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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Woodhouse v. State Bar of Cal.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: B346662

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (156)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 2/27/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, B346662

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 25STCV02208

THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA ET AL.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Woodhouse in pro. per. for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of California,
Ellin Davtyan, Kirsten Galler and Raymond R. Rollan for
Defendant and Respondent the State Bar of California.
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Kristin A. Linsley and Austin
Schwing for Defendants and Respondents Meta Platforms, Inc.
and Nike, Inc.
Davis Wright Tremaine and Dan Laidman for Defendant
and Respondent Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Matthew R. Reed and
John B. Kenney for Defendant and Respondent Alphabet, Inc.

---

The trial court ruled Benjamin Woodhouse is a vexatious
litigant. We affirm this finding. We hold that, as a matter of
law, Woodhouse’s complaint in this case asserts facts that are
delusional: his suit has no possibility of success. We likewise
affirm the trial court orders barring Woodhouse from future self-
represented suits that lack pre-filing approval and posted
security. Undesignated citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
I
Woodhouse holds himself out as the owner and principal of
a company called Havensight Capital LLC. Woodhouse is an
attorney. His California bar number is 261361. In 2024, the
State Bar of California, which Woodhouse made a defendant in
this action, placed him on involuntary inactive status, meaning
Woodhouse cannot practice law until this status changes. In
addition to the State Bar, the respondents in this action are Meta
Platforms Inc., Alphabet, Inc., Nike, Inc., and Warner Bros.
Discovery Inc.
A
To summarize, Woodhouse filed many lawsuits before his
complaint in this case. All his earlier suits were dismissed and
all his past appeals failed. Woodhouse and his company

2
Havensight have been declared vexatious litigants by the Central
District of California and the Southern District of New York, with
the latter issuing a nationwide injunction prohibiting them from
filing new cases in federal court without (1) pre-filing approval
and (2) the posting of security. Many judges have referred
Woodhouse to the State Bar of California.
We recount the relevant history in more detail. It began in
2014 in federal court. Woodhouse filed his first complaint that
year on behalf of his company Havensight against Nike in the
Central District of California. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Nike,
Inc. (C.D.Cal., Sep. 12, 2014 2:14-CV-07153) 2014 WL 4637513.)
Woodhouse alleged the “Nike FC” brand logo infringed a logo for
a Havensight-owned soccer brand “St. Thomas FC.” (Ibid.) The
court dismissed the case. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc.
(C.D.Cal., Nov. 19, 2014, CV 14–7153–R) 2014 WL 12613382.) In
a later case, the court recounted a series of frivolous requests and
other actions by Woodhouse that prolonged the proceedings in the
initial case, harassed Nike, and burdened the court—including
serial requests for default after Nike had timely moved to
dismiss, a writ of execution falsely claiming a judgment of almost
$250 million in favor of Havensight, and a series of “post-
dismissal motions, applications, and requests for default
judgment.” (Havensight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal.
Sept. 24, 2018, CV 17-6727 FMO (MRWx)) 2018 WL 6340757.)
The court struck or denied all of Woodhouse’s requests. (Ibid.)
The day after that case was dismissed, Woodhouse,
representing Havensight, filed a different action against Nike in
the Central District of California, alleging antitrust violations
and tortious interference in the sale of soccer gear. (Havensight
Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Nov. 20, 2014, CV 14-8985)

3
2014 WL 6542776.) The court dismissed that action.
(Havensight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Feb. 18, 2015,
No. CV 14–8985–R) 2015 WL 993334.) The court declared
Havensight to be a vexatious litigant and barred it from filing
any new action in the Central District of California “that arises
from or relates to Havensight Capital LLC and its brand ‘St
Thomas F.C.’ against Nike, Inc.” (Havensight Capital LLC v.
Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Apr. 22, 2015, CV 14–7153–R, CV 14–8985–
R) 2015 WL 3544111.)
A different Central District of California judge denied
Havensight’s motions to disqualify an earlier judge and to seek
reconsideration. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Nike, Inc. (C.D.Cal.
Mar. 31, 2015) 2:14-CV-07153-R, Dkt. 110.) The court turned the
matter over to the State Bar of California “for whatever action
that body deems appropriate.” (Ibid.)
In May 2015, Havensight filed a complaint against
Facebook (now Meta) in the Central District of California,
seeking hundreds of millions of dollars for alleged overcharges on
seven “pay-per-click” Facebook ads. (Havensight Capital, LLC v.
Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal., June 5, 2015, CV 15–3758 FMO) 2015
WL 12819160.) The court dismissed the case. (Havensight
Capital, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal., June 29, 2015, CV 15–
3758 FMO) 2015 WL 3948380.) The court warned that, had it not
dismissed the case, it would have issued an order to show cause
whether Havensight should be declared a vexatious litigant.
(Ibid.)
Woodhouse filed a similar complaint against Google Inc.,
now known as Alphabet Inc., in the Central District of California.
(Havensight Capital LLC v. Google, Inc. (C.D.Cal., July 15, 2015,
2:15-CV-05297-PSG, Dkt. 1).) The court dismissed the complaint.

