State of Delaware v. Bradley Green - Exclusion of Expert Testimony

IN THE SUPERIO R COUR T OF THE ST A TE OF DELA W ARE ST A TE OF D ELA W ARE,)) Plaintif f,)) I.D. No. 2403006 496 v.)) BRADLEY GREEN,)) Defendant. Submitted: Januar y 23, 2026 Decided: Februar y 13, 2026 In this crim inal ca se with alle gations of child sexual abuse, t he State of Delaware has moved to exclude testimony of Mr. Green’ s proposed expert forensic psychologist at trial. In their moving paper s, the parties addressed whether Dr. Byrnes would off er impermissible commentary on the credibility of the witnesses. 1 During the hearing, additional questi ons arose which impl icate this Court’ s gatekeeping fu nction as to re levance and re liability. The Court was provided with a 2 1-page report from the proffered expert. During the hear ing, the defe nse submitted a revised expert disclosure, indicating it 1 See State v. Floray, 715 A.2d 855, 862–63 (Del. 1997) (discussing general prohibition on expert testimony that pertains to witness credibility). In part, the focus on impermissible opinion related to the credibility of witnesses stemmed from portions of Dr. Byrnes’ report; for example, “[i]t would be dif ficult to definitely af firm Mr. Green engaged her in this behavior.” Report of Dr. Byrnes, State’ s Mot. in L imine, Ex. A, at 18. “The investigation process in the current case has deviated markedly and in several ways from best practices, giving rise to significant concerns as to how statements provided by Harmoni and Hannah can be interpreted.” Report of Dr. Byrnes, State’ s Mot. in L imine, Ex. A. at 21.

comprised the sum and substance of the testimony expected from Dr. Byrnes. That revised disc losure states Mr. Green pr off ers Dr. Byrne s to testify regar ding: general empirical findings regarding facto rs that increase or decrease the relia bility of chi ldren’ s rep orts of prior events. She wi ll educ ate the [] j ury about general scientific findings reg arding the reliability o f children’ s reports s o t hat can use th e in formation in we ighing the evidence. Dr. By rnes will discuss memory f ormation, as well as factor s that may af fect memory. Dr. By rnes may review v arious factors that are known to influence a child’ s repor ting of physical or sex ual abuse. These factors may include the circu mstances of t he chil d and f amily, the specif ic char acteristics of the child [], the n ature of the alleg ations, and the circum stances surrounding statemen ts made by the child. Dr. Byrnes will discuss the psychological resear ch literature as it rel ates to the timing and reliability of child abuse reports made by ch ildren and the factors that contribute to that reliability, such as repeated interviewing and the reactions of pers ons to whom the c hild makes statements. Dr. Byrnes will discuss t he importance of proper child foren sic interviewing techniqu es, and the effect that the proper or improper use of such techniques is likely to have o n the quality of a child interview. These topics may include the im pact of leading questions, developmental ly inappropria te language, and forced choice or yes/no questions, as w ell as confirmat ory bias on the part of t he interviewer. Dr. By rnes will discuss the issues related to a child’ s participation in psychotherap y or counseling, the impact of exposure of a child to reports by other persons (particularl y parents) or alleged abusive experiences, and the potential for the d evelopme nt of source misattribution errors (a specific type o f memory error based on such experiences). Dr. Byrnes will app ly these factors t o the ca se in q uestion, and may also discuss the e xtent to which t he child i nterviews in t his specific case adhered to best practice standards. Dr. Byr nes will discuss the re search area of juror kno wle dge and awareness o f the above factors as well. Dr.

