Oregon Disciplinary Board Reporter 2024: Attorney Discipline Cases

DISCIPLINARY

BOARD REPORTER

Report of Lawyer Discipline Cases Decided by the Disciplinary Board and by the Oregon Supreme Court for 2024

VOLUME 38 January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024

PREFACE This Disciplinary Board Reporter (DB Reporter) contains final decisions of the Oregon Disciplinary Board, stipulations for discipline between accused lawyers and the OSB, summaries of 2024 decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court involving the discipline of lawyers, and related matters. Cases in this DB Reporter should be cited as 38 DB Rptr ___ (2024). In 2024, a decision of the Disciplinary Board was final if neither the Bar nor the Respondent sought review of the decision by the Oregon Supreme Court. See Title 10 of the Bar Rules of Procedure (www.osbar.org, click on Rules Regulations and Policies) and ORS 9.536. The decisions printed in this DB Reporter have been reformatted and page numbers and DB Reporter citations have been added, but no substantive changes have been made to them. Because of space restrictions, exhibits are not included but may be obtained by calling the Oregon State Bar. Those interested in a verbatim copy of an opinion should submit a public records request to the Public Records Coordinator at. Final deci- sions of the Disciplinary Board issued on or after January 1, 2016, are also available at the Oregon State Bar website, www.osbar .org. Please note that the statutes, disciplinary rules, and rules of procedure cited in the opinions are those in existence when the opinions were issued. Care should be taken to locate the current language of a statute or rule sought to be relied on concerning a new matter. General questions concerning the Bar's disciplinary process may be directed to me at extension 318. C OURTNEY DIPPEL Oregon State Bar

CONTENTS Oregon Supreme Court, Board of Governors,

State Professional Responsibility Board ............................................................ iv

Disciplinary Board

2025 ........................................................................................................... v

2024 .......................................................................................................... vi

List of Cases Reported in This Volume ............................................................. vii

Cases ............................................................................................................ 1-166

Justices of the Oregon Supreme Court Meagan A. Flynn, Chief Justice Stephen Bushong Roger DeHoog Rebecca A. Duncan Christopher Garrett Bronson D. James Aruna A. Masih 2025 Oregon State Bar Board of Governors Myah Kehoe, President Tomás Hernandez, President-Elect David M. Rosen, Immediate Past-President Chris Cauble Gabriel Chase Candace Clarke, Public Member Kellie Furr Ekua Hackman Tomás Hernandez Joseph Hesbrook, Public Member Megan Houlihan Elizabeth Inayoshi John Marandas Sean Pank Eddie Passadore Curtis Peterson, Public Member Kyle Sciuchetti Robert Welsh Simonne Weyand Nicholas Yanchar Helen Hierschbiel, Chief Executive Officer

2024 State Professional Responsibility Board Lauren E. Walchli, Chairperson Megan K. Burgess, Member Sarah B. Ewing, Member Lillian Erwin, Public Member Matthew Rowan, Member Jinoo Hwang, Member Andrew Orf, Public Member Kathleen M. Baker, Member Shannon Snow, Member Denis M. Vannier, Member Robert Welsh, BOG Contact iv

2025 DISCIPLINARY BOARD Richard C. Josephson, Member Adjudicator Kate Anne Wilkinson, Member Willa B. Perlmutter, Member David F. Doughman, Member Region 1 Michael H. McGean, Chairperson Michael Thomas McGrath, Member Paul B. Heatherman, Member Jonathan W. Monson, Member

1. Christian Malone, Member Christopher R. Piekarski, Member Courtney L. Quale-Conrad, Member Christopher H. Kent, Member Greg Sackos, Public Member Judy D. Henry, Member Charles J. Paternoster, Member Andrew M. Schpak, Member Amy E. Bilyeu, Member Region 2 Vanessa L. Crakes, Chairperson Ben Cox, Member Chas Horner, Member Charles Peirson, Member Marilyn A. Heiken, Member Krista S. Stearns, Member Bryan Boender, Member Melanie Timmins, Public Member George A. McCully, Public Member Clark Haass, Public Member Mitchell P. Rogers, Public Member Natasha Voloshina, Public Member Carrie A. Bebout, Public Member James E. Parker, Public Member Charles H. Martin, Public Member Lucia Becchetti Peterson, Public Member Region 3 Faith Morse, Chairperson Michael J. Patterson, Public Member Kelly L. Andersen, Member Laura Riddell, Public Member Christine Kantas Herbert, Member Jen, Zammetti, Member Region 6 Amy Spence, Public Member Justin M. Thorp, Chairperson Linda Leahy, Public Member Yvonne Ana Tamayo, Member Lorena M. Reynolds, Member John T. Bagg, Member Region 4 Hon. Jill A. Tanner, Chairperson Fadd E. Beyrouty, Public Member Erin K. Lufkin, Member Gary Allen Kanz, Public Member Guy B. Greco, Member Paul Mark Gehlar, Public Member Tinuade Adebolu, Member Arnold S. Polk, Member Region 7 Victoria Leigh Norris, Member Andrew M. Cole, Chairperson Karina M. Grigorian, Public Member Kathleen J. Rastetter, Member Marian Taloi, Public Member Tawnya Stiles-Johnson, Member Tom Kranovich, Member Cynthia V. Lopez, Public Member Region 5 Susan T. Alterman, Chairperson Eugene L. Bentley, Public Member

2024 DISCIPLINARY BOARD David F Doughman, Member Adjudicator Michael Thomas McGrath, Member Jonathan W Monson, Member Kate Anne Wilkinson, Member Region 1 Michael H McGean, Chairperson Christopher H Kent, Member Paul B Heatherman, Member Judy D Henry, Member Courtney L Quale-Conrad, Member Charles J Paternoster, Member Greg Sackos, Public Member Andrew M Schpak, Member Amy E Bilyeu, Member Ben Cox, Member Charles Peirson, Member Region 2 Vanessa L Crakes, Chairperson Krista S Stearns, Member Chas Horner, Member Melanie Timmins, Public Member Marilyn A Heiken, Member JoAnn Jackson, Public Member Bryan Boender, Member Natasha Voloshina, Public Member George A McCully, Public Member James E Parker, Public Member Mitchell P Rogers, Public Member Charles H Martin, Public Member Michael J Patterson, Public Member Clark Haass, Public Member Region 3 Faith Morse, Chairperson Kelly L Andersen, Member Region 6 Christine Kantas Herbert, Member John L Barlow, Chairperson Jen Zammetti, Member Micah S Moskowitz, Member Yvonne Ana Tamayo, Member Lorena M Reynolds, Member Region 4 Hon. Jill A Tanner, Chairperson Theresa L Wright, Member Erin K Lufkin, Member John T Bagg, Member Guy B Greco, Member Justin M Thorp, Member Tinuade Adebolu, Member Fadd E Beyrouty, Public Member Arnold S Polk, Member Gary Allen Kanz, Public Member Victoria Leigh Norris, Member Sylvia Rasko, Public Member Hon. Edward A Kroll, Member Paul Mark Gehlar, Public Member Joan Ploem Miller, Public Member Karina M Grigorian, Public Member Region 7 Marian Taloi, Public Member Andrew M Cole, Chairperson Kathleen J Rastetter, Member Susan K Lain, Member Region 5 Susan T Alterman, Chairperson Tawnya Stiles-Johnson, Member Richard C Josephson, Member Tom Kranovich, Member Willa B Perlmutter, Member Cynthia V Lopez, Public Member Christopher R Piekarski, Member Eugene L Bentley, Public Member

LIST OF CASES REPORTED Volume 38 DB Reporter (Includes summaries of Oregon Supreme Court stipulations and decisions that also appear in the Advance Sheets)

In re Bevans, 38 DB Rptr 90 (2024) ..............................................................................................90

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension, all stayed, 2-year probation.

In re Brown, 38 DB Rptr 31 (2024) ...............................................................................................31

Violation of RPC 1.5(a), RPC 7.3(b), and RPC 7.3(c). BR 3.5 Petition for Reciprocal Discipline. Five-year suspension.

In re Buroker, 38 DB Rptr 51 (2024) ............................................................................................51

Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2), RPC 1.8(c), RPC 1.15-1(a), and RPC 5.3(a). Stipulation for discipline. 150-day suspension.

In re Cassol, 38 DB Rptr 65 (2024) ...............................................................................................65

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d). Stipulation for discipline.

In re Cochran, 38 DB Rptr 114 (2024)........................................................................................114

Violation of RPC 1.16(c), RPC 1.16(d), RPC 3.4(b), RPC 8.1(a)(1), and RPC 8.4(a)(3). Stipulation for discipline. 9-month suspension.

In re Cypher, 38 DB Rptr 161 (2024) ..........................................................................................161

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for Discipline.

In re Day, 38 DB Rptr 128 (2024) ...............................................................................................128

Violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Downs, 38 DB Rptr 133 (2024) ..........................................................................................133

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). Stipulation for discipline. 90-day suspension.

In re Gardner, 38 DB Rptr 104 (2024) ........................................................................................104

Violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). Stipulation for discipline. 30-day suspension.

In re Hale, 38 DB Rptr 41 (2024) ..................................................................................................41

Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.15-1(a). Order granting BR 3.5 petition for reciprocal discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Haraguchi, 38 DB Rptr 7 (2024) ............................................................................................7

Violation of RPC 5.5(b)(2), RPC 7.1, and ORS 9.160(1). Stipulation for Discipline.

In re Harris, 38 DB Rptr 84 (2024) ...............................................................................................84

Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(c). Stipulation for discipline.

In re Hedrick, 38 DB Rptr 151 (2024) .........................................................................................151

Trial Panel Opinion. Dismissal.

In re Lenihan, 38 DB Rptr 59 (2024) ............................................................................................59

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline.

In re Lipps, 38 DB Rptr 121 (2024) .............................................................................................121

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 1.16(a)(1), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). Trial panel opinion. 120-day suspension.

In re Meyer, 38 DB Rptr 26 (2024) ...............................................................................................26

Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.16(d). Stipulation for discipline.

In re Munn, 38 DB Rptr 71 (2024) ................................................................................................71

Violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension.

In re Munn II, 38 DB Rptr 109 (2024).........................................................................................109

Violation of RPC 1.1, RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). 24-month suspension.

In re Naumes, 38 DB Rptr 42 (2024) .............................................................................................42

Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 3.4(d), RPC 8.1(a)(2), RPC 8.4(a)(3), and RPC 8.4(a)(4). Trial panel opinion. 6-month suspension. viii

In re Naumes II, 38 DB Rptr 110 (2024) .....................................................................................110

Violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). Trial panel opinion. 60-day suspension.

In re Parker, 38 DB Rptr 98 (2024) ..............................................................................................98

Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.9(a). Stipulation for discipline.

In re Reitman, 38 DB Rptr 139 (2024) ........................................................................................139

Violation of RPC 1.6(a). Stipulation for Discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Rothauge, 38 DB Rptr 20 (2024) ..........................................................................................20

Violation of RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Starr, 38 DB Rptr 1 (2024) .....................................................................................................1

Violation of RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Thayer, 38 DB Rptr 33 (2024) ..............................................................................................33

Violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension, all stayed, 1-year probation.

In re Turner, 38 DB Rptr 159 (2024) ..........................................................................................159

Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 3.4(d), and RPC 3.4(e). Order granting BR 3.5 petition for reciprocal discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Wall, 38 DB Rptr 144 (2024) ..............................................................................................144

Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.7(a)(2). Stipulation for Discipline. 1-year suspension.

In re Weill, 38 DB Rptr 78 (2024) .................................................................................................78

Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2). Stipulation for Discipline. Public reprimand.

In re Wray, 38 DB Rptr 12 (2024) .................................................................................................12

Violation of 3.4(f), 5.3(a), 5.3(b)(1), 8.4(a)(1), and 8.4(a)(4). Stipulation for Discipline. 9-month suspension.

) ADAM MICHAEL STARR, ) Bar No. 125393 ) Case No. 22-95 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline. Effective Date of Order: January 22, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Adam Michael Starr (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is hereby publicly reprimanded, for violation of RPC 1.5(a). DATED this 22nd day of January 2024.

Adam Michael Starr, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby stipulate to the following matters pursuant to Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 3.6(c).

Oregon on October 10, 2012, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time,

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.5(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this

Facts

On or around April 8, 2016, XRT and David Silverglate (XRT) hired Respondent's firm to defend them in a contract dispute. Initially XRT engaged Respondent's firm through a standard hourly fee agreement.

Due to the litigation, XRT experienced diminished cash flow. XRT requested, and Respondent's firm then agreed, to modify their fee agreement. XRT was represented by inde- pendent counsel during the negotiations. The modified fee agreement (MFA) consisted of two phases. Phase one applied to any resolution of the case prior to February 28, 2017, and phase two applied to any resolution of the case after March 1, 2017. The case was not resolved in phase one.

Regarding the fee that XRT would pay, the MFA stated the following:

"…During phase 1, the Firm will be compensated as follows:

1. By the 5th day of every month, beginning June 5 and continuing until February
   28, 2017, Client will pay the Firm $15,000 to cover a portion of the accruing fees.

2. If the case concludes between June and February 28, 2017, the Firm will receive
   the greater of:

3. Its unpaid fees billed or accrued through the date of the case's
   completion at it's full 2016 rate plus a 10% success fee. The Firm will send monthly bills so that Client may review and object to any of the fees or costs accrued during the billing period. Any fees and costs incurred after the date of a settlement will be billed and paid in full at the Firm's then-prevailing rates.

4. 17% of any recovery in excess of $3 million dollars."
   "…During phase 2 the Firm will be compensated as follows:

5. By the 5th day of every month starting January 5, 2017, Client will pay the

Firm $15,000 to cover a portion of the accruing fees.

1. If the case concludes after February 28, 2017, the Firm will receive the
   greater of:

2. Its unpaid fees billed or accrued through the date of a fully executed
   settlement at its full 2016 and 2017 rates plus a 10% success fee. The Firm will send monthly bills so that Client may review and object to any of the fees or costs accrued during the billing period. Any fees and costs incurred after the date of a settlement will be billed and paid in full at the Firm's then-prevailing rates.

3. 35% of any recovery in excess of $3 million dollars.
   In exchange for a percentage of the recovery without any caps, the Firm will cap the monthly payments to be paid to the Firm for attorney fees at $200,000 …."

Respondent was not involved in the negotiations over the initial fee agreement, or the MFA; he was an associate with the firm at the time.

Prior to the matter going to trial, XRT paid the maximum $200,000 in monthly payments.

Prior to the matter going to trial and on multiple occasions, Respondent communicated the firm's understanding of the MFA's payment terms to XRT, and to its independent counsel who had represented XRT in negotiating the MFA. Respondent indicated that his firm would be owed the greater of its actual fees plus ten percent or 35% of any recovery beyond $3 million, at the conclusion of the representation. XRT did not object to, or indicate a different understanding or interpretation of the MFA.

A week-long jury trial commenced on March 18, 2019. The jury ruled in favor of XRT on some issues, but not others. The jury awarded XRT $107,000.

Following the trial, Respondent sent a letter to XRT informing them that the case was nearing conclusion and that they owed his firm the accrued, unpaid fees billed at his firm's 2016 and 2017 rates at the conclusion of the matter. This figure was the greater of the two fee measurements identified in the MFA and was consistent with what Respondent previously communicated to XRT about the MFA's payment terms.