4
(Id., Dkt. 31.) Woodhouse filed an ex parte application to reopen
the case, to disqualify the judge, and to enter a default judgment
against Google. (Id., Dkt. 32.) The district court denied that
motion and admonished Woodhouse that future “misuse of ex
parte applications will be sanctioned.” (Id., Dkt. 35.)
Woodhouse filed a similar complaint on Havensight’s behalf
against Facebook in California state court. In March 2016, the
court sustained Facebook’s demurrer, explaining Havensight had
not stated a cause of action. (Havensight Capital LLC v.
Facebook, Inc. (Cal.Super., Jan. 1, 2016, CIV537307) 2016 WL
4445919.) Woodhouse filed an amended complaint. Facebook
again demurred, and a different judge sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. (Havensight Capital, LLC v. Facebook,
Inc. (Cal.Super., June 16, 2016, CIV537307) 2016 WL 4410551.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme
Court denied review. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc.
(Apr. 27, 2017, A149366) [nonpub. opn.], review den. July 12,
2017, S241716).)
After the Supreme Court’s ruling, Havensight filed a third
action against Facebook—now back in the Central District of
California. (Havensight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal.,
Sept. 13, 2017, No. 2:17-cv-06727) 2017 WL 4061961.) The court
dismissed Havensight’s complaint, declared Havensight a
vexatious litigant, and ordered Woodhouse to pay $71,269.89 in
attorneys’ fees and expenses. (Havensight Capital LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., (C.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 2018, 2:17-cv-06727) 2018 WL
6340757; Havensight Capital, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (C.D.Cal.,
Nov. 9, 2018, 2:17-cv-06727, Dkt. 59).)

5
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Havensight Capital LLC v.
Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2019, No. 18-56304) 776
Fed.Appx. 420.)
In August 2021, Woodhouse filed an action against “Nike,
Facebook, their counsel Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Alphabet,
Inc., the United States Government, the Chief Justice of the
United States, and a number of federal judges in this district and
the Ninth Circuit” alleging, as the district court described it, “a
stream of nonsensical and imagined allegations—including
accusations of government torture and assassination attempts.”
(Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., Nov. 24, 2021, No. 2:21-cv-
06372) 2021 WL 6333468.) The court dismissed that case in
November 2021. (Ibid.) The court found that Woodhouse and
Havensight were alter egos of, and were in privity with, one
another: the vexatious litigant orders applied to Woodhouse.
(Ibid.) The court held Woodhouse in contempt for violating those
orders and for failing to pay sanctions. (Ibid.) The court referred
Woodhouse to the State Bar. (Ibid.)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th
Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22-55045) 2023 WL 3600032.)
While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, Woodhouse
and Havensight filed another complaint in the Central District of
California—again without complying with the orders imposing
pre-filing conditions and without paying any of the previously-
imposed sanctions. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., Jan. 5,
2022, 2:22-CV-00079) 2022 WL 59509, Dkt. 1.) The complaint
asserted conspiracy and judicial corruption claims against Nike,
Meta, Alphabet, and several federal judges and attorneys with
the U.S. Attorney’s Office who had represented the government
defendants in the earlier actions. (Ibid.) The court dismissed the

6
defendants from the case. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal.
2:22-CV-00079) Dkt. 64.) It referred Woodhouse to the State Bar
and the Central District’s Standing Committee on Discipline.
(Id., Dkt. 93.) It issued a vexatious litigant order protecting
Alphabet from further suits. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal.,
June 10, 2022, 2:22-CV-00079) 2022 WL 2232521.)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th
Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22-55598) 2023 WL 3600024.)
In January 2022, Woodhouse filed another complaint in the
Central District of California. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t.
(C.D.Cal., Jan. 27, 2022, No. 2:22-CV-00285) Dkt. 21.) He alleged
obstruction, fraud, and conspiracy, and named as defendants
Nike, Meta, Alphabet, and others. (Ibid.) The court struck
Woodhouse’s claims against Nike and Meta. (Woodhouse v. U.S.
Gov’t (C.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2022, No. 2:22-CV-00285) Dkt. 52.) The
court dismissed the remaining claims against Alphabet.
(Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (C.D.Cal., May 2, 2022, 2:22-cv-00285)
2022 WL 1405659.)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Woodhouse v. U.S. Gov’t (9th
Cir., May 23, 2023, No. 22-55636) 2023 WL 3600025.)
Woodhouse filed a new complaint, now in the District of
Columbia, against Nike, Meta, Alphabet, and other defendants.
(Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (D.D.C., July 3, 2023, No.
1:23-CV-01924) Dkt. 1.) That court dismissed the complaint sua
sponte. (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (D.D.C., July 13,
2023, No. 23-cv-01924) 2023 WL 4531827.) It ruled the
allegations in Woodhouse’s complaint rest “on the kind of
fantastic and delusional claims that warrant dismissal sua
sponte.” (Ibid.) Specifically, Woodhouse alleged the defendants
“operated a ‘genocide hotel’ in Pismo Beach, CA.” (Ibid.)

