State v. Jackson - Postconviction Relief Denied

IN THE SUPERIO R COUR T OF THE ST A TE OF DELA W ARE ST A TE OF D ELA W ARE)) v.) Crim. ID. No. 2 308012393) RA YMOND JACKSON) Submitted: Novem ber 27, 20 25 Decided: Februar y 17, 2026 Upon Raymon d Jackson’ s Motion for Postc onviction Relief DENIED. MEMORAN DUM AND OP INION ORDER Issac A. Rank, Es quire, Deputy Attorney General, D ELA W ARE D EP AR TMENT OF J USTICE, Attorney f or the State o f Delawar e Raymond Jac kson, Self Repr esented LUGG, J.

2 Raymond Jackson seeks postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Despite pleading guilty, he now contends the abse nce of certain evidence, and his attor ney’ s performanc e at various stages preceding his plea, warrant rel ief. The Court has review ed Jackson ’ s moti on, 1 the affida vit of T ri al Counsel, 2 and the State’ s respo nse. 3 Jackson’ s motion i s denied. F ACTS 4 In Au gust 2023, New Castle County Police Department (“N CCPD”) officers learned that Jackson was selling crack cocaine throu ghout New Castle Cou nty. Of ficers then conducted two “control led buys” from Jackson. In each of these transactions, off icers observed Jackson sell th e drugs “out of the back” of his car, a blue Chevrolet Capr ice. Of ficers also watched Jackson engage in what appeared to be “hand to hand” drug sales to other individuals from his car. Based on these observations, off icers sec ured a warrant to search Jac kson’ s car. On August 23, 2023, o f ficers established surveillance of Jackson’ s residence and vehicle. Of ficers again s aw Jackso n conduct what ap peared to be a “hand t o hand” drug sale from the back of his v ehicle. As he walke d away from the car, 1 D.I. 15 (“Def. Mot.”). 2 D.I. 22 (“T rial Counsel Aff.”). 3 D.I. 21 (“State R esp.”). 4 D.I. 1. Because Jackso n pled guilty, t he Co urt draws fa cts from th e af fi davit o f probable cause s upporting h is arrest.

3 off icers took Jackson into custody and secure d the blue bag he was carrying. Of ficers searched Jackso n and his bag. W ithin the bag, officers found: mariju ana, amphetamine, and oxycodone; on Jackson’ s person, offic ers found a fu nctioning digital scale an d Jackson’ s identifica tion card. Of ficer s then transp orted Jackson and the b lue C hevrolet Caprice to New Castle C ounty Police Headquarters. Ther e, they ex ecuted the search warrant and, within a bucke t in the trunk of Jackson’ s car, found: a loaded Ru ger SR 22 han dgun with an obliterated serial number, a loa ded T aurus G3 9x19 handgun with an extended ma gazine, a loaded ha ndgun ma gazine, an u nlabeled pill bo ttle contain ing 80 doses of Alprazo lam, and a box of b usiness cards for “Raymond Jackson Floor Care T echnician” im printed with Jackso n’ s telephone numb er. Also within the trunk of the vehicle, off icers found: an u nlabele d pill bottle co ntaining 20 d oses of Alprazolam, an ind ividually packaged single dose o f Amphe tamine i n a shoe, a c lear tub containing crack cocaine, a Pyrex measuring cup with cocaine remnants, a handgun light, a b ox of clear p lastic sandwich bags, a firearm shoulder holster, and four p ackage s of marijuana. Investigator s p rovided Jackson Miranda warnings before he admitte d to selling the illegal narcotics and that the firearm s belonged to him.