Subsequently, and for the first time, XRT communicated to the firm its position that no additional fees were owed. The firm and XRT then negotiated, and entered into, a written settlement agreement that resolved their good-faith dispute over their interpretation of the MFA, and which resulted in XRT agreeing to pay a lesser amount of fees. XRT was represented by counsel in those negotiations.

After a review of the foregoing facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would have concluded that no fee was owed based on the MFA's fee language.

Based on the foregoing, Respondent admits that he violated RPC 1.5(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. By charging an excessive fee, Respondent violated his duty as a professional. ABA Standards at 7.

Respondent believed throughout his representation and subsequent fee dispute with XRT that one of the fee measurements stated in their agreement would be due at the conclusion of the representation. That understanding went unchal- lenged by XRT until payment was sought years after the MFA was entered into. Respondent's conduct in failing to accurately apply the terms of the fee agreement fell beneath the standard of care for purposes of RPC 1.5(a), but was not knowing or intentional. Respondent's actions were negligent.

XRT suffered actual injury due to Respondent's misconduct. XRT was forced to litigate whether anything was due to Respondent's firm and was ultimately successful.

Respondent was admitted to the Oregon State Bar in 2012 and the State Bar of California in 2006.

1. Cooperative attitude toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e).
2. No selfish or dishonest motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b). Respondent was not involved in negotiation, drafting, or approval of the MFA and was an associate at the time. Respondent thereafter communicated the firm's understanding of the MFA's payment terms to XRT and its independent counsel on multiple occasions prior to trial, and XRT never told him that it had a different position until after the case was over.

Under ABA Standard 7.3, reprimand is generally appropriate when: "a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."

Oregon cases dealing with an attorney who negligently charges an illegal or excessive fee typically result in a public reprimand. See, e.g., In re Vanagas, 27 DB Rptr 255 (2013) (attorney reprimanded by trial panel for accepting payment from conservatorship funds without obtaining court approval as required by statute); In re Hammond, DB Rptr 187 (2010) (attorney reprimanded when, in a federal workers' compensation matter, attorney collected two fees from a client without obtaining approval as required by statute); In re Mitchell, 17 DB Rptr 26 (2003) (attorney reprimanded for collecting illegal fee from the estate of a disabled person because he did not first obtain court approval); In re Jacobson, 12 DB Rptr 99 (1998)(attorney reprimanded for collecting fees from an estate without first obtaining court approval). The sanction of a public reprimand will accomplish the goal of deterrence by putting the Bar's membership on notice to responsibly draft and enforce their fee agreements.

dent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.5(a), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: California, Washington, and Idaho (inactive).

December 9, 2023. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 12 day of January, 2024. th /s/ Adam Michael Starr Adam Michael Starr, OSB No. 125393

EXECUTED this 12 day of January, 2024. th

Matthew S. Coombs, OSB No. 201951

) KATIE H. HARAGUCHI, Bar No. 083537 ) Case No. 23-32 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 5.5(b)(2), RPC 7.1, and ORS 9.160(1). Stipulation for Discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of Order: January 25, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Katie

1. Haraguchi (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 5.5(b)(2), RPC 7.1, and ORS 9.160(1). DATED this 25th day of January 2024.

Katie H. Haraguchi, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on September 25, 2008, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 5.5(b)(2) and RPC 7.1 of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct and Oregon Revised Statute 9.160(1). The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

In 2021, Respondent closed her law practice and worked as a real estate agent, and her license to practice law was administratively suspended. In fall 2021, a real estate colleague sought Respondent's assistance regarding a contract dispute in which the colleague represented the buyers in a real estate transaction. In an email sent to the seller's agent as well as Respon- dent, the colleague stated, in part: "I had the contract and your communications reviewed by the attorney on our team, Katie Haraguchi." Respondent did not correct or clarify the colleague's reference to her as the "attorney on our team" directly with that seller's agent, though she recalls later clarifying her role as a former attorney in a telephone call with others in his office. Respondent also sent a follow-up letter to the seller's agent and his principal broker in which she requested that the sellers sign the termination agreement or buyers would pursue their remedies in small claims court, including recovery of their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in resolving the matter. Respondent's signature block referred to herself as "Katie H. Haraguchi, Esq." and included her Oregon State Bar number. Respondent's letter was silent as to her attorney status and did not clarify or correct her colleague's prior description of her as the attorney on the team. A few days later, Respondent sent another letter to the same recipients that included "Esq." and her Oregon State Bar number in the signature block and remained silent on her status to practice law.

Respondent admits that by including the title "Esq." and her Oregon State Bar number in the signature block of correspondence she sent to the seller's agent and his principal broker while otherwise failing to clarify her status to practice law directly with the seller's agent after a colleague had misidentified her to him, she represented she was admitted and qualified to practice law in Oregon at a time when she was administratively suspended in violation of RPC 5.5(b)(2) and ORS 9.160(1). Based on the same conduct, Respondent also admits that she made false or misleading communications about herself by omitting facts about her status to practice law that were necessary to make her communication considered as a whole not materially misleading in violation of RPC 7.1.

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated her duty to the profession to refrain from making false or misleading communications regarding her authorization to practice law at a time when she was suspended. ABA Standard 7.0.

Respondent negligently held herself out as authorized to practice law at a time when she was suspended. Respondent should have known that identifying herself as "Esq." and including her Oregon State Bar number in professional correspondence could convey that she was presently capable of practicing law at a time when she knew she was not so authorized.

1. Injury. Injury is defined as harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the
   profession that results from a lawyer's misconduct. Potential injury is the harm that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA Standards at 9. Although there was the potential for injury, such as misleading the public, there is no evidence that Respondent's conduct resulted in any injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

2. A prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.22(a). The following
   factors are considered in applying an attorney's prior discipline as an aggravating factor: (1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction, specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the offense in the case at bar. In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 499, 8 P3d 953 (2000). Respondent stipulated to discipline in February 2023 for misconduct that occurred between 2020 and 2021. The misconduct involved

Respondent's failure to communicate with a client, her improper with- drawal from representing several clients, and her failure to cooperate with DCO investigations. Under the Cohen factors, the prior discipline should be given less weight in aggravation because Respondent was not sanctioned for it prior to engaging in the misconduct at issue here, which also occurred in 2021. The misconduct here is also different than the violations involved in the prior discipline. Respondent has been licensed to practice law since 2008.

1. Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b). Under the ABA Standards, a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.3.

Oregon cases confirm that a reprimand is warranted for Respondent's misconduct. Sanctions in disciplinary matters are not intended to penalize the accused lawyer, but instead are intended to protect the public and the integrity of the profession. In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998). Appropriate discipline deters unethical conduct. In re Kirkman, 313 Or 181, 188, 830 P2d 206 (1992). In the case of In re Carstens, 22 DB Rptr 97 (2008), a lawyer was reprimanded for continuing to use letterhead on which he was identified as an attorney, failing to remove his name from the firm website and office sign, and providing comments to local media as an attorney during a time when he was suspended from the practice of law. In the case of In re

Fjelstad, 29 DB Rptr 122 (2015), a lawyer was reprimanded for continuing to hold himself out

as an attorney on his website while serving a disciplinary suspension. In both cases, the Respondent lawyer's conduct was aggravated by prior discipline and substantial experience practicing law.

dent shall be reprimanded for violation of RPC 5.5(b)(2), RPC 7.1, and ORS 9.160(1), the sanction to be effective upon the day the stipulation is approved by the Adjudicator.

September 9, 2023. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 22nd day of January 2024. /s/ Katie H. Haraguchi Katie H. Haraguchi, OSB No. 083537 EXECUTED this 22nd day of January 2024.

) DEANNA L. WRAY, Bar No. 974423 ) Case No. 22-03 )

Counsel for the Bar: Courtney C. Dippel Counsel for the Respondent: Thomas L. Hutchinson

Disposition: Violation of 3.4(f), 5.3(a), 5.3(b)(1), 8.4(a)(1), and 8.4(a)(4). Stipulation for Discipline. 9-month Effective Date of Order: February 2, 2024

The court accepts the Stipulation for Discipline. Deanna L Wray is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Oregon for a period of nine months, effective February 02, 2024. Meagan A. Flynn, Chief Justice Supreme Court 2/1/2024

Deanna L. Wray, an active pro bono attorney (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby stipulate to the following matters pursuant to Bar Rule of Procedure 3.6(c).

Oregon on September 15, 1997, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time. Respondent transferred to active pro bono status on December 20, 2019, and currently resides in Multnomah County, Oregon.

On July 20, 2023, a formal complaint was filed against Respondent pursuant to the authorization of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB), alleging violation of RPC 3.4(f) [lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal], RPC 5.3(a) [duty to supervise non-lawyer personnel], RPC 5.3(b)(1) [lawyer responsible for non-lawyer's conduct when lawyer orders, has knowledge, or ratifies such conduct], RPC 8.4(a)(1) [violation of the Rules through the acts of another], and RPC 8.4(a)(4) [engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations, and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of the proceeding.

Facts

In or around July 2014, a minor, MSG, reported to the police that in September 2013, he had sex with adults Terrence Bean (Bean) and Kiah Lawson (Lawson). The Lane County District Attorney indicted Bean and Lawson for various sex crimes in 2014 (the 2015 case).

In or around 2015, MSG retained then-attorney Lori Deveny (Deveny) to represent him in pursuing civil claims against Bean while the 2015 case proceeded.

At all material times, Respondent was the managing partner of law firm Bodyfelt Mount, LLP and represented a potential State's witness in the 2015 case against Bean.

On July 2, 2015, Bean's attorney filed a motion for a civil compromise in the 2015 case. The motion asked the court to dismiss the criminal charges against Bean in exchange for a civil compromise that Bean and MSG reached in or around June 2015, whereby Bean would pay MSG $200,000 in exchange for MSG's release of all claims against Bean, among other consideration agreed to by the parties.

On July 16, 2015, the Lane County Circuit Court denied the motion for a civil compro- mise and set trial for August 11, 2015.

Thereafter, Deveny advised MSG to secrete himself so that law enforcement could not serve MSG with a subpoena for trial. Deveny did so for the purpose of making MSG unavail- able as a witness in the 2015 case, though this was not known to Respondent at the time. Deveny instructed MSG to leave California where law enforcement was attempting to locate

him, and to use a burner phone and cash to travel to Oregon, where his mother lived. Respondent had no knowledge of those instructions.

In or around late July 2015, Deveny contacted Respondent and told Respondent that MSG was being threatened and harassed by the deputy district attorney prosecuting the 2015 case and by law enforcement. Deveny asked Respondent whether Respondent knew of any place in Northern California or Southern Oregon where MSG and his mother could stay in order to avoid law enforcement. In so doing, Deveny violated Oregon Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f).

At all material times, Heather Coffey (Coffey) was Respondent's legal assistant at Bodyfelt Mount LLP. In or around July 2015 after speaking with Deveny as described in para- graph 11 herein, Coffey recalls that Respondent told her that law enforcement was attempting to serve MSG with a trial subpoena and that MSG did not want to testify and needed to get away. Respondent does not recall being aware of the fact that law enforcement was attempting to serve a trial subpoena on MSG but understood that law enforcement's attempts to interview MSG was causing him severe mental health problems. Respondent asked Coffey about Coffey's family's cabin in Pine Hollow, Oregon, and suggested that MSG stay there to evade law enforcement.

Thereafter, Deveny, Respondent, and Coffey coordinated to secrete MSG at Coffey's cabin in Pine Hollow, Oregon so that law enforcement could not locate MSG. During a workday with Respondent's knowledge and approval that Coffey was meeting with MSG, but not with knowledge that MSG was attempting to evade service of a subpoena, Coffey met MSG and his mother in Cascade Locks and had them follow her to the Pine Hollow cabin where they stayed for approximately a week.

On July 29, 2015, Deveny wrote a $1,500 check to Coffey from her lawyer trust account for rent for MSG's cabin stay. Deveny provided the check to Respondent who gave the check to Coffey.

Law enforcement was unable to serve MSG with a trial subpoena for the August 11, 2015, trial date. As a result, the court continued the trial date to September 1, 2015, in order to give law enforcement more time to serve MSG.

At all material times, Respondent employed, supervised, and directed Coffey, a nonlawyer.

At all material times, Respondent had direct supervisory authority over Coffey, and was required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that Coffey's conduct was compatible with Respondent's professional obligations.

Respondent failed to adequately supervise Coffey or take reasonable efforts to ensure that her staff's conduct was compatible with her obligations as an attorney, including Respon- dent's obligation not to secrete witnesses, or to assist others in doing so.

By secreting MSG at her Pine Hollow cabin, Coffey engaged in conduct that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. Respondent ordered, or with the knowledge of Coffey secreting MSG at the Pine Hollow cabin, ratified Coffey's conduct.

In suggesting to Coffey that MSG and his mother stay at Coffey's Pine Hollow cabin in July 2015, and in allowing Coffey to use normal working hours during a workday to trans- port MSG to the cabin, Respondent knowingly assisted Deveny in violating Oregon Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f).

Respondent's actions were improper, and occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding, the 2015 case.

Respondent's improper acts had a prejudicial effect upon the administration of justice. Respondent's conduct was designed to assist MSG with what Respondent was informed by Deveny was his stated desire to not meet with law enforcement regarding his status as a victim of a crime. Though Respondent did not know this at the time, this required the court to expend its limited resources to conduct an additional hearing on or about August 7, 2015, to reset the August 11, 2015, trial date because law enforcement was unable to serve MSG with a trial subpoena.

Respondent admits that by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 12 through 14 herein, Respondent caused a person to secrete himself for purposes of making the person available as a witness in violation of RPC 3.4(f). Respondent admits that by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 12 through 19 herein, Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of a nonlawyer over whom Respondent had direct supervisory authority was compatible with the professional obligations of Respondent, in violation of RPC 5.3(a). Respondent admits that Coffey, a nonlawyer, engaged in conduct that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional

Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. Respondent admits that she is responsible for Coffey's conduct because Respondent ordered it, or with the knowledge of Coffey's specific conduct, ratified the conduct involved in violation of RPC 5.3(b)(1). Respondent further admits that by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 12 through 19, she knowingly assisted Deveny's violation of RPC 3.4(f) in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(1). Finally, Respondent admits that by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 11 through 22 herein, Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4).

Sanction

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated her duty to the legal system to abide by its rules and to avoid interfering with the proper administration of justice. ABA Standard 6.2. Respondent violated her duty as a professional in failing to supervise Coffey. ABA Standard 7.0.

Respondent's mental state was knowing. Respondent called Coffey into Respondent's office and told Coffey that MSG was trying to avoid meeting with law enforcement before they put the plan in motion to secrete MSG at Coffey's family cabin. the court may take into account both actual and potential injury. ABA Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Respondent's conduct caused actual injury. Because MSG was secreted, the State had to request a trial continuance and could not proceed as originally scheduled on August 11, 2015, taking up unnecessary court time and resources. Respondent's conduct created a need for at least one additional hearing and delayed a highly contentious and publicized trial, both of which constitute actual injury. In re Gustafson I, 327 Or 636, 654, 968 P2d 367 (1988). Addi- tionally, there is actual injury whenever a lawyer attempts to induce a witness

not to testify, even if unsuccessful. In re Boothe, 303 Or 643, 653, 740 P2d 785 (1987). Furthermore, Respondent caused actual harm to Coffey. As a result of Respon- dent's conduct, Coffey lost her job, and was criminally investigated, which required Coffey to hire a criminal defense attorney.

