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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Pomona Valley Hospital Med. Center v. Kaiser Foundation etc. CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B337963

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (29)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (91)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 2/27/26 Pomona Valley Hospital Med. Center v. Kaiser Foundation etc. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

POMONA VALLEY HOSPITAL B337963, B339448
MEDICAL CENTER,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. KC069796)

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH
PLAN, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Lynette Gridiron Winston, Judge. Reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
King & Spalding, Daron L. Tooch, Paul R. Johnson, Amanda L.
Hayes-Kibreab and Ariana E. Fuller for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reed Smith, Amir Shlesinger, Kasey J. Curtis, Michelle L.
Cheng; Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, Daniel G. Bird, Eric
J. Maier and Kathleen W. Hickey for Defendant and Appellant.

---

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser) provides medical
services to its members primarily through its own healthcare facilities.
In an emergency, however, a Kaiser member may go to a non-Kaiser
emergency department.
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center (Pomona Valley
Hospital) is a regional hospital with an emergency department. Under
federal and state law, Pomona Valley Hospital is required to provide
emergency medical services to anyone in need of such services. Kaiser
is required to reimburse Pomona Valley Hospital for emergency
services provided by Pomona Valley Hospital to Kaiser members.
Through most of 2017, Kaiser did so pursuant to a contract executed
with Pomona Valley Hospital in 2004 (the 2004 Contract). In 2017,
Kaiser terminated the 2004 Contract and began paying amounts that it
unilaterally determined to be the reasonable value of Pomona Valley
Hospital’s emergency services.
Pomona Valley Hospital, dissatisfied with the non-contracted
amounts paid by Kaiser, sued in quantum meruit for the asserted
unreimbursed reasonable value of emergency medical services provided
from October 2017 through March 2020. Pomona Valley Hospital
claimed that it was owed approximately $66 million more than the
approximately $40 million reimbursed by Kaiser.
The matter went to a jury trial and the jury returned a verdict in
the amount sought by Pomona Valley Hospital. Subsequently, the trial
court granted a motion for new trial brought by Kaiser, finding that it
was legal error to allow as evidence at trial the 2004 Contract between
Kaiser and Pomona Valley Hospital previously governing rates paid for
emergency services. The court, however, entered a conditional order
allowing Pomona Valley Hospital to accept an approximate $8 million
remittitur to the verdict in lieu of a new trial. Pomona Valley Hospital
accepted the remittitur.
Following entry of judgment, Kaiser appealed and Pomona Valley
Hospital cross-appealed. Kaiser makes four primary contentions on

2
appeal: (1) that the trial court properly granted the motion for new
trial but improperly allowed for remittitur because admission of the
2004 Contract impacted the issue of liability, not just damages; (2) that
the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of Pomona Valley
Hospital’s overall operating costs at trial; (3) that Pomona Valley
Hospital presented improper expert testimony; and (4) that the proper
rate of prejudgment interest is 7 percent, not 10 percent as awarded.
Pomona Valley Hospital’s cross-appeal relies on a single argument:
that there was no legal error in allowing the 2004 Contract as evidence
and therefore Kaiser’s motion for new trial should have been denied.
We agree with Pomona Valley Hospital that the trial court erred
in granting the new trial motion. We conclude that the 2004 Contract
was properly introduced at trial because a provision of the contract
excluding its use in certain matters only applied by its terms to
valuations under subdivision (a)(3)(B) of section 1300.71 of title 28 of
the California Code of Regulations (Regulation 1300.71). The issue
decided by the jury in this case was not a valuation under the
regulation, but rather a distinct quantum meruit valuation. As such,
the 2004 Contract was properly considered by the jury.
We additionally reject each of Kaiser’s remaining contentions
except for the final one, that 7 percent was the proper rate of
prejudgment interest.
BACKGROUND
The parties
Kaiser is a health care service plan that, with affiliated entities,
has providers, hospitals, and other medical facilities throughout
California. Although Kaiser members predominantly receive medical
care through the Kaiser system, in an emergency they may go to the
closest emergency department, including one not associated with
Kaiser. Kaiser hospitals likewise provide emergency care to non-Kaiser
patients.

3
Pomona Valley Hospital is a full-scope hospital and regional
medical center with operations including a trauma center and other
specialized care. As a hospital with an emergency department, Pomona
Valley Hospital treats patients in need of emergency care, including
Kaiser members. For the period at issue in this case, from October 1,
2017, through March 31, 2020, a total of 4,078 claims for emergency
care services provided by Pomona Valley Hospital were for Kaiser
members.
Emergency services and reimbursement
As previously noted, under federal and state law, a hospital
emergency department must provide emergency services to anyone in
need of such care. (42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b); Health & Saf. Code,1 § 1317,
subd. (a).) California’s Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of
1975 (the Knox-Keene Act) (§ 1340 et seq.), “a comprehensive system of
licensing and regulation under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Managed Health Care [(DMHC)]” (Bell v. Blue Cross of California
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 211, 215 (Bell)), governs health care service
plans and obligations relating to emergency services. (Prospect Medical
Group, Inc. v. Northridge Emergency Medical Group (2009) 45 Cal.4th
497, 504–505 (Prospect Medical Group).) The Knox-Keene Act requires
a health care service plan to reimburse a hospital for providing
“emergency services and care” to the plan’s members “until the care
results in stabilization.” (§ 1371.4, subd. (b); see also County of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1037–1038, 1042
(County of Santa Clara).)
The DMHC, which has authority to promulgate regulations
under the Knox-Keene Act, issued, among other regulations, section
1300.71, setting forth standards for reimbursement of emergency
services. (County of Santa Clara, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1042.) “The

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety
Code.

4
amount of reimbursement depends upon whether the hospital and plan
already have a contract in place: If they do, the plan must pay the
‘agreed upon’ contractual rate [(Regulation)] 1300.71, subd. (a)(3)(A); if
they do not, the plan must pay the ‘reasonable and customary value for
the [emergency] health care services rendered’ (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)).”
(Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 323, 329 (Long Beach Memorial).)
Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) lists six criteria for
determining the “ ‘reasonable and customary value’ ” of the services.
(Id. at p. 335.)
The 2004 Contract between Kaiser and Pomona Valley Hospital
established an agreed upon rate of reimbursement for emergency
services provided by Pomona Valley Hospital to Kaiser members in
accordance with Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(A). As relevant
here, Kaiser agreed to reimburse 86 percent of Pomona Valley
Hospital’s billed charges for emergency services. The 2004 Contract
further provided that Pomona Valley Hospital could not “Balance-Bill”
Kaiser members—a practice where hospitals previously sought to
directly recover from patients the remainder of billed amounts not paid
by their health service plans and which was outlawed in 2009 by
Prospect Medical Group, supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 502. Additionally,
the 2004 Contract allowed either party to terminate the contract, at
least one year after its effective date, by providing written notice of
termination, with termination to become effective 180 days thereafter.
The 2004 Contract remained in effect for over 12 years. In March
2017, Kaiser gave notice to Pomona Valley Hospital that it was
terminating the 2004 Contract effective September 30, 2017. At trial, a
Kaiser representative stated that Kaiser’s intent was to try to
renegotiate the contract but that the parties could not come to an
agreement on rates. In the months following the termination notice,
and without a new contract in place, Kaiser informed Pomona Valley
Hospital that it would reimburse 29 percent of billed charges for

5
emergency services claims. According to Kaiser, it calculated 29
percent as a fair and reasonable rate by reference to an internal
methodology.
Pomona Valley Hospital sues Kaiser
In November 2017, shortly after termination of the 2004
Contract, Pomona Valley Hospital filed this action. The operative first
amended complaint, filed in March 2019, stated (as relevant to this
appeal) a cause of action for quantum meruit premised on Kaiser’s
alleged failure to reimburse the reasonable value of emergency services
provided to Kaiser members. During the period at issue—from
October 1, 2017, through March 30, 2020—Kaiser reimbursed
approximately $39.8 million out of approximately $136.6 million in
total billed charges, a roughly 29 percent reimbursement rate. Pomona
Valley Hospital alleged that Kaiser’s payments were insufficient to
cover the reasonable value of emergency services provided, and it
sought to recover the remainder.
Pomona Valley Hospital’s choice to bring its suit in quantum
meruit was consistent with relevant authority, which sets out a
potential two-step process for obtaining reimbursement. As noted
previously, without a contract in place, a health care service plan must
pay the hospital the “reasonable and customary value” for emergency
services. (Regulation 1300.71, subd. (a)(3)(B).) The health care service
plan is to determine this amount with reference to subdivision (a)(3)(B)
of Regulation 1300.71, which provides that the value be determined
“based upon statistically credible information that is updated at least
annually and takes into consideration: (i) the provider’s training,
qualifications, and length of time in practice; (ii) the nature of the
services provided; (iii) the fees usually charged by the provider; (iv)
prevailing provider rates charged in the general geographic area in
which the services were rendered; (v) other aspects of the economics of
the medical provider’s practice that are relevant; and (vi) any unusual
circumstances in the case.”

