Truitt v. Winder - Prejudgment Interest Allocation Opinion

IN THE SUP ERIOR COUR T OF THE ST A TE OF DELA W ARE SHEQUITA TRUI TT,)) Individually and a s Administrator of) the Estate of G.M. T., a Minor,)) Pla inti ff s,)))) v.) C.A. No. S2 0C - 03 -039 CA K) BRYAN WIND ER and) DWAYNE R. MCC ONNELL,)) Def enda nts.) Submitted: Januar y 23, 2026 Decided: Februar y 13, 2026 Allocation of Pr ejudgment Int er est Betwee n Defendants MEMORAN DUM OPINION AND ORDER Robert J. Leoni, Esquire, Gilbert F. S helsby, Jr., Esquire, and James J. Mee han, III, Esquire, Shelsby & Leoni, 221 Main Street, W ilmington, DE 19804, Attorneys for Plai ntiffs Sh equita T ruitt an d the Estate of G.M.T.

2 Jeffr ey A. Y oung, Esquire, Y oung & McNelis, 300 South State Street, Dover, DE 19901, Attorney for Defe ndant Bryan W inder. Daniel P. B ennett, Esquire, M intzer Sarawitz Zeris & W illis LLC, Ci tizens Bank Center, 919 North Market Street, Suite 2 00, W ilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defe ndant Dwayne R. Mc Connell. KARSNITZ, R. J.

3 PROCEDU RAL BACKGROUN D This case originated as two wrongf ul death cases, one brought by Shequita T ruitt, both i ndividually and as th e administrator o f t he e state of G.M.T., a minor (“Truitt” or “Plaintiffs”) in New Castle County Superior Court on February 14, 2020, as amended on March 24, 202 0, a nd the other brought by Jeremie Handy (“Ha ndy”) on March 27, 2020 in Sussex County Super ior Court against, inter alia, Dwayne R. McConnell (“McConnell” or “Def endant McConnell”) and Bryan Winder (“Winder” or “Defend ant Winder”) (McConnell and Winder, collective ly, “Defendants”). The cases were consolidated fo r purposes of trial 1 in Susse x C ounty Superior Court on December 15, 2 022. On June 14, 2024, Pl aintiffs extende d a settleme nt demand to Defendan t W inder, pursuant to 6 D el. C. § 2301(d), for t he $ 300,000 liability policy limits which Defendant W inder dis closed as the ext ent of his insurance coverage. Defendant W inder did not accep t the demand. Plaintif f ’ s offer to settle with Defendant W inder was valid for a minimum of 30 days prior to the trial and verdict. The demand was s ignificantly less than the amount of the judgment 1 See 10 Del. C. § 3724(e).

4 ultimately entered a gainst Defendan t W inder (as discusse d below). Plaintif fs extended no settlement demand to Defendant McConnel l pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d), On March 17, 2025, I severed Handy’s claim. N either Handy nor his counsel partici pated in the ensuin g jury trial. Following discovery and p retrial motions, trial was held on March 17, 18, 19, and 20, 2025. On March 21, 2025, the jury returned a verdict against McConnell and Winder, 2 found that that G.M.T. was not negligent, apportioned negligence between McConnell (90%) and Winder (10%), awarded $350,000.00 to the estate of G.M.T. for consciou s pain and suffering and $68,069.44 for medical bills, and awarded $1,300,00 0.00 to Truitt f or mental anguish. On March 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Prejudgmen t and Post - Judgment Interest. On April 10, 2025, Winder filed his Response to this Motion. On April 3, 2025, Winder filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 3 or, in the Al ternative, for a New Trial, 4 in wh ich McC onnell joined. After full briefing and several o ral arguments, o n December 4, 2025, I issued my 2 McConnell had stipulated as to his liability. 3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 50. 4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 59.

5 Opinion on a ll issues rel ated to th is Moti on. I g ranted Defendants’ Motion with respect to the jury’ s award of $350,000.00 to the Estate of G.M.T. fo r pain and suf fering, which I vacate d. In all other res pects, the Motion w as denied. On December 1 1, 2025, I received a letter from counse l for Defendant W inder, on behalf of all counsel of record (including Jeremie Handy’ s counsel), requesting a temporary stay of Jer emie Handy v. Bry an W inder, et a l. unt il th e Delaware Supreme Court has heard and ruled on the appeal of Defendant Brya n W inder in this case, S hequita T ruitt v. Bryan W inder, et al. On December 16, 2025, I issued an Opinion and Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prejudgment and Post -Judgment Interest, a nd Defendant Winder’s Response there to. I deducted $3 50,000 from the amount of the jury award (which is the amount of the award for pain and suffering that I v acated) and directed the parties to submit orders calculating p rejudgm ent interest at 7.25% and post-j udgment interest at 9. 5%. 5 On December 18, 2025, Plaintiffs, h aving submitted a draft order to Defendants, wrote to the Court that a conflict had arisen between Defendan ts regarding the allocation (not the amount) of prejudgmen t interest b etwee n 5 The parties hav e not challenged my Opinion and Order on the calculation of Prejudgment Interest, or any aspect of Post-Judgment Inte rest. On December 16, 2025, I also entered an Opinion and Order on Plaintif fs’ Motion for Costs, which the parties have not challenged.