Respondent was admitted to practice in 1997 and had been practicing law for approximately 18 years at the time of her conduct. Respondent spent her entire legal career in civil practice, not criminal law.

1. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d).
2. Character or reputation. ABA Standard 9.32(g).
3. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the following ABA Standards apply: Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. ABA Standard 6.22. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.2.

Case matching in the disciplinary content is an inexact science. In re McGraw, 362 Or 667, 698, 414 P3d 841 (2018) (citing In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 70, 956 P2d 967 (1998)). While Oregon does not have any cases regarding secreting witnesses, this case involves deliberate interference in a criminal proceeding. Cases involving interference designed to disrupt the administration of justice have resulted in suspensions ranging from six to 12 months. See e.g., In re Carl, 26 DB Rptr 36 (2012) (stipulated 18-month suspension for multiple rule violations when the respondent was convicted of tampering with evidence when he attempted to conceal a bottle of alcohol during an unannounced home visit by his wife's probation officers. Respondent was also convicted of endangering the welfare of a minor after the probation officers found marijuana and marijuana residue in several locations in the family home in which minor children resided); In re Allen, 31 DB Rptr 2 (2017) (stipulated 12-month suspension for multiple rule violations, including the unauthorized practice of law and

engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In an attempt to get a Bar complaint dismissed, the respondent offered through an intermediary to pay the complainant in exchange for the complainant facilitating dismissal of the Bar complaint. The payment was contingent upon dismissal of the complaint); In re Chancellor, 22 DB Rptr 27 (2008) (stipulated 12-month suspension for a prosecutor who met socially with a rape victim in a case he was prosecuting and engaged in sexual contact with her. The respondent falsely denied to the district attorney's office and police that he had done so when questioned. The respondent also had additional criminal convictions for DUII, and he failed to comply with court orders and his probation.); In re Gustfafson, supra, (six-month suspension imposed for a deputy district attorney's unjustified threatening of a criminal defense attorney with criminal or ethical prosecution in order to secure the defense attorney's favorable testimony.); In re Jeffery, 321 Or 360, 898 P2d 752 (1995) (nine-month suspension for a criminal defense attorney who threatened to commit reversible error unless the court granted his motion to continue. The court also found the lawyer had conflicts of interest).

Or at 66. Appropriate discipline deters unethical conduct. In re Kirkman, 313 Or 181, 188, 830 P2d 206 (1992).

Respondent shall be suspended for a period of nine months for violation of RPC 3.4(f), RPC 5.3(a), RPC 5.3(b)(1), RPC 8.4(a)(1), and RPC 8.4(a)(4), the sanction to be effective one day after the stipulation is approved.

Respondent acknowledges that she has certain duties and responsibilities under the foreseeable prejudice to her clients during the term of her suspension. In this regard, Respondent certifies that she has no client files or client records pertaining to active or current clients.

period of suspension. She is required to comply with the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the suspension, she must apply for formal reinstatement pursuant to BR 8.1. Respondent further

to whether Respondent should be reinstated. Respondent also acknowledges that she cannot hold herself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until she is notified that her license to practice has been reinstated.

her suspension or the denial of her reinstatement application. This requirement is in addition

to any other provision of this agreement that requires Respondent to attend continuing legal education (CLE) courses.

suspended, and her acknowledges that the Bar will be informing these jurisdictions of the final

October 13, 2023. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties agree the stipulation is to be submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration pursuant to the terms of BR 3.6. EXECUTED this 17th day of November 2023. /s/ Deanna L. Wray Deanna L. Wray, OSB No. 974423

/s/ Thomas L. Hutchinson Thomas L. Hutchinson, OSB No. 994896 EXECUTED this 17th day of November 2023. By: /s/ Courtney C. Dippel Courtney C. Dippel, OSB No. 022916

) RENEE E. ROTHAUGE, Bar No. 903712 ) Case No. 22-94 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline. Effective Date of Order: February 13, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Renee

1. Rothauge (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.5(a). DATED this 13th day of February, 2024.

Renee E. Rothauge, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on September 21, 1990, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.5(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set for the all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

On or around April 8, 2016, XRT and David Silverglate (collectively, XRT) hired Markowitz Herbold, Respondent's former firm, to defend them in a license dispute involving XRT's intellectual property commenced by the Licensor in Atlanta Georgia. Initially XRT engaged Respondent's former firm through a standard hourly fee agreement.

Due to the litigation and XRT's unrelated start up business , XRT experienced tempo- rary diminished cash flow. XRT requested, and Respondent's firm then agreed, to modify their fee agreement. XRT was represented by independent counsel during the negotiations. The firm agreed to an Alternative Fee Agreement which modified the original fee agreement (MFA) and consisted of two phases. Phase one applied to any resolution of the case prior to February 28, 2017, and phase two applied to any resolution of the case after March 1, 2017. The case was not resolved in phase one.

Regarding the fee that XRT would pay, the MFA stated the following:

"… During phase 1, the Firm will be compensated as follows:

1. By the 5 day of every month, beginning June 5 and continuing until th

February 28, 2017, Client will pay the Firm $15,000 to cover a portion of the accruing fees.

1. If the matter concludes between June and February 28, 2017, the Firm will
   receive the greater of:

2. Its unpaid fees billed or accrued through the date of the case's completion at
   its full 2016 rate plus a 10% success fee. The firm will send monthly bills so that Client may review and object to any of the fees or costs accrued during the billing period. Any fees and costs incurred after the date of a settlement will be billed and paid in full at the Firm's then-prevailing rates.

3. 17% of any recovery in excess of $3 million dollars."
   "… During phase 2, the Firm will be compensated as follows:

4. By the 5th day of every month starting January 5, 2017, Client will pay the firm
   $15,000 to cover a portion of the accruing fees.

5. If the case concludes after February 28, 2017, the Firm will receive the greater of:

6. Its unpaid fees billed or accrued through the date of a fully executed settlement
   at its full 2016 and 2017 rates plus a 10% success fee. The Firm will send monthly bills so that Client may review and object to any of the fees or costs accrued during the billing period. Any fees and costs incurred after the date of a settlement will be billed and paid in full at the Firm's then-prevailing rates.

7. 35% of any recovery in excess of $3 million dollars."
   In exchange for a percentage of the recovery without any caps, the Firm will cap the monthly payments to be paid to the Firm for attorney fees at $200,000 …."

Prior to the matter going to trial, XRT paid the maximum $200,000 in monthly payments.

Prior to the matter going to trial and on multiple occasions, Respondent's former firm communicated the firm's understanding of the MFA's payment terms to XRT, and to its independent counsel who had represented XRT in negotiating the MFA. Those communica- tions indicated that Respondent's firm would be owed the greater of its actual fees plus ten percent or 35% of any recovery beyond $3 million, at the conclusion of the trial representation. XRT did not object to, or indicate a different understanding or interpretation of the MFA.

A week-long jury trial commenced on March 18, 2019. The jury ruled in favor of XRT on some issues, but not others. The jury awarded XRT $107,000.

Following the trial, Respondent's firm sent a letter to XRT informing them that the case was nearing conclusion and that XRT owed unpaid costs and the accrued, unpaid fees billed at the firm's 2016 and 2017 rates at the conclusion of the matter. This figure was the greater of the two fee measurements identified in the MFA and was consistent with what Respondent previously communicated to XRT about the MFA's payment terms.

Subsequently, and for the first time, XRT communicated to the Markowitz firm its position that no additional fees were owed. The firm and XRT then mediated their dispute, and ultimately, with both sides represented by counsel, negotiated, and entered into, a written settlement agreement that resolved their good-faith dispute over their interpretation of the

MFA, and which resulted in XRT agreeing to pay a lesser amount of fees. Respondent was not involved in the firm's negotiation of the Settlement Agreement; and Respondent was no longer at Markowitz when the firm commenced collection proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement reached with XRT, after it disputed the fees owed.

After a review of the foregoing facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would have concluded that no additional fee was owed based on the MFA's fee language.

Based on the foregoing, Respondent admits that she violated RPC 1.5(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. By charging an excessive fee, Respondent violated her duty as a professional. ABA Standards at 7.

Respondent believed throughout her representation and subsequent fee dispute with XRT that one of the fee measurements stated in their agreement would be due at the conclusion of the representation. That understanding went unchal- lenged by XRT until payment was sought years after the MFA was entered into. Respondent's conduct in failing to accurately apply the terms of the fee agreement fell beneath the standard of care for purposes of RPC 1.5(a), but was not knowing or intentional. Respondent's mental state was negligent.

XRT suffered actual injury due to Respondent's misconduct. XRT was forced to litigate whether anything was due to Respondent's firm and was ultimately successful.

Respondent was admitted to the Oregon State Bar in 1990.

1. Cooperative attitude toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e).

2. No selfish or dishonest motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b). Respondent entered
   into a valid MFA with XRT and, thereafter, Respondent's firm communi- cated the firm's understanding of the MFA's payment terms to XRT and its independent counsel on multiple occasions prior to trial, and XRT never told her or the firm that it had a different position until after the case was over. Moreover, Respondent was not involved in the firm's negotiation of the Settlement Agreement; and Respondent was no longer at Markowitz when the firm commenced collection proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement reached with XRT, after it disputed the fees owed.

3. Character and reputation. ABA Standard 9.32(g).
   Under ABA Standard 7.3, reprimand is generally appropriate when: "a lawyer negli- gently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."

Oregon cases dealing with an attorney who negligently charges an illegal or excessive fee typically result in a public reprimand. See, e.g., In re Vanagas, 27 DB Rptr 255 (2013) (attorney reprimanded by trial panel for accepting payment from conservatorship funds without obtaining court approval as required by statute); In re Hammond, DB Rptr 187 (2010) (attorney reprimanded when, in a federal workers' compensation matter, attorney collected two fees from a client without obtaining approval as required by statute); In re Mitchell, 17 DB Rptr 26 (2003) (attorney reprimanded for collecting illegal fee from the estate of a disabled person because he did not first obtain court approval); In re Jacobson, 12 DB Rptr 99 (1998) (attorney reprimanded for collecting fees from an estate without first obtaining court approval). The sanction of a public reprimand will accomplish the goal of deterrence by putting the Bar's membership on notice to responsibly draft and enforce their fee agreements.

dent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.5(a), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: Washing- ton, California.

December 9, 2023. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 1st day of February, 2024. /s/ Renee E. Rothauge Renee E. Rothauge, OSB No. 903712

EXECUTED this 6th day of February, 2024.

Matthew S. Coombs, OSB No. 201951

) SHAWNA RENE MEYER, ) Bar No. 011580 ) Case No. 23-140 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.16(d). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of Order: February 15, 2024

Shawna Rene Meyer (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violations of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.16(d). DATED this 15th day of February 2024.

Shawna Rene Meyer, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on June 27, 2001, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having her office and place of business in Multnomah County, Oregon.

On January 27, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.16(d) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

Client retained Respondent in 2018 to pursue an employment discrimination/wrongful termination claim against Portland Public Schools (PPS). On Friday, August 24, 2018, Client used a credit card to pay Respondent $615 for costs (an anticipated $560 filing fee and service fees). Although Respondent's bookkeeper was trained to deposit cost advances into trust, he instead deposited Client's advance into her business account, because the bank would take two days to process the credit card payment, and the firm expected to incur the filing fee within the next two business days. When Respondent filed the complaint on Client's behalf on Tuesday, August 28, 2018, the filing fee was only $267. Respondent did not deposit and maintain Client's unexpended funds in her trust account, and she did not refund the unexpended funds to Client until April 2023.

After Client was deposed in February 2019, Client and Respondent discussed the low odds of his prevailing on his claims in light of multiple factors. She advised Client that the most he could achieve was a nuisance value settlement offer, but that she did not expect even that. She advised that she would not contact him unless or until she received an offer, or another development occurred. Respondent believed that Client agreed that they would not move forward on his case, and that no further action was necessary. However, she did not confirm this understanding in writing to Client. Client, who is not a native English speaker, did not share this understanding.

In February 2019, the court issued a notice of dismissal for want of prosecution, and in March 2019, issued a general judgment of dismissal of Client's case. Because she believed that Client had agreed with her assessment that his case should not proceed, Respondent did not inform Client that his case had been dismissed. Client, unaware that his case was dismissed, continued to wait to hear from Respondent until November 2022, when he contacted the court and discovered that his case was closed.

Respondent admits that: by failing to tell Client that the court had dismissed his case, she failed to keep her client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, in violation of RPC 1.4(a); by failing to deposit or maintain in trust Client's cost advance until the expenses were fully incurred, she violated RPC 1.15-1(c); and by failing to refund the balance of Client's advance payment for costs that had not been incurred when Client's case was dismissed, she failed upon termination of representation to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, in violation of RPC 1.16(d).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated duties owed to her client to handle his funds properly and to act with diligence in communicating key developments in his case. Duties to clients are the most important of a lawyer's duties.

Respondent acted negligently. She failed to heed the substantial risks that she and Client did not have a mutual understanding of the merits and likely outcome of his case, and that she owed him a partial refund of his cost advance.

Standards at 6; In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 600, 238 P3d 13 (2010); In re

Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Not knowing for three years

that his case had been dismissed, and not having his money returned for that period, were actual injuries to Client.

Respondent was admitted in Oregon in 2001.

1. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences
   of misconduct. ABA Standard 9.32(d). When Client contacted Respon- dent about the dismissal, she sent him a detailed letter explaining what she understood to have transpired, taking full responsibility for the miscommunication, and informing him that he should talk to a lawyer about making a malpractice claim against her.

2. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude

3. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Respondent has expressed deep
   remorse both in her letters to the Bar and her letters to Client.

negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.43. When a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client, reprimand is generally appropriate. ABA Standard 4.13 Given the injury caused to Client, reprimand is the presumptive sanction, absent aggra- vating and mitigating factors.

Oregon cases reach a similar conclusion. The following cases resulted in public repri- mand for failing to return client funds and/or failing to adequately communicate.

In re Brown, 34 DB Rptr 144 (2020) (stipulated reprimand for violation of RPC 1.15-

1(d) and RPC 1.16(d)). Attorney worked for a client on a custody, parenting-time, and child support matter. The client terminated Attorney, requested an itemized billing, and asked for a refund of unused retainer funds. Attorney sent the bill, showing a $783 balance. The client's new lawyer declined to handle the refund. Attorney was uncertain about whether she could contact the client directly now that the client had new counsel. She eventually called the client twice, but the client's voicemail was full. Attorney held the unearned retainer for a period of 19 months.

In re Ponzini, 34 DB Rptr 46 (2020) (stipulated reprimand for violation of RPC 1.4(a),

RPC 1.15-1(d) and RPC 1.16(d)). Attorney closed her law practice without refunding remaining retainer funds to one of her clients. She failed to respond to the client's inquiries and failed to refund the funds until the client contacted the Bar.

In re Crawford, 32 DB Rptr 278 (2018) (stipulated reprimand for violation of RPC

1.16(d)). Attorney failed to return original documents to a client who sought representation probating her brother's estate. Attorney decided not to take the case, instructed his staff to

return the documents, and mistakenly believed that the documents were returned. Documents were returned more than a year later after the client filed a complaint with the Bar.

In re Morgan, 31 DB Rptr 28 (2017) (stipulated reprimand for violation of RPC 1.15-

1(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.15-1(d)). After a client terminated Attorney's representation, Attorney transferred the entire amount paid by the client for costs from trust to her general account, without balancing the trust account or checking other records, and therefore did not realize that her client was actually entitled to a substantial refund of unused costs.