6
As the DMHC has explained, however, the “ ‘regulations are
intended to set forth the minimum payment criteria to ensure
compliance with the [Knox-Keene] Act’s claims payment and dispute
resolution standards.’ ” (Children’s Hospital Central California v. Blue
Cross of California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1273 (Children’s
Hospital).) The DMHC advised that “the intent was to establish a
methodology for determining the reasonable value of health care
services by noncontracted providers but that the criteria specified do
not dictate a specific payment rate,” and that “[i]f a payor fulfills its
claims payment obligation using these criteria, the DMHC will consider
the payor compliant with Health and Safety Code sections 1371 and
1371.35, i.e., the reimbursement of the claim will be deemed timely.”
(Children’s Hospital, at p. 1273.)
Courts and the DMHC have recognized that this initial,
minimum payment does not always represent the proper amount of
reimbursement, and so a second step—a quantum meruit suit—may be
necessary. “If a hospital or other medical provider believes that the
amount of reimbursement it has received from a health plan is below
the ‘reasonable and customary value’ of the emergency services it has
provided, the hospital or provider may assert a quantum meruit claim
against the plan to recover the shortfall.” (Long Beach Memorial,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) The DMHC, “ ‘unlike the courts, lacks
the authority to set specific reimbursement rates under theories of
quantum meruit and the jurisdiction to enforce a reimbursement
determination on both the provider and the health plan. Because the
[DMHC] cannot provide an adequate forum, health care providers must
be allowed to maintain a cause of action in court to resolve individual
claims-payment disputes over the reasonable value of their services.’ ”
(Bell, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 [quoting and relying on amicus
curiae brief filed in Bell by DMHC].)
In a quantum meruit action for reimbursement of services
provided under the Knox-Keene Act, the proper measure for

7
reimbursement is the reasonable or fair market value of the services.
(Children’s Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274; Long Beach
Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 345.) This value is measured by
what a hypothetical willing buyer would pay to a hypothetical willing
seller in a hypothetical transaction. (Long Beach Memorial, at pp. 345–
346.) The “law looks to the ‘reasonable value of [the] services’ in the
‘open market,’ and explicitly acknowledges that this value may be
different than the price fixed by a prior contract between the parties to
that case.” (Id. at p. 345.) In determining the reasonable or fair
market value, a “wide variety of evidence” is properly considered.
(Children’s Hospital, at p. 1274.)
Trial proceedings and verdict
The matter proceeded to a jury trial in January 2023, at which
the parties’ experts played a significant role.
Pomona Valley Hospital’s expert, Chris Fritz, opined that the fair
market value of emergency services provided to Kaiser members was
77.5 percent of the hospital’s total billed charges. In coming to this
percentage, Fritz considered six different sets of rates negotiated for
emergency services: the 86 percent rate under the 2004 Contract; an
average 80 percent rate from single case “letter[s] of agreement” for
specific out-of-network claims at Pomona Valley Hospital; average rates
of 80 percent and 70 percent respectively contracted by Kaiser and
Pomona Valley Hospital for “rental networks” of health plans with
relatively few members; 53 percent, based on rates paid by Kaiser to
other hospitals pursuant to contract; and rates paid to Pomona Valley
Hospital pursuant to in-network contracts with large commercial
health plans (referred to at trial as “the big six” plans).
In assigning a percentage to the last of these categories—which
was by far the largest set of claims—Pomona Valley Hospital’s expert
did not use the actual rate paid under the in-network contracts because
he considered the rate to be artificially low for calculating reasonable
value in this case. This was due to the large health plans’ role in

8
“steerage” of patients to non-emergency elective services at the
hospital. According to Fritz, steerage increases non-emergency patient
volume and benefits the hospital financially and logistically. Because
Kaiser members predominantly receive only emergency services at
Pomona Valley Hospital, the hospital does not obtain the advantage of
providing other services to Kaiser members that it does with in-
network plans. In an attempt to adjust for this differing impact, Fritz
assigned a multiplier to the relatively low percentage paid by the large
health plans to “make them more comparable to the out-of-network
claims that are at issue in this dispute,” and came up with a weighted
average rate of 75 percent. Finally, Fritz took the median value of the
six categories he considered in estimating that the fair market value for
the emergency services provided to Kaiser members was 77.5 percent of
the hospital’s billed charges.
In contrast, Kaiser’s expert, Mark Gustafson, opined that the
amount of approximately $39.8 million that Kaiser had already
reimbursed “exceed[ed] the fair market value . . . and no additional
payment would be warranted.” According to Gustafson, contracted
commercial insurers would have reimbursed an average of 26.3 percent
of the total billed charges at issue, while Kaiser itself reimbursed
approximately 29 percent. Gustafson further testified that the amount
Kaiser was previously paying Pomona Valley Hospital under the
terminated 2004 Contract increased at a rate “much faster than the
price of hospital services generally”—8.4 percent compared to 4.6
percent. He additionally contrasted Pomona Valley Hospital’s charges
with those of other hospitals in the region and found Pomona Valley
Hospital’s charges “roughly higher than 80 percent of the hospitals.”
The jury returned a verdict form in which it answered two
questions. First, the jury found that Pomona Valley Hospital proved
that the reasonable or fair market value for the 4,078 claims at issue
was $105,887,963. Second, the jury subtracted from this amount the
$39,796,251 already reimbursed by Kaiser to calculate an amount due

9
of $66,091,712. The amount awarded prior to reduction equaled
roughly 77.5 percent of the total charges, the same percentage that
Fritz opined was appropriate, and the amount that Pomona Valley
Hospital maintained was warranted during closing argument.
Motion for new trial and final judgment
Judgment on the jury verdict was entered approximately a year
later, after other issues not relevant to this appeal were resolved, and
after the case had been reassigned to a different judge.
Following entry of the original judgment, Kaiser filed a motion
for new trial. Kaiser made a number of arguments, three of which
align with claims it makes on appeal: that the trial court’s admission of
the 2004 Contract into evidence was prejudicial legal error, that the
trial court erroneously excluded evidence of Pomona Valley Hospital’s
operating costs, and that the testimony presented by Pomona Valley
Hospital’s expert, Fritz, was improper. Pomona Valley Hospital
opposed the motion.
The trial court agreed with Kaiser’s first argument and rejected
the latter two. In partially granting the motion the court found that
the previous denial of a motion in limine filed by Kaiser—in which
Kaiser sought to exclude the 2004 Contract as irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial—was erroneous as a matter of law and unfairly prejudiced
Kaiser at trial.
The trial court further concluded, however, that this stated error
“was essentially limited in effect to the question of damages,” not
liability, and found that remittitur of the amount awarded was “the
proper remedy to cure the error and avoid the necessity of a new trial.”
The court thus issued a conditional order granting a new trial unless
Pomona Valley Hospital consented to a reduction of the verdict to
$58,030,564.08. The court reached this sum by removing the 2004
Contract rate from the six categories considered by Fritz and
calculating a new average based on the remaining five factors,
subtracting the amount Kaiser previously reimbursed.

