Stonebridge Townhomes Owner's Association v. Ptoomey - Adverse Possession Dispute

IN THE COURT OF CHAN CERY OF THE STATE O F DELAWARE STONE BRIDGE TOWNHO MES OWNER S’ ASS OCIA TION, Plain tiff, v. MA RK T. PT OME Y and MART HA PT OME Y, Defe nda nt s.))))))))))) C.A. No. 20 20 - 0607 - SEM Final Report: Feb rua ry 2 7, 2026 Date S ubm itte d: Novembe r 1 3, 20 25 FINA L POST - TRIAL REPORT Chad J. Toms, Que en C. Nwang w u, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLC, Wilm ingto n, D elaw are; Co unse l for Plaintiff Sto nebridg e Prop erty Owners’ Assoc iation, I nc. Mark T. Pto mey, Mart ha K. Pt omey, Wilm ing ton Dela war e; Self - Repr es ent ed Defenda nts. MOLINA, Seni or M agi strat e

This ho meowner s ’ asso ciation dis pute be gan more than fi ve years ago with the assoc iation’ s com pla int a lleg ing ho meo wner s were tr espa ssi ng on the commun ity’ s comm on are as. The hom eowne rs do no t dis pute th at the y are exclu sive ly us ing a nd en joyin g the a rea at issue. Bu t they ar gue tha t they h ave acquir ed ti tle to the ar ea through a dver se posse ssi on. Th at adve rse pos sess ion coun terc laim was t he f ocus of o ur tr ial la st f all. Thro ugh this pos t - tria l deci sion, I concl ude t he ho me owne rs fa ile d to mee t the ir b urde n of pr oof and j udgme nt s houl d be ent ere d for the assoc iati on on i ts tre spass c laim. The c onte sted a rea sh ould be cleared out, returned to the asso ciation, a nd r emed iate d at t he home owners’ ex pense. The as socia tio n sho uld rec ove r cos ts as t he pr evai ling party, but a ttor ney s’ fee s shoul d no t be sh ifte d. This i s my f inal r epor t. I. BACKG RO UND 1 This ac tion wa s init iat ed by St onebr idge T own home O wners ’ Assoc iation (the “Pla intif f”) a gain st homeowne rs Mar k T. P tome y and M artha K. P tome y (th e “Def enda nts”). The Plain tiff is a non - pro fit De la ware co rpor ati on, which is respo nsi ble for the m ainte na nce of the pr iv ate ope n spac e of t he de vel opme nt kn own 1 The facts in this report reflect my findings based on the record d eveloped at trial on October 15, 20 25. See Docket Items (“ D.I.”) 163. I grant the evidence the weight and credibility I find it des erves. Citations t o the trial transcri pt are i n the form “[La st Name] Tr.” referring to the testimony of th e identified person; I use full name s to differentiate the defendants. The plai ntiff’s exhibits are cite d as “PX,” and the defe ndants’ as “DX.”

2 as Sto nebr idge, a c omm unity of to wnh omes i n Ne w Cas tle, Delaware. 2 The Defe nda nts own a t ownh ome i n Stone brid ge loc ated on 457 Sto nebri dge B lvd. (th e “ Unit ”). The U nit is adja ce nt to la nd wh ich is denot ed a s privat e ope n spa ce ow ned and cont roll ed by Sto nebr idge (the “C ommon Ar ea”). It is t he De fenda nts’ (prim aril y Mr. P tome y’s) use of th at Co mmo n Area t hat is i n dis pute. I will begin with a fac tual backgr oun d, bef ore turn ing t o the dispute befo re me. A. Stonebrid ge The St onebr idg e co mmu nity date s bac k, at leas t, to 1 989. The o rigi nal p lan was for con dom iniu ms. 3 I n Nove mber 1989, Man n - Tal ley E ng ineer s & Sur ve yors recorded a re - s ubdiv isi on pla n for St one bridg e, pre suma bly t o tha t effec t. 4 That plan was t hen s uper sede d by a 1990 plan subm itte d by S ton ebri dge T own homes, Inc. fo r a comm unit y of to wnhom es. 5 In that 1990 plan, t he deve lope r co nfir med tha t the subdiv ision would includ e “open spa ce” wh ich wo uld be m ainta ine d priva tel y and availa ble for pub lic use. 6 The Pla inti ff w as incor por ated in 1990 to ma na ge and maint ain t hat s pace. 7 2 PX8 (B). 3 See Weinsteiger Tr. 95:11-14. 4 See PX7. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 PX8(C) at 43–44.

3 Prope rtie s wit hin Sto nebri dge ar e gover ne d by a set of d ocume nts, incl udin g Stone brid ge’ s Decla r atio n of Re stric tio ns and s upple men ts thereto (coll ectively referred to as the “Declarat ion”), 8 and the Sto nebr idge To wnh omes Ow ner’ s (sic) Assoc iat ion R ules a nd Re gula tion s (the “Re gula tions ”). 9 The De clar ati on pro vide s, i n rele van t part, tha t owne rs of units wit hin Stone brid ge sha ll ha ve “the f ree a nd uni nte rrupte d use of al l of th e . . . privat e and/ or public ope n spa ce, as show n on the Plan s, in c omm on wit h oth ers e ntitle d the ret o forever.” 10 It furt her prov ides t hat e ach ow ner, “by acc ep tance of the deed, gra nts t o all o ther s uch o wner s, .. . the f ree a nd uni nt erru pted use of a ll t he .. . priva te a nd/ or public ope ns spa ces, an d gran ts to the ma inte nance cor pora tion the r ight t o com e upon a n y owne r’s pro per ty for purp oses of m aint aini ng the. . . priva te an d/or pub lic open s pace s.” 11 There is n o di spute tha t the C omm on Ar ea is a co vere d “o pe n space.” 12 The Re gulatio ns gover n how h ome owne rs w ithin t he c ommu nity c an se ek alter ati ons to co mmu nity pr oper ty. S pecifi cal ly, Sec tio n E prov ides th at 8 PX8(A)–(D). 9 PX8(E). 10 PX8(C) at 45–46. 11 Id. 12 See PX7; D.I. 5 ¶ 10.

