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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Sierra CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338335

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/27/26 P. v. Sierra CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of
rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B338335

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA204828)
v.

HILARIO SIERRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

Hilario Sierra appeals a judgment following conviction of first
degree kidnapping and murder. He argues the court improperly
admitted evidence of prior, uncharged misconduct. We disagree
and affirm.

BACKGROUND
A. Uncharged 1997 Robbery
In November 1997, Sierra, Jose Morales, and Luis Rodriguez,
went to the rear house at 1126 Stockton Street in Compton
intending to rob the residents, Veronica Lopez and Antonio Angola
Escobar. They forced the residents at gunpoint to lie down on the
floor and demanded money. The evidence varied as to how much
they stole: One of the victims told police the robbers took $300 and
a cowboy hat; Morales testified they stole $3,000; and at trial the
victims testified the robbers took $600 and some jewelry.

B. 1998 Murders
On February 2, 1998, Sierra, Morales, and Rodriguez went
back to 1226 Stockton Street with Sandro Perez, who told them
they could “make some quick money.” They saw two residents of
the front house, Guadalupe Gurrola and his 15-year-old son Andres,
drive away in a van. They followed, and when the van stopped,
Sierra, Rodriguez and Perez pointed guns at Guadalupe and Andres
and got into the van with them. They demanded money and drove
to a bank, where they withdrew $300 with Guadalupe’s ATM card.
They then drove to an underpass, where Sierra shot Guadalupe in
the head and Rodriguiez shot Andres. Both victims were killed.

C. Trial
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Sierra
with two counts of kidnapping during carjacking and two counts
of murder, and alleged the murders were committed during the

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commission of a robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 209.5,
subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(1) & 17(A).)
At trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to introduce evidence
of the 1997 home invasion robbery, arguing the robbery was
relevant to show Sierra’s motive. Defense counsel objected that the
offense was too dissimilar to the charged offenses to warrant
admission of the evidence.
The trial court admitted testimony from Morales, Lopez, and
Escobar about the uncharged robbery for the purpose of
demonstrating motive.
In argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued that evidence
of the successful 1997 robbery demonstrated that Sierra had a
motive to commit the 1998 robbery.

D. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
The jury convicted Sierra of kidnapping and first degree
felony murder and found several special circumstances and
enhancement conditions to be true, including that he committed
the murders in the course of a robbery. The court sentenced him to
two consecutive and two concurrent sentences of life without the
possibility of parole, plus enhancements.
Sierra appealed.

DISCUSSION
Sierra contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of the 1997 robbery to demonstrate his motive to commit the 1998
robbery. We disagree.

A. Pertinent Law
Generally, the prosecution may not use a defendant’s prior
criminal act as evidence of a disposition to commit a charged

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criminal act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)1 But such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove some fact other than the
defendant’s disposition to commit the charged crime, such as
motive. (§ 1101, subd. (b); People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539,
602.)
Admissibility of other crimes evidence depends on “ ‘(1) the
materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative
value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and
(3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if
the evidence is relevant.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622,
667.)
We review the admission of evidence of an uncharged offense
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
1129, 1138.)

B. Application
Sierra argues that evidence of the robbery of residents in the
house behind the Gurrolas’ house lacked substantial probative
value because it proved nothing more than that he was involved in
another robbery.
Probative value goes to the weight of the evidence of other
offenses. Evidence is probative if it is material, relevant, and
necessary. (People v. Johnson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 296, 318, fn. 20.)
Here, the evidence showed that Sierra successfully obtained
$3,000 by committing a robbery at 1126 Stockton Street in
November 1997. The evidence was relevant because it tended in
reason to prove that Sierra knew he could successfully commit a
second robbery at that address, which provided a motive to return.
The evidence was material because Sierra’s intent to rob the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

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Gurrolas may be inferred from his motive to do so. (See People v.
Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 [“motive is an intermediate
fact, from which the existence of an ultimate fact may be inferred”].)
The evidence was necessary because it supported the credibility
of other evidence that Sierra committed the murder during the
commission of a robbery.
Sierra argues that the 1997 and 1998 robberies were too
dissimilar to permit evidence of the former to prove the latter.
To be admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), a prior
uncharged act must be sufficiently similar to the charged offense to
support the inference that the defendant committed the charged
offense. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393.) But “the
probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the issue of motive does
not necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and
uncharged crimes, so long as the offenses have a direct logical
nexus.” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.) It is
enough that the motive for the charged crime arise simply from
commission of the prior offense. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 191.)
Here, the 1997 robbery was a key piece of evidence that
helped explain the development of Sierra’s motive to rob the
Gurrolas: He successfully obtained money in the first robbery,
which led him believe he could do so again. The offenses therefore
have a direct logical nexus, rendering the evidence of the 1997
robbery admissible.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

KIM, M., J.

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