10
Pomona Valley Hospital accepted the remittitur, and the trial
court entered an amended judgment in place of the original judgment,
awarding prejudgment interest to Pomona Valley Hospital at a rate of
10 percent. Kaiser timely appealed from the final judgment and
Pomona Valley Hospital timely cross-appealed.2
DISCUSSION
I. Kaiser’s motion for new trial was erroneously granted
Kaiser’s first argument on appeal is that, while the trial court
correctly granted its motion for new trial based on the finding that
admission of the 2004 Contract was an error of law, the court then
erred by allowing for remittitur. Kaiser contends that the motion
instead should have been granted in full because the issues of liability
and damages were interwoven and both impacted by admission of the
2004 Contract, and retrial was therefore required. Pomona Valley
Hospital, on the other hand, argues in its cross-appeal that the trial
court committed reversible error in conditionally granting the motion
for new trial, and that the jury verdict should have been allowed to
stand.
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the new trial
motion and accordingly do not reach Kaiser’s argument that remittitur
was an improper remedy.
A. Relevant background
The trial court conditionally granted Kaiser’s new trial motion
based on its finding that the court had previously committed legal error
in denying Kaiser’s first of eight motions in limine.
That first motion in limine sought to exclude the 2004 Contract
from evidence at trial, as well as “any other evidence related to the

2 Following the plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur, “if the
defendant appeals, the plaintiff may cross-appeal because the
defendant’s appeal deprives the plaintiff of the benefits of consenting to
the remittitur.” (King v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 675, 680, fn. 1.)

11
existence of the 2004 Contract, its contract rate and claims paid under
that rate, or its termination.” According to Kaiser’s notice of the
motion, the motion was “made on the grounds that any such evidence
or argument is irrelevant and will unduly prejudice Kaiser. See Cal.
Evid. Code §§ 350, 352.”
In the motion, Kaiser argued that it and Pomona Valley Hospital
had a contractual agreement not to use the 2004 Contract in a case like
the present one. Kaiser based this assertion on a clause in the 2004
Contract, section 3(G), which stated: “Nothing in this Section 3
[Compensation for Covered Services] shall be construed as an
admission or otherwise used as evidence concerning what constitutes
the reasonable and customary value of [Pomona Valley Hospital’s]
services under section 1300.71 (a)(3)(B), 28 Cal. Code of Reg.” Kaiser
asserted both that the parties had agreed that the payment rate in the
2004 Contract was not relevant and not admissible as evidence of
reasonable value, and that the contract was not probative of reasonable
value due to changes in the law since the time of its execution,
including that balance billing had since been outlawed.
At the hearing on the motion in limine, following argument by
the parties, the trial court took the matter under submission. Later,
the court denied the motion in limine in a written order stating: “The
court denies this motion based upon the plain meaning of the 2004
contract term at issue.”
Following the verdict, Kaiser argued in its motion for new trial
that the court committed an “ ‘[e]rror in law’ ” by denying the motion in
limine and allowing the 2004 Contract as evidence at trial. Kaiser
focused on the language of section 3(G) of the 2004 Contract, arguing
that Pomona Valley Hospital’s quantum meruit action was a claim for
“ ‘reasonable and customary value’ ” under Regulation 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B), and so should have been excluded.
The trial court concurred with Kaiser’s analysis, stating that
Kaiser and Pomona Valley Hospital “agreed that the compensation

12
terms agreed to by the parties would not be used as evidence to
determine the reasonable and customary values of services rendered as
that term is defined in Section 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B).” The
court found that Pomona Valley Hospital’s quantum meruit action was
based on Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), and thus section
3(G) of the 2004 Contract applied to exclude the 2004 Contract. The
court further concluded that it was legal error to deny Kaiser’s motion
in limine to exclude the contract and that the error was prejudicial to
Kaiser. Based on these findings, the court conditionally granted
Kaiser’s motion for new trial.
B. Review of the new trial order
An order granting or denying a new trial motion is generally
reviewed for abuse of discretion, with the appellate court independently
determining whether any error was prejudicial. (Argueta v. Worldwide
Flight Services, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 832.) We review the
ruling underlying the new trial order, however, “ ‘under the test
appropriate to such determination.’ ” (Id. at p. 833.)3 Kaiser’s motion
for new trial argued that the denial of its first motion in limine was an
error in law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (7) [new trial allowed
for “[e]rror in law”].) Whether that initial denial was an error in law is
an issue we review de novo. (Smith v. Magic Mountain LLC (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1128, 1135.)
A trial court has “no discretion to grant a new trial unless its
original ruling, as a matter of law, was erroneous.” (Ramirez v. USAA
Casualty Ins. Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 391, 397; see also Tun v. Wells
Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 323.) “Where a
new trial is granted on the basis of legal error, we must first determine

3 The fact that the trial court judge who heard the motion for new
trial was not the same judge who ruled on the motions in limine or
presided at trial did not limit the judge’s authority in ruling on the
motion for new trial. (Sandco American, Inc. v. Notrica (1990) 216
Cal.App.3d 1495, 1508–1509.)

13
whether the ruling the trial court claims was made in error is as a
matter of law truly error.” (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 138, 147 (Donlen).) If the original order was legally
correct, the new trial order was an abuse of discretion and is properly
reversed. (Ibid.)
C. Considered in the proper context, the original order
was not erroneous as a matter of law
In granting the new trial motion, the trial court focused on the
language of the 2004 Contract’s section 3(G) limiting the contract’s use
as evidence. The court ruled that the prior judge had erred in
interpreting this contract provision in deciding the motion in limine,
and, based on the court’s new, differing interpretation, it conditionally
granted the motion for new trial. In so ruling, the court improperly
disregarded the procedural context in which the motion in limine was
decided, as well as later events relevant to the determination.
As noted previously, the stated reason for denial of the motion in
limine was “the plain meaning of the 2004 contract term at issue.”
Whether the trial court’s brief stated reason for denying the motion in
limine was correct or not, however, should not have been the sole
consideration in deciding the new trial motion. “No rule of decision is
better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a
sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision,
itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because
given for a wrong reason.” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19 (D’Amico).) A similar standard applied when
the trial court was faced with the motion for new trial, since it was
obligated to consider whether the denial of the motion in limine was
necessarily, as a matter of law, erroneous. (See Donlen, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) The ruling underlying a new trial order “is
scrutinized under the test appropriate to such determination.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.) Because the result

14
of the trial court’s initial ruling—denial of the motion in limine—was
proper, the new trial motion should have been denied.
First, per Kaiser’s notice of motion, the motion in limine was
solely brought under Evidence Code sections 350 and 352 “on the
grounds that any such evidence or argument is irrelevant and will
unduly prejudice Kaiser.” A notice of motion must state “the grounds
upon which it will be made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a) [accord].) “As a general rule, the trial
court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.”
(Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.) Although “[a]n
omission in the notice may be overlooked if the supporting papers make
clear the grounds for the relief sought” (ibid.), there was no
requirement that the trial court do so here. Indeed, under the “legal
standard” section of Kaiser’s motion in limine, it again relied solely
upon Evidence Code sections 350 and 352, and it argued that the 2004
Contract “should be excluded as irrelevant evidence.”
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary
questions of relevance and prejudice under Evidence Code sections 350
and 352. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229,
281; Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) This principle holds
particular force in a quantum meruit action like this one where “a wide
variety of evidence” is accepted and, as a general matter, “a written
contract providing for an agreed price is admissible in evidence.”
(Children’s Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.) The trial
court, in deciding the motion in limine, did not err in concluding the
2004 Contract was relevant evidence that the jury could properly
consider in determining the reasonable value of emergency services
provided. In fact, on appeal, Kaiser does not dispute that the 2004
Contract, the 86 percent contractual rate, or the years of payments
Kaiser made pursuant to the contract were relevant. Instead, Kaiser
contends that section 3(G) should be construed to preclude use of the
2004 Contract as evidence, not that the contract itself is irrelevant.