7
Woodhouse also alleged the defendants sent commandos to
assassinate him on his property. (Ibid.)
The D.C. Circuit affirmed. (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms
Inc. (D.C. Cir., Oct. 30, 2023, No. 23-5188) 2023 WL 7268255.)
“The district court correctly concluded that [Woodhouse’s]
complaint, which lacked an arguable basis either in law or in
fact, was frivolous.” (Ibid.)
In August 2023, a month after the district court’s dismissal
in the District of Columbia case, Woodhouse filed an action in the
Southern District of New York against Nike, Meta, Alphabet, and
other defendants, raising claims that “appear[ed] to mirror, or
are similar to, the ones asserted in his previous action in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.” (See Woodhouse v.
Meta Platforms Inc. (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 8, 2023, No. 23 Civ. 7000)
2023 WL 5939036.) The District Court recounted allegations that
included Woodhouse’s claims about a genocide hotel. (Ibid.) The
district court sua sponte dismissed that complaint with prejudice.
(Ibid..) It issued a nationwide injunction prohibiting Woodhouse
and any company he owns and controls from filing any new
federal court action relating to the same allegations absent leave
of court and compliance with pre-filing conditions. (Woodhouse v.
Meta Platforms Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 704 F.Supp.3d 502, 521.)
The court noted that, were Woodhouse to start filing similar suits
in California state court, that development “would factually
support the imposition of [a] filing injunction running to all
courts in the nation—state as well as federal.” (Id. at p. 520, fn.
15.) “Should Woodhouse direct his vexatious litigation to state
courts,” the court cautioned, “an appropriate court” might find
cause “for entry … of an injunction reaching state courts.” (Ibid.)

8
The Second Circuit affirmed. (Woodhouse v. Meta
Platforms, Inc. (2d Cir., Sept. 26, 2024, 23-7973-cv) 2024 WL
4297471.) It noted Woodhouse’s complaint set “forth no facts that
suggested such acts were remotely plausible.” (Ibid.) “Simply
put, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that Woodhouse’s allegations were and are irrational, and fell
solidly in the realm of fantasy or delusion.” (Ibid.) “Woodhouse
had a history of filing frivolous lawsuits, at least one of which
alleged the same ‘genocide hotel’ conspiracy and was also
dismissed as frivolous.” (Ibid.) “[F]ailing to provide notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a sua sponte dismissal” is bad
practice in some contexts and reversible error in others, but in
this case there was no error. (Ibid.) “Although Woodhouse was
not given notice here that his allegations were vulnerable to
dismissal, his pattern of prior litigation would have informed him
that these kinds of claims were defective.” (Ibid.)
B
We describe Woodhouse’s complaint in this case.
As a self-represented litigant, Woodhouse filed a 53-page
complaint in the superior court on January 27, 2025. In his
complaint, Woodhouse listed his address as in Pismo Beach,
California. The factual allegations are diverse but include
themes that recur in Woodhouse’s papers. We limit our
description to five themes: (1) decapitations; (2) genocide hotel;
(3) attacks on Woodhouse; (4) actress Kate Bosworth; and (5)
incineration of the Honorable Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit.
In what follows, we excerpt portions of Woodhouse’s
allegations. We excerpt extensively to convey the nature and
persistence of Woodhouse’s themes. We note Woodhouse often
uses the terms “Conflicted Parties,” “Conflicted Counsel,” and

9
“Triply Conflicted Counsel.” Woodhouse also refers to “Counsel
Not of Record.” He does not define these terms.
1. Decapitations. There are many decapitations in the
world Woodhouse perceives. “Conflicted parties” have
decapitated “female fellow California Bar Members.” Woodhouse
“actually had to watch [his] colleagues be decapitated.” “9th
Circuit Judge Miller . . . also witnessed Ms. Bosworth, and Ms.
Fernandez Beshore be decapitated, he did nothing to stop it . . . .”
“It is also questionable for National press to be engaging in
felonious conduct, in order to participate in genocide. The
Leaders of the National Press need to reflect, why our Federal
Judges, and National press Members, would temporarily lapse
into genocide movements, and what kind of mental issues, would
cause a Member of the National Press, to support an elderly lady,
who is helping to decapitate and raping minors, as a result of
mental illness, after failing to write her name, at the State Court
level. There has to be a higher level of discipline, and higher
level of accountability from U.S. Leaders. They need to stop
taking bribes, and think beyond second grade rhetoric, and never
again uphold the decapitations of minor and women, off of six red
flagged cases.” “As the 2,000 assassination attempts were not
successful, Counsel Not of Record, did not resolve the matters,
and improve chance of life for the Leaders of his Clients, instead
he commenced decapitating defenseless females, who were fellow
members of the California Bar, and colleagues of Woodhouse.
Ms. Michelle Fernandez Beshore, and Ms. Heather Baker Dobbs,
were, both decapitated in front of Woodhouse . . . Coming to my
house, decapitating women, putting on torture shows, and
aggrandizing those who have plead felonies, and conflicts, is more
than any one human being’s patience can endure.” “Woodhouse