Respondent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.15-1(c), and RPC 1.16(d), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

Respondent represents that, in addition to Oregon, she is not admitted to practice law in any other jurisdiction, whether her current status is active, inactive, or suspended.

EXECUTED this 13th day of February 2024. /s/ Shawna Rene Meyer Shawna Rene Meyer, OSB No. 011580 EXECUTED this 13th day of February 2024.

Cite as In re Brown, 38 DB Rptr 31 (2024)

) JEFFREY B. BROWN, Bar No. 110703 ) Case No. 23-191 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.5(a), RPC 7.3(b), and RPC 7.3(c). BR 3.5 Petition for Reciprocal Discipline. Five-year Effective Date of Order: March 26, 2024

This matter is before me on the Oregon State Bar's (Bar) Petition for Reciprocal Disci- pline pursuant to BR 3.5. The Utah Supreme Court accepted Respondent's resignation with discipline pending on June 20, 2023. Respondent was charged with soliciting employment from former clients who subsequently made it known they did not want Respondent's services. Despite this, Respondent performed legal work on their behalf and charged and attempted to collect an unreasonable fee from the former clients while communicating with them in a harassing manner. The Bar contends that Respondent's conduct violated the following Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct: RPC 1.5(a) [A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee or a clearly excessive amount for expenses]. RPC 7.3(b) [A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by any means when the person who is the subject of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer]. RPC 7.3(c) [A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by any means when the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment]. The Bar seeks a five-year suspension as reciprocal discipline. Respondent answered the petition by letter dated February 15, 2024. He wrote: "I fully welcome the relief sought by the Oregon State Bar. I am 70 years of age, retired and no longer practice law in any State. Nor do I have any intention

Cite as In re Brown, 38 DB Rptr 31 (2024) to practice law in the future. I have no clients. I first passed the Utah State Bar in 1981 and finalized the practice of the same in 2020. My practice was focused on estate planning, and most if not all my clients - being at least 50 years older than me - have passed away. Please inform any necessary Oregon State Bar personal [sic] of this letter." Accordingly, based on the submissions of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Reciprocal Discipline is GRANTED and Respondent is suspended for a period of five years commencing on the date this order becomes final. DATED this 23rd day of February 2024.

) JEFFREY PAUL THAYER, ) Bar No. 983592 ) Case No. 23-328 )

Counsel for the Bar: Courtney C. Dippel Counsel for the Respondent: Dayna E. Underhill

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension, all stayed, 1-year probation. Effective Date of Order: March 30, 2024

Jeffrey Paul Thayer (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar (Bar), and good cause appearing, Jeffrey Paul Thayer is suspended for 30 days, with all of the suspension stayed, pending Respondent's successful completion of a one-year term of probation, for violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). This sanction, including the term or probation, shall commence 10 days after the date on which this order is signed by the Adjudicator. DATED this 20th day of March, 2024.

Jeffrey Paul Thayer, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on October 2, 1998, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Marion County, Oregon.

On December 9, 2023, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set

Facts

Client hired Respondent in 2017 to represent her in pursuing personal injury claims arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2016. Respondent filed the complaint against the at-fault driver and Client's insurer for nonpayment of PIP benefits. He recovered PIP benefits for Client, and by December 2019, the client's matter against the at-fault driver was set for trial. The majority of Client's medical bills were incurred with her treating chiropractor. Respondent obtained only modest settlement offers prior to trial. With trial approaching in late 2019 and concerned he could not obtain the best possible result for Client, Respondent reached an understanding with defense counsel to dismiss Respondent's case without prejudice. Respondent intended to negotiate the balance owed to Client's treating chiropractor, and then engage in further settlement negotiations with the defendant. With Client's consent, Respon- dent agreed to that approach. Following dismissal of the lawsuit, Respondent contacted Client's chiropractor on three occasions, but received no response. Thereafter, he failed to follow up. On February 6, 2021, Client emailed Respondent inquiring as to the status of her law- suit, but Respondent did not respond. After another year went by with no response from Respondent, on March 2, 2022, and March 8, 2022, Client left messages with Respondent's assistant, who timely forwarded those voicemails to him, but Respondent still did not contact Client.

Respondent admits that he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of RPC 1.3, and he failed to keep his client informed about the status of a matter and failed to promptly respond to reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4(a).

Sanction

stances.

Respondent's mental state may have been negligent when he failed to follow up with Client's chiropractor. However, his mental state became knowing by February 2021, when Client emailed him about the status of the matter. At that point, Respondent knew he had failed to advance his client's cause for over a year and still took no further action. Respondent knowingly failed to respond to Client's communication attempts and requests for information.

Respondent's misconduct caused multiple injuries to his client. After dis- missing the lawsuit and getting no traction with the chiropractor, he did nothing further to obtain a recovery for Client. Additionally, the foregoing also con- tributed to significant uncertainty, anxiety, and aggravation. "Client anguish, uncertainty, anxiety, and aggravation are actual injury under the disciplinary rules." In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 321, 232 P3d 952 (2010).

Respondent was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1998.

1. Character or reputation. ABA Standard 9.32(g).
2. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the following ABA Standards appear to apply:

Oregon cases have resulted in stayed suspensions subject to an appropriate term of probation. In re Cowan (2023) [stipulated 60-day suspension, with 30 days stayed, subject to a one year term of probation for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and 1.5(a)]; In re Vivien

Lyon (2023) [stipulated 30 day suspension, all stayed, subject to a one year term of probation

for violations of RPC 1.3]; In re Bosket (2018) [stipulated 30 day suspension, all stayed, subject to a two year term of probation for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(a)].

BR 6.2 recognizes that probation can be appropriate and permits a suspension to be stayed pending the successful completion of a probation. See also, ABA Standard 2.7 (proba- tion can be imposed alone or with a suspension and is an appropriate sanction for conduct which may be corrected). In addition to a period of suspension, a period of probation designed to ensure the adoption and continuation of better practices will best serve the purpose of protecting clients, the public, and the legal system.

Respondent shall be suspended for 30 days for violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a), with all of the suspension stayed, pending Respondent's successful completion of a one-year term of probation. The sanction shall be effective 10 days after this stipulation for discipline is approved, or as otherwise directed by the Disciplinary Board (effective date).

Probation shall commence upon the effective date and shall continue for a period of one year, ending on the day prior to the one-year anniversary of the effective date (the "period of probation"). During the period of probation, Respondent shall abide by the following conditions:

1. Respondent will communicate with Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) and
   allow DCO access to information, as DCO deems necessary, to monitor com- pliance with his probationary terms.

2. Respondent has been represented in this proceeding by Dayna E. Underhill
   (Underhill). Respondent and Underhill hereby authorize direct communication between Respondent and DCO after the date this stipulation for discipline is signed by both parties, for the purposes of administering this agreement and monitoring Respondent's compliance with his probationary terms.

3. Respondent shall comply with all provisions of this stipulation for discipline,
   the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to Oregon lawyers, and ORS Chapter 9.

4. During the period of probation, Respondent shall attend not less than 4 MCLE
   accredited programs, for a total of 12 hours, which shall emphasize law practice management, time management, adequately communicating with clients, and diligently attending to legal matters. These credit hours shall be in addition to those MCLE credit hours required of Respondent for his normal MCLE reporting period. (The Ethics School requirement does not count towards the 12 hours needed to comply with this condition.) Upon completion of the CLE programs described in this paragraph, and prior to the end of his period of probation, Respondent shall submit a Declaration of Compliance to DCO.

5. Throughout the period of probation, Respondent shall diligently attend to client
   matters and adequately communicate with clients regarding their cases.

6. Each month during the period of probation, Respondent shall review all client
   files to ensure that he is timely attending to the clients' matters and that he is maintaining adequate communication with clients, the court, and opposing counsel.

7. Ryan Jennings shall serve as Respondent's probation supervisor (Supervisor).
   Respondent shall cooperate and comply with all reasonable requests made by Supervisor that Supervisor, in his sole discretion, determines are designed to achieve the purpose of the probation and the protection of Respondent's clients, the profession, the legal system, and the public. Respondent agrees that, if Supervisor ceases to be his Supervisor for any reason, Respondent will imme- diately notify DCO and engage a new Supervisor, approved by DCO, within one month.

8. Respondent and Supervisor agree and understand that Supervisor is providing
   his services voluntarily and cannot accept payment for providing supervision pursuant to this stipulation for discipline.

9. Beginning with the first month of the period of probation, Respondent shall
   meet with Supervisor in person at least once a month for the purpose of:

10. Allowing Supervisor to review the status of Respondent's law practice
    and his performance of legal services on the behalf of clients. Each month during the period of probation, Supervisor shall conduct a random audit of ten (10) client files or ten percent (10%) of Respon- dent's active caseload, whichever is greater, to determine whether Respondent is timely, competently, diligently, and ethically attending to matters, and taking reasonably practicable steps to protect his clients' interests upon the termination of employment.

11. Respondent authorizes Supervisor to communicate with DCO regarding his
    compliance or non-compliance with the terms of this agreement, and to release to DCO any information necessary to permit DCO to assess Respondent's compliance.

12. Within seven (7) days of the effective date, Respondent shall contact the Profes-
    sional Liability Fund (PLF) and schedule an appointment on the soonest date available to consult with PLF's Practice Management Attorneys in order to obtain practice management advice. Respondent shall notify DCO of the time and date of the appointment.

13. Respondent shall attend the appointment with the PLF's Practice Management
    Attorneys and seek advice and assistance regarding procedures for diligently pursuing client matters, communicating with clients, effectively managing a client caseload and taking reasonable steps to protect clients upon the termina- tion of employment. No later than thirty (30) days after recommendations are made by the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys, Respondent shall adopt and implement those recommendations.

14. No later than sixty (60) days after recommendations are made by the PLF's
    Practice Management Attorneys, Respondent shall provide a copy of the Office Practice Assessment from the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys and file a report with DCO stating the date of his consultation(s) with the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys; identifying the recommendations that he has adopted and implemented; and identifying the specific recommendations he has not implemented and explaining why he has not adopted and implemented those recommendations.

15. Respondent shall implement all recommended changes, to the extent reasonably
    possible, and participate in at least one follow-up review with PLF Practice Management Attorneys on or before October 31, 2024.

16. On a quarterly basis, on dates to be established by DCO beginning no later than
    ninety (90) days after the effective date, Respondent shall submit to DCO a written "Compliance Report," approved as to substance by his Supervisor, advising whether Respondent is in compliance with the terms of this Stipulation for Discipline, including:

17. The dates and purpose of Respondent's meetings with his Supervisor.

18. The number of Respondent's active cases and percentage reviewed in
    the monthly audit with Supervisor and the results thereof.

19. Whether Respondent has completed the other provisions recommended
    by Supervisor, if applicable.

20. In the event that Respondent has not complied with any term of this
    Stipulation for Discipline, the Compliance Report shall describe the non-compliance and the reason for it.

21. Respondent is responsible for any costs required under the terms of this stipula-
    tion and the terms of probation.

22. Respondent's failure to comply with any term of this agreement, including
    conditions of timely and truthfully reporting to DCO, or with any reasonable request of his Supervisor, shall constitute a basis for the revocation of probation and imposition of the stayed portion of the suspension.

23. A Compliance Report is timely if it is emailed, mailed, faxed, or delivered to
    DCO on or before its due date.

24. The SPRB's decision to bring a formal complaint against Respondent for
    unethical conduct that occurred or continued during the period of his probation shall also constitute a basis for revocation of the probation and imposition of the stayed portion of the suspension.

25. Upon the filing of a petition to revoke Respondent's probation pursuant to BR
    6.2(d), Respondent's remaining probationary term shall be automatically tolled and shall remain tolled, until the BR 6.2(d) petition is adjudicated by the Adjudicator or, if appointed, the Disciplinary Board.

foreseeable prejudice to his clients during any term of his suspension, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed. In this regard, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed Respondent has arranged for Ron L. Sayer, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of his actual suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Sayer has agreed to accept this responsibility.

Respondent acknowledges that reinstatement is not automatic on expiration of any period of suspension, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed. If a period of suspension is necessitated by his non-compliance with the terms of his probation, he will be required to comply with the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Bar Rules of Procedure. Respondent also acknowledges that, should a suspension occur, he cannot hold himself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until he is notified that his license to practice has been reinstated.

his suspension or the denial of his reinstatement, if a suspension is imposed. This requirement is in addition to any other provision of this agreement that requires Respondent to attend continuing legal education (CLE) courses.

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: Washing- ton.

February 22, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 15th day of March 2024. /s/ Jeffrey Paul Thayer Jeffrey Paul Thayer, OSB No. 983592

/s/ Dayna E. Underhill Dayna E. Underhill, OSB No. 926004 EXECUTED this 18th day of March 2024. By: /s/ Courtney C. Dippel Courtney C. Dippel, OSB No. 022916

Cite as In re Hale, 38 DB Rptr 41 (2024)

) LEILA LOUISE HALE, Bar No. 142084 ) Case No. 23-197 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.15-1(a). Order granting BR 3.5 petition for reciprocal discipline. Effective Date of Order: April 20, 2024

The Oregon State Bar (Bar) petitioned for imposition of reciprocal discipline on Leila Louise Hale (Respondent) pursuant to BR 3.5. Respondent was disciplined in Nevada on August 11, 2023, for violations of Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (NRPC) 1.7(a)(2) [conflict of interest: current clients] and NRPC 1.15(a) [safekeeping property]. Respondent failed to obtain informed consent from her clients regarding a potential personal conflict of interest that Respondent had with an expert witness in the clients' cases, in violation of NRPC 1.7(a)(2). Respondent also used monies in her trust account to pay the expert witness fees for these clients' cases in violation of RPC 1.15(a). The Bar seeks imposition of a public reprimand in Oregon which is the equivalent of the discipline imposed in Nevada. Respondent does not object to the imposition of a public reprimand. See Petition, Ex.

1. Now, therefore, being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for reciprocal discipline is GRANTED and Respondent is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for violations of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.15-1(a). DATED this 20th day of March 2024.

) NICHOLAS J. NAUMES, Bar No. 134380 ) Case No. 23-92 )

Christine K. Herber Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 3.4(d), RPC 8.1(a)(2), RPC 8.4(a)(3), and RPC 8.4(a)(4). Trial panel opinion. 6-month suspension. Effective Date of Opinion: April 8, 2024

The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged Respondent Nicholas J. Naumes with violating six Rules of Professional Conduct. The charges arise from Respondent's representation of the husband in a dissolution case. The Bar alleges that Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed and failed to adequately explain a matter (RPC 1.4(a) & (b)); failed to comply with discovery obligations (RPC 3.4(d)); engaged in conduct involving dishonesty (RPC 8.4(a)(3)); engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (RPC 8.4(a)(4)); and failed to respond to disciplinary inquiries (8.1(a)(2)). The Bar requests that we suspend Respondent for no less than six months. Respondent is in default for failing to answer the complaint against him. When a respondent is in default the Bar's factual allegations in the complaint are deemed true. BR 5.8(a); In re Magar, 337 Or 548, 551-53, 100 P3d 727 (2004). Our role is to first determine whether the facts alleged support the charged rule violations. If we conclude they do, we then determine what sanction is appropriate. See In re Koch, 345 Or 444, 446, 198 P3d 910 (2008);

see also In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 253, 27 P3d 102 (2001).

we suspend Respondent for six months.