15
Second, in deciding the new trial motion, the trial court did not
give due consideration to the fact that in Kaiser’s third motion in
limine—which it filed concurrently with the first—Kaiser sought to
preclude evidence of its “reimbursement methodology.” Kaiser argued
that whether its “methodology complies with [the] applicable
regulation” was irrelevant, as “providers have [no] standing to
challenge a plan’s reimbursement methodology.” Referencing
Regulation 1300.71, Kaiser distinguished Pomona Valley Hospital’s
quantum meruit action from the “regulatory determination” of
reimbursement methodology, and explained that a market value
inquiry is distinct from the “regulatory process pursuant to which the
initial payment by a healthcare service plan is made.” Then, at oral
argument on the matter, Kaiser’s attorney maintained that “[t]he State
is requiring us to come up with a methodology under this 1300.71
regulation,” and “we have a methodology to pay these claims, but we’re
not here arguing that the results of the methodology, because of the
factors of the methodology, are the quantum meruit value.”
Thus, in this third motion in limine, which was granted in
pertinent part, Kaiser argued a position—contrary to the one it took in
the motion for new trial and now on appeal—that supports the trial
court’s initial order denying the first motion in limine. Section 3(G) of
the 2004 Contract provided that the terms of the contract would not be
“used as evidence concerning what constitutes the reasonable and
customary value of [Pomona Valley Hospital’s] services under
[Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B)].” In its third motion in
limine, and at the hearing, Kaiser argued that the determination of
value under Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) was separate
from the determination required in a quantum meruit action. This
argument was consistent with the trial court’s finding on the first
motion in limine that “the plain meaning of the 2004 contract term at
issue,” which covers only a determination “under” Regulation 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B), did not preclude use of the 2004 Contract as

16
evidence in a separate quantum meruit action such as this one.4
Kaiser cannot fault the trial court for effectively adopting its position.
(See Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403 [party is
estopped from asserting error induced by the party’s conduct].)
Third, positions taken by Kaiser at trial, and prior to the time
that the motion for new trial was made, affirmed the distinction
between an initial valuation under Regulation 1300.71, subdivision
(a)(3)(B) and the valuation required in a later quantum meruit action.
The jury instruction on quantum meruit, which was requested by
Kaiser, did not resemble Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) and
its six criteria for determining the “ ‘reasonable and customary value’ ”
of services. Instead, the instruction relied on a standard conception of
quantum meruit, stating in pertinent part that under the law of
quantum meruit, “Pomona Valley Hospital has the burden to prove the
reasonable value, or fair market value, of services that were provided
by [it]. The measure of recovery in quantum meruit is the reasonable
value, or fair market value, of the services. Fair market value is the
price that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a
hypothetical willing seller for the services, neither being under
compulsion to buy or sell, and both having full knowledge of all
pertinent facts. . . . In determining fair market value, you should
consider the full range of transactions presented to you, but you are not
bound by them.” This jury instruction was consistent with case law
distinguishing the criteria for determining value under Regulation
1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) from a quantum meruit valuation. (See
Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346
[articulating quantum meruit standard]; Children’s Hospital, supra,

4 Pomona Valley Hospital’s operative complaint referenced
Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) as background in discussing
Kaiser’s initial reimbursement obligations. These references did not
weigh in favor of a finding that this quantum meruit action was based
on the regulation.

17
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274 [contrasting quantum meruit valuation
from valuation under the regulation].)
In deciding the new trial motion, the trial court improperly
disregarded this procedural and evidentiary background. Examined in
the proper context—considering that Kaiser sought to exclude the 2004
Contract on grounds of relevance and prejudice and repeatedly took
positions contrary to the reasoning advanced in the first motion in
limine—it cannot be said that the denial of Kaiser’s first motion in
limine was erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in granting Kaiser’s motion for new trial.
D. Regardless, the trial court’s initial interpretation of
the contractual clause was superior
Even if the procedural context of the first motion in limine was
properly disregarded and only the language of the 2004 Contract was
considered in deciding whether to grant a new trial for error in law, the
new trial order would still be improper. That is because the trial
court’s initial conclusion that section 3(G) of the 2004 Contract did not
preclude use of the contract terms as evidence in this case was better
than the court’s later determination that it did.
When interpreting a contract, courts seek to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time they entered
into the contract. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1254, 1264; see also Civ. Code, § 1636.) That intent is interpreted
according to objective, rather than subjective, criteria. (Wolf v. Walt
Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1126.)
When the contract is clear and explicit, the parties’ intent is
determined solely by reference to the language of the agreement. (See
Civ. Code, §§ 1638 [“language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not
involve an absurdity”], 1639 [“When a contract is reduced to writing,
the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone,
if possible”].) The words are to be understood “in their ordinary and

18
popular sense” (Civ. Code, § 1644) and the “whole of [the] contract is to
be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other” (Civ. Code,
§ 1641).
However, “ ‘[i]f the contract is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous [citations], and it is the
court’s task to determine the ultimate construction to be placed on the
ambiguous language by applying the standard rules of interpretation in
order to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties [citation].’ ”
(People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 516, 524–525.) “Whether contractual language is
ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. . . . The
interpretation of a contract, including the resolution of any ambiguity,
is solely a judicial function unless the interpretation turns on the
credibility of extrinsic evidence.” (American Alternative Ins. Corp. v.
Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245.) Neither party
submitted extrinsic evidence demonstrating their intent with respect to
section 3(G) at the time they entered into the 2004 Contract, and so any
review of the contract language is de novo.
Again, section 3(G) states: “Nothing in this Section 3
[Compensation for Covered Services] shall be construed as an
admission or otherwise used as evidence concerning what constitutes
the reasonable and customary value of [Pomona Valley Hospital’s]
services under section 1300.71 (a)(3)(B), 28 Cal. Code of Reg.” This
provision is hardly a model of clarity. Indeed, evidence before the trial
court showed that the provision was not used in any other contract.
Kaiser argues in its briefing here that, in entering into this contract, it
“recognized that . . . its agreement to a high, 86% reimbursement rate
could be misused in later cases,” and so section 3(G) was intended to
preclude the use of the 86 percent rate as evidence in a quantum
meruit action. Kaiser, however, provides no record support for this
assertion; an equally viable conjecture is that the parties agreed to this

19
poorly drafted provision with little if any consideration of its ultimate
effect.
In accordance with the rules of contractual interpretation, we
examine the language of the provision itself. One point stands out.
The provision limits only evidence “concerning what constitutes the
reasonable and customary value of . . . services under section 1300.71
(a)(3)(B), 28 Cal. Code of Reg.” (Italics added.) When the required
determination is a valuation that does not fall “under” Regulation
1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), the provision does not apply. Based on
case law clarifying the differing functions of Regulation 1300.71 and a
quantum meruit action, the most logical conclusion is that section 3(G)
does not apply to Pomona Valley Hospital’s quantum meruit claim.
Accordingly, the terms of the 2004 Contract, including the 86 percent
reimbursement rate, were properly introduced at trial.
Valuation and reimbursement under Regulation 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B) are different processes from valuation and
reimbursement in a quantum meruit action and are based on different
considerations. As noted above, Regulation 1300.71 sets out the first
step for reimbursement of noncontracted emergency services, wherein a
health plan determines “reasonable and customary value” of the
services based on the six factors listed under subdivision (a)(3)(B).
(Children’s Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1271, 1273.) “These
factors provide a framework for reimbursement, but do not necessarily
resolve every dispute regarding the proper amount of payment.”
(County of Santa Clara, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) As the DMHC
observed, the intent of the regulation was to “set forth the minimum
payment criteria” and “establish a methodology for determining the
reasonable value.” (Children’s Hospital, at p. 1273.) If reimbursement
complies with the factors, the DMHC considers the reimbursement
“timely.” (Ibid.)
This first step of valuation and reimbursement, under Regulation
1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), is not intended or expected to resolve all