10
had offered notice in writing to the U.S. Attorneys, earlier that
week, to extract [Kate Bosworth], after Woodhouse’s colleagues
had been decapitated by Gibson Dunn Inc.”
2. Genocide hotel. Woodhouse alleges there is a genocide
hotel “across the street from me” in Pismo Beach. “The genocide
hotel remains open, and the Counsel Not of Record, who is an
enemy combatant, continues to yell slurs throughout the night
with Judge Miller, despite Woodhouse’s testimony in person, in
the 2nd Circuit.” “As there have been no detentions, Woodhouse
is unsure if People are still dying in the genocide hotel, he is sure
that Counsel Not of Record, is still yelling slurs in the middle of
the night, and making assertions of felonious misrepresentation
of resolutions, regarding the genocide matters, at hand.
Additionally, the 2nd Circuit has followed this act up, in
upholding genocide, terrorism, infanticide, the decapitations of
women and minors, and ending conflict checks and Court
admissions, after Woodhouse testified in the 2nd Circuit to
watching Linsley hand off and participate in the sodomization
and decapitation of a minor, after Woodhouse’s comely female
colleagues, and Ms. Kate Bosworth, had already been decapitated
in the same hotel, which Woodhouse also witnessed and testified
to.” “None of these acts, brought genocide hotel to closure and
default. Instead, a 9th Circuit Judge, Judge Miller, took up
illegal residence in the genocide hotel, commenced sleeping with
Alphabet Inc.’s Counsel, and upheld the most felonies, conflicts,
violations, and red flagged cases, in U.S. legal history, after
Judge Bea was incinerated.” “Further, such behavior, could be
an explanation as to why C.N.N. would have published photos of
an imposter of Ms. Bosworth, a few days, after Woodhouse filed
into the federal record, watching her being decapitated by

11
Seminole Cell, and Counsel Not of Record, in the genocide hotel,
across from his house. This event, came after Woodhouse ordered
U.S. Attorneys of Record, in writing, to extract Bosworth
immediately from the hotel, and even offered to do it himself.”
3. Attacks aimed at Woodhouse. “[T]he Conflicted Parties
attempted to execute Woodhouse, on his property, in over 2,000
assassination attempts. The Conflicted Parties used contractors
to begin with, then Meta Platforms Leaders paid $50MM U.S. to
the Yakuza for hits, and then Nike paid Seminole cell similar
amounts for hits, and eventually, Russian dissidents, and then
Russian and Moldovan soldiers would also be hired, to kill
Woodhouse.” “The Conflicted Parties have funded the espionage
and terrorism discussed below, which is racketeering via
operation of law, as any act, intended to terrorize U.S. citizens,
would surmount to racketeering. These acts, here, include, but
are not limited to, mass decapitations, over 2,000 assassination
attempts, funding of foreign national armies, impeaching
testimony with doctored evidence, and bribing of the Trial
Counsel, via organized criminals.” “In this matter, we have
multiple singular acts, with every one of the 2,000 assassination
attempts, and every decapitation of a women or minor, being a
singular act of terrorism, notwithstanding the coup de gras, of
the financing of the Russian and Moldovan troops.”
4. Kate Bosworth. “After failing to assassinate Woodhouse,
the Conflicted Parties commenced decapitating women and
minors. Woodhouse witnessed two female colleagues executed,
Ms. Bosworth, the most famous actress in the world, one minor,
and one 2nd Circuit Clerk decapitated.” “Shortly, thereafter,
after hearing Kate Bosworth’s voice, Woodhouse requested that
the U.S. Attorneys extract Ms. Bosworth, with an urgency of life,