4 PROCEDU RAL BACKGROUN D On January 2, 2024, a New Castle County g rand ju ry returned an indictment char ging Jackson with two counts of Possession, Purchase, Ownershi p, or C ontrol of a Fi rearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”); on e count o f Drug Dealing; tw o counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Co mmissi on of a Felony (“PFDCF”); two counts of Carrying a C oncealed Deadly W eapon (“CCDW ”); and one count of Possession of a W eapon with a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial Num ber. 5 On April 15, 2024, J ackson pled guilty to PFBPP, and the State dropped all remainin g char ges. 6 After accepting Jack son’ s plea, upon the parties’ j oint recomm endation, the Court sentenced Jackson to 15 years of Level V incarceration, suspende d after 10 years for 1 8 months of L evel III probation. 7 Jackson did not ap peal his sente nce or conviction. On March 26, 2025, Jackson, acting pr o se, filed a M otion f or Po stconvictio n Relief. 8 After receiving counsel’ s affidavit, the Cour t permitted J ackson t he opportunity to file a Memorand um of Law in support of his postconviction motion by Ju ly 25, 2025. 9 Jackson did not file a memorandum. The State responded to 5 D.I. 5. 6 D.I. 1 1 (“Plea Agreement” a nd “T r uth- In -Sentencing G uilty Plea Form ”). 7 D.I. 12. 8 Def. Mot. 9 D.I. 20.

5 Jackson’ s m otion on October 13, 2025. 10 T he Court’ s schedul ing order permi tted Jackson to reply to the State’ s response within 45 days of its filing; 11 Jackson did not reply. 12 In his m otion, Jacks on asserts thr ee claim s of inef fecti ve assistance of counsel. First, he contend s his T rial Co unsel and the prosecutor coerced h im into pleadin g guilty by telling him “that if [he] didn’t take the ‘10 year ’ p lea then [he] would surely receive ‘ 86 years’ at trial.” 13 Second, he ar gues his T rial C ounsel “didn’ t wor k to the best of his abilit y” and did not h ave J ackson’ s “best interest at heart.” 14 And third, he posited that T rial Coun sel failed to seek dismiss al of his case when the State fai led to obtain an indictment within forty-five d ays of his arrest. 15 Finally, Jackso n contends, without additiona l context, that there was “no DN A evidence on the firearm found.” 16 10 State Resp. 11 D.I. 20. 12 Because J ackson’ s reply was due within 45 days of the filing o f the State’ s response, o r November 27, 2025, the Court considers this matter under submission as of that da te. 13 Def. Mot. at 3. 14 Def. Mot. at 3. 15 Def. Mot. at 4. 16 Def. Mot. at 3.

6 ANAL YSIS “Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provid es the exclusive remedy for setting aside a final judgment of conviction.” 17 The Rule is “intended to c orrect errors in the trial process, not to allow defendants unlimited opportunities to reliti gate their convictions.” 18 Rule 61 provi des incarcerated in dividuals a procedu re to seek to have a convict ion set aside on the gr ound that the Court lacked jurisdiction or t o collaterally attack their conviction. 19 Before addressing any substantive issues this Court must first consider and app ly R ule 6 1’ s procedural bars. The rule prohibits the Court from considering a motion that is: (1) untimely (filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final); 20 (2) repetitive; 21 (3) procedural ly defaulted; 22 or (4) formerly adjudica ted. 23 “Absent extraordinar y circumstances, a n inef fective-assista nce- of -coun sel claim cannot be asserted leading to a judgment of conviction.” 24 Jackson’ s ineff ective assista nce of counsel claims are not procedurally barre d and will be considered on their merits. Jackson’ s asser tion that 17 Jackson v. State, 2007 WL 2231072, at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2007). 18 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3 d 81 1, 820 (Del. 2013). 19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 22 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 24 Kellam v. State, 341 A.3d 475, 489 (Del. 2025).