20
reimbursement disputes. A second step—a quantum meruit action—
becomes necessary when a provider believes that the full fair market
value of the services has not been reimbursed under the first step.
(County of Santa Clara, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1038; Long Beach
Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) A quantum meruit action
is separate from the reasonable and customary valuation and
reimbursement process under Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B).
(County of Santa Clara, at p. 1053, fn. 10 [rejecting argument that “a
quantum meruit action is unnecessary because the Knox-Keene Act
provides adequate alternative mechanisms for resolving
reimbursement disputes”]; Long Beach Memorial, at p. 337
[distinguishing reimbursement under Regulation 1300.71 from “the
quantum meruit remedy already available to hospitals and other
medical providers”]; Bell, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 216 [“nothing in”
the Knox-Keene Act “preclude[s] a private action . . . at common law on
a quantum meruit theory”].) A quantum meruit action is by necessity
brought in a legal forum, as the DMHC “ ‘lacks the authority to set
specific reimbursement rates’ ” or to enforce a quantum meruit
reimbursement determination. (Bell, at p. 218.)
These different steps are distinguished, in part, by their purpose.
In adopting Regulation 1300.71, the DMHC “was setting the minimum
claims payment and dispute resolution standards to ensure compliance
with the Knox-Keene Act’s time requirements for claims
reimbursement.” (Children’s Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1276.) Under the regulation, a health care service plan like Kaiser is
“statutorily obligated to pay some reimbursement amount within 30 or
45 days” of the time emergency services are provided. (Long Beach
Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 343.) The purpose of a quantum
meruit action in this context, on the other hand, is to resolve disputes
over reimbursement. (County of Santa Clara, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.
1052–1053.) This second step—which is brought “ ‘in a court of law or
through any other available civil remedy’ ”—can only occur after the

21
initial reimbursement is made pursuant to Regulation 1300.71 and
thereafter disputed. (Children's Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1273; see also Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 335.)
Furthermore, although the criteria for deciding reasonable value
under Regulation 1300.71 may partially overlap with relevant criteria
in a quantum meruit claim, there are also significant differences.
Subdivision (a)(3)(B) of Regulation 1300.71 provides that a health care
service plan is to determine “the reasonable and customary value for
the health care services rendered based upon statistically credible
information that is updated at least annually and takes into
consideration” the six listed factors. This methodology “ ‘is not a
substitute for traditional forums for contract dispute resolution.’ ”
(County of Santa Clara, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) In contrast, “[i]n
determining value in quantum meruit cases, courts accept a wide
variety of evidence,” including expert testimony, “agreements to pay
and accept a particular price,” “ ‘the price agreed upon by the parties,’ ”
a “professional’s customary charges and earnings,” and “the full range
of fees,” including the “scope of the rates accepted by or paid to [a]
[h]ospital by other payors.” (Children’s Hospital, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1274–1275, 1277.) As explained in Children’s
Hospital, the “DMHC neither intended nor had the power to dictate
payment rates or change California law on quantum meruit,” and as
such, Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B) does not set out “the
exclusive standard for determining the reasonable value” of services.
(Id. at p. 1276.) Indeed, this differing standard was recognized by
Kaiser at trial, as the quantum meruit jury instruction it requested did
not track the language of Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but
instead outlined a typical quantum meruit valuation, incorporating
“reasonable value, or fair market value, of the services,” and the “price
that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a

22
hypothetical willing seller for the services.” (See Long Beach Memorial,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.)
Kaiser argues for a broad reading of section 3(G) of the 2004
Contract, noting that Children’s Hospital described section 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B) as “incorporat[ing]” and “embod[ying] the concept
of quantum meruit.” (Children’s Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1274; see also Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Regal Medical Group, Inc.
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1061 [discussing Children’s Hospital].)
Kaiser takes this language out of context. In the section of the
Children’s Hospital opinion in which the court stated that 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B) “embodies the concept of quantum meruit,” the
court nevertheless clarified that “[t]he section 1300.71 subdivision(3)(B) factors are not the exclusive measure of value.” (Children’s
Hospital at p. 1274.) The court went on to describe the standard
quantum meruit valuation of “ ‘reasonable value,’ ” “ ‘going rate,’ ”
“ ‘reasonable market value at the current market prices,’ ” and “the
price that ‘ “a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither being
under compulsion to buy or sell, and both having full knowledge of all
pertinent facts.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Critically, Children’s Hospital reiterated
that, for purposes of a quantum meruit valuation, “courts accept a wide
variety of evidence,” and the factors listed in 1300.71, subdivision
(a)(3)(B) are “not exclusive or necessarily appropriate in all [emergency
medical service reimbursement] cases.” (Id. at pp. 1274–1275.)
Kaiser additionally argues that section 3(G) should be given a
broad reading because its stated exclusion of the 2004 Contract as
evidence will be rendered meaningless otherwise. There are several
problems with this argument. First, if the parties wished for the
exclusion to apply more broadly to actions predicated on the Knox-
Keene Act, or actions in quantum meruit, or actions brought in court,
they simply could have said so. Instead, the exclusion is limited to
“what constitutes the reasonable and customary value . . . under
[Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B)].” “The fact that the contract

23
expressly so provides tends to negate any inference that the parties
also intended another consequence to flow from the same event.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” (Stephenson v. Drever (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1167, 1175.)
Second, Kaiser’s assertion that section 3(G) will lack utility since
the parties are unlikely to seek to exclude the 2004 Contract outside of
a quantum meruit action does not weigh in favor of reading the
provision broadly. Even if there were few to no applications of the
clause as drafted, that does not mean that a narrow clause—limited to
a subpart to a regulation to an entire statutory scheme—should be
given a broad reading. We do not “ ‘insert in the contract language [a
term] which one of the parties now wishes were there’ ” (Estate of Jones
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 948, 953), and “ ‘will not add a term about which
a contract is silent’ ” (Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern
California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 549,
569).
In any event, there appear to be circumstances in which the
exclusionary terms of section 3(G) could apply in a determination of
“what constitutes the reasonable and customary value . . . under
section 1300.71 (a)(3)(B), 28 Cal. Code of Reg.” As Kaiser stated in its
third motion in limine: “Since at least 2004, the DMHC has required
all health plans to explain how they intend to pay for out-of-network
emergency claims. Like other plans, Kaiser files its reimbursement
methodology with the DMHC and, when revisions to that methodology
are made from time to time, Kaiser files its revised methodology with
the DMHC, as well. DMHC has the authority to take disciplinary
actions, including by seeking civil, criminal, or administrative penalties
if it finds a methodology is non-compliant.” If Kaiser is correct in this
interpretation, presumably section 3(G) could have some utility in such
a disciplinary action. (See also Prospect Medical Group, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 507 [noting that “the Legislature has acted to protect the
interests of noncontracting providers in reimbursement disputes by

24
prohibiting HMO’s from engaging in unfair payment patterns involving
unjust payment reductions, claim denials, and other unfair practices as
defined, and by authorizing monetary and other penalties against
HMO’s that engage in these patterns”]; § 1371.37; see also § 1371.39
[authorizing providers to report HMO’s that engage in “unfair payment
pattern[s]” to the DMHC].) Pomona Valley Hospital observes that
Kaiser itself might have cited the exclusion to excuse reimbursing
lesser amounts in its initial payments under section 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B) after terminating the 2004 Contract. The hospital
also reasons that the exclusion could apply if Pomona Valley Hospital
had attempted to bring an action directly premised on section 1300.71,
subdivision (a)(3)(B) rather than one in quantum meruit. (See
Northbay Healthcare Grp. – Hosp. Div. v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life &
Health Ins. (N.D.Cal. 2018) 342 F.Supp. 3d 980, 986 [rejecting, 14 years
after the 2004 Contract was executed, a Business & Professions Code
§ 17200 claim premised on the regulation’s factors].)
Regardless, it is not this court’s role to guess what limited
circumstances the parties may have had in mind when agreeing to the
exclusionary language of section 3(G). The point remains that there is
no reason for this court to give the provision a broad reading—even
more broad than a reasonable interpretation allows—just because it
may have been poorly considered and drafted. Our role is simply to
interpret the provision as it pertains to this case. Because the best
interpretation of the provision is that it does not apply to the valuation
required in a quantum meruit action, the trial court correctly decided
the first motion in limine by allowing the terms of the 2004 Contract
into evidence. The trial court’s later determination in granting the new
trial motion was therefore erroneous and must be reversed.