12
with either, Federal law enforcement, or, military personnel.
Woodhouse even offered to extract her himself, with her
permission, and permission from the U.S. Attorneys to use deadly
force. Three days later, Ms. Bosworth was decapitated,
Woodhouse disrupted three decapitation ceremonies, at which
point the Seminole cell, abandoned the ceremony, and executed
her within seconds, in the parking lot of the genocide hotel.”
5. Judge Bea. “[W]hen Conflicted Parties decapitate female
fellow California Bar Members, decapitate the most famous
actress in the world, incinerate 9th Circuit Judge Carlos Bea, and
execute what is estimated to be, over 15,000 victims, in front of
[Woodhouse’s] house, and prevail, after pleading the above, it
calls into question, whether any Constitutional rights, and
values, are still available to the American People?” “[Ninth
Circuit] Judge Miller also witnessed Ms. Bosworth, and Ms.
Fernandez Beshore be decapitated, he did nothing to stop it, and
did not feel compelled to take down his Order, which verges on
insanity, after Triple Conflicted Counsel burned alive his
colleague, Judge Bea.” “[O]nce the matter was taken up with the
9th Circuit, Judge Bea, thought he would make the U.S.
Government settle, such that he could take illegal consideration
from the Conflicted Private Parties, but such benevolent act to
the Conflicted Parties, did not sit well with Counsel Not of
Record, and Judge Bea was incinerated in front of Woodhouse,
and around 5 p.m. when it was still daylight.”
Based on these and other factual allegations, Woodhouse’s
current complaint asserted causes of action for what he terms
(1) “Defamation of Woodhouse and Violation of his constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and California Civil Code
section 45, 6”; (2) fraud; (3) “Civil RICO”; (4) “I.I.P.E.R.”; and (5)

13
“Economic Espionage Via Funding of Foreign Militaries Based on
California Civ. Section 3426.1, and the Federal Economic
Espionage Act, Which Extends To All Conflicted Parties, Foreign
Actors, State Agencies, and Warner Bros. Discovery.”
C
The record gives the history of Woodhouse’s status with the
California Bar.
The State Bar of California placed Woodhouse on
involuntary inactive status. Licensed attorneys in California are
either active or inactive. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6003.) The
State Bar Court may enroll a licensed attorney as inactive due to
mental infirmity or illness. Inactive licensees are not authorized
to practice law. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 6006.) Licensees who have
been involuntarily enrolled as inactive cannot be reinstated to
practice law unless reinstatement is directed by a court order.
(Bus & Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (e)(2).) The Office of Chief Trial
Counsel may initiate a proceeding for involuntary inactive
enrollment under section 6007, subdivision (b), by filing a motion
in the State Bar Court. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule
5.171(a) [Bus & Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (b)(1)]; 5.181 [Bus &
Prof. Code, § 6007, subd. (b)(2)]; 5.191(B)(2) [Bus & Prof. Code,
§ 6007, subd. (b)(3)].) The State Bar Court determines if clear
and convincing evidence has established grounds for involuntary
active enrollment. If so, the court transfers the licensee to
inactive status. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rules 5.172–5.173.)
These proceedings are confidential.
On November 30, 2024, shortly after the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Woodhouse’s claims and
the issuance of the nationwide injunction against him, the State
Bar ordered Woodhouse inactive and, consequently, rendered him

14
ineligible to practice law in California. Woodhouse then sent
messages to the State Bar that included a threat of violence
against State Bar Judge Yvette Roland, who had presided over
Woodhouse’s bar proceedings.
Woodhouse’s November 2024 email to the State Bar
included the following about “Triple Conflicted Counsel.” The
emphasis is ours.
“[A]fter [Triple Conflicted Counsel] told me that she had
coffee with Judge Bea earlier in the morning, when I watched
Gibson Dunn burn Judge Bea to death six months ago. Mr.
Binder and Judge Roland can also legally be executed with all
California Bar Members, as the act of disbarment, is a
furtherance of the conspiracy to engage in genocide acts... [⁋] I
will offer five business days for the California Bar to rescind all
charges, and charge Triple Conflicted Counsel, otherwise, I will
serve the California Bar at the end of December, and we will
proceed with the remediation program. [⁋] If I find that Judge
Roland is connected to any of the organized crime groups that the
Conflicted Parties paid for assassination attempts, I will drown
her to death, under all possible options individually.”
On December 2, 2024, Woodhouse included the following in
an email, again with our emphasis: “I will offer up five business
days from today, and then I intend to let them kill every
member of the California Bar, as I will not allow any more
People to be decapitated, because of People being on the take.”
Woodhouse sent other threatening emails as well.
Based on Woodhouse’s threats, on December 23, 2024, the
State Bar filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court Family Law
Division a petition on behalf of Judge Roland for a Workplace
Violence Restraining Order. After a hearing, the court granted