Byrnes will not opine on the issue of cre dibility (believability) of the child, as that i ssue is solely th e province of the trier of fact. Dr. Byrnes provided testimony to this Cou rt to assist in making its determination. She testified memory d evelops across our life span, including duri ng middle age and within t he geriatric population. She cited familiarity with studies regarding memor y and ma lleability. Dr. Byrnes has experience with the Finding W o rds/ChildFir st course, which was employed b y the interview ers in this case; first as an observer, then as a participant, and most recently with a refresher course. She testif ied protocols have been established to limit suggestib ility in interviews with children—specifically citing conce rns with questions t hat are (1) repeated, (2) leading, (3) problem atic ally phras ed, (4) force choice res ponses, and (5) limit expo sure to informa tion. Less clear, though, was Dr. Byrnes’ testimony regarding methodol ogy for assess ing the i ntegrit y of a forensic intervi ew. She tes tified regarding a Martindale rubric, the s pecific s of which were not provided to the Court. Although she was unsure if this rubric was utilized under the ChildFirst protocol, she testified that it was akin to the ChildFirst protocol. She was also unsure if the work of Dr. Martindale was p eer -reviewed. When asked during cros s-examination i f her opinion as to whether a deviation or contamination is subjective, Dr. Byrnes explained

forensic interviewer s are provided training and feedback on videotape d interviews. She stated spec ific scores are not part of t he rubric. W ithin the context of forensic interviewin g, Dr. Byrnes e xplained that contaminatio n is anything that can contribute to inaccuracies in t he account. Contaminati on can come from w ithin the interview or o utside the interview, but the protocols are designed t o limit contamination. However, according to Dr. Byrnes, there is no method ology available to determine if an interv iew has been contaminate d. Dr. Byrnes also sp oke about a stu dy which measured t he amount of influenc e caregivers can have on childre n’ s memories, finding 20% o f the participants were influenced. She testified source monitoring is weake r in children than adults and thus the forensic interviewer ’ s inte nt is to maxim ize re liable informatio n. Howev er, she did not necessarily equate rel iability with ho nesty. She note d “[t]here is no suc h thing a s a p erfect i nterview.” Dr. By rnes has te stified pr eviously; 2 however, she has never testifie d in a criminal c ase regard ing forensic interviewing prot ocols. Dr. Byrnes’ Opinions on this Case As for Mr. Green’ s case, Dr. Byrnes opined the interviews lacked fidelity t o the protocols a nd those dev iations cau sed significant concern. In her wor k on this 2 Her prior testimony was on divorce and custody. She also testified on specific clinical matters related to her work at the Audrey Hepburn Children’ s House.

case, Dr. Byr nes only review ed four of the seven total i nterviews of the child- witnesses. She also r eviewed one of two survei llance videos t aken from i nside the home. Dr. Byr nes was aware o f the existen ce of additio nal interviews. 3 T he fact that her mater ials were lim ited did not p revent her from providing an a nalysis including “[t] here are clear c oncerns that f orensic inter views cond ucted with the [] girls did not a dhere to best pra ctices in f orensic interv iewing.” 4 Dr. Byrnes is critical the interviewer “did not suf ficie ntly explain gr ound rules pertaining to t he interaction…” 5 One criticism by Dr. Byrnes of the interviews of the child -witnesses in this case relates to multiple interviews of the children. Hannah was interviewed four times. Her fi rst interview, in June of 2023, was prompted by st atemen ts Hannah made to her m other, suggest ing the defendant “peed” on her h and; howev er, H annah did not disclose a ny allegations of criminal wrongdoing by Mr. Green. A second interview was p rompte d in October by v ideo su rveilla nce, within t he home, of purported physical abuse. Again, no sexual abuse was disclosed. A t hird interview was conducted in Maryland, a s a prec aution, after a third-par ty made allegatio ns against the children ’ s grandfather. A fourth interview took place in October of 2024, after Hannah told her mother she was “ready to t alk.” It app ears she made 3 See report of Dr. Byrnes at p. 14-5. 4 See report of Dr. Byrnes at p. 14-5. 5 Id. at p. 15.