25
II. The trial court’s rulings relating to costs do not compel
reversal
A. Relevant background
Pomona Valley Hospital filed two motions in limine relating to
costs of providing services. In its fourth motion in limine, it sought to
exclude “costs or profits as evidence of the reasonable value of the
services rendered.” Citing to Children’s Hospital, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th 1260, Pomona Valley Hospital argued that evidence of
costs was not relevant to a quantum meruit fair market value
determination, and that such evidence would unreasonably shift the
jury’s attention away from the value of services provided and toward
the provider’s costs. In a related motion in limine, its sixth, Pomona
Valley Hospital argued in part that Kaiser’s expert, Gustafson, should
not be allowed to base his valuation on the hospital’s costs because they
were irrelevant to the fair market value of the services.
Kaiser opposed the motions. It argued that Children’s Hospital
only precluded introduction of service-specific costs, not overall costs.
It further contended that Pomona Valley Hospital’s overall costs were
relevant to a fair market value determination. At oral argument on the
matter, Kaiser agreed that the hospital’s profits were not relevant but
continued to argue against an exclusion of overall costs.
The trial court granted Pomona Valley Hospital’s fourth motion
in limine. The court’s ruling stated: “The court grants the motion to
preclude either party from producing evidence of the overall costs or
profits of either Kaiser or Pomona.” The ruling on the sixth motion
directed the parties, in pertinent part, to “see” the ruling on the fourth
motion, but also stated “the court denies the motion as it seeks to
exclude Mr. Gustafson’s value opinion because it relies upon incorrect
and misleading data. This is the proper subject for cross-examination.”
Despite the court’s ruling on the fourth motion in limine,
extensive evidence relating to Pomona Valley Hospital’s costs was
presented at trial. During opening argument, Kaiser presented a chart

26
comparing the increase in Pomona Valley Hospital’s charges over time
to the hospital services inflation rate, which Pomona Valley Hospital
complained reflected operating costs. The trial court stated that the
information in the chart was not something that it intended to exclude.
Later, the executive director of Kaiser’s actuarial department,
Michelle Abhasakun, testified about the methodology Kaiser used to
determine reimbursement amounts paid to Pomona Valley Hospital
following the termination of the 2004 Contract. Among other things,
Abhasakun testified that “[t]he first thing that we look at is what we
call the costs of the hospital” and “we want to make sure that we are
paying them more than their costs.” She continued that, after
determining the hospital’s costs, Kaiser applied “a multiplier,” “[s]o
we’re not just trying to pay the hospital their exact costs. We try to
make sure we are paying well more than their costs. . . . [I]f the
hospital is like Pomona Valley and it’s a trauma hospital, we double
that ratio. . . . So let’s say the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio was 10
percent, then in this prong we’re doubling that and the result would be
20 percent.” “We’re going to try to pay them a hundred percent more
than their costs.” Abhasakun testified that Kaiser was “really
confident” that its methodology was “reasonable and fair and that’s
because it kind of overshoots in a conservative way in a couple of
places.” She stated that Kaiser uses the higher result of two amounts
it calculates, and “we’re making sure that we’re more than covering the
hospital’s costs. In fact, we target double the hospital’s costs in the
event it’s a trauma hospital. And we’re paying 20 percent more at least
than what the hospital reports receiving from other payors.”
Abhasakun continued her testimony with several more references to
Kaiser reimbursing Pomona Valley Hospital at an amount well in
excess of its costs.
In sidebar discussions conducted during and after Abhasakun’s
testimony, Pomona Valley Hospital raised concerns that Abhasakun
was testifying about costs in violation of the trial court’s previous order

27
on its fourth motion in limine. The trial court declined to strike the
testimony. Instead, it ruled that the jury could be instructed that the
parties’ experts’ opinions were not based on Kaiser’s methodology in
determining the initial reimbursement amounts.
Pomona Valley Hospital for its part presented evidence that,
according to Kaiser, “highlighted the significant expense of running a
hospital.” This included increasing resources required to run a trauma
center, such as a helipad, trauma and plastic surgeons, specially-
trained nurses, medical equipment, and additional facility construction.
Following the parties’ presentation of evidence, the jury was
instructed: “ ‘The evidence you heard about Kaiser’s methodology
serves only as background information about how Kaiser determined
the fair market value of Pomona Valley Hospital’s services. The
parties’ respective experts in this case are not relying on Kaiser’s
reimbursement methodology to determine the fair market value of the
emergency medical services at issue.’ ” The trial court also instructed
the jury, “ ‘You are not to consider either Pomona Valley Hospital’s or
Kaiser’s costs or profits in determining the reasonable value of Pomona
Valley Hospital’s services.’ ” This latter instruction was submitted to
the court by the parties jointly on a form that stated it was “requested
by” both parties.
B. New trial motion
Pertinent to our analysis here, in Kaiser’s new trial motion it
argued that the trial court improperly prevented it from presenting
evidence relevant to Pomona Valley Hospital’s operating costs. Kaiser
contended that the court misapplied Children’s Hospital, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th 1260 by excluding overall costs instead of a narrower set of
costs, and that this ruling constituted an error in law. Kaiser averred
that, absent the claimed error, it would have shown that Pomona
Valley Hospital’s billed charges increased at a rate greater than its
costs, and that the ruling prevented Kaiser from rebutting any claim
that Kaiser’s reimbursements did not cover Pomona’s costs. According

28
to Kaiser, if the evidence was allowed, Kaiser could have undermined
two of the six different sets of rates Pomona Valley Hospital’s expert
Fritz relied on in opining on fair market value: the 86 percent rate
from the 2004 Contract, and the rate Fritz obtained by applying a
multiplier to the percentage paid by large health plans.
In opposition, Pomona Valley Hospital argued that the trial
court’s prior rulings were consistent with Children’s Hospital, and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence
regarding costs. Pomona Valley Hospital additionally noted that,
despite the trial court’s rulings on the motions in limine, Kaiser was
allowed to and did present evidence regarding the hospital’s costs
through Abhasakun’s testimony.
The trial court rejected Kaiser’s argument regarding costs. First,
the court found that there was no error of law in the prior orders
excluding costs evidence. Second, the court agreed with Pomona Valley
Hospital that Kaiser was allowed to present certain costs evidence
anyway.
C. Analysis
1. The trial court properly acted within its broad
discretion
Kaiser argues that the trial court, in ruling that evidence of
Pomona Valley Hospital’s costs be excluded, misapplied Children’s
Hospital, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1260. According to Kaiser, while
Children’s Hospital found that certain types of costs evidence were
irrelevant to a fair market value determination, the opinion did not
purport to prohibit the presentation of evidence relating to overall
costs. Kaiser asserts that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous
because it did prohibit such evidence.
Similar to this case, Children’s Hospital concerned a dispute over
the reasonable value of emergency medical services provided by a
hospital. (226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.) A motion in limine that
excluded certain cost information, relating to the hospital’s service-

29
specific costs, was granted by the trial court. (Id. at p. 1277.) In
reviewing the ruling, the appellate court found that this exclusion of
costs evidence was correct. (Id. at p. 1268.) The court reasoned that
“under quantum meruit, the costs of the services provided are not
relevant to a determination of reasonable value. Quantum meruit
measures the value of services to the recipient, not the costs to the
provider.” (Id. at p. 1278.) The court observed that, in disputes
pertaining to attorney fees, “the courts have rejected a ‘cost-plus’
approach finding that basing the fee on costs is neither appropriate nor
practical. [Citation.] ‘Costs—high or low—can be subjective and if
deemed relevant to value might reward inefficiency and greed.’ ” (Ibid.)
The court continued, “the reasonable and practical way to value the . . .
services provided by Hospital is to analyze what is being paid and
accepted in the market. Parsing the costs for each service would be
impractical. As pointed out by Hospital, a cost-based system ‘would
undermine efficiency and reward waste.’ ” (Ibid.)
To the extent that Kaiser argues that the trial court read too
much into this holding of Children’s Hospital, Kaiser appears to be
correct. Although the trial court in this case made a number of
statements relating to the exclusion of costs, and at one point said, “I’ve
changed my opinion on this,” the court’s ruling on the fourth motion in
limine stated that evidence relating to overall costs was precluded.
While certain language in Children’s Hospital could be viewed as
applying to overall costs, the motion in limine at issue in that case
targeted “service specific” costs. (226 Cal.App.4th 1260 at p. 1278.)
Drawing a conclusion that Children’s Hospital necessarily prohibits
any evidence of a hospital’s overall costs in any dispute relating to
valuation of medical services is an overly broad reading of the opinion.
That said, it bears repeating that we review the trial court’s
ruling, not its reasoning. (D’Amico, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 18–19.)
Pomona Valley Hospital moved to exclude evidence of costs as being
irrelevant, and the trial court expressed the view that such evidence