6 Defendants. On December 19, 2025, Defendant Winder wrote to the Court and argued that there s hould be no preju dgment interest w ith respec t to him based on the 10% liability assigned to him by the jury, or, in the alternati ve, Defendants should be treate d equally with pre judgment interest a pplying to both. On December 19, 2 025, Defendant McConnell wrote to the Court and argued that Pla intiff is not entitled to any prejudgmen t interest against him. On December 19, 2025, Defendant W inder filed his Notice of Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court in this case, Shequita T ruitt v. Bryan W inder, et al., and an Amende d Not ice of Appeal was filed on December 22, 2025. On December 23, 2025, th e Supreme Court issued a Notice to Show Cause by January 2, 2 026, why t he appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) for defendant W inder ’ s failure to comply with Rule 42 when taking an appeal f rom an apparent in terlocutory order. December 24, 2 025, I wrote to all counsel for the parties and advised that I had no jurisdiction to consider their claims regarding prejudgme nt interest while the appeal w as pending before the Supreme C ourt. On January 23, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory without prejudice as to any future appeal following the entry of

7 final judgment by this Court. N ow that I have regained jurisdiction, this is m y Opinion and Ord er on Prejudgment I nterest. ARGUMEN TS OF P AR TIES Defendant Wi nder Defendant W inder ar gues in the alternative. First, he ar gues that there should be no prejudgment interest p ermitte d in the case at all. Th e only demand pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) made to Defendant W inder was for $300,000.00. Because the jury determined that Mr. W inder was only l0% responsible for the damages, with an agreed $1,368,069.44 total judgment, Defen dant W inder' s portion of the damages would be $136, 806.94, which is less than the $300,000 demand Plaintiffs filed. Because he has a crossclaim against Defendant McConnell for c ontribution and indemnification, ar gues Defendant W inder, the only amount owed directly to P laintiff i s $136,806.9 4. In the alternative, Defendant W inder argu es that, even if Delaware law allows prejudgment interest attached based on the overall judgment against Defendant W inder and Defendant McConnell as joint t ortfeasor s, as opposed to the individual liability of the two Defe ndants, then the liability for prejudgment interest should be shared with Defendant W inder by Defendant McConnell.

8 Although the jud gment agai nst Defenda nt W inder was less than the demand by Plaintif fs, he argues th at I should not treat the two Defendants dif ferently. Because he has a crosscla im against Defendant McCo nnell, there should be a right of contribution and indemnification against Defendan t McConnell for prejudgment interest as well. Defendant McC onnell Defendant McConn ell ar gues that Plaintiffs are entitled to no prejudgment interest against him. He offered his insurance policy lim its in an attempt to resolve the litigation, but his offer was not accepted, and no statutory demand was e ver made on him. ANAL YSIS 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) provides: In any tort action for compensatory damages in the Superior Court or t he Cou rt of Common Ple as seeking m onetary relief f or bodily injuries, death or property damage, interest s hall be a dded to any final judgment entered for damages awarded, calculate d at the rate established in subsection (a) of this section, commencing from th e date of injury, p rovided that p rior to trial the plaintif f had extended to d efendant a written settlement demand valid for a minimum of 30 days in an amount less t han the amount of d amages upon w hich the judgment was e ntered.

9 Thus, if the settlement demand on a defendant is less than the amount of damages awarded by the jury against that defendant, the plaintif fs can recover prejudgment interest. The purpose o f this stat ute is t o promote earlier se ttlement of cl aims by encouraging parties t o make fa ir offer s sooner, w ith the effect of red ucing court congestion. 6 In Christian a Car e Health Services, Inc. v. Crist, 7 plaintif fs brought a survival and wr ongful deat h action ag ainst a doctor an d Christiana Care H ealth Services (“CCHS”). Plaintif fs alleged that t he doctor and CCHS were negligent in the professional care provided t o a patient during his stay at the hospital following hip sur gery. A Superior Court jury found that both the doctor and CCHS were negligent, that their negligence was a proximate cause of the patient’ s death and awarde d damages of $2 million in favor of plaintiffs. The jury a ttributed 4 0 percent of the fault to the doctor and 60 percent of the fault to CCHS. Prior to trial, plaintif fs made a settlement offer to th e doctor an d CCHS for $1.25 m illion each, which both parties rejected. The trial judge found that 6 Rapposelli v. Stat e Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 988 A.2d 425 (Del. 2010). 7 956 A.2d 622 (Del. 2008).