7 there was no DNA found on t he firearm is procedurally defaulted and ther efore barred. Procedural Def ault Rule 61 prohibits the filing of “any g round for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconvicti on proceedings leading to the j udgment of co nviction . . . unless the movant shows (A) cause for relief from the procedura l d efault, or (B) prejudice from a vio lation of the movant’ s rights.” 25 The absence of DNA on the firearm was not asserted prior to Jackson’ s judgment o f convic tion. While not framed as an inef fective assistance of counsel cl aim, Jackson’ s T ri al Counsel aptly notes that the absence of DNA on th e firearm would not be helpful as Jack son offere d a Mirandized confession. 26 In light o f J ackson ’ s ad mission, coupled w ith the a bundance of evidence found in Jackson’ s possession at t he time of his arres t, the existence of DNA on a firearm wa s of m inimal, if any significance. The direct and c ircumstantia l evidence against Jackson was overwhelmi ng. Th us, Jackson knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily elected to plead guilty; 27 “a defen dant who enters a 25 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 26 See D.I. 22 ¶ 4. 27 T ru th- In -Sentencing Guilty Pl ea Form.

8 knowing, intelli gent, and voluntary guilty plea waives his right to challen ge errors occurring before t he entry of t he plea.” 28 Jackson’ s attempt to raise the absence of D NA evidence as a “freestandi ng claim of tria l error” is proce durally barre d under Rule 61(i)(3) if it w as n ot raised at trial or on direc t appeal. 29 It was not; an d Jackson has not demonstrated cause for relief from his procedural default nor prejudice from an alleged violation o f his rights. “T o establish cau se, t he movant must demon strate that an external impediment prevented him fr om ra ising the cla im ear lier. T o establish prejudice, t he movant must show actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error. ” 30 Jackson does neither; therefore, his challenge to the absence of DNA evidence is procedurally defaulted and barred, w ithout exceptio n. Ineff ective Assistance of C ounsel T o succeed on an ineffecti ve assistance of counsel claim, Jackson must meet the two-pro ng test established by Strickla nd v. W ashington. 31 Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’ s representatio n fell below an objective 28 Dollar d v. S tate, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (Del. May 1 1, 2020) (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2 d 1229, 1232 (De l. 2003)). 29 See State v. Thomas, 202 4 W L 51 171 17, at *5 (Del. Su per. Ct. Dec. 16, 2024). 30 Ruffin v. State, 2019 WL 719038, at *2 (Del. Feb. 19, 2019) (citi ng Y ounger v. State, 580 A.2 d 553, 556 (De l. 1990)). 31 466 U.S. 668, 68 7 (1984).

9 standard of reasonableness;” 32 and (2) “that there i s a reasonable probability that, but for c ounsel’ s unprofessional errors, the re sult o f the p roceeding would have b een dif ferent.” 33 “A reason able probability is a probability suff icient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 34 The Court may dispose of an inef fective assistance of co unsel claim if the defendant fails to show a reasonable probability of a different result but for counsel’ s alleged errors. 35 “[A]ctual i nef fectivenes s claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmat ively prove prejudice.” 36 A defendant must allege prejudice and then substa ntiate that allegation. 37 Because a defendan t must prove both parts of an inef fective assistanc e of counsel claim, a failure to estab lish suf ficient pre judice alone is enough to defe at an ineffe ctive assista nce of counsel allega tion. “It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable ef fect on the outcom e of the proceeding.’” 38 T he “court must consider the ‘totality o f the evidence,’ and ‘must ask if the [movant] has met 32 Id. at 688. 33 Id. at 694. 34 Id. 35 Id. at 697. 36 Id. at 693. 37 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1 186, 1 196 (Del. 1996). 38 Harrington v. Rich ter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (201 1) (quoting St rickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