15
the State Bar’s petition and imposed a three-year order
restraining Woodhouse from coming within 100 feet of Judge
Roland.
D
We summarize the trial court proceedings in this matter.
As part of the Workplace Violence Restraining Order
proceedings, Woodhouse filed a “Cross Complaint.” The trial
court dismissed this filing. Woodhouse refiled it on January 27,
2025 as a complaint in the superior court, thus commencing the
proceeding that is the subject of this appeal. Woodhouse named
as defendants Nike, Meta, Alphabet, as well as the State Bar of
California and Warner Bros, Discovery, Inc.
Defendants moved for an order under section 391 declaring
Woodhouse a vexatious litigant.
Each defendant asked the trial court to find that
Woodhouse was a vexatious litigant and to require him to post
security of $10,000 before his claims as to each defendant could
proceed. They also asked the court to enter a pre-filing order
requiring Woodhouse to seek leave of the presiding judge or
justice of any California court before he may file new litigation.
Woodhouse opposed the motions. In these oppositions,
Woodhouse asserted “the Conflicted Parties, here, have financed
the killing, in a boutique beach hotel, in Pismo Beach, CA. over a
36 month period, of almost twice the number of Americans, killed
by Osama Bin Ladin in the 9/11 attack, restitution, and self-
reporting are the only chance at life for the Leaders of these
Conflicted Clients, and these Firm Members, under U.S. counter
terrorist protocols, irrespective of what this State Court decides
. . . . [T]he Conflicted Counsels offer no real explanations, as to
why they have interfered with Woodhouse’s Customers, why they

16
have hacked the California State Appellate system, to make
Woodhouse a drug convict, during his Pepperdine law training,
and as to why they have decapitated a 2nd Circuit Clerk, one
female minor, two of Woodhouse’s comely female colleagues, and
the most famous actress on earth, in Ms. Bosworth, all, in
Woodhouse’s witness. . . . [T]he type of black sports tape used on
a dead infant left at the base of Woodhouse’s housing
development, now adorns the fire hydrant at the base, in a clever
attempt, to cover up, this sadistic act.”
Another portion of Woodhouse’s opposition faulted Warner
Bros. Discovery for failing to produce evidence that Kate
Bosworth was alive. Woodhouse suggested this failure to produce
Bosworth showed Warner was complicit in Bosworth’s alleged
death.
The defendants replied to Woodhouse’s oppositions.
The trial court granted the defendants’ vexatious litigant
motions. The court ruled Woodhouse was a vexatious litigant
under two statutory definitions. First, Woodhouse qualified as a
vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(4), because
he “was declared to be a vexatious litigant by the United States
District Court for the Central District of California” and by “the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York” based on claims involving “substantially similar facts and
transactions that are alleged in this action.” Second, Woodhouse
was a vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(1),
because he “commenced or maintained . . . five litigations in
propria persona within the immediately preceding seven-year
period,” and each of “those five litigations were finally
determined adversely to [Woodhouse].”

17
The trial court determined there was no reasonable
probability that Woodhouse would prevail in the litigation
against any of the defendants. The trial court explained that
Woodhouse failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the
elements of any of his five causes of action. The court ordered
Woodhouse to post a security of $10,000 as to each of the
defendants within 45 days of each of the court’s orders as a
condition to proceeding with the action as to each of them.
The court likewise issued pre-filing orders under section
391.7. These orders prohibit Woodhouse, “directly or indirectly
through entities that he owns or controls . . . from filing any new
litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without
first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of
the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.”
On July 22, 2025, the trial court dismissed Woodhouse’s
action because he had not posted security.
Woodhouse appealed. In his notice of appeal, Woodhouse
wrote that, “as the Complaint, here, states that the Defendants
have executed over 15,000 individuals, in a single beach hotel,
over a 36 month period, and that Nike paid uniformed Moldovan
forces, and Russian special forces with machine guns to breach
his residence. Additionally, Woodhouse testified to the Conflicted
Parties brandishing an active atomic weapon on Woodhouse’s
property, and that the U.S. Senate has been briefed on the atomic
attack, in Pismo Beach, CA. Woodhouse has filed for death
warrants, here, against Judge Broadbelt III, and Mr. Van
Schwing, who is not a U.S. citizen, as, both, the participation, and
the upholding of an atomic attack, against the U.S. Government,
is unequivocal treason, and colloquially absolutely mentally
retarded. This atomic attack has been reported to the Nuclear

18
Regulatory Agency, and to the California U.S. Senators by
Woodhouse.”
II
We affirm the orders of the trial court.
A
Vexatious litigants use the justice system as a weapon to
impose costs on real or imagined enemies. Vexatious litigants
often represent themselves and thus avoid the cost of counsel but
force defendants to retain counsel, which is expensive. Using
courts as a tool thus to inflict disproportionate costs perverts a
noble ideal. It turns an institution designed to resolve conflict
into a weapon that magnifies conflict. This conduct can cause
serious financial injury to the unfortunate object of the attack.
(Camerado Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 838, 842.)
Self-represented plaintiffs who avoid retaining licensed
attorneys dodge the gatekeeping function that retained counsel
can perform. Retained attorneys generally act as gatekeepers
against frivolous litigation. Attorneys are governed by prescribed
rules of ethics and professional conduct, and, as officers of the
court, are subject to disbarment, suspension, and other
disciplinary sanctions not applicable to self-represented litigants.
Retained attorneys also are bound by rules of ethics and rely on
their reputation in the community to sustain their careers. They
are less likely to file frivolous claims. The threat of malicious
prosecution liability for bringing an unmeritorious action or
special proceeding without probable cause may do little to deter a
vexatious litigant but is likely to have more significance for a
vexatious litigant’s attorney. (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51
Cal.4th 1164, 1176.)

