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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Quijano CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B339719

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/27/26 P. v. Quijano CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B339719

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. LA048968)

MARIA QUIJANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and
Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Stacy
Schwartz and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

In 2008, a jury convicted Maria Quijano (appellant) of
conspiracy to commit murder and first degree murder and found
true the special circumstance that the murder was committed for
financial gain.
In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied
the petition because the record of conviction shows that appellant
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We agree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, appellant paid a man to kill her husband,
Reynaldo Quijano. That man hired several others to do the job,
and one of them shot the husband to death in his car.2
A jury convicted appellant of conspiracy to commit murder
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) and first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and
found true firearm allegations (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and the
special circumstance that the murder was committed for financial
gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)).
Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. We affirmed her conviction on direct appeal.
(People v. Quijano, supra, B207955.)
In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, and the trial court appointed counsel. The People
filed an opposition to the petition, and appellant filed a reply.
The trial court then set an order to show cause, before staying the
case pending our high court’s decision in People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433. The court then recalled its decision to set an

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 These facts are drawn from the unpublished decision in
appellant’s direct appeal from her conviction. (People v. Quijano
(Oct. 19, 2009, B207955).)

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order to show cause and summarily denied appellant’s petition,
concluding that the jury instructions preclude the possibility that
appellant was convicted under a now invalid theory of murder.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable legal principles
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 in 2018,
abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
cases of murder and limiting the application of the felony-murder
rule. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder
convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is,
any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a
killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People
also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the
intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).)
Specifically, the Legislature amended section 188 to require that,
when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the
crime of murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and
“[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.)
Section 1172.6 contains the procedure for vacating the
murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be
convicted because of the amendments to sections 188 and 189.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959, 971.) After
appointment of counsel (if requested), the trial court must permit
briefing and hold a hearing “to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see

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Lewis, at p. 971.) At this stage, the trial court can and should
look to the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 970–971
[“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless”].) “If
the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a
prima facie case is made—that is, if the petitioner is not
ineligible as a matter of law—the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)
& (d)(1); see People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 543.)
Whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6 is a purely legal issue subject to de novo
review. (People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 447.)
2. The record shows that appellant is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law
Appellant argues that she is not ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because the jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and the instructions did not
require the jury to find the mens rea and actus reus necessary for
direct aiding and abetting. We disagree. Although the jury was
instructed on natural and probable consequences, it was also
instructed on direct aiding and abetting, and the instructions
given on the financial gain special circumstance and conspiracy
to commit murder required the jury to find that appellant
specifically harbored the intent to kill.3 (See People v. Medrano

3 We granted appellant’s request for judicial notice of the
record from the direct appeal (People v. Quijano, supra,
B207955).

4
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1265; People v. Cortez (1988) 18
Cal.4th 1223, 1226 [conspiracy to commit murder requires intent
to kill].) The instruction on the financial gain special
circumstance required the jury to find that appellant “intended to
kill” and that the killing was done for financial gain. (CALCRIM.
No. 720.) The conspiracy to commit murder instruction
(CALCRIM No. 563) required the jury to find that appellant
agreed with others “to intentionally and unlawfully kill another
person,” and that one or more members of the conspiracy
committed at least one of the overt acts enumerated in the
complaint. (See People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548,
645 [where defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder, there was no possibility they were found guilty of
murder on a natural and probable consequences theory]; People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395–396.)
These instructions foreclose the possibility that appellant
was convicted of murder on a theory of imputed malice, thereby
rendering her ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (See People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22,
31–32 (Whitson).) Appellant resists this conclusion, arguing that
the jury’s findings that appellant intended to kill did not require
“a union of act and intent.” She argues that because the killing
itself occurred after she had conspired with others to kill her
husband, the jury did not necessarily find that she still harbored
the intent to kill at the time her husband was actually shot. This
argument ignores that a defendant’s liability for a coconspirator’s
pursuit of the object of the conspiracy (here, murder) continues
until she affirmatively rejects or repudiates it and communicates
that repudiation to her former cohorts. (People v. Lovejoy (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 860, 869.) In the absence of such repudiation, a

5
defendant is “criminally responsible” for all efforts to achieve the
object without any additional finding regarding her “specific
mental state at the time of the shooting.” (Ibid.) Because there
was no finding of any repudiation by appellant, the killing by her
coconspirator qualifies as appellant’s own actus reus for the
purpose of direct aiding and abetting. (See Whitson, at p. 36 [“A
jury’s finding that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy to murder,
when a murder has in fact been committed, is ‘in effect [a finding]
that [the defendant] was a direct aider and abettor of the
killing[]’ ”].)
Appellant relies on People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433
(Curiel) to argue that her jury’s findings do not foreclose relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Curiel is readily
distinguishable. The court there held that the jury’s finding on a
gang-murder special circumstance that the defendant harbored
the intent to kill did not show he was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law where the jury was also
instructed on natural and probable consequences. The
instructions for the gang-murder special circumstance were:
“ ‘the People must prove that: [1] the defendant intended to kill;
[2] at the time of the killing the defendant was a member in a
criminal street gang; and [3] the murder was carried out to
further the activities of the criminal street gang.’ ” (Curiel, at
p. 447.) The instructions given in Curiel only required the jury to
find that the defendant knew the direct perpetrator intended to
commit one of the underlying target offenses and that he
intended to aid the perpetrator in that offense, not murder.
(Curiel, at p. 468.) Such is not the case here, where appellant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, meaning that the
target offense was murder and that appellant knew (by having

6
agreed with the others) that other members of the conspiracy also
intended to kill the victim.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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