disclosures during this fourth interview. Dr. Byrnes only reviewed the latter two of these recorded i nterviews. Harmoni wa s inte rviewed i n June of 2 023 because o f the statement purportedly made b y Hannah to h er mother. Harmoni was again interviewed in October of 2 023. Finally, Harm oni was interviewed in March of 2024, during w hich time she made a disclosure of alleged sexual abuse by Mr. Green. Dr. By rne s reviewed two of those three in terviews. As noted, a focus of her full report an d the more streamline d summary of her testimony critical of the methods used in this case relates to multiple interviews. However, on cross examination, Dr. Byrnes acknow ledged the ChildFirst manual permits multi ple interviews, if required by the situation, so long as they are open - ended and non-leading. She also recognized tha t a second or third inter view i s w ithin protocol if the c hild w ould like to talk. Rela tedly, she is critica l that t he interview er did not engage in building rapport with the child during subsequent interviews. However, on cross examination, she agreed a second interview does not require rapport build ing. Moreover, she never review ed the initial i nterviews. Use of Photogr aphs During th e Interview Another criticism of Dr. By rnes’ is of the use of surveilla nce stills by the interviewer. S pecifically, s he testified ther e is no reason t o b elieve a commo n photo

of a househol d room would trigger the memory. But that testimony was not linked to a particular fa ct of su ggestibility or study. W ritten Responses Dr. Byrnes criticize d the interviewer for permitting the c hild -witness to write answers to questions instead of verbalizin g them. Specifically, Dr. Byrnes pointed out tha t the goal is to interview t he c hild. She opined the interview er engage d in this tactic beca use she was uncomforta ble. However, when asked if this was her subjective b elief, she di d n ot answer directly. On cross-examination, Dr. By rnes agreed t he ChildFirst protocol advises interviewers should “observe non -verbal ways the child c ommunicate s.” Clarification Dr. Byrne s critic ized the interviewer for not clarifying “confusing” details put forth by one child witness. She testified th e ChildFirst protocol req uires follow-up. For example, she found the child’ s d escript ion of a penis as a “p illow” to be confusing. Contaminati on The report of Dr. Byrnes addresses concerns related to co ntaminatio n. Specifically, she discusses the fact that the initial disclosure was made to an adult, and she sugges ts the possibility that person may have contaminated the child’ s memory by questioning. Her report states “[i]t w ould not b e unreasonable to believe

a parent facing such sho cking information and having had alcohol would likely engage in problema tic interact ions discussed abo ve that have been show n to impact statements pr ovided upon i nterview.” Legal Standar ds As the pr oponent of the testimony in thi s case, Mr. Green bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Specifical ly, Mr. Green must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Byrnes’ opinions are reliable. 7 This Court “must act as a gate keeper and determine that the evidence is both (1) reliab le and (2) relevant.” 8 “ Ultimately, the testimo ny of a n expert is admitted upon the theory t hat, in a particular case, the issue i s such that the jurors are not competent to draw their own conclu sions from the facts without the aid of the expert. ” 9 In making this determination, t he Court lo oks to D.R.E. 702 and to Daubert. 10 Delaware Rule of E vidence 702 pro vides: A witness who is qualifi ed as an expert by knowle dge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in t he form of an opin ion or otherwise if: 6 In r e Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation, 342 A.3d 1 131, 1 144 (D el. 2025) citing Bowen v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 795 (Del. 2006). 7 State v. McM ullen, 900 A.2d 103, 1 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) citing In r e Paoli R.R. Y ar d P.C.B. Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994). 8 In r e Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation, 342 A.3d at 1 144 quoting T umlinson v. Advanced Micr o Devices, Inc., 106 A.3d 983, 990 (Del. 2013). 9 Minner v. Am. Mortg. & Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 846 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (citation omitted). 10 D.R.E. 702; Daubert v. Merr ell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