On October 5, 2023, the Bar filed a formal complaint against Respondent. Respondent was personally served that same day. Respondent failed to answer the complaint by October 19, 2023, as required by Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 4.3. The Bar sent Respondent a ten-day

notice of intent to take a default on October 20, 2023. Respondent still failed to file an answer and the Bar moved for default on October 31, 2023. The motion was granted.

FACTS

Respondent represented Michael Villanueva in a divorce case. ¶ 3. Attorney Jamie 1 Hazlett represented Villanueva's wife. Hazlett served requests for production (RFPs) on Respondent. Respondent forwarded the RFPs to his client but did not tell him the deadline to respond to the RFPs. Respondent told his client that the RFPs were overbroad and that he would object to producing some of the items asked for. Respondent, however, waived objections to the RFPs when he failed to serve a response to the RFPs within the time allowed. Respondent did not tell his client that he failed to object. ¶ 4. On or about August 23, 2021, when documents had still not been produced, Hazlett moved to compel production. Respondent filed a response to the motion, but the court ruled that Villanueva had to produce all documents requested in the RFPs by October 20, 2021. Respondent did not tell his client about the motion to compel or the order to produce the documents. ¶ 5. Respondent and his client failed to produce documents by the court's deadline, so Hazlett filed a motion for sanctions on November 5, 2021. Respondent filed a response to the motion and the court held a hearing. The court ordered Villanueva to produce specific documents by December 27, 2021. Respondent again failed to tell Villanueva of the motion for sanctions or the new order to produce the documents. ¶ 6. Respondent and his client again failed to produce the documents subject to the court's order by the deadline, so Hazlett filed a second motion for sanctions on December 30, 2021. ¶ 7. Hazlett also served a notice of deposition on Respondent on January 12, 2022, for Villanueva's deposition to be taken on January 27, 2022. Respondent failed to tell his client of the deposition and waited until one hour prior to the deposition to tell Hazlett that neither Respondent nor his client would be attending. ¶ 8. Hazlett filed a third motion for sanctions on February 22, 2022, this time based not just on failure to produce documents but also on Villanueva's failure to appear for his noticed deposition. The court again held a hearing on the matter and ordered Villanueva to produce specific documents by March 18, 2022. Respondent again did not tell his client of this motion for sanctions or the order to produce the documents. ¶ 9. Hazlett gave Respondent options for a rescheduled deposition of Villanueva. Respon- dent sent these to his client, who responded with his availability. Respondent, however, never confirmed with his client the date that was ultimately set for the deposition. Having heard nothing about a new deposition date, Villanueva assumed the deposition was not going forward and communicated this to Respondent. Respondent only told Hazlett that Villanueva would not be appearing when Hazlett arrived for the deposition. ¶ 10. Hazlett filed a fourth motion for sanctions on April 22, 2022, based on Villanueva's failure to appear at the rescheduled deposition. The court held a hearing on the motion and Paragraph references are to the formal complaint. 1

sanctioned Villanueva. Respondent again failed to tell his client of the order for sanctions. ¶ 11. The court ultimately entered four separate judgments against Respondent's client to pay Hazlett's attorney fees incurred because of Respondent's failure to comply with his discovery obligations. The court also imposed a daily penalty of $100 while the discovery remained outstanding. Hazlett also served a writ of garnishment in an attempt to collect the amounts owed. Although Respondent did communicate with his client at times while the discovery disputes were before the court, he never told his client of the judgments against him, of the daily penalty imposed by the court, or of the garnishment. This information was material and Respondent knew it was material. ¶ 12. Respondent's failure to comply with or make valid objections to discovery require- ments and court orders were improper. This conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding. It caused actual harm in the form of unnecessary delay, increased attorney fees for the opposing party, monetary sanctions for Respondent's client and wasted court time and resources. ¶ 13. In February of 2023 Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) sent correspondence to Respondent requesting an explanation for the conduct at issue here. The correspondence was sent by email and first-class mail to the addresses on file with the Bar. No response was received. The correspondence was not returned undelivered. ¶ 16. DCO sent further correspondence to Respondent the next month again requesting comment on the conduct at issue here. The correspondence was sent by email, first-class mail, and certified mail to the addresses on file with the Bar. No response was received. The certified mail was returned undelivered. ¶ 17. DCO discovered another possible mailing address for Respondent and sent the corres- pondence again via first-class mail and certified mail. The certified mail was returned unclaimed. ¶ 18. DCO moved for Respondent's interim suspension pursuant to BR 7.1 in April of 2023 and served the motion as required by the rule. Respondent failed to respond. The Adjudicator suspended Respondent on April 24, 2023. DCO's inquiries to Respondent remain outstanding. ¶ 19.

1. RPC 1.4(a) - Duty to Keep Clients Reasonably Informed violation of RPC 1.4(a) occurred we are to consider the length of time the lawyer failed to

485 P3d 258 (2021) (citing, In re Groom, 350 Or 113, 124, 249 P3d 976 (2011)). In some circumstances a lawyer may be required to communicate information immediately in order to keep a client reasonably informed and in some circumstances a lawyer may have an obligation to initiate the communication. In re Graeff, 368 Or at 26. In Graeff, the court found a violation

where the lawyer's failure to communicate covered only a short time because it occurred during a critical phase of the case because a summary judgment motion had been filed against the clients' case. In re Graeff, 368 Or at 25-26. We find that Respondent here failed to communicate adequately in a number of ways. He failed to tell his client of the need to file timely discovery objections, of his failure to file objections, of the orders compelling production, and of the client's scheduled depositions. He failed to tell his client in a timely manner that the client had been sanctioned by the court and that the monetary penalties were growing as time went by. He then did not tell his client that a writ of garnishment had been issued. These failures to communicate harmed Respondent's client and a reasonable lawyer would have foreseen that likelihood. We find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(a)

1. RPC 1.4(b) - Duty to Sufficiently Explain a Matter to a Client
   RPC 1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces- sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." The multiple failures to communicate outlined above all deprived Respondent's client of informa- tion necessary to make informed decisions about how to proceed in the case. Respondent kept his client in the dark on critical matters, making informed decisions about the representation impossible. We find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b).

2. RPC 3.4(d) - Duty to Comply with Discovery Obligations
   RPC 3.4(d) states in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not … in pretrial procedure …fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party." After receiving the opposing party's RFPs Respondent told his client that the requests were overbroad. Despite the requests possibly being overbroad, Respondent was still obligated to make an effort to produce documents that were not subject to objection. Beyond that, in order to preserve any objections to the requests, Respondent had to serve objections in a timely manner. Here Respondent missed the deadline to assert objections and also failed to produce the requested documents. This led to a motion to compel and four subsequent motions for sanctions against his client. Respondent failed to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with the discovery requests. We find that Respondent violated RPC 3.4(d).

3. RPC 8.4(a)(3) - Conduct Involving Dishonesty
   RPC 8.4(a)(3) provides, in relevant part: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to … engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." A misrepresentation in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3) occurs "either when the lawyer makes an affirmative false statement or when the lawyer remains silent despite having a duty to speak." In re Lawrence, 337 Or 450, 464, 98 P3d 366 (2004). "A misrepresentation 'whether direct or by omission must be knowing, false, and material in the sense that the misrepre- sentation would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process.'" Id., (citing In re Eadie, 332 Or 42, 53, 36 P3d 468 (2001)). The Bar does not need to prove that the misrepresentation was successful, In re Summer, 338 Or 29, 39, 105 P3d 848 (2005), or that the attorney intended to deceive. In re Claussen, 322 Or 466, 481, 909 P2d 862 (1996). It is

enough for the Bar to show that the lawyer's statement could have influenced the decision- maker. Summer, 338 Or at 39. Respondent here knew, among other things, that judgments had been entered against his client, that a fine was accruing daily as a discovery sanction, and that a garnishment seeking to collect on the undisclosed judgments had been issued. Respondent had a duty to report these significant events to his client. Respondent knew these undisclosed facts were material just as any reasonable lawyer would. Respondent engaged in misrepresentation by omission. We find that Respondent violated RPC 8.4(a)(3).

1. RPC 8.4(a)(4) - Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
   RPC 8.4(a)(4) states that: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to … engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." To prove a violation of this rule, the Bar must show that a lawyer did something he should not do (or failed to do something he should have done), during the course of a judicial proceeding, and that such conduct - if it consisted of a single act - caused substantial actual or potential harm to the administration of justice. In re Ard, 369 Or 180, 501 P3d 1036 (2021). If the lawyer engaged in several wrongful acts or omissions, the Bar need only prove that there was some actual or potential harm to the administration of justice. Id. The concept "administration of justice" includes the procedural functioning of the court and the substantive interests of the parties. In re Hartfield, 349 Or 108, 115, 239 P3d 992 (2010). Lawyers who make misrepresentations or engage in obstruction in connection with discovery requests have been held to violate RPC 8.4(a)(4). See, In re Skagen, 342 Or 183, 149 P3d 1171 (2006). Respondent here failed to properly handle discovery in his client's case. He failed to serve timely objections to RFPs. He failed to provide documents in response to orders to compel. That failure led to discovery sanctions against his client. Respondent's conduct forced the court to hear a motion to compel and four motions for sanctions. Opposing counsel wasted time preparing for and appearing at noticed depositions. Respondent's client was absent only due to Respondent's failure to communicate. Respondent's failure to comply with his dis- covery obligations caused the case to be more complicated and delayed its resolution. We find that Respondent violated RPC 8.4(a)(4).

2. RPC 8.1(a)(2) - Duty to Respond to Disciplinary Inquiries
   RPC 8.1(a)(2) states, in relevant part: "…a lawyer in connection with a…disciplinary matter, shall not: fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand

for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that

this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." (Emphasis added). DCO is a disciplinary authority under this rule. DCO sent a letter to Respondent in early February 2023 requesting his response to the grievance submitted by Hazlett and for additional information. The letter was sent by email and first- class mail. The communications were not returned as undelivered. Respondent did not respond.

DCO sent him another request for a response in early March 2023, by certified mail along with email and regular mail. The certified mail letter was returned undelivered, but the email was not. Respondent did not respond. DCO discovered a possible alternate address for Respondent and sent a third letter in late March by certified and regular mail. The certified mail was again returned unclaimed, but the first-class mail was not returned undelivered. Respondent was later personally served with the formal complaint at this address. Respondent did not respond. DCO petitioned for Respondent's immediate suspension pursuant to BR 7.1. Respon- dent did not respond to the petition. On April 24, 2023, the Adjudicator entered an order sus- pending Respondent. Throughout DCO's investigation Respondent failed completely to respond or coope- rate with the disciplinary authorities. We find that Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a)(2).

SANCTION

also may find guidance in case law that leads us to adjust the preliminary sanction.

The most important ethical duties lawyers have are owed to their clients. ABA Standards at 4. Respondent violated the duty of diligence he owed to his client to timely and effectively communicate. ABA Standards 4.4. Respondent violated his duty of candor to his client when he omitted critical information from his communications. ABA Standards 4.6. Respondent violated his duty to the legal system by failing to comply with discovery obligations and by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. ABA Standards 6.2. Respondent finally violated his duty as a professional when he failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities. ABA Standards at 7.

that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and which deviates from the standard of Respondent engaged in repeated instances of misconduct over an extended period of time. His actions resulted in extensive unnecessary motion practice and significant penalties against his client. He hid his misconduct from his client. He had actual notice of the Bar's investigation and charges but ignored them. We find that Respondent knowingly failed to meet his professional obligations to his client and the court.

We may consider both actual and potential injury in determining an appropriate sanc- tion. ABA Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). "Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA Standards at 9. Respondent caused actual injury to his client who was sanctioned by the court more than once. Respondent also caused actual injury to the legal system by forcing the court to waste time dealing with his discovery failures. Respondent also caused actual injury to the profession and to the public when he failed to respond to the Bar's investigation. When lawyers fail to cooperate with a Bar investigation, they cause time-consuming delays for the Bar and resolution of the complainant's grievance. See In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 558, 857 P2d 136 (1993).

The following ABA Standards apply here: knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client." Under ABA Standard 4.62, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes injury to the client. Under ABA Standard 6.22, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule and causes interference with a legal proceeding. Under ABA Standard 7.2, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engaged in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. We find that the presumptive sanction here is suspension.

The Bar urges us to find that ABA Standard 9.22(d), multiple offenses, is an aggra- vating factor present here. We agree. In mitigation, the Bar concedes the absence of a prior record of discipline. ABA Stan- dard 9.32(a). We agree.

Oregon case law supports a suspension. Lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed are generally suspended. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010). The Oregon Supreme Court has observed that attorneys who knowingly neglect a client's legal matter are generally sanctioned with a 60-day suspension. In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007); see also, In re Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (attorney suspended for 60 days for knowing neglect of a client matter and failure to communicate). No Oregon case addresses the appropriate sanction for a violation of RPC 3.4(d) (disobeying discovery rules). The Bar contends that the sanctions analysis under this rule should mirror that for a violation of RPC 3.4(c) (disobeying rules of a tribunal). The Oregon Supreme Court has approved a 30-day suspension for a single violation of RPC 3.4(c).

In re Chase, 339 Or 452, 121 P3d 1160 (2005).

As to violations of RPC 8.1(a)(2) the Oregon Supreme Court has said, "failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation standing alone, is a serious ethical violation." In re

Parker, 330 Or 541, 551, 9 P3d 107 (2000). Even in cases where attorneys are initially

unresponsive to a Bar investigation but eventually provide some information, the court has imposed 60-day suspensions. See In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 801 P2d 818 (1990) (attorney suspended for 63 days for seven counts of failing to cooperate with the Bar when providing brief, inadequate responses); In re Shaffner, 323 Or 472, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (attorney suspended for 60 days after failing to respond to the Bar initially and subsequently providing information and sitting for a deposition). Respondent here completely failed to cooperate with the Bar's investigation. The Bar cites In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 923 P2d 1219 (1996). In Miles, the attorney never responded to any of the multiple attempts the Bar made to reach her. The court imposed a 120-day suspension for violations of the predecessor rule to RPC 8.1(a)(2) with no other misconduct found. Miles involved two separate client complaints while this one involves an investigation of a single client relationship. In light of this we agree with the Bar that a 60-day suspension is appropriate for Respondent's single violation of the current rule. Lastly, a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4) has justified a 30-day suspension in the past. In re

Carini, 354 Or 47, 308 P3d 197 (2013). In Carini, the lawyer failed to appear for several court

appearances. The court determined that the lawyer had acted negligently, which would warrant a public reprimand according to the ABA Standards, but because the lawyer had previously violated the same rule in a different case, was given a 30-day suspension. Id at 59. Carini can be distinguished from Respondent's case in that he has no disciplinary history, however, his misconduct was committed knowingly. Respondent's mental state justifies a suspension in this case. ABA Standards 6.22. The aggravating and mitigating factors here do not justify an enhancement of a suspen- sion. The Bar asks us to impose the aggregate of the suspensions discussed above. We will follow that reasoning. We order that Respondent be suspended for six months effective on the

discharge their professional duties. ABA Standard 1.1. We believe a six-month suspension will accomplish that goal. We order that Respondent be suspended for six months effective on the Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April 2024.

/s/ Christine K. Herbert Christine K. Herbert, Attorney Panel Member /s/ Larry Lehman Larry Lehman, Public Panel Member

) MICHAEL JAMES BUROKER, ) Bar No. 870284 ) Case Nos. 23-109 and 23-220 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2), RPC 1.8(c), RPC 1.15-1(a), and RPC 5.3(a). Stipulation for discipline. 150-day Effective Date of Order: April 15, 2024

Michael James Buroker (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for 150 days, effective June 1, 2024, for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2), RPC 1.8(c), RPC 1.15-1(a), and RPC 5.3(a). DATED this 15th day of April 2024.