4 homeo wner s m ust se ek “ prior co nsen t of t he Boa rd [.] ” 13 Owners are also p rohibit ed from insta llin g fe nces or en gagi ng in “ noxi ous o r off ensi ve ac tivit y.” 14 B. The Unit Altho ugh, at fir st g lanc e, the Defe nda nts appea r to b e newc omer s to t he commun ity, the Unit is t heir fam ily prope rty. It wa s orig ina lly owne d by Ms. Ptome y’s s iste r and M r. Ptom ey’ s aun t: Mary El iza beth “Beth” Kuh n. Ms. Kuhn purch ase d the Unit direct ly from the b uilde rs of the Sto nebri dge c ommu nity on September 3 0, 19 92. 15 N eighbo rs descri bed Ms. K uhn a s a “nice” per son and an overa ll “ great” neighbo r. 16 The Def end ant s’ disp uted u se of the C omm on Area st em s from Ms. Kuhn ’s histor ica l use. S he f irst a lte red a nd m ain taine d th e area to ad dre ss dra ina ge iss ues that sh e face d when she moved i nto her home in 1992. 17 “[D] uring h eav y rai ns, sh e 13 PX8(E) ¶ E(1). The board must then respond to written request s within 45 days. PX8(E) ¶ E(2). 14 PX8(E) ¶ E(8); PX8(E) ¶ F(9). 15 PX5. See also Mackes Tr. 32:3–6. 16 Weinsteiger Tr. 94: 17 – 20; Mackes Tr. 74:12. Robert Mackes, owne r of Unit 465 since 2008, and Ms. Kuhn’s neighbor for approxi mately seven years, de scribed her as being “very personal” and keeping “her prope rty meticulously m aintained.” Mackes Tr. 15:19 – 16:4, 74:12 –14. Mr. Mackes’ property is located on the opposit e corner of t he same building as the Uni t. M ackes Tr. 21:4 –7. Ann Weinsteiger, also Ms. Kuhn’s neighbor for several years and owne r of Unit 457, described Ms. Kuhn as be ing “very nice” an d “down - to-earth.” Weinsteiger Tr. 94:17 –223. From her property, she can view the Common Area. Weinsteiger Tr. 94:3–14. 17 See Mackes Tr. 22:10 –24; see also Wein steiger Tr. 98:5 –21.

5 would ge t wat er in he r house. And so [,] by agreeme nt wit h the bu ilder and the n subse que ntly t he boa rd of dire ctor s, she was give n perm issi on to maint ain a swa le [18 ] that d irec ted the wate r away f rom the c ommo n area.” 19 M s. Kuhn also ha d perm issio n to ma inta in a garde n, s hed, and fence wit hin the Com mon Ar ea. 20 Ms. K uhn was gra nted this spec ial permi ssio n to u se and e njo y the C omm on Area despite the restricti ons i n the Declarati on. 21 When Ann Weinsteig er first beca me a b oard m ember in 20 11, she as ked a bout M s. K uhn’ s she d and fe nci ng in the Com mo n Area, and was told by prior b oar d memb ers t hat: “ it ha d been grandf at here d beca use the y ha d been b uil ding [Stone bri dge] as con domi nium s. .. [a]n d the n whe n it be cam e to wnhom es an d the y were no t goin g to al low that type of shed a nd fe nci ng in c omm on ar eas, the y . .. allow[e d] [M s. K uhn’ s fenc ing] there. ” 22 18 A “swale” is a “low - lying or depressed and often wet stretch of land.” M ERRI AM - W EBSTE R, https://www.merriam - webster.c om/dictionary/swale (la st updated Sep. 24, 2025). 19 See PX10(A); Mackes Tr. 22: 16 –21, 26:7–11; Wei nsteiger Tr. 103:16 –20. Th e Defendants’ trial test imony disputing an y such permission was n ot persuasive and was overborne by the evidence to the contrar y including Ms. Ptom ey’s own deposition testimony. See Martha Ptomey Tr. 313:16–31 6:8. 20 See PX20 (Martha Ptomey Dep.) 5:23 – 6:3 (stating that the shed we nt in shortly af ter Ms. Kuhn purchased the Unit). Mr. Ma ckes testifi ed that Ms. Kuhn ha d a small garden, which contained “some tomato plants, vege table plants, basil, her bs, things like that, [and] s ome flowers.” Mackes Tr. 23:16 – 18. Mr. Mackes also testified that community members had open access to Ms. Kuhn’s gard en, somethin g Mr. Ptomey disputes. Compare Macke s Tr. 23:21–24 with Mark Pt omey Tr. 260:23– 261:4. 21 See Mackes Tr. 23:7– 9. 22 Weinsteiger Tr. 95:3– 12.

6 Mr. P tomey was no t priv y to an y per mis sion gr ant ed but wa s a fr equen t vis itor to his au nt’s prop erty. He helped Ms. Ku hn wor k on the proper ty star tin g when he was aroun d eigh t or ni ne ye ars ol d. 23 Ms. Ptome y was a lso pr ivy t o Ms. K uhn’ s garde ning ac tivit ies. 24 It a ppear s they both en joyed a close rela tionshi p with Ms. Kuhn un til he r passing in February 2015. C. The Ptomeys Short ly af ter M s. Kuhn’ s pa ssin g, Mr. P tom ey mo ved i nto t he Unit. 25 He wa s, initi ally, a tenant, until h e and his mother, Ms. Ptom ey, officially p urcha sed the U nit on Mar ch 31, 2017. 26 This c han ge of o wner ship tr igge red a few thin gs. On the Pla in tiff ’s si de, i t compe lle d Ms. We ins teig er, a cti ng on be half of the Plaintif f, to direc t the commun ity’ s pro per ty mana ger that, with t he tran sfer, “the s hed sh oul d be rem oved, unle ss [St one brid ge’ s] ar chi tectu ral guide li nes c han ge b efore the n.” 27 The P lai ntiff, thus, anticipa te d that the new ow ner s would ha ve reduce d use and p osse ssi on of th e Comm on Ar ea. 23 Mark Ptomey Tr. 207:23–208:3; PX 19 (“ Mark Ptomey Dep.”) 29: 4 –8. See also Mackes Tr. 56:13–21. 24 Martha Ptomey Tr. 29 2:14–20. 25 Mark Ptomey Tr. 241: 14–19. 26 PX6. The parties disp ute whether Mr. Ptomey had, and disclose d to th e Plaintiff, a rental agreement for his initia l residence; that fac tual issue is n ot material to t he dispute present ly before me. 27 PX10(A).