(a) The expert’ s scientific, technical, or other sp ecial ized knowledge will help the t rier of fact to u nderstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) The testimo ny is base d on suf ficient fa cts or data; (c) The testimo ny is the prod uct of reliable principles and me thods; an d (d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. This Court must be focused on principles and methodology, not the conclusions of the e xpert—and w hile the Court’ s inquiry is g uided by f actors, they ar e flexible. 11 The factors whic h have been i dentified 12 include: (1) Whether the ex pert opinion tes timony “ca n be (and has been) tested” (2) Whether the opinion testimony “has been subjected to peer review and publication” (3) The “known or potential rate o f error” and (4) Whether i t has attracted widespread acceptance within the scientifi c community. 11 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 12 Most recently in In r e Z antac (Ranitidine) Litigation, 342 A.3d at 1 144 quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.

The Delaware Supreme Court has recently reaf firmed t he seriousness o f this Court’ s obligation as a gatekeeper and that this Co urt should not presume admissibility: Rule 702 and Daubert esta blish t he suf f iciency and re liability elements and the threshold that a proponent of expert t estimony must meet to establish admissibility. Unless that threshold is met, expert testimony is not admissible, and trial courts should not approach a challenge to expert testim ony with any presumption t oward adm issibility. 13 As to relevance, the prof fered expert test imony must both “rela te to an ‘issue in the case’ and ‘assis t the trier of fact t o understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue.’” 14 “Courts are not just to let the opinion of the credentialed expert into evidence for what it is worth a nd leave its evaluation to the ju ry.” 15 W hile the Cour t should consider the expert ’ s backgrou nd, [t]he words of an expert qu alified to opine within a recognized “field” do not automatica lly guarantee reliable, and therefore admissible, testimony, however. The i nquiry will b e whether the expert and the “field of expertise” itself can produce an opinion that is suffi ciently informed, testable and in fac t ver ifiable on an issue to be determ ined a t trial. 16 In Delaware, our S upreme Cour t addressed the State offering ex pert testimony in the contex t of intra family ch ild se xual abuse w here “a com plainant’ s behavior or testimony is, to the a verage layperson, s uperficial ly i nconsistent with the occurre nce 13 Id. at 1 147. 14 T umlinson v. Advanced Micr o Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264 (De l. 2013) (internal footnote omitted) quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 15 Minner v. Am. Mortg. & Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 841 (Del. 2000). 16 Eskin v. Car den, 842 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Del. 2004).

of a rape, and its otherwise inadequately explained, thu s requiring an expert’ s explanation of its emotional antecedents, expert testimony can assist a jury in this regard.” 17 In Wheat, the Court held that limited us e of exper t testimony in child s exual abuse prosecutions is appropriate to assist the finder of fact, whether judge or jury, in evaluating the psychologica l dynamics and resulting behavior p attern s of alleged victims of child abuse, where t he child’ s behavior is not within the c ommon experience of the average juror. T o the extent such expert testimony is given in general terms and directed to behavior factors in evidence, i t i s a dmissible. T o the extent it attempts to quantify the veracity of a particular witness or provide a statistical test for truth telling in the c ourtroom, it is clearly u nacceptable. 18 For s upport of his position in this case, Mr. Green has attached the transcript from a case tried in this Court. 19 In Smith, after voir dir e of the expert, the Cour t limited the testimony it would al low. Th e Court found the expert compe tent t o t estify on memory a nd prop er interview ing tech niques. Tha t decisi on carefully l imited the testimony, noting that our Supre me Court has held it would be im proper for an expert witness to opine as to the truth or falsity of testimony. The scope of his testimony included proper interviewing techniques, h is opinion that the int erviews conduc ted in t he case displayed poor techniques, contamination, risk of therapy before 17 Wheat v. Stat e, 527 A.2d 269, 273 (Del. 1987). 18 Id. at 275 (Del. 1987). 19 State v. Micah Smith, C.A. No. 1512004476. See Def. Resp., Ex. B.