Michael James Buroker, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on April 17, 1987, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Clackamas County, Oregon.

opportunity to seek counsel. This Stipulation for Discipline is made under the restrictions of Bar Rule of Procedure 3.6(h).

On February 1, 2024, an amended formal complaint was filed against Respondent pursuant to the authorization of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB), alleging violations of RPC 1.7(a)(2), RPC 1.8(c), RPC 1.15-1(a), and RPC 5.3(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of the proceeding.

Rudolph and Newcomb Matter - Case No. 23-109 Facts

In 2021, Respondent drafted estate planning documents for an elderly client, Patricia Frances Stone (Stone). This included a transfer-on-death deed involving real property owned by Stone worth more than $300,000. The deed, which Stone executed, named Respondent as the beneficiary who would inherit the property upon Stone's death. Respondent also drafted successive amendments to a Revocable Living Trust Agreement (the trust) on behalf of Stone. Those amendments, which Stone executed, named Respondent as a remainder beneficiary and included specific distributions to Respondent of a motorcycle and $50,000.

Although Respondent had represented Stone and her late husband in several prior legal matters, and although he considered Stone a longtime friend, Respondent was not related to Stone.

In late 2021, state Adult Protective Services (APS) investigated a complaint regarding Stone's ability to care for herself. APS learned that Stone had undergone tests indicating dementia, and Stone told APS she was unaware of recent changes made to the trust. In 2022, a protective proceeding was initiated, and the court appointed a guardian and conservator for Stone.

In May 2022, Respondent presented a draft of additional trust amendments on behalf of Stone to the attorney for the guardian and conservator. The amendments, if executed, would have increased a monetary distribution to Respondent to $100,000. The attorney requested that

Respondent sign a Waiver of Inheritance Rights, but Respondent did not sign and return the form.

Respondent admits that by drafting estate documents on behalf of Stone as described above, Respondent prepared on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer a substantial gift when Respondent was not related to the client, in violation of RPC 1.8(c). Respondent also admits that when he drafted estate documents on behalf of Stone that contained substantial gifts to himself as described above, a significant risk arose that his representation of Stone regarding her estate planning would be materially limited by Respondent's personal interest in inheriting those valuable distributions. Respondent further admits that Stone did not provide her informed consent, confirmed in writing, to Respondent's continued representation of her despite the existence of that conflict of interest, in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2).

OSB-TA - Case No. 23-220 Trust Account Management Facts

At all relevant times herein, Respondent had custody and control over his firm's IOLTA account maintained at Key Bank ("trust account") and had direct supervisory authority over a non-lawyer bookkeeper who had access to the firm's trust account and processed the firm's banking deposits and withdrawals ("the bookkeeper").

On September 21, 2023, the bookkeeper made a $7,814.17 deposit (the deposit) into trust and also issued a $8,566.84 check (the check) disbursing trust funds to the business account of Respondent's firm. The check, which reflected Respondent's signature, was intended to disburse the deposit as well as $752 in other earned funds from the trust account into the firm's business account. The bank honored the check before the full deposit was present and available in the trust account, overdrawing the trust account by $3,004.94. The bank also charged a $20 overdraft fee to the trust account.

On September 22, 2023, Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) received a notice from Key Bank about an overdraft on the trust account. Specifically, the bank notified DCO that a check in the amount of $8,566.84 had been presented for payment against insufficient funds in Respondent's trust account (the "NSF Notice").

When the bookkeeper deposited the check, only $101.17 from the deposit was imme- diately available. Therefore, Respondent briefly drew on approximately $5,460 belonging to 13 of his clients in his trust account to prematurely pay himself before those funds were earned.

After receiving notice of the overdraft, the firm conducted further inquiry into the trust account records and discovered a $5.13 discrepancy between the firm trust account bank statements and the firm's QuickBooks ledgers. This indicated that $5.13 of unearned client funds should have been in the trust account but was not. Also, the trust account monthly account statements consistently showed a different balance than the firm's QuickBooks ledgers.

Respondent admits that his failure to segregate client funds as described above and failure to keep complete records of client funds in the firm's trust account violated RPC 1.15- 1(a). Further, Respondent admits that his failure to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the bookkeeper's conduct was compatible with Respondent's professional obligations violated RPC 5.3(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated his duty to his client to avoid a conflict of
   interest. ABA Standard 4.3. Regarding the trust account overdraft, Respondent violated a duty owed to clients to segregate client funds and maintain accurate and complete lawyer trust account records. ABA Standard 4.1. Respondent also violated his duty to the profession to supervise staff. ABA Standard 7.0.

2. Mental State. The ABA Standards recognize three mental states: "Intent" is
   the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA Standards at 9. "Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. Id. "Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. Id. When determining a lawyer's knowledge of a conflict of interest, the rules state that, "all facts which the lawyer knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, will be attributed to the lawyer." RPC 1.0(h). Here, Respondent knowingly engaged in a conflict of interest. He knew that he was drafting estate planning documents on behalf of Stone, his client, that

named himself as a beneficiary of valuable property and cash. In other words, Respondent knew the essential facts that gave rise to the violation. In re

Schenck, 345 Or 350, 369, 194 P3d 804, mod on recon 345 Or 652 (2008).

Regarding his trust account, Respondent acted negligently regarding the management of his trust account records and his oversight of the bookkeeper's work.

1. Injury. The ABA Standards define "injury" as harm to the client, the public,
   the legal system, or the profession that results from a lawyer's conduct. "Potential injury" is harm to the client, the public, the legal system, or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's conduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA Standards at 7. An injury does not need to be actual to support the imposition of sanctions. In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Respondent caused potential injury to Stone by drafting estate planning docu- ments on her behalf that named himself as a beneficiary without advising Stone to seek independent legal advice. The circumstances also created the risk that Respondent would overreach when drafting Stone's estate documents. Regarding the trust account overdraft, Respondent's failure to supervise his staff and maintain complete and accurate trust account records caused potential injury to his clients by creating a risk that the clients' funds would not be timely paid out to the appropriate persons in the correct amounts.

2. A prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.22(a). In 2015, Respon-
   dent was reprimanded for violating RPC 4.2 [communication with a represented party]. Respondent believed a former client owed him approximately $840 in attorney fees, and Respondent filed suit against the former client in small claims court. The former client hired new counsel, who informed Respondent that she represented the former client on the fee claim. Respondent persisted in contacting the former client directly regarding the fee claim, over continued objections by the former client's counsel. In re Buroker, 29 DB Rptr 321 (2015). To determine the amount of weight in aggravation to attribute to prior offenses, the Oregon Supreme Court considers the following factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and the sanction; (2) whether the prior offense is similar to the current case; (3) the number of prior offenses; (4) the recency of a prior offense; and (5) when the conduct at issue in the current matter occurred relative to the imposition of the sanction in the prior offense. In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997). Respondent's prior discipline was imposed prior to the conduct at issue here and was fairly recent in time. However, the prior misconduct is dissimilar to the current case and involved a public reprimand, a less

serious sanction. Thus, Respondent's prior discipline should receive less weight in aggravation.

1. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d).

2. Vulnerable victim. ABA Standard 9.22(h). Stone was diagnosed with
   dementia around the time of the events at issue here, and a court agreed that Stone was legally incapacitated, requiring the appointment of an indefinite guardian and conservator for her protection. Respondent was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1987.

3. Aggravating Circumstances. Aggravating circumstances include:

4. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
   toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). Respondent has demon- strated a cooperative attitude based on a willingness to resolve his disci- plinary matters.

Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.32. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.13. Reprimand is also generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.3.

Oregon cases confirm that a suspension of 150 days is appropriate here. Lawyers engaged in client conflicts have received suspensions of significant length. For example, an attorney received a 1-year suspension after he committed several violations, including pre- paring a will for an elderly client that included a gift to the attorney's wife and provided that the wife would also be a residual beneficiary. In re Schenck, 345 Or 350, 194 P3d 804, mod

on recon 345 Or 652 (2008). In a separate case, a lawyer who was a long-time friend and legal

counsel to an elderly woman was found to have violated several client conflicts rules regarding that client, among other rules. In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 936 P2d 975 (1997). Although the court noted that the lawyer had acted in good faith, and always in his client's best interest, it nevertheless imposed a suspension of 120 days. Id. Fact matching between cases is a difficult endeavor, but Respondent's conduct reasonably falls between the above-referenced cases.

dent shall be suspended for 150 days for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2), RPC 1.8(c), RPC 1.15-1(a), and RPC 5.3(a), the sanction to be effective on June 1, 2024.

In addition, on or before July 1, 2024, Respondent shall pay to the Bar its reasonable and necessary costs in the amount of $620.15, incurred for deposition and transcript costs.

Should Respondent fail to pay $620.15 in full by July 1, 2024, the Bar may thereafter, without further notice to him, obtain a judgment against Respondent for the unpaid balance, plus interest thereon at the legal rate to accrue from the date the judgment is signed until paid in full.

dent anticipates that only one, but possibly two, active client matters will remain unresolved after his suspension takes effect, and he has arranged for Timothy Heinson, an active member of the Bar with a business address of 19530 SE Sunnyside Road, Damascus, OR 97089, to substitute in as counsel on one of those matters and will arrange for Timothy Heinson to substi- tute in as counsel on the other if it becomes necessary. Respondent represents that Timothy Heinson has agreed to accept this responsibility. Regarding Respondent's former clients, Respondent's paralegal will serve as the contact person for former clients in need of their files during the term of Respondent's suspension.

EXECUTED this 9th day of April 2024. /s/ Michael James Buroker Michael James Buroker, OSB No. 870284 EXECUTED this 9th day of April 2024.

) THEODORA HSIA LENIHAN, ) Bar No. 084006 ) Case No. 23-37 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a). Stipulation for discipline. 30-day suspension. Effective Date of Order: June 1, 2024

Theodora Hsia Lenihan (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for 30 days, effective June 1, 2024, for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a). DATED this 23rd day of April 2024.

Theodora Hsia Lenihan, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on September 25, 2008, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that

On December 9, 2023, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that

Facts

At all relevant times, Respondent was an attorney with the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization in Portland (IRCO), a non-profit organization that serves refugees and immigrants through community education and legal services. In late March 2021, Respondent agreed to represent a client (PO) in applying for PO's parents, Iranian citizens, to enter the US from Turkey. The matter was urgent, as PO needed his parents to help him care for his special-needs son, and his father was medically fragile. By early May 2021, Respondent and PO completed the l-130 petition and accom- panying forms ("I-130 forms"), and PO gave Respondent a $150 check. In late June 2021, Respondent told PO that she had not yet filed the I-130 forms with USCIS but agreed to submit them shortly. In late September 2021, Respondent told PO that she thought, but could not confirm, that she had mailed the I-130 forms to USCIS. She took responsibility for the oversight, promised to re-file the I-130 forms, pay $25 for overnight delivery, and request expedited handling due to his father's medical fragility. She also promised to destroy or return PO's $150 check and to handle the matter at no cost in light of the delay. In early October 2021, Respondent told PO that she had completed and mailed the l- 130 forms to USCIS. When PO did not receive any acknowledgement from USCIS, he began calling Respondent. He could not reach her until February 2022, when she again stated she could not find the l-130 forms she had prepared, or a postal tracking number showing they had been mailed. On February 9, 2022, Respondent informed PO that she would personally mail the I-130 forms the next morning, provided PO a tracking number, and assured him that USCIS would receive the package on Friday, February 11, 2022. However, the United States Postal Service never received the package to be tracked. Respondent acknowledges that she has no record that the I-130 forms were ever sent. PO terminated Respondent's employment and discovered that, on March 22, 2022, the $150 check she had said she would return to him had been negotiated. Respondent maintains that she had intended to, and believed she had, pulled the check from the payments awaiting processing by IRCO's finance department, but acknowledges that she did not do so.

During the period she represented PO, Respondent was one of two attorneys and a co- manager of IRCO's legal services program until the other attorney left and she became the sole lawyer and manager. In August 2021, IRCO's Cultural Center director left, which required Respondent to take on state-level advocacy and funding issues, while also working an over- full caseload. That caseload grew further in the fall of 2021, after IRCO was designated a Reception and Placement Program for Afghan refugees who arrived in this country after the US withdrew from Afghanistan. By January 2022, IRCO had taken on 180 new clients, all of whom received legal services. In addition to handling immigration applications and other legal issues, Respondent worked to build a legal team and train new lawyers. These events all unfolded during the pandemic, when IRCO's offices were closed to the public, further compli- cating her work.

Respondent admits that, by failing to submit the I-130 forms for PO, failing to keep him reasonably informed of the status of the effort to obtain permission for his parents to enter the county, and collecting a legal fee for services she had agreed to perform free-of-charge, she violated RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated her duties to her client by failing to com- municate in a timely and effective manner, and by failing to diligently attend to the matter. ABA Standard 4.4. By collecting an excessive fee, she violated a duty owed as a professional. ABA Standard 7.0.

Although the difficult circumstances she faced at IRCO affected her ability to carefully monitor her handling of PO's I-130 forms, over time Respondent became aware that she had not mailed the forms as promised for several months, but still did not ensure that she mailed them on February 10, 2022, as she represented to PO she would do. Respondent acted negligently when she col- lected the $150 payment after agreeing to handle PO's matter free-of-charge.

1. Injury. PO suffered actual injury in the form of frustration, disappointment,
   and lost time with his parents after waiting from May to October 2021 to start the I-130 application process; he then waited another several months, through February 2022, believing that Respondent had submitted his I-130 forms when she had not. PO also lost the $150 he paid for preparation and filing of the I- 130 forms.

2. A prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.22(a). Respondent was
   suspended in 2011 for 60 days for failing to provide the required annual IOLTA certification, and for failing to respond to DCO's inquiries into that failure. However, due to the remoteness in time and dissimilarity in misconduct, this suspension does not receive much if any weight. In re

Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997) ("[T]he following con-

siderations also are an important part of our analysis: (1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction, specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the offense in the case at bar.")

1. Vulnerability of victim. ABA Standard 9.22(h). PO is a recent immi-
   grant who was trying to get his parents into the US due to his father's fragile health, and to help him with his special-needs child. Respondent was admitted in Oregon in 2008.

2. Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b).

3. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c).

4. Full and free disclosure and cooperative attitude toward proceedings.
   ABA Standard 9.32(e).

5. Good character or reputation. Three attorneys who have worked with
   Respondent describe her dedication, integrity, skill, and professionalism in representing vulnerable immigrants on removal defense and asylum matters. ABA Standard 9.32(g).

6. Remorse. In addition to Respondent's expressing remorse in this pro-
   ceeding, Respondent's three character references confirm that Respon- dent disclosed the allegations to them and accepted responsibility for how PO's immigration matter was handled. ABA Standard 9.32(L).

Under the ABA Standards, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, suspension is generally appropriate when an attorney knowing fails to act with diligence in representing a

client. ABA Standard 4.42. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.3.