30
was not relevant to the fair market value determination required in
this case. A trial court’s discretion in determining the relevance of
evidence is broad, and the court’s exercise of discretion is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170
Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) “This is particularly so with respect to rulings
that turn on the relevance of the proffered evidence. [Citation.] This
standard is not met by merely arguing that a different ruling would
have been better.” (Ibid.)
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling
that evidence of overall costs be excluded. Even if the trial court read
certain aspects of the Children’s Hospital decision too broadly, the
principles expressed in the opinion supported the exclusion of overall
costs evidence in this case. (See Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Regal
Medical Group, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060, fn. 3 [“the
decision in Children’s Hospital leaves considerable discretion to trial
courts to determine what billing and payment evidence might be
relevant to a particular case”].) As Children’s Hospital observed, the
proper determination in a quantum meruit action is “the value of
services to the recipient, not the costs to the provider.” (226
Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.) Valuation of services generally considers
“what is being paid and accepted in the market.” (Ibid.) Consideration
of costs, including overall costs, can “ ‘undermine efficiency and reward
waste.’ ” (See ibid.)
Consideration of what a willing buyer would pay to a willing
seller in this case did not require evidence of overall costs. In fact, if a
valuation were based on a percentage of costs, that could reward waste
and inefficiencies since higher costs would inevitably result in higher
amounts of reimbursement. The trial court properly acted within its
discretion in effectively ruling that evidence of costs should be excluded
as irrelevant.
In a related argument, Kaiser asserts that its expert, Gustafson,
should have been allowed to testify that Pomona Valley Hospital’s total

31
billed charges increased at a rate greater than its total operating
expenses (or costs), which, according to Kaiser, would have
demonstrated that the 86 percent rate in the 2004 Contract had become
untenable. Exclusion of this evidence was a matter squarely within the
trial court’s discretion. Testimony relating to such evidence likely
would have strayed into the type of costs evidence that Children’s
Hospital expressly found inadmissible—“[p]arsing the costs for each
service” (226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278)—and certainly could have
confused the jury.5 The testimony could have led the jury to speculate
that the hospital’s overall charges and costs were directly correlated
with emergency charges and costs, and that emergency service charges
outstripped emergency service costs at the same rate as overall costs.
Such speculation on the part of the jury would have been detrimental to
its ultimate task of determining a fair market value for the emergency
services at issue. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the testimony.
2. In any event, Kaiser fails to show prejudice
As noted, following trial, in rejecting Kaiser’s argument that a
new trial was warranted due to the exclusion of costs evidence, the trial
court observed that, despite the prior ruling, Kaiser was allowed to
present costs evidence anyway. Implicit in this ruling was a finding
that Kaiser was not prejudiced by the trial court’s intended preclusion
of costs evidence.
Even when legal error is established on a motion for new trial,
“[t]o be entitled to a new trial, the moving party must also show the
error was prejudicial—that it affected a substantial right and
prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. [Citation.] We may not

5 Gustafson did testify that the amount Kaiser previously paid
Pomona Valley Hospital under the terminated 2004 Contract increased
at a rate “much faster than the price of hospital services generally”—
8.4 percent compared to 4.6 percent.

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substitute our judgment for the trial court’s on the essentially factual
question of whether the legal error was prejudicial, and we will reverse
only on a strong showing of abuse of discretion.” (Donlen, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s implicit finding that the purported exclusion of costs evidence
did not result in the trial being unfair to Kaiser.
Kaiser argues that, based on the trial court’s order regarding
costs, its expert Gustafson was prevented from presenting testimony
that “Kaiser covered [Pomona Valley Hospital’s] fixed costs even
without steerage, which undermined [the hospital’s] justification for
charging Kaiser higher rates than in-network plans.” This argument
ignores the extensive testimony regarding costs given by Abhasakun.
Again, Abhasakun testified, among other things, “[W]e want to make
sure that we are paying them more than their costs,” “[w]e’re going to
try to pay them a hundred percent more than their costs,” and “we’re
making sure that we’re more than covering the hospital’s costs.”
Abhasakun repeatedly emphasized in her testimony that Kaiser’s
reimbursements covered Pomona Valley Hospital’s costs. Further
testimony on the matter would have simply been redundant, and it is
not reasonably probable that it would have led to a different verdict.
Kaiser further asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury, “You are not to consider either Pomona Valley Hospital’s or
Kaiser’s costs or profits in determining the reasonable value of Pomona
Valley Hospital’s services.” As explained, the trial court acted within
its discretion in excluding evidence of costs, and Kaiser agreed with the
court’s exclusion of profits. Even if there were possible error in the
instruction, however, it would not warrant reversal.
“A judgment may not be reversed on appeal, even for error
involving ‘misdirection of the jury,’ unless ‘after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a
‘miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 548, 574 (Soule), quoting Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)

33
“ ‘Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial “ ‘[w]here it seems
probable’ ” that the error prejudicially affected the verdict. [Citation.]
It is not enough that there may have been a “mere possibility” of
prejudice.’ ” (Alcala v. Vazmar Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 747, 755
(Alcala).)
We first note that the instruction Kaiser complains about was
requested by both Kaiser and Pomona Valley Hospital. Kaiser argues
that it was simply following the ruling previously made by the trial
court and that it had no choice but to acquiesce to the jury instruction.
The record demonstrates, however, that the trial court did not take a
strict line at trial on the preclusion of costs and allowed a significant
amount of evidence pertaining to costs despite its initial ruling. Rather
than simply requesting a jury instruction precluding consideration of
costs, Kaiser could have requested clarification, particularly because
Kaiser agreed that at least some consideration of costs was
inappropriate. Where a “ ‘court gives an instruction correct in law, but
the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is
incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in
order to have the error reviewed.” ’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1131.)
In any event, it is not probable that Kaiser suffered undue
prejudice from the instruction. In its opening brief, Kaiser
characterizes Pomona Valley Hospital’s case at trial as centered on
three themes: the 2004 Contract, the “costs of running a hospital,” and
“the role of steerage.” The latter two of these themes, according to
Kaiser, expressly involved consideration of the hospital’s costs. Kaiser
references Pomona Valley Hospital’s opening statement, in which
Kaiser asserts it “emphasized the significant expense of running its
hospital.” Kaiser also argues that witnesses called by Pomona Valley
Hospital “highlighted the significant expense of running a hospital.”
And Kaiser contends that Pomona Valley Hospital’s presentation of
evidence relating to steerage was premised on the hospital’s “overall

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operating costs,” “on the theory that high volumes of patients allow
hospitals to lower the average cost per patient and more easily offset
fixed costs.”
Thus, if Kaiser was correct that the jury instruction was
erroneous, the error was at least as likely to have prejudiced Pomona
Valley Hospital as Kaiser. Under Kaiser’s theory, due to the
instruction, the jury would have had to disregard the significant
expenses of running the hospital and many of the claimed benefits the
hospital received due to steerage. Accordingly, even assuming the
instruction was erroneous, Kaiser cannot demonstrate that it was
reasonably probable it would have obtained a more favorable verdict
had the instruction not been given. (See Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 574; Alcala, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) The asserted error
did not unfairly skew the verdict against Kaiser.
III. The expert testimony was proper
Kaiser next argues that the testimony of Pomona Valley
Hospital’s expert, Fritz, was improper and that the trial court’s
admission of the testimony prejudiced Kaiser. Kaiser asserts that
Fritz’s valuation relied on data that did not reflect the actual market
rates for emergency services, and that the valuation rested on
unfounded conjectures.
The basis for Kaiser’s complaint is Fritz’s reliance on one of six
sets of rates he considered in valuing the emergency services provided:
his analysis of the rates paid to Pomona Valley Hospital under in-
network contracts with “the big six” plans. Kaiser does not contend
that these rates should have been excluded as part of a proper fair
market valuation. Rather, Kaiser disputes Fritz’s conclusion that a
multiplier was required when evaluating these rates because they were
dissimilar from the valuation considerations relevant to reimbursement
by an out-of-network, uncontracted payor like Kaiser.
As explained previously, Fritz opined that, in valuing the
emergency services at issue in this case, simply factoring in the actual,