interviews, and the best me thodology for eliciting information. 20 The defense expert in Smi th was not Dr. Byrnes. The State points to this Court’ s decision in State v. Herbert. 21 In Herbert the defense expert was prepared t o opine that the child’ s memory was “vague” and “illogical.” This Court found her testimony to be inadmissible b ecause it di rectl y and indirectly attacked the credibility of the child -witness. While portions of Dr. Byrnes’ 21 -page report draw similar conclusions, during the hearing and in t he revised proffer such obvious attacks on the credibility of the witnesses have been muted. Other Jurisdiction s The parties ha ve cited decisio ns from arou nd the countr y to support t heir positions. 22 In V er mont v. W igg, 23 the Supre me Court fo und “a lar ge ma jority of courts have he ld that the t ype of genera l expert evidence i ntroduced in this case, explaining t he proper and im proper meth ods of exam ining child ren who may be victims of sexual assault, is admissi ble.” 24 T here, the trial c ourt permi tted some 20 Def. Resp., Ex. B, at 140. 21 2022 W L 3211004 (Del. Super.). 22 Defendant cites in a footnote along with other cases to New Jersey v. Mich aels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994), but that case is over thirty years old, and the procedural posture is not terribly helpful here. That said, the decision highlights issues with “coercive or highly suggestive interrogation techniques [that] can create a significant risk that the interrog ation itself will distort the child’ s recollection of events….” Id. at 1379. 23 889 A.2d 233, 238 (Vt. 2005). 24 Id. at 239 (collecting cases).

testimony from t he defense e xpert, but di d not permit tes timony regarding the interviewers’ adheren ce to protoco l or any impact t heir deviatio n from protoco l might have on the child-witness’ s credibility. 25 T he state supr eme court held it was appropriate t o exclude the portion of e xpert testim ony that a c omplainant’ s testimony is unre liable becau se of defects i n the initial q uestioning. 26 However, the court determ ined that the exper t’ s assessin g whether interv iew tactics were w ithin protocol did n ot constitute comment ing on the w itnesses’ cre dibility. 27 Kansas v. Huntley 28 is not entirely helpful, as it d ealt with a continuance request to h ire a potential expert. That said, t he decision suggests caselaw trended toward permitt ing expert testimony “ on the impact of sug gestive interview ing techniques on child witne sses.” 29 Mr. Green al so cites Montana v. Colburn, a d ecision from the Montana Supreme Court reversing the trial court for not permitting expert testimony on forensic in terviewing. 30 Colburn is d istinguishable for tw o reason s; first, the exper t was excluded by the tria l c ourt beca use she was not traine d on a partic ular interview protocol—which is not factually analogous to our case. 31 Second, the Monta na 25 Id. at 238. 26 Id. at 239 (collecting cases). 27 Id. at 241–42. 28 177 P.3d 1001 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 29 Id. at 1008 (citations omitted). 30 366 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2016). 31 Id. at 261. This was also the thrust of the decision by the South Dakota Supreme Court case cited by the defense, South Dakota v. W ills, 908 N.W.2d 757 (S.D. 2018).

Supreme Court made it clear that its trial court s are to “con strue l iberally … so a s to admit all relevant expert t estim ony….” 32 As noted above, ou r Supreme Court ha s reiterated the g atekeeping ro le of this Cour t. 33 The Ohio Supreme Court has determined defendants in child sexual abuse cases “may pr esent te stimony as to t he proper protocol fo r interview ing” children. 34 In a later decision, Ohio v. Pryor, t he court of appeals found no error in denying a defense re quest f or an expert where the tr ial court concluded there was no issue wi th whether the pr otocols were foll owed by the interviewer. 35 Or egon v. Black 36 addressed some of the ar gument s advanced by the State in this case. Bu t the decision itself focused on whether the proposed testimony was improper vouc hing. The Court d id not make a Daubert a ssessment. New Hampshir e v. Sar gent 37 is also distinguishable. In that case, the State introduced expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome in its case in chief. As rebutta l, the defense sought to offer an expert to opine “on the danger of improperly-conducte d interview s of children.” 38 T he court acknowledged a split in decisions wi th regard to whether such testimony was “within t he knowle dge 32 366 P.3d 258, 260 (quotation omitted) (citation omitted). 33 In r e Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation, 342 A.3d 1 131, 1 135 (D el. 2025). 34 Ohio v. Gersin, 668 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ohio 1996). 35 Ohio v. Pryor, 2004 WL 251659, at *1–3 (Ohio Ct. App.). 36 437 P.3d 1 121 (Or. 2019). 37 738 A.2d 351 (N.H. 1999). 38 Id. at 352.