10 the burden of s howing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been dif ferent abse nt the error s.’” 39 An ineffe ctive assistance of counsel claim is a question of whether trial counsel’ s actions wer e adequa te. 40 A review of counsel’ s re presentation is subject to a strong presumpti on that counsel’ s co nduct was profes sionally reasonable. 41 As such, mere allegations will n ot suffice; instead, a defendant must make concrete allegations of inef fective assistance, and then s ubstantia te the m, or risk summary dismissal. 42 Jackson’ s Ineffe ctive Assistance of Coun sel Claims 1. T rial Counsel di d not coerce Jac kson into accepting a plea. Jackson al leges his T ri al Cou nsel and the prosecutor coerced him into accepting a plea by tel ling him that if he did not accep t t he plea offered (recommending a t en-year sente nce), he “would surely receive 86 years at trial.” 43 T ri al Counsel a sserts that he explained the stre ngth of the St ate’ s evidence to Jackson, includin g his admission “to s elling dr ugs and possessing th e firearm.” 44 39 S tate v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 343 (Del. 2017) (citing Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 384 (Del. 201 1) (quotin g Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6 95-96)). 40 State v. W right, 2023 WL 2128338, at *3 (Del. Su per. Ct. Fe b. 21, 2023). 41 Id. 42 Y ounger, 580 A.2d at 556. 43 Def. Mot. at 3. 44 T ri al Counse l Af f. ¶ 2.

11 Further, T rial Counsel informed Jackso n that based on his existing criminal history, if convicted at trial, he would be eligib le for sentenc ing as a habitual offen der and face a potential ninety-six year minimum mandatory senten ce. 45 T rial Counse l explained that Jackson’ s decision to plead guilty “constituted J ackson’ s sober view of his legal predicament,” 46 and, in open court, Jackson d enied that anyone threatened or forced him to acce pt the guilty plea. On April 15, 2024, Jackson engaged in a plea colloquy in which he indicate d to the Court t hat he “freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the char g es listed in [his] written p lea agreemen t” an d t hat he was not forced by his “law yer, the State, or anyone” t o enter his plea. 47 “In the absence of clear and convincin g evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is bound b y his answer s on the T ruth - in - Sentencing Guilty Plea form” and by his stateme nts given during the plea colloquy.” 48 “[T]he Unite d States Supreme Co urt has determined that a defendant’ s decision to plead guilty as a means to avoid additional pris on time does not amount to ‘coercion.’” 49 T rial Counsel and the State, “truthfully telling [Jackso n] that he 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 T ru th- in -S entencing Guilty Plea Form. 48 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (D el. 1997). 49 Edwar ds v. State, 2007 WL 4 374237, at *1 (Del. Dec. 17, 2007) (citin g Brady v. United State s, 397 U.S. 742, 7 51-52 (1970)).

12 was lookin g at signi ficantly more time if convicted of hi s char ges” doe s not amoun t to coerci on. 50 Jackson’ s plea collo quy r eveals tha t h e free ly and v oluntarily decide d to plea d g uilty wit hout threa t o r c oercion. T rial Counsel’ s fr ank e xplanation of Jackson’ s legal predicament was profe ssionally reasonable and does not amount to inef fective as sistance. 2. T rial Counsel’ s representation was profession ally reasonable. Jackson alleges, despite paying “close to $10,000” his T ria l Counsel d id not work to the best of his ability or have Jackson’ s best int erests at heart. 51 In response, T ri al Counsel states that “[t]rial would have been a kamikaze mission with no discernable upside.” 52 Thus, T rial Counsel worked “to find som e weakness in t he case to leve rage for the benef it of Jackso n.” 53 And Counse l “gathered and pr ovided mitigation to th e State in the hopes that the State w ould exten d mercy to Jac kson below the 10 year plea,” 54 but the S tate rema ined steadfast in it s of fer of ten years. 55 Jackson has failed to allege, let alone show a reasonable degree of probability, that but f or T rial Counsel’ s allege d ineffective ness, he would not have entered the 50 See State v. Starr, 2014 WL 6673914, at *5 (Del. S uper. Ct. Oc t. 29, 2014). 51 Def. Mot. at 3. 52 T ri al Counse l Af f. ¶ 3. 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id.