19
Legislatures have enacted vexatious litigant statutes to
curb misuse of the court system. These persistent and obsessive
litigants abuse the justice system, thereby wasting court
resources and harming other parties waiting their turn before the
courts. The California Legislature first enacted sections 391.1
through 391.6 in 1963 to combat the tendency of vexatious
litigants to engage in meritless litigation. These sections
empower defendants to stay pending litigation by moving to
require a vexatious litigant to furnish security if the court
determines there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will
prevail. Failure to post the security results in dismissal of the
litigation in favor of the defendant. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 211, 220–221 (Bravo).)
In 1990, the Legislature enacted section 391.7 to provide
the courts with an additional means to counter misuse of the
system by vexatious litigants. Section 391.7 operates beyond the
pending case and authorizes a court to enter a prefiling order
prohibiting a self-represented vexatious litigant from filing new
litigation without first obtaining permission from the presiding
bench officer. That officer may condition the filing of the
litigation on posted security as section 391.3 provides. (Bravo,
supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.)
Sections 391.1–391.6 differ from section 391.7 in some
significant ways. The former sections allow the litigant to
proceed with the case without showing a reasonable probability of
prevailing, but the litigant will have to furnish security to
proceed if the court finds success improbable. The latter section
bars the litigant from filing the action or proceeding if success is
considered improbable. Even if the court finds a requisite
probability of success, it may compel the litigant to furnish

20
security as a condition to maintaining the action. Vexatious
litigant statutes are constitutional and do not deprive a litigant of
due process of law. (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221–
222.)
We independently review questions of statutory
interpretation. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95.)
We deferentially review fact finding.
B
Although Woodhouse’s notice of appeal references only the
trial court’s May 2025 order granting Nike and Meta’s vexatious
litigant motion and related relief, the respondents ask us to
construe Woodhouse’s appeal as encompassing the corresponding
orders in favor of the State Bar, Warner, and Alphabet. They
likewise request that we construe the appeal as including the
trial court’s July 2025 order dismissing the action for
Woodhouse’s failure to furnish security.
We assent to these unopposed requests. We may liberally
construe Woodhouse’s notice of appeal because it is reasonably
clear from this notice that Woodhouse seeks relief from all orders
joined to the order the trial court granted, and Woodhouse’s
omission does not prejudice the respondents. (See In re Joshua
S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272.) The Rules of Court allow us to
treat a notice of appeal filed after the trial court has announced
its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed
immediately after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(d)(2).) We exercise our discretion to do so because no
motions remain pending before the trial court and we can decide
the propriety of the orders against Woodhouse from the
undisputed facts in the record.

21
C
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s orders.
The trial court found Woodhouse had, in the preceding
seven-year period, commenced at least five lawsuits that courts
ultimately determined against him. (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).)
The trial court made the alternative finding that courts
previously declared Woodhouse to be a vexatious litigant on
similar facts. (§ 391, subd. (b)(4).)
Our recitation of the record shows overwhelming support
for both findings. We do not repeat our earlier presentation.
Woodhouse makes no cogent argument to the contrary in
his briefing to us. This briefing is a renewed excursion through
Woodhouse’s world of decapitations and so forth. For instance,
on page 10 of his opening papers, Woodhouse offers that
“Conflicted Counsel decapitated the 2nd Circuit Clerk, hired in
quid pro quo, within ten days from him arriving at the hotel,
across from Woodhouse’s property.” There is more of the same
elsewhere in Woodhouse’s briefs to us.
The trial court also ruled there was no reasonable
probability Woodhouse would prevail on his claim against any
Respondent. (See § 391.1, subd. (a).)
As a matter of law, this ruling was correct.
California precedent supports the trial court’s ruling. For
instance, in Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 181
(Huang), a self-represented litigant filed requests for civil
harassment restraining orders against defendants Tom Hanks,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Dalai Lama, Mark Zuckerberg,
Monica Lewinsky, and 26 other prominent personalities. The
plaintiff alleged these “defendants are ‘a lot of people with
Hollywood background or Scientology background ... or political

