed to cite any legal citation or
the record in his opening brief. An opening brief must include an argument
containing the appellant’s contentions about the issues presented, along
with supporting reasons and citations to the record and legal
authority. ARCAP 13(a)(7); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶

3
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

62 (App. 2009). An appellant’s failure to support or develop an argument
waives the issue on appeal. Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶
6 n.2 (App. 2007). The decision to find waiver, however, is discretionary,
Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018), and
because the best interests of a child are at stake, we decline to do so here
and will address the merits, see Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App.
2013).

¶13 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory
ground for termination exists and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence
that the termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018); see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (listing
grounds for termination). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). We therefore affirm the
juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence.
Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93-94, ¶ 4 (App. 2009).

I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding Father
in default.

¶14 Father argues the court abused its discretion in finding him in
default, arguing that his absence should be excused because he was
misinformed about the hearing time, experienced poor cell service, and had
no Wi-Fi connection. A finding of good cause for failure to appear rests
within the juvenile court’s discretion. Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
215 Ariz. 96, 101, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). Therefore, we review for abuse of
discretion, which occurs if the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion was
“manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for
untenable reasons.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶15 If a parent fails to appear at a pretrial conference, status
conference, or termination trial, and the court confirms the parent received
the required notice under Section 8-535, the court may deem the parent to
have “waived his or her legal rights and admitted the petition’s
allegations.” Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 53, 58, ¶ 27 (2017);
A.R.S. § 8-535(D). The court may then “terminate the parent’s rights based
on the record and evidence presented.” Marianne N., 243 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 27;
A.R.S. § 8-537(C). Although Section 8-537(C) does not explicitly reference
“default,” it effectively incorporates the concept from Rule 55 of the
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure when a parent fails to appear at a

4
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

termination hearing. See Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299,
304, ¶ 14 (App. 2007). But a parent does not waive his rights and admit the
petition’s allegations if he shows good cause for the absence, which requires
him to show both “excusable neglect” and a “meritorious defense.” See id.
at ¶ 16.

¶16 Here, Father failed to appear at trial despite being properly
notified of the date and time in open court on May 8, 2025. Father was also
not prejudiced when his attorney mistakenly told him the trial started at
9:00 a.m. because the court waited to start the trial until after 9:00 a.m. And
while the court indicated it would proceed in his absence, it noted he could
appear in person or virtually at any time during the proceedings. He did
not. We are not persuaded by Father’s claimed poor cell service and lack of
Wi-Fi because his attorney told the court she had been communicating with
Father that morning and he expressed no issues about connecting remotely.
Father’s counsel cross-examined witnesses and otherwise participated in
the trial on his behalf. The court did not abuse its discretion by finding
Father in default. See Marianne N., 243 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 27; A.R.S. § 8-537(C).

II. The juvenile court’s termination order is not clearly erroneous.

¶17 Father next argues that he did not abandon H.K.; rather,
Mother improperly prevented him from seeing H.K. by avoiding his phone
calls and refusing to let him pick up H.K. from school.

¶18 Whether abandonment occurred is a question of fact for the
juvenile court, and we will affirm its termination order unless clearly
erroneous. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20
(2000); In re B.W., 153 Ariz. Cases Dig. 19, 25, ¶ 14 (2025). A parent
abandons his or her child when he fails “to provide reasonable support and
to maintain regular contact with the child” and instead only makes
“minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” A.R.S. § 8-
531(1). A parent’s “[f]ailure to maintain a normal parental relationship with
the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima
facie evidence of abandonment.” Id.; In re B.W., 153 Ariz. Cases Dig. at 25,
¶ 15.

¶19 Here, the juvenile court found Father failed to maintain a
normal parent-child relationship with H.K. for more than six months.
Father saw H.K. only nine times between September 2023 and August 2024
and had no contact with H.K. at all from August through December 2024.
The court further noted Father had provided H.K. no financial support
between his $100 child support payment in August 2024 and the trial in

5
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

June 2025. Mother’s testimony and the investigator’s testimony and social
study support these findings.