13 plea. 56 T his Court must focus on whether T rial Coun sel’ s actions were o bjectivel y reasonable, not wheth er J ackson subjecti vely believed Counsel had his best interest at h eart. 57 T rial Counsel convinced the State to exten d a plea recomme nd ing a sentence substantially l ess than what Jackson faced if convicted at trial. 58 Jackson chose to acce pt that of fer. T o be sure, “Defendants have no legal en titlement to a plea bar gain.” 59 “Plea bar gaining flow s from the ‘mutuality of ad vantage’ to defendants and prosecutors each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid tria l.” 60 Counsel i s not ineffect ive for failing to compel the State to extend what, in Jackson’ s view, is a better a plea offe r. And, of cour se, Jac kson wa s un der n o obliga tion to acce pt any of fer exte nded by the State. But, recogniz ing the overwhelming evidence against him, Jackson elected to plead guilty. Counsel’ s efforts to mitigate the consequences of Jackson’ s election reflec t objectively rea sonable strat egy. 56 Foote v. State, 2012 WL 562791, a t *1 (Del. Feb. 21, 2012) (c iting Alb ury v. Stat e, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988)) (“In order to prevail on a claim of in effec tive assistance of counsel in connectio n with a guilty plea, the defendant must d emonstra te a reasonable pro bability t hat, bu t for his counsel’ s unpr ofessional error s, he wo uld not have pleaded g uilty but wou ld have in sisted on proc eeding to tr ial.”). 57 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 58 D.I. 12. 59 W ashington v. State, 844 A.2d 293, 296 (Del. 2004) (citati ons omitted). 60 Bor denkir cher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 752).

14 3. T rial Counsel was not ineff ective in his unsuccessful ef fort to seek a dismissal of J ackson’ s case base d on a delaye d indictment. Jackson a lleges that T rial Counsel failed t o move to d ismiss t he c ase when the State fail ed to indict h im – Jackson – wi thin forty-five days of his arrest. 61 T rial Counsel contends that he wa s not retained, and did not enter his appearance in this case, un til December 5, 2023. 62 “That same day, in ligh t of the passage of time sinc e the date of arrest, counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss.” 63 Counsel ac knowledged, “[i ]t is highly unli kely that t he c ourt would grant the motio n t he first t ime it is hear d after just three mon ths of pretrial detention.” 64 Jackson was arre sted on August 23, 2023, 65 and indic ted on January 2, 2024. 66 One-hundred and thirty-two d ays elapsed between Jackson’ s arrest and his indictment; 67 this “delay” does not amount to a s peedy trial violation. 68 Nonetheless, Jackson ignores his T rial Counse l ’s motion to dismiss for lack of indictment on 61 Def. Mot. at 4. 62 T ri al Counse l Af f. ¶ 5; D.I. 3. 63 T ri al Counse l Af f. ¶ 5. 64 Id. 65 D.I. 1. 66 D.I. 5. 67 See D.I. 1; see also D.I. 5. 68 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 165 (Del. 2008).

15 December 5, 2023. 69 Recognizing the futility of the motion, counsel withdrew the request on Decem ber 18, 2023, 70 after the State filed its discovery response. 71 In any event, Jackson cho se to plead gui lty, waiving his claim to any a lleged errors occurring before his plea. 72 Jackson’ s final claim t hat T rial Counsel provide d inef fective as sistance of counsel is without merit. CONCLUSION T ri al Cou nsel provide d Jackson constitutionally effect ive as sistance of counsel. T rial Counsel, as he must, informed Jackson o f the potential s entence he faced if found guilty at trial; he did not force o r coerce Jacks on to enter the plea. T ri al Counsel’ s objectively reasonable and diligent investigation of Jackson’ s case and preparati on of mitigation m aterial yielded a favorable plea for Jackson. And, because Jackson’ s plea forestalls any challenges to the events that preceded it, the Court finds T rial C ounsel was not inef fec tive, and Ja ckson suffered no prejudice. Jackson’ s M otion for Pos tconviction R elief is DENIED. IT IS S O ORDER ED. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Sean P. L u g g, J u d g e 69 D.I. 4. 70 D.I. 14. 71 Id. 72 Dollar d, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (citing Miller, 840 A.2d at 1232).