7 Mr. P tomey ha d oth er pla ns. S hor t ly af te r the De fenda nts t ook ti tle to t he proper ty, Mr. Ptomey sta rted t o make m odif ica tio ns to the C omm on Area. Th e Defe nda nts fir st ex pan ded th e or iginal f enc ing and the n the patio. Mr. Ptomey test ified tha t he “re placed” the fenc ing be ca use th e or igina l fen cin g was t wen ty yea rs old at the tim e and wa s “bent over with ve getat ion or wit h anim als tryi ng to go over it [or ] under it.” 28 But the Defe nda nts a lso signifi cantly expan ded the size, material, and p eri met er of the f encin g. 29 The Defenda nts als o re move d the central gard en and expanded the s ize o f th e origi nal p atio unde rneath. Mr. Ptomey tes tifi ed that he remo ved Ms. Kuhn’ s cent ral garde n because his la rge d ogs de stro yed it by constantly running throug h it. 30 When he took out t he ce ntra l gar den, he fo und a “crum bli ng pati o” be neath it. 31 He, thu s, 28 Mark Ptomey Tr. 24 7:8 –12. 29 See, e.g., P X13 (showing an enc losed fenc e with a topper mad e of black tarp). This expansion was confirmed by the Defendant s’ evidence, in particular the Google Earth images in DX1. The Plaintiff objected to DX1 for lack o f authent ication. Tr. 20 3:21– 204:10. That objection is overruled and DX1 is admitted into evidence. Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 901, authenticati on requires the proponent to produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the ite m is what the p roponent claims it is. One way to do that is through testimony of a witness with k nowledge — i.e., te stimony that an item is what it i s claimed to be. D.R.E. 901(b)(1). At trial, Mr. Ptomey and Ms. Pt omey testified to their intimate familiarity with the Unit, the changes done over the years, and that those changes were accurately reflected through the pic tures in DX1. See, e.g., Ma rk Ptomey Tr. 20 6:2 – 215:23. That testimony is sufficient to show that the image s are what Mr. Ptomey claims them to be—changes t o the Unit and Co mmon Area from 1992 to present. 30 Mark Ptomey Tr. 24 2: 12–17. See also M ark Ptomey Dep. 13:16 – 18 (“[the garden] got removed when I got there becaus e my dogs just were killi ng everyt hing in it as so on as they ran out the door.”); DX1. 31 Mark Ptomey Tr. 24 3:6 –7.

8 hired a co ntrac tor to bri ng the “crumb ling” p atio u p to the le vel of the or igin al patio. 32 Mr. Ptomey testif ied th at he wa s not “enlar gin g” the pat io but “ mer el y repa ir[in g] the c onc rete tha t exis ted.” 33 But, in his August 22, 20 22 deposi tion he admit ted t o ext end ing the s urfac e are a. 34 He expla ined t hat onc e the or igina l cen ter garde n wa s rem ove d, th e “cr umb ling pat io” wa s “pr oba bly a bout ten inche s belo w the exis tin g pad, so [he] had [concrete] poure d on t o top t o ma ke it s o it wa s [an ] even tr an sitio n fr om the o ther pad inste ad of hav ing a step dow n.” 35 This w ork wa s not well take n. Ac ting on beha lf o f the P lain tiff, M s. Wein stei ger put a n ote on the Def en dants’ fro nt door i nform ing the m that t hey ne eded to s top the ir work a nd reac h out t o the m anag ing c omp any. 36 She also s ent an em ail to the ma nagi ng c ompa ny o n May 29, 201 8, m aking them awa re o f the 32 Id. at 243:7 –14. 33 Id. at 243:14–16. 34 Mark Ptomey Dep. 13: 10–12. 35 Id. at 13:18–14:3. Mr. Ptomey was doing more than expandin g the footprint for personal enjoymen t; he began operati ng an animal rescue in the Unit and i nto the Comm on Area in or around 2023. See Mark Ptomey Tr. 245:13 –14. Whether those commercial activities were a separate violation of the restrictions o n the Unit was an issue in this a ction until the second pretrial conference as addressed bel ow. The co mmercial activities wi ll not be addressed in this report. I will also n ot attempt to su mmarize or opine on the c riminal proceedings tha t appear to be ongoing regarding t he animal re scue and removal of said anima ls from the Unit. See D.I. 147. Those matters are outs ide the scope of the issues ripe for my consideration. 36 Weinsteiger Tr. 113:1 3–19. This was after prior dispute s about the Defendants having a commercial vehicle pa rked outside the Unit. See PX10(B)– (C); We insteiger Tr. 111: 1 – 112:17.

9 activ ity be ing d one on the Com mo n Area, noting it req uired the Pla intif f’s appro val. 37 The Plain tiff then se nt a let ter to the De fen dant s on May 31, 20 18, inform ing th em tha t “[a]ll co nstr ucti on mu st ce ase u nti l the prope r ap prova l has bee n grante d by t he Ass ocia tio n, or leg al ac tion w ould be take n.” 38 That let ter went uncla ime d an d was r etur ne d to send er. 39 The P lain tiff sent a follow - up emai l to th e mana ging c ompa ny on June 30, 20 18, a sking t hat the y co nta ct an at torn ey and chara cte rizi ng th e sit uati on as “ urgen t.” 40 The Def en dant s enga ged w ith t he pro per ty mana ger a nd ac ted, t o some ext ent, upon th ese com municati ons. 41 Through an applic ati on date d Jul y 17, 201 8, the Defe nda nts first so ught a pproval for th e work “pr es entl y done ” to the pr oper ty. 42 The re tro acti ve re que st wa s form all y de nie d by le tter date d October 19, 2018. 43 The Defe nda nts then made anoth er r eques t on May 20, 20 19, aga in for “work prese ntly 37 PX10(D). 38 PX10(E). 39 Id.; see also Weinsteig er Tr. 114:12–115: 14. 40 PX10(F). 41 See Mark Ptomey Tr. 246:8 –21. 42 PX10(G). 43 PX10(H).