22
background,’ who ‘control [a] mental department in Texas,’ by
which ‘they falsely accuse [him] and use [ ] technology from
mental department (mind reading) [to] attack[ him] secretly[,] ...
ask[ing] some adults to keep on stalking [him] and harass[ing]
and threaten[ing him] by nano probes.” (Ibid.) The trial court
dismissed the actions as patently frivolous. The Court of Appeal
affirmed because California courts possess the inherent authority
to dismiss cases that are fraudulent or vexatious. (Id. at p. 182.)
That includes complaints that are frivolous because they lack an
arguable basis either in law or in fact or that include claims
describing fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios. (Ibid.)
The Huang opinion cited many precedents that supported
its holding. (Huang, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 181–182.)
Other courts have applied the Huang rule to Woodhouse’s
past lawsuits. For example, the District Court of the District of
Columbia summarily dismissed Woodhouse’s complaint
presenting similar allegations about a genocide hotel,
assassination attempts, and a conspiracy with foreign
governments and commandos, concluding that the “[c]omplaint
rests on the kind of fantastic and delusional claims that warrant
dismissal sua sponte.” (Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
(D.D.C., July 13, 2023, No. 23-cv-01924) 2023 WL 4531827.)
The Southern District of New York cited similar allegations
in dismissing Woodhouse’s action as frivolous, concluding that his
“allegations about the defendants, including, but not exclusive to,
their alleged conspiratorial and corrupt behavior, attempts to
assassinate Woodhouse, sexual abuse and murders of others,
etcetera, are fantastic and delusional.” (See Woodhouse v. Meta
Platforms Inc. (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 8, 2023, No. 23 Civ. 7000) 2023
WL 5939036.)

23
These earlier sua sponte dismissals of Woodhouse’s cases
were by federal courts applying federal law.
California state law operates in a similar fashion, as the
Huang case and others illustrate. (E.g., Lodi v. Lodi (1985) 173
Cal.App.3d 628, 630–631 [trial court was empowered to dismiss
the complaint by section 436 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides the court may, upon a motion or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court].)
In a state of some 40 million people, some percentage
entertain false and fixed beliefs, which are delusions. (Cf. People
v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 125 [“A delusion is a fixed, false
idea”]; People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 726 fn. 5 [a delusion
is a belief that is false, illogical, and quite fixed]; id. at p. 726
[psychiatrist testified defendant Sirhan Sirhan “gave no evidence
of believing himself to be a person chosen by God to kill [Robert]
Kennedy whom he regarded as the devil—that such a belief
would have been a delusion”].)
Some delusional people know how to file a complaint and to
get into court. Trial courts have the tools swiftly to unburden
their dockets of complaints that all reasonable people must agree
are delusional, as were the claims in this complaint. Plainly this
power to dismiss must be used sparingly and only in the most
obvious cases, for truth can be stranger than fiction. Courts must
remain open to proof that seemingly startling claims are in fact
true.
No reasonable person, however, would classify the world
that Woodhouse describes as within the realm of possibility. The

24
trial court was right to rule the case had no reasonable possibility
of success. We affirm its orders in all respects.
D
Woodhouse has filed three motions for judicial notice, a
“motion to strike and requests,” and a “motion to stay for
Department of Justice review and for patent perjury.”
The first motion asks that we take notice of our order
informing Respondents of their overdue brief and asks that we
“default all of the Conflicted Parties” and award Woodhouse
“record punitive damages.” It asserts this “case also includes
Woodhouse witnessing, two of his female Bar colleagues being
decapitated, two Courts clerks being decapitated, Ms. Bosworth,
the most famous thespian in the world being decapitated, and
Judge Bea, incinerated, all, across from Woodhouse’s residence,
and by assailants, financed by the Conflicted Parties.”
We need not grant the request to take notice of our own
order. We deny the remainder of the motion as delusional.
The second motion claims that, “[s]ince this last Appellate
Order, while failing to file a Brief, the Conflicted Parties have
managed to execute a San Luis Obispo sheriff using a wire
around the neck, and murder a elementary school child, using
some kind of martial arts knife, all, within the genocide hotel,
across the street from Woodhouse.” We denied this motion the
day after Woodhouse filed it.
The third motion accuses us of “executing close to 30,000
people, in Pismo Beach, CA, after leaving a dead infant on
Woodhouse’s property, after driving two truckloads of Moldovan
and Russian uniformed troops into Woodhouse’s house, and after
entering an atomic weapon into the genocide hotel, and
simulating ignition on Woodhouse’s property.”

25
The motion to strike asks that we strike Alphabet’s
“untimely” request for oral argument, our order granting pro hac
vice status to Alphabet’s counsel, “default the Conflicted Parties,”
and “grant a protective order for the 9th Circuit clerk.” It further
states “Woodhouse has fought off a second Russian, and
Moldovan attack, led by the lone Moldovan survivor of the first
attack on his property.”
Woodhouse filed the motion to stay after receiving our
tentative opinion, which he described as a “defective, factually
incorrect, and terrorist Judgment.” Therein, he claims we “ha[ve]
been bribed” and that we committed “patent perjury” with
respect to Bosworth.
We deny these motions in their entirety as delusional.
DISPOSITION
We affirm and award costs to Respondents.

WILEY, Acting P.J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.

SCHERB, J.

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