35
relatively low rates paid by the big six was not conducive to
determining reasonable value because it did not account for the
benefits the hospital received through steerage. Fritz thus assigned a
multiplier to the rates paid by the big six to “make them more
comparable to the out-of-network claims that are at issue in this
dispute,” and calculated a weighted average rate of 75 percent for this
factor. This number was slightly below his ultimate opinion that, when
considering all six factors, the fair market value of emergency services
provided to Kaiser members was 77.5 percent of the total billed
charges.
The trial court allowed Fritz’s testimony, noting in its ruling on
Kaiser’s pertinent motion in limine that Kaiser’s concerns were “the
proper subject of cross-examination.” We review the trial court’s ruling
admitting the expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th
747, 773 (Sargon).) We find no abuse of discretion here.
Kaiser seems to assert that, whenever an expert opines on
valuation, the expert must avoid projections or adjustments, and may
only base his or her opinion on concrete numbers alone. That is not the
role of a valuation expert. Assumptions of some sort are likely to be
necessary whenever an expert is tasked with opining on fair market
value. The methodology used to arrive at a valuation depends on the
particular circumstances of a case. (See People ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation v. Presidio Performing Arts Foundation (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 190, 206, fn. 7.) “ ‘Valuation methods will differ with the
nature of the business or practice and with the purpose for which the
evaluation is conducted.’ ” (Id. at p. 210.)
In a case like this one involving the valuation of emergency
medical services, “a determination of fair market value is necessarily
hypothetical.” (Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.)
Parties’ “prior actual transactions are not dipositive,” and a “ ‘wide
variety of evidence’ ” is properly considered. (Ibid.) The jury has

36
discretion to reject transactions that it determines are not
representative of the reimbursement obligations at issue in the case,
and to give greater weight to transactions that it views as more
analogous. (Id. at p. 346.)
Certainly, in a case such as this one, an expert’s valuation must
be grounded in relevant market figures and may not rely on “a leap of
logic or conjecture.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) Nor can an
expert rely on unfounded methodology. (People ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation v. Dry Canyon Enterprises, LLC (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
486, 495.)
Fritz’s testimony, however, did not run afoul of these principles.
As made clear during the testimony, his evaluation of the rates paid by
the big six insurers did consider the actual rates paid. Fritz informed
the jury what those rates were. He then explained his reasons for
applying a multiplier to the rates.
Fritz offered a rational basis for applying the multiplier. He
explained the benefits of steerage and why a hospital would accept less
from an in-network plan. He testified that hospitals discount
emergency services in exchange for a health plan’s agreement to pay for
elective services, that in-network plans advertise the hospital for
elective services, and that scheduled surgeries allow the hospital to do
advance planning through diagnostics and by ensuring the required
staff is present. He further explained that in-network contracts assist
hospitals in attracting physicians, who can surmise that there will be a
sufficient number of patients to maintain a practice at the hospital.
This testimony was not inconsistent with legal authority. As
Long Beach Memorial recognized, transactions grounded in contracts
will have lower rates than “the higher rates charged and accepted
where no contract exists.” (71 Cal.App.5th at p. 341; see also HCA
Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Employers Health Insurance
Company (11th Cir. 2001) 240 F.3d 982, 997, fn. 29 [noting that

37
“[w]ithout the benefit of steerage” there was “no reason” for a medical
center “to agree to discount its fees”].)
Kaiser additionally argues that the multiplier chosen by Fritz in
evaluating in-network rates was arbitrary. Fritz gave concrete reasons
for choosing the multiplier that he used, however, which rested on
actual rates paid for reimbursement of medical services. He testified
regarding payments made to a specific hospital frequented by two types
of Kaiser members, those under a “directed” or “steered” plan, and
those under a “self-directed” plan. The rate paid by Kaiser for the self-
directed members was substantially higher than the rate for the
directed ones, by an amount significantly greater than the multiplier
used by Fritz. Fritz further testified concerning other market data that
supported his chosen multiplier. Moreover, the rate calculated by
application of the multiplier was similar to other out-of-network rates
in the six factors ultimately relied upon by Fritz.
In this case, there was no single method of determining a
reasonable fair market value of the services provided. Fritz’s
methodology sufficiently considered actual transactions and relevant
market dynamics.
As noted by the trial court, Kaiser was able to cross-examine
Fritz regarding his methodology. Kaiser availed itself of this
opportunity, cross-examining Fritz at length regarding the factors he
considered and the adjustments he made. Additionally, Kaiser’s
expert, Gustafson, criticized Fritz’s valuation, stating, among other
things, that “it doesn’t pass the smell test” and saying, “[H]e’s wrong.”
The jury was free to credit Fritz’s opinion or discredit it as it saw
fit. In the end, the jury apparently believed Fritz. That was a matter
within the jury’s discretion and a determination we have no cause to
reverse.

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IV. Prejudgment interest should have been awarded at a rate
of 7 percent
Finally, Kaiser argues that the trial court erred in awarding
Pomona Valley Hospital prejudgment interest at a rate of 10 percent
rather than 7 percent. We agree.
Following trial, the court found that Pomona Valley Hospital was
entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (b) because the action was “based on a cause of action in
contract where the claim was unliquidated.” In light of that conclusion,
the court determined that an interest rate of 10 percent was warranted
under Civil Code section 3289, subdivision (b), which provides that if “a
contract . . . does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation
shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach.”
The trial court erred in concluding that the 10 percent interest
rate provided for under Civil Code section 3289, subdivision (b) applied
simply because prejudgment interest was awardable under Civil Code
section 3287, subdivision (b). Article XV, section 1 of the California
Constitution provides that unless the parties “contract in writing for a
rate of interest,” the “rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or things in action, or on accounts after demand,
shall be 7 percent per annum.” Civil Code “[s]ection 3289 provides
rules for interest rates applicable to breaches of contract. If the
contract specifies a legal rate of interest, a court will apply that rate
‘after a breach [of contract] . . . until the contract be superseded by a
verdict or other new obligation.’ ([Civ. Code,] § 3289, subd. (a).) If a
contract does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, a 10 percent per
annum interest rate applies in the event of a breach. (Id., subd. (b).)”
(Carmel Development Co., Inc. v. Anderson (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 492,
525–526 (Carmel Development).)
Quantum meruit is considered an action in contract under Civil
Code section 3287, subdivision (b). (George v. Double-D Foods, Inc.
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 36, 47 (George).) It does not follow, however,

39
that, simply because this matter meets the definition of an action in
contract, Pomona Valley Hospital is entitled to 10 percent prejudgment
interest. While Civil Code “section 3287, subdivision applies
broadly to any cause of action in contract,” “section 3289 applies only to
breach of contract actions.” (Carmel Development, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 527.) Civil Code sections 3287 and 3289 are thus
reconcilable—a claim may be for a cause of action in contract but not
for breach of contract. (Carmel Development, at p. 527.) It is evident
that the instant action in quantum meruit, although an action in
contract, is not an action for breach of contract. The proper rate of
prejudgment interest is therefore 7 percent.
Pomona Valley Hospital argues that a 10 percent interest rate is
appropriate under George, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d 36 and Zalk v.
General Exploration Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 786. Neither case,
however, discussed the proper rate of interest awardable under Civil
Code section 3289. Instead, both cases simply found that prejudgment
interest was available in a quantum meruit action under section 3287,
subdivision (b). (See George at pp. 46–47; Zalk at pp. 794–795 [noting,
in dicta, that the trial court erred by failing to award prejudgment
interest on a claim in quantum meruit].) There is no dispute in this
appeal as to whether prejudgment interest could be awarded. Rather,
the dispute concerns the amount of prejudgment interest. Because this
action was in quantum meruit, not one for breach of contract, the trial
court could only award prejudgment interest at a rate of 7 percent.
(See Carmel Development, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 527.)

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DISPOSITION
The order of April 12, 2024 conditionally granting the new trial
motion is reversed, and the amended judgment entered May 7, 2024, is
vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to
enter judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict and the initial
judgment of January 31, 2024, except that prejudgment interest shall
be awarded at a rate of 7 percent.
Pomona Valley Hospital is entitled to its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GILBERT, J.*

• Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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