10 done.” 44 T he P lain tiff did not re spo nd to the reit era ted req uest in w riti ng; 45 rather, i t hire d legal c oun sel to take ov er th e dis pute. 46 Thro ugh co unse l, the P lain tiff, on Au gust 1 3, 202 9, alerted the De fendan ts to their tr es pass a nd re ques ted to s ched ule a m eetin g. 47 T he Pla intiff ’s r e quest was repea ted o n Au gust 2 7, 201 9. 48 The D efendan ts nev er respo nded to the se reque st s and a thir d re que st wa s mad e by t he Pl aint iff on Se pt ember 15, 2 019, this time warni ng t hat t he Pla intif f w ould s eek le gal a ctio n if they rece ived no r esp onse. 49 The Defend ants cont inue d to be unr esp onsi ve, and the P la intif f sent a fina l cease and desi st letter da ted Sep tembe r 2 8, 2019. 50 D. Pro ce dura l Post ure With the Defend ants unr espons ive and conti nu ing to use the Common Area, t he Plain tiff ult ima tely initiated this action on Jul y 22, 202 0. 51 Seeing a largel y 44 PX10(I). 45 See PX 8 (E) ¶ E(2). Ms. Weinste iger testified that a rejection was orally comm unicated to the Defendants throu gh the property ma nager. Weinstei ger Tr. 136:11–14. 46 Per Mr. Ptomey, the Defendants reached a potential ease ment agreement wit h the property manager, but i t was overruled by Mr. Weinsteiger. Tr. 246:14–20. 47 PX10(J). 48 PX10(K). 49 PX10(L). 50 PX10(M). 51 D.I. 1. While this action was pen ding, the Defendants co ntinued to alter and use the Common Area. See, e.g., PX1, PX13. This continued use was de scribed by multiple witnesses, including Sh arita Brooks, a code off icer for New Castle Co unty. Officer Brooks testified about her involvement wi th the Unit and the Defe ndants, in connectio n with

11 inact ive d ocke t, I wr ote t o the pa rtie s on A ugu st 17, 2 021 a ski ng ab out the sta tus of this ac tio n. In res pon se, the Pla intif f’s c ounsel a dvi sed on A ugu st 23, 20 21 “t hat th e partie s [had] r eache d a frame wor k for t he r esol ution of th is ma tter. ” 52 T hey hop ed to fil e a sti pul atio n w ithin 30 da ys. B y No vembe r, howe ver, t he par tie s repo rte d “a few po int s of con tent ion[, ]” w hich w er e hold ing up the st ipu lati on. 53 But, in Febr uary 2 022, c oun sel r epor ted t hat t he pa rties were “ uns ucc essfu l in rea ch ing a n amica ble re sol ution o f the matte r.” 54 With se ttle men t off the ta ble, l iti gati on tr uly be gan i n 2022. T he partie s initia lly tried to re so lve t his a cti on thr ough mot ion s for sum mary judgm en t. The Plain tiff filed its f irs t motion for sum ma ry judgm ent on Mar ch 1 8, 202 2. 55 I den ied that mo tio n without p reju dice on Jul y 14, 20 22 finding the evi dent iary r ecor d want ing, ye t wit h mat erial di spu tes of fact. 56 T hereafter, I entered a schedule f or fact complaints made to the county. Brooks Tr. 177:1 –179:18. Th ose complaints led to several inspections of the property, a search warrant, and a determination that the Unit was not livable. See Brooks Tr. 178:2 – 1 5, 188:18, 1 90:7 – 11. New Ca stle County’s i nvestigation and findings are outsid e the limited scope of these proceed ings. 52 D.I. 9. 53 D.I. 10. 54 D.I. 13. 55 D.I. 17. 56 D.I. 28.

12 disc overy to co nclu de by F ebr uar y 202 3, wit h ano ther oppor tu nity for di spo sit ive moti on prac tice t hereaf ter. 57 The Plainti ff fil ed their s econ d moti on for sum mar y judgm en t on Janua ry 11, 2023, 58 and the Defe ndant s cross - moved on March 16, 202 3. 59 A round this time, the case wa s reass igne d to newl y appoi nt ed Magist rate Jud ge Mitc hell. 60 Magistr ate Judge Mitc hell he ar d the se co nd mot ion for s umm ary ju dg ment a nd de nied i t t hroug h an or der da te d Nove mber 6, 20 23, explai ning there wer e sti ll gen uine dispu tes a s to mate ria l fact s, part icu lar ly rega rdi ng the Defen dant s’ ad verse posse ssion co unterclai m. 61 Magis trate Jud ge M itche ll t hen set a new sched ule, exp a nding the fa ct disc over y tim elin e a nd pe rmit tin g an other dis pos itive mot ion oppor tuni ty i n adva nce of a Ju ne 20 24 tr ial da te. 62 Under th is new sche dule, t he Defen dant s m oved a gain f or sum mar y judg men t on Mar ch 21, 2 024. 63 The Plai ntiff opp osed t he mo tion b ut, s hort ly the reaf ter, chang ed c ounse l. 64 With t hat c han ge of c ouns el, t he Pla inti ff re que sted a 57 D.I. 30. 58 D.I. 33. 59 D.I. 37. 60 D.I. 32. 61 D.I. 55. 62 D.I. 57. 63 D.I. 58. 64 D.I. 65, 68.

13 cont inua nce of the J une 20 24 trial da te, with an opp ortu nit y for more disc over y and anoth er dispo sit ive mot ion opp ortu nit y. 65 At a June 4, 2 02 4 telec onf erenc e, Magis tra te Jud ge Mi tche ll de nied t he latest motion for summary judgme nt, and grante d t he c onti nuan ce i n par t, dir ect ing the part ies t o sec ure a n ew tr ial date in F all 2024, and denyi ng th e Plai ntiff ’s re ques t to reo pen d isco ver y or file ano ther m otio n for summary judgment. 66 The pa rt ies ul tima tely la nde d on Oc tob er 2, 20 24 for the ir new tri al date. 67 Shortl y ther eafter, I w as reas sig ned t o this matter. 68 Thereaf ter, the Defe nda nts tr ied ag ain to sec ure summ ary j udgm ent; I de nie d the ir mot ion on Septe mber 24, 202 4. 69 Mr. Ptom ey t hen re que ste d a co nti nuanc e of the Oct ober 2, 2024 tr ia l for he alt h rea sons, whic h I gra nt ed by m inu te or der. 70 In conn ection with tha t cont inuance, the P laintif f sough t a statu s quo order. 71 I heard th at reque st d urin g a telec onf ere nce on Octo ber 2, 202 4, a nd granted it, in part, barr ing the D efe ndan ts, “a nd any one a ctin g on the ir beha lf, [from makin g] any 65 D.I. 67. 66 See D.I. 73–75. 67 See D.I. 78. 68 D.I. 79. 69 D.I. 87–88. 70 D.I. 91. 71 See D.I. 90–92.