Oregon case law supports a presumption that neglect of a client's legal matter results in a suspension. See, In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (court so concluded after reviewing similar cases). Similar sanctions have been imposed in cases involving neglect and failure to communicate. In re Knappenberger, 337 Or 15, 90 P3d 614 (2004) (noting that a 60-day suspension for neglect, including failing to adequately communicate with clients, is generally appropriate, but imposing a 90-day suspension based on the facts of the case); In re

LeBahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (imposing a 60-day suspension where attorney filed

lawsuit on last day before statute of limitations ran, failed to effect timely service, which caused the court to dismiss the case, and then failed to inform his client of the dismissal for more than a year). Oregon case law supports a 30-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.4. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010) (attorney's failure to respond to his personal injury client's status inquiries, failure to inform the client of communications with the adverse party and with the client's own insurer, and failure to explain the strategy attorney decided upon regarding settlement negotiations, were not just poor client relations; attorney was suspended for 30 days because he kept from the client precisely the kind of information that the client needed to know to make informed decisions about the case); In re Franklin, 26 DB Rptr 122 (2012) (30-day suspension when attorney failed to contact designated mediator or follow through on mediation, then failed to secure an abatement agreement tolling the statute of limitations, resulting in dismissal of client's case). Excessive or improper fee violations, standing alone, frequently result in admonition or public reprimand. In re Alway, 35 DB Rptr 170 (2021) (public reprimand for multiple rule violations, including communicating with represented parties, using a misleading law firm name and letterhead, and collecting a fee from a protected party without prior court approval);

In re Hale, 35 DB Rptr 48 (2021) (reciprocal discipline for public reprimand for multiple rule

violations, including failing to supervise nonlawyer employees and collecting a clearly excessive fee); In re Kmetic, 33 DB Rptr 518 (2019) (reprimand failing to refund unearned portion of an advance fee upon termination of representation); In re Sandor, 33 DB Rptr 221 (2019) (stipulated 30-day suspension, all stayed, one-year probation for charging excessive fee in estate planning matter); In re Buchanan, 32 DB Rptr 308 (2018) (reprimand for charging an excessive contingency fee); and In re Swihart, 32 DB Rptr 296 (2018) (reprimand for accepting fees in guardianship matter without court approval).

Respondent shall be suspended for 30 days for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.5(a), the sanction to be effective June 1, 2024.

Respondent acknowledges that she has certain duties and responsibilities under the

foreseeable prejudice to her clients during the term of her suspension. In this regard, Respon- dent has arranged for Justine M. Elliot, OSB No. 195951, an active member of the Bar, to have of the files during the term of her suspension. Respondent represents that Ms. Elliot has agreed to accept this responsibility.

period of suspension. She is required to comply with the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Bar Rules of Procedure. Respondent also acknowledges that she cannot hold herself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until she is notified that her license

March 9, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties

EXECUTED this 15th day of April, 2024. /s/ Theodora Hsia Lenihan Theodora Hsia Lenihan, OSB No. 084006

EXECUTED this 16th day of April, 2024.

) ROGELIO C. CASSOL, Bar No. 082086 ) Case No. 23-107 )

Counsel for the Respondent: John C. Howry

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d). Stipulation for discipline. 30-day suspension. Effective Date of Order: May 21, 2024

Rogelio C. Cassol (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for thirty (30) days, effective May 21, 2024, for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d). DATED this 29th day of April 2024.

Rogelio C. Cassol, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on June 23, 2008, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Lane County, Oregon.

On January 27, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that

Facts

In late May 2018, a client (Mother) retained Respondent to seek a modification of custody, child support, and parenting time over her nine-year-old child. She paid a total of $1,750, which Respondent deposited into his IOLTA account and billed against over the next five months. As of the date of Mother's complaint to the Bar, $732 of her retainer remained in Respondent's IOLTA account.

In July 2018, Respondent prepared the pleadings and declaration, which he filed in Lane County Circuit Court on August 20, 2018. The court signed an order to show cause on August 21, 2018.

Respondent did not communicate with Mother until she emailed him in October 2019 that she had not heard anything for over a year. He quickly responded, acknowledging that her case had been lagging, and informing her that Father had never been served with the order to show cause. He offered to refile the show cause motion and continue to represent her at no additional charge. At his direction, she took the mandatory parenting class in November 2019.

Mother heard nothing further from Respondent until March 2020, when she emailed asking what was happening in her case. In response, he asked for her parenting class comple- tion certificate and made an appointment to update the paperwork. Respondent filed the class certificate on March 20, 2020, but did nothing further until September 2020, when Mother wrote that she was ready to start the case again. Respondent and Mother exchanged emails about the contents of her declaration, but he did not send the final version for her signature until she prompted him on November 10, 2020. Respondent did not file the second motion for a show cause order or take any further action for Mother.

On August 30, 2021, Mother asked Respondent for the status of the case because she had not heard from him since November 2020. She asked whether he could file a new motion

and serve Father. Respondent responded, asking for updated information on parenting time and the now 11-year-old child's schedule. Respondent took no further action after this point.

After his August 30, 2021, communication with Mother, Respondent's representation of Mother constructively terminated in September 2021.

After he obtained the August 2018 order to show cause, Respondent did not provide Mother with copies of pleadings and did not respond to her multiple phone calls. Respondent did not take action on Mother's legal matter or communicate with her for several periods, including August 2018 - October 2019 (11 months); November 2019 - March 2020 (four months); November 2020 - August 2021 (nine months); and September 2021 - January 2023 [date of Mother's Bar complaint].

After DCO inquired about his intention with respect to the $732 he continued to hold in his trust account, Respondent returned it to Mother in December 2023.

Respondent admits that, by failing to take action on Mother's case or to communicate with her over significant periods of time, he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, and failed to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). By failing to refund the balance of Mother's unearned retainer after he ceased working on her matter, Respondent failed to take steps protect his client's interest upon termination of repre- sentation, in violation of RPC 1.16(d).

Sanction

stances.

effectively communicate. ABA Standard 4.4. Respondent also violated his duty to his client to properly handle her property in his possession. ABA Standard 4.1.

Respondent was aware that he was failing to act with diligence on Mother's case. After Mother complained to the Bar, Respondent was unsure whether he should do anything, so he took no action, including refunding her money still in his trust account. Respondent acted knowingly with respect to the neglect and failures to communicate, but negligently with respect to his failure to determine that he should refund Mother's money. the court takes into account both actual and potential injury. ABA Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Mother suffered actual injury as a result of Respondent's lack of diligence on her legal matter. She also lost the use of $732 in funds he held in trust for over a year after he ceased working on her case.

Respondent was admitted to practice in Oregon in 2008.

1. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c). Beginning in
   August 2018 and through May 2022, Respondent faced significant personal problems stemming from a close family member's ongoing substance abuse (which entailed multiple trips to the hospital and residential treatment facilities), resulting in turmoil and stress in his personal life.

2. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
   toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). Respondent admitted his misconduct from the outset of this investigation.

3. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Respondent has repeatedly expressed
   his regret and remorse.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, suspension is generally appropriate when: a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.42.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.13. Because the mitigating factors, including the substance abuse problem within his family, outweigh the sole aggravating factor, a brief suspension is appropriate.

Under Oregon case law, lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed over significant periods of time are generally suspended. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010). In In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007), the Oregon Supreme Court noted that attorneys who knowingly neglect a client's legal matter are generally sanctioned with 60-day suspensions. See also, In re Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (attorney suspended for 60 days for knowing neglect of a client matter and failure to com- municate). In In re Gatti, 356 Or 32, 57, 333 P3d 994 (2014) (citing In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 323-24, 232 P3d 952 (2010)), the court found that a 30-day suspension was justified when the lawyer failed to maintain adequate communication with a client. Consistent with Redden, the SPRB has stipulated to suspensions for similar misconduct over the last several years. See, In re Potter, 37 DB Rptr (2023) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b)); In re Faulconer, 36 DB Rptr 189 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.16(a)(1)); In re Maanao, 36 DB Rptr 31 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.15 1(d)); In re Tschudy, 36 DB Rptr 183 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.5(c)(3), and RPC 1.15-1(c)); In re Sterner, 34 DB Rptr 7 (2020) (stipulated 30-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.1, RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b)); and In re Walsh, 34 DB Rptr 126 (2020) (stipulated 30-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.8(e)).

dent shall be suspended for 30 days for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d), the sanction to be effective May 21, 2024.

dent has arranged for E. Bradley Litchfield, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of his suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Litchfield has agreed to accept this responsibility.

EXECUTED this 25th day of April 2024. /s/ Rogelio C. Cassol Rogelio C. Cassol, OSB No. 082086

/s/ John C. Howry John C. Howry, OSB No. 052884 EXECUTED this 26th day of April 2024.

) JASON P. MUNN, Bar No. 061674 ) Case No. 22-59 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3). Stipulation for Discipline. Effective Date of Order: May 13, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Jason

1. Munn (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for 30 days, effective May 13, 2024 for violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3). DATED this 13th day of May 2024.

Jason P. Munn, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on May 3, 2006, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Deschutes County, Oregon.

On September 19, 2023, a Formal Complaint was filed against Respondent pursuant to the authorization of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB), alleging violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of the proceeding.

Facts

On or about September 11, 2020, the State of Oregon Office of Public Defense Services (OPDS) sent Respondent a letter informing Respondent that the agency was suspending his authority to handle public defense cases. The suspension stemmed from reports the agency received regarding Respondent's work as a public defender in Jefferson and Crook counties.

On or about April 29, 2021, Respondent's license to practice law in Oregon was administratively suspended pursuant to BR 7.1 for failure to respond to inquiries from Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) in Case No. 21-39. DCO's inquiries were related to his work as a public defender. The administrative suspension remained in effect as of the date of the filing of this complaint.

Indeed.com posting

While administratively suspended, Respondent identified himself in a posting on the employment website Indeed.com as an "Attorney/Public Defender" and/or as an "Attor- ney/Public Defender - Law Office of Jason Munn." Under the heading "Work Experience" Respondent listed "Attorney/Public Defender" in the "Law Office of Jason Munn" from October 2017 until April 2022 as his most recent work experience.

Respondent's affirmative representations in the posting described in paragraph 5 above regarding his status as an attorney and work experience between April 2021 and April 2022 were false and material, and Respondent knew those representations were false and material.

Respondent knowingly omitted in the posting described in paragraph 5 above any reference to his administrative suspension and then-present inability to practice law in Oregon. Respondent knew that such an omission would lead a prospective employer viewing his posting to falsely believe that he was an attorney authorized to practice law in Oregon. The information was material, and Respondent knew it was material.

Law Office of Angela Lee-Mandlin

On or about August 23, 2021, Oregon attorney Angela Lee-Mandlin (Lee-Mandlin) posted a job opening on the website Indeed.com seeking a "Family Law Attorney." The posting contained a pre-screening question that stated: "Do you have a valid Oregon State Bar license? (Deal breaker)." After posting the job opportunity, Lee-Mandlin found Respondent's resume on the Indeed.com website, and she communicated with Respondent through the website, encouraging him to contact her for an interview. Lee-Mandlin subsequently interviewed Respondent and offered him the job, which he accepted in or around early September 2021.

When Respondent failed to show up for work in mid-September 2021 as he had agreed to do, Lee-Mandlin contacted the Oregon State Bar and learned for the first time that Respondent's license to practice law was suspended. Lee-Mandlin contacted Respondent and told him she was rescinding the offer of employment. Lee-Mandlin also inquired about the suspension, and Respondent disclosed the then-pending DCO investigation and the adminis- trative suspension.

Prior to mid-September 2021, Respondent knowingly omitted in his communication with Lee-Mandlin any reference to his administrative suspension and then-present inability to practice law in Oregon. Respondent knew that such an omission would lead Lee-Mandlin to falsely believe that he was an attorney authorized to practice law in Oregon. The information was material, and Respondent knew it was material.

Umpqua Valley Public Defenders

On or about February 3, 2022, Respondent applied for an attorney position as a public defender with the Umpqua Valley Public Defenders (UVPD). Respondent sent UVPD his resume through the Indeed.com website. The resume identified himself as "Attorney/Public Defender - Law Office of Jason Munn" and listed his Oregon State Bar number under the heading "Certification and Licenses."

After receiving Respondent's resume, UVPD contacted the Bar to confirm the status of Respondent's license to practice law and learned that his licensed remained administratively suspended.

In the resume Respondent sent UVPD, Respondent knowingly omitted any reference to his administrative suspension and his then-present inability to practice law in Oregon. Respondent also knowingly omitted any reference to his suspension from engaging in public defense work, which had not been rescinded or lifted by OPDS. Respondent knew that omitting such information would lead UVPD to falsely believe that he was an attorney then presently authorized to practice law in Oregon who was not prohibited from engaging in work as a public defender. The information was material, and Respondent knew it was material.

Deschutes County District Attorney's Office

On or about February 25, 2022, Respondent applied for a deputy district attorney position in Deschutes County. The job posting indicated that one of the minimum qualifica- tions was either being a member in good standing with the Oregon State Bar or having the ability to become a member of the Oregon State Bar by the hire date. In Respondent's applica- tion, he represented "I am a member in good standing with the Oregon State Bar." At that time, Respondent remained administratively suspended from the practice of law.

Additionally, in the application, Respondent represented that his most recent work experience was as an attorney with the Law Office of Jason Munn, employment that ended in June 2020. He listed his supervisor as himself and described his duties as representing indigent clients in all types of criminal cases as well as juvenile dependency and delinquency clients. Respondent represented that he had no reason for leaving that position other than to "[t]ry something different."

Respondent's affirmative representation described in paragraph 14 above that he was a member in good standing with the Oregon State Bar was false and material, and Respondent knew it was false and material.

Respondent knowingly omitted from the representations in his application described in paragraph 15 above that his contract with a public defense consortium was terminated in June 2020 and that OPDS subsequently suspended his ability to work in public defense in Oregon. Thus, Respondent's affirmative representation that he had no reason for leaving that position was false and material, and Respondent knew it was false and material.

Respondent admits that, by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law, he violated RPC 8.4(a)(3).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated his duty to maintain his personal integrity. ABA Standard 5.1. "The community expects lawyers to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or interference with the administration of justice." In re

Carpenter, 337 Or 226, 232, 95 P3d 203 (2004), citing ABA Standards at 5.

Respondent was aware of his suspensions from the Bar and OPDS. Despite the knowledge, Respondent continually communicated the false impression that he was qualified for the positions he was applying for. Respondent acted knowingly. the trial panel may take into account both actual and potential injury. Standards at 6; In re Keller, 359 Or 410, 417, 506 P3d 1101 (2022). Respondent's misrepresentations caused Lee-Mandlin harm by forcing her to dedicate time and resources to screening an applicant who lacked the minimum qualifications for the position she was looking to fill. When Respondent failed to appear for work, Lee was forced to have other lawyers cover the work she had anticipated assigning to Respondent. Respondent caused potential harm to UVPD, Deschutes County and other potential employers by maintaining the appearance that he was qualified for positions that he was not authorized to perform. There is also potential serious injury to the legal system, the profession, and to the public when a lawyer engages in misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 601, P3d 13 (2010)(citing In re Paulson, 346 Or 676, 716, 216 P3d 859 (2009), adh'd to as modified on recons, 347 Or 529, 225 P3d 41 (2010)).

1. A dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.22(b). Respondent is
   charged with violating duties of honesty and transparency several times with the goal of obtaining employment for himself.

2. A pattern of misconduct. ABA Standard 9.22(c). Respondent main-
   tained making misrepresentations over a period of time even after having experienced the consequences of his dishonesty.

3. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d).

4. Substantial experience in the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
   Respondent obtained a license to practice law in Oregon in 2006.

5. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c).
   Under the ABA Standards, public reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. ABA Standard 5.13.