and understanding of t he average juror.” 39 T he New Hampshire Supreme Court found it was expert testim ony but also held “[t ]here must be a p articular ized showing that improper interview techniques were used, ho wever, before a party ca n introduce expert testim ony.” 40 Similarly, t he Geor gia Supreme Cour t h as d etermined it is appropriatel y within the scope o f expert testimony to “provid[e] the jury with information about proper techniques for interview ing children and whether t he interviewing techniq ues actually utilized were proper.” 41 A particular concern for th at court was that the State’ s witness was permitted to testify regarding his “extensi ve experience and training in investigating child sexual abuse and interviewing the v ictims thereof.” 42 The exclusion of the defense expert created an “uneven playing field.” 43 T he trial court can exclude expert testimony th at is “not based upon either the facts within the expert’ s know ledge or other fa cts admit ted in evidence.” 44 W isconsin’ s Court of Appeals has examined this issue and found “in some cases, it may be an erroneous exercise of discretion to deny an indigent defendant ’ s request for permission to hire an expert for testimony on t he issue of suggestive 39 Id. at 354 (collecting cases). 40 Id. citing W isconsin v. Kirschbaum, 535 N.W.2d 4 62, 466–67 (W is. C t. App. 1995). 41 Barlow v. Geor gia, 507 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ga. 1998). 42 Id. at 418. 43 Id. 44 Id. citing Lane v. Geor gia, 479 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).

interview techn iques used with a young ch ild witness.” 45 However, the defense di d not provide “a single specific example of an improper i nterview technique that her expert would discuss su ch that t he court could invoke its decisional process.” 46 Arizona has determined a properly qualified expert may testify, b ut such testimony is “properly limited to ex plaining to the jury the dangers of contamina ted memories and sugge stive p racti ces when interviewing c hildren and discussio n of the particular practices empl oyed in the i nstant case.” 47 Missouri’ s Court of Appeals dealt with this issue, but the context within which that case was decided i ndicates the State offered its interviewer as an expert. 48 T he court found that the defendant’ s expert would testify tha t the qu estions asked b y the State’ s interview er were inappropriate. The court found this was, indeed, expert testimony. The same was true in Flori da v. Malarney, whi ch held “ it is not necessarily equally improper for a defen dant to show tha t the interviewing techniques and proc edures of the abuse treatment experts p layed a role i n pla nting a story into a young, impression able child’ s mind.” 49 In contrast to the se cases is the Supreme Cour t of Maine’ s determination that testimony regardi ng children’ s susceptib ility to suggestiv e questions was not ex pert 45 Kirschbaum, 535 N.W.2d at 467. 46 Id. 47 Arizona v. Speers, 98 P.3d 560, 567 & n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 48 State v. Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592, 596 (M o. Ct. App. 1995). 49 617 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