14 modif ica tions, imp rove men ts, al tera tion s, or chan ges to t he ” Commo n Area (the “Sta tus Quo Or der”). 72 By April 2025, th e Plainti ff cont ends the Defe ndants were viol ating the Stat us Quo Ord er. 73 T he Pla inti ff mo ved f or c onte mpt a nd sa nc tions (the “C onte mp t Motio n”). 74 The Defe ndan ts de nied a ny co ntem ptuo us be hav ior, c ro ss - moved arguing the P lainti ff was th e bad ac to r, an d reque ste d mor e tim e to prepa re f or tri al, advoc atin g for a fur the r 6 - month cont inuance. 75 I heard and de nie d those reques ts a t a June 1 6, 202 5 tele phoni c hear ing; the Conte mpt M oti on, I rule d, would be 72 D.I. 93. Before the Status Quo Order, th e Defendants had continued to modify, alter, and expand their contested use. The most curre nt showing of their use was demonstrat ed durin g trial by drone footage obtained b y the Plaintiff. PX2. During trial, the Defendants objected to the admissibility of the drone footag e. See Defendants Tr. 59:24 – 60:7. I directed the Plaintiff to submit the flight approval plan and held in abeyance m y ruling on admissibility until I could review the plan and applicable De laware law. Tr. 63:16– 21. On November 5, 2025, the Plaintiff submitted: (1) a s cope o f w ork that depicts the agreement betw een the Plaintiff and its vendor; (2) a copy of the dr one pilot’s license by the Federal Aviation Administration (the “ FAA”); and (3) a copy o f the FAA’s approval, obtained by an online application. D.I. 161. T his submi ssion resolve s any concerns and PX 2 is admitted. Cf. 11 Del. C. § 1334 (crim inalizing, at the state leve l, certain drone operation, but exempt ing any use for “a commercial or other pur pose if the op erator is authorized by t he Federal Aviatio n Administration”); B ETHA NY B EA CH, DE., C ODE pt. III, ch. 212, art. III, § 212 - 6(b) (20 16) (prohibiting drone ope rators in the To wn of Bethany Beath from flying t heir drone: “[d]irectly over any p erson wh o is not involved in the op eration of the [drone], without such person’s consent; [and] “[o] ver property that the operat or does not own, without t he property owner’s co nsent, and subject t o any restrictions that the prope rty owner m ay place on such operation”). The operator was auth orized, the flig ht was over the Com mon Area at the behest of the Pl aintiff, and the Def endants have fa iled to articulate any wrongful conduct in connection t herewith. 73 See D.I. 95. 74 Id. 75 D.I. 97–102.

15 addre sse d post - tr ia l and the p artie s were to se cure a trial da te in or aro und Se ptem ber 2025. 76 Ultim atel y, I schedu led a pretri al c onfer en ce for S eptem ber 10, 2025, befor e an Oct ober 1 5, 2025 t rial da te. 77 The Def endants failed t o appe ar at th e init ial pr etr ial conference despite n otic e and oppor tunit y to do s o. 78 In their abs ence, I gra nt ed t he Plain tiff ’s t wo ev iden tiary r eq uest s and conf irme d tho se rul ing s by letter is sue d the same day as the conference. 79 I scheduled a nother pr etrial confer ence for Septembe r 29, 2025, which went forwa rd wi th all par ties pre sen t. 80 At the seco nd pre tria l c onfer ence, Mr. Pt ome y stipu late d tha t his “ busine ss wi ll n ot op erate on [the c onte ste d] pr oper ty.” 81 I instr ucte d the pa rtie s to wor k toget her t o memo riali ze tha t lim itin g stipu lati on in writ ing, b ut t hey wer e una ble t o do so a nd Mr. Ptome y la ter a ttemp ted t o qua lify o r limi t his re pre senta ti on. I h e l d Mr. P tome y to it, none the les s, as e xplain ed in my Octo ber 7, 202 5 rul ing den yin g Mr. P to mey’ s eme rgen cy m otio n for a t empor ar y restr ain ing or der a nd pre lim inar y inj unc tion. 82 At the seco nd pretr ial co nfer ence I 76 See D.I. 113–116. 77 D.I. 118. 78 D.I. 121–122. 79 D.I. 122. 80 D.I. 131. 81 D.I. 154 (Pretrial Tr.) at 30:13–14. 82 D.I. 147.

16 also limi ted the D efe ndan ts’ t rial pre senta tio ns to a cc ount for their fai lure to t ime ly disc lose exh ibi ts and wi tnes s lists. 83 The re sc hedu led tr ial went for ward a s pl ann ed o n October 15, 2 025. 84 T he partie s comple ted th eir evid ence but ne ede d addi tio nal ti me for clos ing rem ark s; I direc ted t hem to sub mit writ ten closing stat ement s on Oc tober 2 2, 2 025, which they did t imely. 85 The fina l out stan din g matt er re la ted t o dr one f oota ge pla yed a t trial, b ut for wh ich th e Def end ants pre serve d an ob jec tion; t he P laint iff pr oduc ed t he docum enta tio n I ord ered o n Nove mber 5, 2025. 86 With th e Defe nda nts’ le tte r respo nse t here to, f ile d on N ovem ber 1 0, 2 025, I too k this m att er un der a dvi seme nt. 87 II. ANAL YS IS Altho ugh init iate d as a tr espa ss ac tion, th e prim ary q uest ion before me i s whet her the Defe nda nts have advers ely po sses sed the Com mo n Area. If the answer is “ yes, ” the y are t he r ightf ul o wner s a nd ca nno t be held lia ble f or the al lege d trespa ss. If “ no, ” the y ha ve tre spa ssed, a nd the Plaint iff is en tit led to ju dgme nt in its favor and approp riate r elief. For the re asons expl ained herein, I conclude the 83 D.I. 131. 84 D.I. 155. Before trial, Mr. Ptomey filed two purportedly emergenc y motions related to animals at the Unit, wh ich I denied on Oct ober 7, 2025. D.I. 141–48. 85 D.I. 156; D.I. 158. 86 D.I. 161. 87 D.I. 162.