10 the combined settlement of fer ($2.5 million) ex ceeded the $2 million award of damages by the jury and denied prejudgment interest. While the trial judge acknowledged that plaintiff s could collect the entire $2 million jury award from each defendant, he fo und that the apportio nment of the jury v erdic t demonstrated that e ach individual defen dant's liability did not exceed t he settlement demand. The trial judge found that the apportionment of the jury verdict was less than the s ettlement demand to the individual tortfeasors and denied prejudgment interest. In reaching this decision, the trial judge focused on the total am ount of the two settlement o ffers. The Delaware Supre me Court reversed and rem anded, and held that a n award of prejudgment interest was required under 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) be cause plaintif fs' settlement o ff er t o t he doctor o f $1.25 m illion, and its se parate settlement offer to CCHS of $ 1.25 million, were each for an amount less than the amount of th e $2 million judgment entered against them jointly and severally, notwithstan ding the right of contribu tion between join t tortfeasors. 8 8 In the event a party pays more than its pro rata share of the “common liability,” it may recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor. See 10 Del. C. § 6302.

11 The Supreme Court interpret ed 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) consistent with its interpretatio n of Rule 68 relating to offers of judgment. 9 In ruling on the tria l judge’ s statutory interpretation de novo, 10 the Court explained that “[a]lthough a defenda nt may still phrase an offer of settlement as a collective one to multiple plaintif fs, an award of costs is only avai lable under R ule 68 where the o ffer is formally apportioned among each of the p laintif fs individually.” 11 The $2 million judgment i n fav or of plaintif fs was a common liability of both the doctor and CCH S. Thus, plaintif fs ma y collect upon the full amount of the judgment from either tortfeasor. The written settlement demand fo r each to rtfeasor was for less than $2 million. 25 Althou gh a jury apportionmen t of fault affects contribution among joint tortfeasors, it does not c hange th e common liability of each tortfeasor to plaintif fs for the entire amount o f the judgment. The plain language of 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) requires that prejudgment interest be awarded when the settlement d emand was less than the amount of damage s upon which 9 See Super Ct. Civ. R. 68, which provides in relevant part: “ If the judgme nt finally obtained by the of feree is not more favorable than the of fer, the offeree must pay the costs incurre d after the making of the of fer.” 10 Leatherbury v. Gr eenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Del. 2007). 11 Cahall v. Thomas, 906 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2006).

12 the judgment was entered, regardless of how th e ju ry apportioned fault among the joint tortf easors for purpose s of contribution. Under Crist, I would ordinarily agree with Defendant W inder that the liability for prejudgmen t interest should be shared by Defendant W inder and Defendant Mc Connell. Although the p ercentage jury verdict aga inst Defenda nt W inder was less than the $ 300,000 set tlement dema nd by Plai ntiffs, Defendant W inder has a crossclaim against Defendant McConnell. Thus, ordinari ly Defendant W inder would have a right of contribution and indemnific ation against Defendant McConnel l for prejudgment interest, and I would not treat the two Defenda nts differen tly. However, Defe ndant McConnell must be li able t o plaintif fs f or prejudgment interest under 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) in th e fir st place. A s he point s out in his ar gument, he is not. He offered his policy limits in an attempt to resolve the litigatio n, but it was not accepted, and no settlement demand was ever made. Defenda nt McConnell cannot be punished by assessing prejudgment interest against him when n o settlemen t demand was made by Plaintif fs. T o hold otherwise woul d contravene the purpo se and intent of the statute.

13 In Crist, the same demand was made to both Defendant s, and n either Defendant agreed to offer the amounts demanded. In this instance, no demand was ever made upon D efendant McCon nell. Therefore, 6 Del. C. §2 301(d) was never triggered as to Defendant McConnell, and no prejudgment interest can be awarded. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the statutory liability for prejudgment interest rests sole ly upon Defendant W inder. Using the calculation s contained in my December 16, 2025, Opinio n and Ord er with respect to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prejudgment and Post- Judgment Interest, and Defendant Winder’s Response thereto, the parties are directed to submit an Order consiste nt with this Opinion. IT IS S O ORDERED. /s/ Craig A. Karsnitz Craig A. Kars nitz cc: Prothonotary T asha M. Stevens-Gueh, E squire