testimony. 50 The Supreme Court of W ashington in W ashington v. W illis reached a nuanced decision, finding “merely because i t is a matter of general knowledge tha t children’ s memories are changeable does not p reclude testimony that specific interview techniques might compromise specific memorie s.” 51 In W illis, t he court found the expert’ s opinion critiquing the interview was “highly equivocal, it did nothing to he lp the trier of fac t evaluate [the child’ s] m ost critical testim ony ….” 52 Analysis The review o f decisions from around the count ry suggests the inquiry is intensely fact specific. W ithout making a blanke t determ ination on the admissibility of such testimo ny, this Court finds the prof fered testimony of Dr. By rnes is not tied to any objective measure or standard and has concerns related t o its relevance and reliability. While not dispositive, this prof fered expert has n ever been acce pted by any court, in an y jurisdiction, to provide e xpert testim ony on for ensic interv iewing. Further, i t is unclear t o the Court why Dr. Byrnes’ review of this case was limited to only certain interviews and videos. Dr. Byrnes was aware she did not have the full picture, and yet that fact did not qualify her criticism s. He r opinions are based on a record that is limited without any logical basis —whic h calls int o question several of her conclusions related to rapport-building or establishing rules for the 50 Maine v. Elli s, 669 A.2d 752, 753 (Me. 1996). 51 87 P.3d 1 164, 1 167 (W as h. 2004) (en banc). 52 Id. at 1 168.

interview, as those may have been addressed in prior interviews. For example, Dr. Byrnes states “[i]t is i mportant to highlight [] at this point in the series of forensic interviews, though[,] Ms. Coronado deviated markedly from the ChildFirst [e.g. no ground r ules, no pr omise to tell the truth, no scaff olding of discussion, direct inquir y about private parts].” 53 But, Dr. Byrnes did no t see the initial interviews of either child to determine whether those items had been covered. The Court finds her opinion is n ot based on suffi cient facts or data under Daubert. Second, h er testimo ny on cross -exami nation revealed many of her criticisms of t he interviewers in this case are, in fact, allowed by the ChildFirst protocol. For example, Dr. Byrnes is critical that multiple interviews took place. But, d uring cross-examinati on, she acknowledged that the APSAC guidelines on forensic interviews states “the number of interviews should be g overne d by the number necessary to elicit complete and accurate information from the child.” Despite her opinion that the interviewers in this case did not establish g round rules, Dr. Byrnes later testified an interviewer i s not supposed to go through the entire protocol each time they meet w ith a child. 54 Si milarly, h er testimon y related to c ontamination was clarified to indicat e she had n o basis to believe these interview s w ere contami nated, only that they were possibly contam inated. The Court f inds this test imony does not 53 Report of Dr. Byrnes, State’ s Mot. in Limine, Ex. A, at 18. 54 During her testimony on January 9, 2026.

meet the standard, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. By rnes reliably applied the principles an d methods to the facts of this case o r that her testimony o n these issues is relevant. It is not necessarily that such testimony is not within the realm of proper expert opinion— th at determ ination is fac t-specific. Here, the Court finds the testimony of this p articular expert—as it pertains to the methodology applied to t he limited interviews she reviewed in this case —does not meet th e standards of relevance and reliability such that it shoul d be heard by the jury. Because the Court’ s concerns are specific to Dr. Byrnes opinions related to the interviews in this case and there appears to be no challenge to her qualifications—t he Court wi ll consider permitting her testimony as to the C hildFirst protocols/foren sic interviewing techniques and th e underlying rationale for those protocols. She may testify regarding concerns with questions that are (1) repeated, (2) leading, (3) problematically phrased, (4) forced choice, and (5) the importance of limiting e xposure to information. Dr. Byrnes may expla in to t he jury the importance of develo pmentally ina ppropriate lan guage as well as confirmatory bia s on the part o f the interviewer. T o be cl ear, if called a s a w itness, Dr. Byrnes m ay not testify as to the cred ibility of the children (directly or indi rectly), and she wi ll not be permitted to t estify as to her analysis of the CAC interviews in this case for the reasons cited a bove.

The State’ s M otion in Limine is t herefore, GRAN TED, in part. IT IS S O ORDER ED. /s/Sonia Augusthy Judge Sonia Augus thy