17 Defe nda nts ha ve fa ile d to m eet t heir bur den to pr ove a dvers e po ssess ion and I awa rd injunc tive an d mone tar y reli ef fo r the ir tre spa ss. The Pla inti ff’ s rema inin g req uest s for re lief a re lar gely d enie d. The Pla intif f faile d to prove vio lat ion s of t he Sta tus Qu o Ord er suf fic ient to find c ont empt; the Cont empt Moti on, as p reserve d, is therefor e deni ed. And the Plai ntiff has fai led to convi nce me that I should shi ft it s attorn eys’ f ees to the Defe nda nts. I do, however, recom me nd tha t cos ts be shif t ed in the P lai ntiff’ s fa vor a s the preva ili ng par ty. I addr ess t hese m at ters i n tur n. A. T he Defendants did not pr ove ad ver se p osse ssion. The D efendants ’ tre spa ss ont o the C omm on Area in thi s ma tter i s unco ntes ted; the Def en dant s have admi tted on num erou s occ asi ons tha t the y are us ing the Comm on Area as t heir ow n. 88 B ut the Defe nda nts c ontend that th ey ow n the pr ope r ty thro ugh ad verse posse ssi on. 89 To prevail o n their count er cl aim of ad ver se 88 See, e.g., D.I. 5 ¶ 1 2. 89 The Defendants also appear to argue that the Plaintiff conse nted to thei r actions by failing to respond to t heir Ma y 20, 2019 request. See Weins teiger Tr. 136: 7 – 14; D.I. 156 at V.2 (“silence in the face of obviou s possessio n is consent by acquiescence ”). The Defendants rely on paragraph E(2) of the Regulatio ns, which state s ‘[t]he Board shall have the obligation to answer any written request rec eived by it from a Unit O wner for approval of a proposed structural a ddition, alteration or improvement to hi s or her Unit within forty - five (45) days after rec eipt of such request, an d failure to do so within the stipulat ed time shall constitute a consent to the propo sal.” PX8(E) ¶ E(2). I n doi ng so, however, the Defendants ignore the preceding language, w hich states “[n]o U nit Owner (or tenant) may make any structural additions, alterations or improvements i n his or her unit or in or to the association areas, with out the prior consent of the Boar d[.]” PX8(E) ¶ E(1) (e mphasis

18 posse ssion, the Defe nda nts nee ded t o “ show by a prepo nder ance of the e vide nce t hat [they] used an d poss esse d the [C omm on Area], in a ma nner o pen a nd noto rio us, exclu sive, and host ile and adve rse, for a c ontin uou s sta tut oril y - prescr ibe d perio d of year s. The pre scri ptiv e perio d in Delaw are is tw enty ye ars. ” 90 “Pro of by a pr epo nderanc e of t he ev iden ce mean s proo f tha t somet hin g i s more like ly tha n no t. It me ans t hat ce rta in e vide nce, when com pa red to the e vide nce oppose d to it, ha s the more conv inci ng forc e and ma kes you be lie ve that something is mor e lik ely true tha n not. ” 91 If this b urde n is m et, the r ecor d hol der may o ver com e it wit h suff ici ent pr oo f that the use or pos sess ion was per mi ssi ve. 92 The Def enda nts’ ev id ence fa lls shor t. The Defen dant s have de mon stra ted t hat they posse sse d the C omm on Ar ea ope nly and not orio usly. But t he recor d sho ws that the i nitia l posse ssion was pe rmis sive a nd the expand ed pos sess io n, altho ugh ad ver se and h ostile, wa s not f or t he sta tut oril y requ ire d peri od (2 0 year s). added). Reading these provisions together, it would not be appropriate to treat the lack of written response as con sent. The Defendant s’ argument fai ls. 90 Swann Key s Civic As s’n v. Dippolito, 2022 WL 17999590, at * 6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2022), aff’d, 340 A.3d 1133 (Del. 2025) (citations omitte d). 91 St. of R.I. Off. o f Gen. Treasurer on Behalf of Emp ls.’ Re t. Sys. Of R.I. v. Paramount Glob., 331 A.3d 179, 190 (Del. Ch. 2025) (citing Agilent Techs., In c. v. Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (D el. Ch. Feb. 18, 2 010)) (internal qu otation marks omitted). 92 Est. of Waples v. Burto n, 2020 WL 328653 5, at *2 (Del. C h. Jun e 18, 2018) (cit ing In re Campher, 1985 WL 21 134, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 198 5)).

19 To reach the 20 - yea r per iod, t he Def enda nts p oint ba ck to Ms. Kuhn, who used p arts of the Comm on Ar ea for her fl ower be ds, shed, and fe ncing. Only with her use incl ude d can th ey reac h the 20 - ye ar mar k. Bu t the evide nce a t tria l demon stra ted tha t Ms. Kuhn ’s use was per mis sive, not ad verse or hosti le. And, e ven if her u se cou ld be se en as ad ver se or ho sti le, the Defe nda nts gr eatly e xpa nde d the foot prin t there of, c utt ing o ff the trac kin g per iod a nd def ea ting th eir c laim now. “A use is a dver se or h ostile if it is inc ons iste nt with t he rig hts of t he owner. ” 93 State d othe rw ise, “[h]os tile m ean s aga inst the cl aim of owne rsh ip of al l oth ers, incl uding t he rec ord ow ner.” 94 “ It is n ot nec essary t hat one enter ing a pro per ty mu st expre ssly de clare his inte nti on to take and hol d the prope rt y as his own. Th e actual entry u pon a nd the u se of the pre mis es as if it were his o wn, to t he exc lus ion of a ll other s, is suf fic ient. ” 95 The adve rse posse sso r mu st pr ove t hat the us e was a dve r se to the righ ts of the re cor d hol der. 96 The tr ial r ecor d c onfi rmed that Ms. Kuhn had perm ission f or her use o f the Common Area. Th e on ly evi denc e to t he con trar y was t he te stim ony of the Defe nda nts. Mr. Pto mey’ s test imo ny wa s unpe rsua siv e as la rgely self - serving and 93 Berger v. Colonial Pa rking, Inc., 1993 W L 208761, at * 4 (Del. Ch. June 9, 19 93). 94 Bogia v. Kleiner, 2019 WL 3761647, at * 10 (Del. Ch. A ug. 8, 2019). 95 Tumulty v. Schreppler, 132 A.3d 4, 27 (Del. Ch. 2015). 96 David v. Steller, 269 A.2d 203, 204 (De l. 1970).