¶20 Further, Father’s arguments are inconsistent with the facts.
Mother reported to the investigator that she offered Father the opportunity
to be more involved in H.K.’s life—for example, by inviting him to watch
H.K. while she worked throughout the summer of 2024—but Father
consistently declined. And Father did not dispute at trial that he agreed to
the arrangement that the court adopted early on regarding Father’s
parenting time. That agreement specifically provided that Father could
only exercise parenting time if he drug tested to prove sobriety—which he
did not do. Mother testified she repeatedly told Father he could see H.K. if
he submitted to drug testing, yet Father refused to do so. Reasonable
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father abandoned H.K.

III. Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s best interests
findings.

¶21 Finally, Father argues he “has a lot to offer his son,” so it was
not in H.K.’s best interests to terminate his parental rights.

¶22 We will affirm the juvenile court’s best interests findings if
supported by reasonable evidence. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240
Ariz. 96, 97, ¶ 6 (App. 2016). After finding a statutory ground for
termination exists, the juvenile court must then determine whether
termination is in the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the
evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). Once the court
finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for termination,
“termination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit
from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma
S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13.

¶23 “[A] determination of the child’s best interests must include a
finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed
by the continuation of the relationship.” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv.
Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Courts “must consider the
totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance
determination, including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s
rehabilitation.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1. The court may find a child
would benefit from termination if there is an adoption plan in place, or if
the child is considered adoptable—even if only one parent’s rights are
terminated. See In re M.L., 162 Ariz. Cases Dig. 13, 17-18, ¶¶ 13-17 (App.
2025).

6
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

¶24 In finding that termination was in H.K.’s best interests, the
court relied on his adoptability and Fiancé’s plan for adoption. Mother and
Fiancé were scheduled to marry in June 2025 and Fiancé testified he
intended to adopt H.K. as soon as possible. The court found Mother
provided H.K. with a loving, nurturing home where he is thriving. The
court further found H.K. and Fiancé shared an “amazing relationship,”
noting they spent significant time together, and already have a parent-child
relationship. Fiancé testified that he regularly took H.K. to and from school,
prepared his meals, and engaged in various activities with him, such as
video games and taking him to the park. Fiancé also testified he is an
attorney and financially capable of supporting H.K.

¶25 H.K.’s attorney also argued that termination was in H.K.’s
best interests because it would allow for Fiancé to adopt and give him a safe
and stable home. Although Father argues he has much to offer his son, we
do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶
18. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s best interests findings.

IV. Mother’s Answering Brief

¶26 Mother’s answering brief contains what appear to be
hallucinated quotations from statutes and cases.

¶27 Mother claims that Section 8-531(1) states that
“[a]bandonment is measured by a parent’s conduct, not the parent’s
subjective intent.” Mother also claims Section 8-533(B)(1) provides that
abandonment is established when the parent has failed to maintain a
normal parental relationship “without just cause.” These statutes do not
contain the language Mother quotes.

¶28 Mother also claims Raymond F. v. Department of Economic
Security, 224 Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 21 (App. 2010), contains the following quote:
“[a] parent who creates barriers to contact through substance abuse cannot
claim just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship.” This quote does
not exist in the case.

¶29 Finally, Mother cites JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 577, claiming it
states, “[a] parent’s ability to maintain a relationship must be judged by
what they do, not what another parent does or does not do.” Mother also
claims this case holds that Arizona courts consistently find: “[m]inimal
efforts do not preclude abandonment . . . sporadic or infrequent contact is
not normal parental contact.” We are unable to find these quotes within
this case.

7
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.
Decision of the Court

¶30 Counsel has ethical duties of candor to this court and to
certify that representations made to this court are accurate. Ariz. R. Sup.
Ct. 42, ER 3.3; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see also Mangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz. 346,
353-54, ¶¶ 29-32 (App. 2011) (sanctioning counsel for misrepresenting the
record and relying on inappropriate legal authorities). We will forward this
decision to the State Bar of Arizona to determine whether Mother’s counsel
violated any rules of professional conduct.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

8