20 admit tedl y lac king f ounda tio n. 97 Ms. Pt omey’ s te stim ony wa s e ven less persu asi ve beca use i t was unde rmin ed b y her dep ositi on te stim ony. 98 The Defen dant s’ evi denc e faile d to prove th at, m ore like ly tha n not, Ms. Kuh n’s use was adve rse and h ostil e, rathe r than pe rmissive. 99 Becau se Ms. Kuh n’s p osse ssi on of t he Com mon Area wa s perm issive, the De fen dant s can not tac k the 22 ye ars Ms. K uhn w as in pos sess ion of the Com mo n Area to the thr ee ye ars th ey wer e in poss essi on wh en th is ca se wa s initia te d; there fore, they fa il to meet th e 20 - year requi rement. B. The Com mon Area shou ld be cleared out and returned to the Plain tiff and remediated at the Defenda nts’ expense. Abse nt adver se p osse ssion, there is no dis pute th at the Defe ndan ts are trespa ssi ng. 100 The o nly que stio n that r ema ins is the relief warr ante d to add res s the ir trespa ss. The Pla int iff seeks m an dator y in junc tive re lie f and dama ges. F or the 97 Mark Ptomey Tr. 2 55:16 – 256:24 (admit ting that he never had a discussion w ith Ms. Kuhn about whether sh e had or did not ha ve permission t o utilize the Common Area). 98 See Martha Ptomey Dep. 5:23 – 6:3 (“Berman who owned the property let her, you know, put grass and stuff down, you know, when they were done and I don’t know who have her permission for the shed, but the shed went right in in October.”); Id. at 4:12–14 (“Nobody ever knocked on [Ms. Kuhn’s] door. Matter of fact neighbors came over to borrow — I mea n to cut her herbs and go through her garden[. ]”). 99 Cf. Weinsteiger Tr. 121:1 – 5 (stat ing that it was her “un derstanding t hat Ms. Kuhn h ad permission to maint ain the garde n and her shed on [the] property.”); Mackes Tr. 23:21 – 24 (explaining that members of the community h ad “open access” to help themselves to herbs and plants in the garde n.). 100 The Defendant s asserted the affirmative def enses of laches and equ itable estoppel in their answer and briefl y mentioned them i n their closing statement. See D.I. 5; D.I. 156. But the Defendants failed to meet their burde n of proof by failing to p roduce any evidence during trial supporting either of their defens es.

21 forme r, it s eeks a n inju ncti on re quir ing th e De fenda nts t o rem ov e any proper ty o n, or impr ovem ent s to, the Comm on Area and a pro hib itio n agai nst their u se or posse ssio n the reo f go ing f orwar d. 101 For t he l atter, it seeks dam age s for any cos ts i t incur s reme dia ting the C ommo n Are a to re mo ve the u naut hori ze d altera tio ns th eret o. I grant bo th forms of relief. For its r eq uest f or in jun ctiv e rel ief, t he Pla inti ff needed to pr ove “(1) ac tual succe ss o n the m eri ts; (2) i rre para ble h arm; and (3) t he ha rm r esul ting f rom f ai lure to issue an inj unc tion ou twei ghs the har m befal lin g the op posi ng par ty if th e injunc tio n is iss ued. ” 102 On the dam age s side, this C ourt has look ed t o an d ad opte d the Re statem en t (Sec ond) of Tort s under w hich “t he rea sona ble cos t of rep lacin g the land in its or igi nal p osi tio n is or dina rily a ll owab le as t he me asur e of re co very. ” 103 101 The Plaintiff initially sought further injunc tive relief barring the Defendants from operating a business at the Unit. D.I. 126. This request was reiterated in the Plaintiff’s closing statement. D.I. 158. As noted, howe ver, this issue wa s mo oted by Mr. Ptomey’s binding representation at the second pretri al conference. D.I. 131. I confirm herei n Mr. Ptomey’s binding repre sentation that his rescu e business will no long er operate at the Unit, subject to the limited exceptions ag reed to by t he parties at the pretrial conference. See D.I. 147. 102 ID Biomed. Corp. v. TM Techs., In c., 1995 WL 1307 43, at *15 (De l. Ch. Ma r. 16, 19 95) (citing Draper Commc’ns, Inc. v. De l. Valley B roads., L.P., 505 A.2d 1285, 1288 (Del. Ch. 1985)). 103 Gordon v. N at’l R.R. Passenger C orp., 1997 WL 298320, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997) (quoting RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 29 cmt. b (1979)).

22 Here, t he Pla int iff met i ts bur de n of proof on both inj unc tive r elief an d da mag es. T he Defen dant s’ cont inu ing tr espas s ont o the C omm on Are a amount s to irreparable harm. Th e Defen dan ts are exc lus ivel y pos sess ing the Plaint iff’s pr iva te land w itho ut the ir pe rmis sio n and e xclu din g othe r mem ber s of the c omm unit y from free a nd uni nter rup ted use of the C ommo n Area; inj unct ive re lief to h ave the Defe nda nts’ ite ms rem ove d and the Co mmo n Area return ed to t he Pla intiff is warra nte d. The Pl ainti ff a lso suffer ed dam ages d ire ctly ca use d by the Defen dant s’ trespa ss. Here, the Plaintif f i s seek ing dama ges suff icien t to co mpe nsa te it fo r restor ing the la nd t o it s nat ural c ondi tio n. The am o unt is pr ese ntl y unkn own, beca use of the Pl aint iff’ s exclu sive and hos tile p osse ssi on. The Comm on Ar ea sho uld be retur ned to the P lain tif f, whic h can r eme dia te the u nau thor ize d mod ifica tio ns ther et o and assess the reasonable cost t here of to the Defe nda nts. C. The Plaint iff h as not d emonst rate d th at th e Defen dant s sho uld be sanct ioned for vio latin g the Status Quo Order. Th ro ugh t he Conte m pt Moti on, which was he ld for p ost - t rial c ons ider ati on, the Pla inti ff fur the r argu es tha t the Defe nda nts v iola ted t he St atus Quo Or der an d shoul d be sa nc tione d acc ord ingly.

23 To pro ve con tem pt, the P lain tiff ne ede d to de mon stra te th at th e Defe ndan ts were “ bou nd by an o rder, ha [d] notice of it, a nd neve rthe les s viola te [d] it.” 104 T he v iolat ion “m ust n ot be a mere te chn ical on e, but m ust co nst itute a fail ure to o bey th e Court i n a mea nin gfu l way. ” 105 The P lainti ff, as “party p etitioning f or a f inding of cont empt [, bore] t he burden to show conte mpt by cle ar and convinc ing evide nce.” 106 The Pla intif f fa iled to me et th is bur den. The Plain tiff conte nds th at th e Defe nda nts co ntin ued to a lte r the C omm on Are a de spit e my pr ohib iti on in the Status Quo Or der. But t he P laint iff fail ed to present c onv inci ng ev ide nce that mate rial alter ati ons were mad e after I issued t he St atus Quo Or der; the chang es and time line are not suf fic ient ly d efini te for me to c onc lude a kno wing, inte ntio nal v iola tion by the re quir ed cle ar an d con vinc ing e vid ence. D. Preva ilin g par ty cos ts sho uld be shift ed; attorn ey s’ fe es sh ould be borne by each side. Final ly, t he Pla inti ff asks t hat its attorn eys’ fees an d cost s incurr ed in thi s action be shif ted t o the D efend ants unde r 10 Del. C. § 348 (e). Section 348 sets up 104 Aveta Inc. v. Bengoa, 986 A.2d 1166, 1181 (Del. Ch. 2 009). 105 Dickerson v. Castle, 1 991 WL 208467, a t *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1991). 106 Trascent M gmt. Cons ulting, LLC v. B ouri, 2 018 WL 6338996, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2018). Clear and co nvincing evidence “is a higher evi dentiary standar d than a preponderance of the evidence, but is a lesser standard of proof beyond a rea sonable doubt.” Amstel Assocs., L.L.C. v. B rinsfield - Ca vall Assocs., 2002 WL 1009457, at *5 n.12 (May 9, 2002). That standard requires evidence that would lea d a trier of fact to “an abidi ng conviction that the trut h of the [factual] contention is ‘highly pro bable.’” In re Mar tin, 105 A.3d 967, 975 (Del. 20 14).

24 an expe dite d proce ss for cer tain h ome owne rs ’ a ssoc iati on dispu tes. If tha t proce ss i s follo wed, u nder Se cti on 34 8(e), “[t] he nonpr evai lin g par ty a t tri al he ld p ursua nt to the pr ovi sions of t his secti on m ust pay t he pre vai ling par ty’s a tt orney fee s and cour t cost s, un less the c ourt f inds tha t enforcing this subs ection would result in an unf air, unrea sona ble, or hars h ou tcome. ” 107 Sectio n 348(e) gives this Cour t “the dis cretion to de ny fee shif tin g in whole, a di scre tio n tha t inc lude s the le sser power to c onc lude that whole hog f ee sh ifti ng w ould be unf air, unre aso nabl e, or h arsh in th e circ umsta nce s.” 108 For a n acti on t o be t rea ted as expe dite d un der Sect ion 3 48, the Pl aint iff neede d to “at tac h to the com plai nt, a c ert ifica tio n that the c ase i s eli gib le to proce ed u nde r 10 Del. C. § 348 [,]” as re quir ed in C ourt of C hancer y R ule 1 74(c)(2). Th e Pla intif f faile d to do so. And, as t he pr oced ura l post ure of thi s cas e refle ct s, thi s case proce ede d in an yth ing but e xpe dite d fas hio n. Sect ion 348 fee shi ftin g is unavailable, and t he Pla intif f ha s fa iled to art icula te a ny other e xce ption to t he Am erica n R ule. 109 107 10 Del. C. § 348(e). 108 Swann Keys Ass’n v. S hamp, 2008 WL 4 698478, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2008). 109 See Johnston v. Arbitrium (Cayman I slands) Handels AG, 720 A. 2d 542, 545 (Del. 1998) (“Under the Am erican Rule, absen t express statut ory language to the con trary, each party is normally oblig ed to pay only hi s or her own attorneys’ fe es, whatever th e outcome of the litigation.”). To the extent the Plaintif f is seeking bad faith fee shifting, it has faile d to meet the heavy burden required. Se e Donnelly v. Keryx Bio pharma ceuticals, Inc., 2019 WL 5446015, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2 4, 2019) (“The Court ty pically will not find a lit igant acted in bad faith f or purposes of shiftin g attorneys’ fees unless the litigant’s co nduct rose to the level of ‘glaring egregiousness.’”).

25 The Pla int iff is, ho wever, e ntitle d to c ost s un der C ourt of Ch ancer y R ule 54(d), wher e “co sts s hall be a llo wed a s of co urse to the pr evai ling p arty u nles s the Court ot her wise d irec ts.” 110 This Co urt ha s defi ned a preva ili ng p arty a s “t he par t y who suc cess full y pre vail s on the me rit s of the m ain issu e or on most o f he r claim s.” 111 Here, th e Pl aint iff is the pre vaili ng par ty, an d cos ts sho uld be s hifte d in its fa vor. III. CONCL USIO N For the reaso ns sta te d here in, I f ind that the Defe ndan ts did not acqui re ti tle to the Comm on Ar ea thr oug h adv ers e pos sess ion. I t her efor e find in favor o f the Plain tiff o n its tre spas s claim. An in junct i on should be iss ued re quiring the Defe nda nts to rem ove a ny pr ope rty f rom the C omm on Ar ea a nd barr ing them fro m cont inue d tres pass. Once pos session is return ed, the Pla intif f’s r eme dia tion c osts a nd expens es, if any, sh oul d be as sesse d a gain st the Defe nda nts a s a ppro pria te rem edi es for the ir unau thor ize d altera tion s. Each p art y should be ar the ir own leg al fee s and 110 At trial, Mr. Ptomey introduced and hig hlighted documentation showi ng attorneys’ fees and expenses purportedly charged to the Unit b y Stonebridge. See DX05. With this ruli ng, I expect the parties to meet and conf er to address wha t charges are appropriately included within the limit ed cost shifting g ranted herein; if they cannot, they may seek reli ef through motion practice. To avoid any unnecessary delay, any request for relief must be filed withi n 30 days of this post-tria l ruling becoming a n order of the C ourt. 111 Adams v. Calvarese Farms Maint. Co rp., 2011 WL 383862, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011) (emphasis in ori ginal).

26 expens es incurr ed in this ac tio n, but co sts sh ould be shif ted t o the Pla int iff as t he preva iling pa rty. This i s my f ina l rep ort, and e xce pti ons m ay be f ile d unde r Co urt of C hance ry Rule 1 44. Respe ctfu lly su bmit ted, /s/ Selena E. Mol ina Senior Magi stra te in Cha ncery