In the matter of In re Kumley, the Oregon Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a lawyer on inactive status that identified himself as an attorney in his campaign materials for public office. In re Kumley, 335 Or 639, 653, 75 P3d 639 (2003). There, the court noted that single aggravating factor canceled out the single mitigating factor. In another case, a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for making false statements in connection with a driver's license application. In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 47 P3d 891 (2002). The court determined reprimand was appropriate because the false statement resulted in only "trivial" gain for the lawyer and did not seriously adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law. Id at 232-237. Here, Respondent has aggravating factors outweigh his mitigating factors. Addi- tionally, the misrepresentations made by Respondent had the potential to benefit him greatly, with the risk that he may practice law in Oregon without a license. Based on these considera- tions, elevating the presumptive sanction of public reprimand to a suspension of 30 days is appropriate.

dent shall be suspended for 30 days for violation of RPC 8.4(a)(3), the sanction to be effective May 13, 2024. In addition, on or before August 1, 2024, Respondent shall pay to the Bar its reasonable and necessary costs in the amount of $376.85, incurred for deposition and transcript costs. Should Respondent fail to pay $376.85 in full by August 1, 2024, the Bar may thereafter, without further notice to him, obtain a judgment against Respondent for the unpaid balance, plus interest thereon at the legal rate to accrue from the date the judgment is signed until paid in full.

foreseeable prejudice to his clients during the term of his suspension. In this regard, Respondent warrants that he has no clients at this time.

May 10, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties

EXECUTED this 10th day of May, 2024. /s/ Jason P. Munn Jason P. Munn, OSB No. 061674 EXECUTED this 10th day of May, 2024.

Matthew S Coombs, OSB No. 201951

) RICHARD A. WEILL, Bar No. 821396 ) Case No. 23-95 )

Counsel for the Respondent: Amber Bevacqua-Lynott

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2). Stipulation for Discipline. Effective Date of Order: May 15, 2024

Richard A. Weill (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded, for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2). DATED this 15th day of May 2024.

Richard A. Weill, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on April 22, 1982, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time,

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.7(a)(2) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

George Geppert (Geppert) died in 2015 in Multnomah County. On September 9, 2015, a petition to admit Geppert's will to probate was filed and his widow, Rene Augustine (Augustine), was appointed Personal Representative (PR) of Geppert's Estate. Augustine was represented by attorney Ronald C. Hoover (Hoover) in her role as PR.

On January 10, 2017, the Lincoln Loan Company (Lincoln Loan), the mortgage holder on real property of the Geppert Estate, filed a foreclosure action on one of its three mortgages. Lincoln Loan held three mortgages on the real property owned by the Geppert Estate: two originating in 1986 and one originating in 1999. Initially, Lincoln Loan only foreclosed on the 1999 mortgage. In the 1999 mortgage foreclosure complaint, Lincoln Loan's prayer for relief called for payment of the balance of the 1999 mortgage, costs and attorney fees, and stated that any surplus left after those payments should be distributed to the Geppert Estate. Augustine accepted service of the complaint but did not file an answer. Lincoln Loan obtained a default judgment in May 2017 that provided for a foreclosure sale and payment per the prayer in the complaint; however, Lincoln Loan added a clause to its default judgment that ordered additional payment from the sale proceeds to "other secured creditors" which Lincoln Loan likely believed would allow it to obtain payment of the 1986 mortgages.

On September 5, 2017, Augustine submitted a final accounting in the Geppert Estate and noted that the estate did not have any assets, citing the pending foreclosure. On October 10, 2017, the Geppert Estate's real property was sold at a foreclosure auction for $221,000, which after payment to Lincoln Loan, left a surplus of approximately $150,000.

On March 13, 2018, Augustine passed away. Prior to her death, Augustine made an agreement with a company called PDXF3 to pursue collection of the $150,000 surplus funds from the foreclosure sale. The agreement, according to PDXF3 CEO Joseph Taylor (Taylor), called for PDXF3 to front the legal costs of obtaining the surplus funds, and in exchange, the Geppert Estate would split any recovery (after repayment of legal costs) 50/50 with PDXF3. Taylor later testified that he believed that the agreement with the Geppert Estate was reduced

to writing but acknowledged that he has not been able to locate it, and a copy of the written agreement has never been produced. Shortly after entering into the agreement with the Geppert Estate, PDXF3 hired Respondent to represent it in its effort to collect the $150,000 surplus.

Geppert's will nominated his daughter Melissa Skaggs (Skaggs) to act as successor PR in the event Augustine died. In March 2018, Skaggs contacted Respondent to represent her as PR of the Geppert Estate. Respondent met with Skaggs and agreed to represent her. Respondent also undertook representation of PDXF3 in its efforts to collect the Geppert Estate foreclosure sale surplus. Respondent discussed his representation of PDXF3 and the arrange- ment between PDXF3 and the Geppert Estate with Skaggs. However, Respondent did not obtain written informed consent from either Skaggs or PDXF3 to his representation of Skaggs.

On March 15, 2018, Respondent petitioned to have Skaggs appointed successor PR of the Geppert estate. On March 20, Skaggs was appointed successor PR. On the same day, Respondent caused Skaggs, in her role as successor PR, to execute a bargain and sale deed that transferred the Geppert Estate's entire interest in the real property to PDXF3 for $0. The bargain and sale deed acknowledged that other valuable consideration was given but did not articulate what the consideration was.

Throughout the spring and summer of 2018, Respondent litigated against Lincoln Loan in an attempt to obtain the $150,000 surplus. In August 2018, Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Marilyn Litzenberger denied PDXF3's motion to obtain the surplus funds as the Geppert Estate's successor in interest, awarded Lincoln Loan payment from the foreclosure sale as to the 1999 mortgage foreclosure, and ordered that the surplus funds be held by the court pending the outcome of the foreclosure proceeding Lincoln Loan's foreclosure of its two 1986 fore- closure mortgages. Shortly thereafter, Respondent informed Skaggs of the outcome and moved to close the Geppert Estate.

Respondent admits that there was a significant risk that his duty to represent Skaggs as the successor PR of the Geppert Estate would be materially limited by his duty to represent PDXF3 in its attempt to obtain funds that could otherwise go to the Geppert Estate. Although Respondent's clients agreed to the dual representation, Respondent failed to obtain written informed consent from each client, in violation RPC 1.7(a)(2).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. The ABA Standards classify Respondent's conduct as a failure to avoid a conflict of interest. ABA Standard 4.3.

Respondent acted knowingly. "Knowingly," denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question, except that for purposes of determining a lawyer's knowledge of the existence of a conflict of interest, all facts which the lawyer knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, will be attributed to the lawyer. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. RPC 1.0(h).

There was potential injury to Skaggs in that Respondent caused her to sign over the Geppert Estate's interest in its only major asset for no money and with no enforceable contract with PDXF3. However, the injury is potential because the real property was heavily encumbered and the recovery of surplus funds was not guaranteed.

Respondent has been practicing law for over 30 years.

Although Respondent did not obtain informed consent confirmed in writing, the evidence shows that he made Skaggs aware of the dual representation, and Respondent mistakenly believed that PDXF3's interests were aligned the Geppert Estate's.

1. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board of cooperative attitude Under the ABA Standards, Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.32.

A finding that a lawyer has engaged in a conflict of interest in violation, standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension. In re Campbell, 345 Or 670, 689, 202 P3d 871, (2009); see also In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 603, 238 P3d 13 (2010), In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164, 734 P2d 877 (1987). However, a public reprimand has been imposed in more recent cases involving RPC 1.7(a)(2) violations. See In re Nicholas Slinde 37 DB Rptr 153 (2023), In re

Jennifer Towne, 36 DB Rptr 12 (2022), In re William John Edgar 33 DB Rptr 187 (2019).

Due to the mitigating factors outweighing the aggravating factors, and in keeping with recent resolutions of RPC 1.7(a)(2) violations, the parties agree that Respondent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

EXECUTED this 13th day of May, 2024. /s/ Richard A. Weill Richard A. Weill, OSB No. 821396

/s/ Amber Bevacqua-Lynott Amber Bevacqua-Lynott, OSB No. 990280 EXECUTED this 13th day of May, 2024.

) BENJAMIN D. HARRIS, Bar No. 192344 ) Case No. 23-57 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(c). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of Order: May 17, 2024

Benjamin D. Harris (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(c). DATED this 17th day of May 2024.

Benjamin D. Harris, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on June 12, 2019, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Los Angeles, California.

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(c). The parties intend that this stipula- tion set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

Respondent became friends with Janett Lane (Lane) in 2012 when they both worked at a debt collection law firm in Eugene. Respondent was in his late twenties at the time, and Lane was in her mid-sixties.

In 2018, Lane told Respondent that she lost her housing. At this time, Respondent was living in Los Angeles and practicing law, and Lane was living in Corvallis. Respondent reported that Lane did not want to spend a lot of her retirement money to make a down payment on a house, and so Respondent offered to loan Lane $50,000 to use as a down payment on a manufactured home. In August 2018, Respondent wired $50,000 to Lane.

Respondent and Lane initially planned to have Lane repay the $50,000 loan in monthly installments. However, Respondent and Lane later decided that in lieu of making payments to Respondent during her lifetime, Lane would devise the house to Respondent in her will.

Respondent and Lane never reduced their agreement to writing, opting instead to draft a will that reflected their agreement. After some initial confusion as to who would draft Lane's will, Respondent drafted a will for Lane in January 2019 that devised the house to Respondent per their agreement. The will also included a clause that if Lane should outlive Respondent, the house would pass to Respondent's husband. The will provided that Lane's adult son Shannon would act as personal representative of Lane's estate, and devised the residue of Lane's estate to Lane's two adult children.

In early 2019, Respondent advised Lane to take the will to an Oregon attorney for review. In response, Lane directed Respondent to send the estate documents to Oregon attorney Lindsay Wostmann (Wostmann), which he did. On June 12, 2019, Respondent was admitted to practice law in Oregon. On June 30, 2019, Lane executed the estate documents.

Throughout 2019 and 2020, Lane and Respondent communicated about projects that Lane was doing around the house. Lane kept a bedroom set up for Respondent when he came to visit, and Lane referred to the house as "our house." Respondent came to stay with Lane in March 2020 while he and his husband were getting divorced and stayed with her for approximately six months during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In October 2022, Respondent drafted a pour-over will and trust for Lane, on his own initiative. Respondent believed that the new documents would help to avoid probate, and the new documents mirrored the provisions of the previous will, with the exception that Respondent's ex-husband was omitted. Lane sent the documents to Wostmann for review but Lane did not sign them before she passed away in November 2022. Lane's estate was admitted to probate in December 2022. Respondent did not do any other legal work for Lane.

After Lane's death, Respondent contact the Lane estate's attorney and explained the arrangement that he had with Lane. Lane's adult children alleged that Respondent exercised undue influence over Lane. Respondent and Lane's estate reached a settlement whereby Respondent received his initial investment back, less attorney fees.

Respondent admits that, by drafting estate documents for Lane that included a substan- tial gift to him, he violated RPC 1.8(c). Respondent also admits that this conduct created a significant risk that his own personal interest in the distribution of Lane's estate could materially limit his judgment in drafting estate documents for Lane, in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. The most important ethical duties are those obligations which a lawyer owes to clients. ABA Standards at 5. The ABA Standards classify both of Respondent's violations as a failure to avoid a conflict of interest. ABA Standard 4.3.

Respondent's conduct is negligent. He and Lane did not initially intend to have Respondent draft estate documents for Lane, and he only did so in an attempt to memorialize their loan agreement. Respondent also believed that Lane was relying on Wostmann for legal advice more than Lane actually was.

Respondent caused minor actual injury to Lane by drafting estate planning documents that named himself as a beneficiary without considering the effects of his actions on Lane's estate as a whole and without advising Lane to seek independent legal advice as to his 2022 draft. Furthermore, Respondent's actions created a probate dispute involving Lane's children.

1. Aggravating Circumstances. There are no aggravating circumstances present.
   Respondent believed that he entered into a mutually beneficial loan arrangement with a longtime friend. toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). Respondent promptly and thoroughly responded to all inquiries from the Bar.

2. Inexperience in the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.32(f). At the time
   that he began this transaction with Lane, Respondent had been licensed to practice law in California for three years.

3. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Respondent has repeatedly expressed
   his remorse for how he handled the transaction with Lane and stated a willingness to accept responsibility.

negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer's own interests and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.33.

A finding that a lawyer has engaged in a conflict of interest in violation, standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension. In re Campbell, 345 Or 670, 689, 202 P3d 871, (2009);

see also, In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 603, 238 P3d 13 (2010), In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164,

734 P2d 877 (1987). However, a public reprimand has been imposed in more recent cases involving RPC 1.7(a)(2) violations. See, In re Nicholas Slinde 37 DB Rptr 153 (2023), In re

Jennifer Towne, 36 DB Rptr 12 (2022), In re William John Edgar 33 DB Rptr 187 (2019).

Cases where lawyers have violated RPC 1.8(c) are rare. In In re Schenck, 345 Or 350, 194 P3d 804 (2008), modified on recons, 345 Or 652 (2009), a lawyer was suspended for one year after he prepared (but did not execute) a will for an elderly client that included a gift to the lawyer's wife and provided that the wife also would be a residual beneficiary. In re

Schenck, 345 Or at 352-353. However, Schenck involved multiple rule violations, no miti-

gating factors, and numerous and significant aggravating factors. Id. at 368. More recently, an attorney was suspended for 150 days when he repeatedly amended the estate documents of a longtime client with dementia, resulting substantial gifts being awarded to attorney from the client. In re Buroker, OSB Case Nos. 23-109, 23-220 (2024). This matter is distinguishable from both Schenck and Buroker in that Respondent drafted the estate documents for his friend in a misguided attempt to memorialize a loan, as opposed to selfishly taking advantage of a vulnerable client.

Consistent with the ABA Standards and Oregon case law, and in consideration of the significant mitigating factors present, the parties agree that Respondent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(c), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: California.

EXECUTED this 15th day of May, 2024. /s/ Benjamin D. Harris Benjamin D. Harris, OSB No. 192344 EXECUTED this 15th day of May, 2024.

) TODD R. BEVANS, Bar No. 092840 ) Case No. 23-59 )

Counsel for the Bar: Stacy R. Owen

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension, all stayed, 2-year probation. Effective Date of Order: May 22, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Todd

1. Bevans and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for 30 days, effective on the date of this order for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). DATED this 22nd day of May 2024.

Todd R. Bevans, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on October 8, 2009, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time. Respondent's office and place of business are in Polk County, Oregon.

On March 9, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized 1.4(a), and 1.4(b) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations, and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

In February 2022, Wife retained Respondent to obtain a dissolution of marriage and paid him a retainer and funds for a filing fee. By May 2022, Respondent sent Husband a proposed stipulated general judgment of dissolution of marriage. In August 2022, Wife contacted Respondent to inquire about the status. Respondent informed Wife that he had received papers signed by Husband and that he would contact her again soon. Wife did not hear from Respondent, despite leaving messages for him in September 2022 and December

1. In January 2023, Wife complained to the Bar. After receiving Wife's Bar complaint, Respondent sent her a letter of apology, which included a full refund, copies of all of the documents that he had prepared, instructions for filing the documents with the court, and an offer to file the documents on her behalf. Respondent called Wife in follow-up to his letter to again offer to file the documents, which she declined. Later in the dissolution matter, Respondent did additional work for his then former client, at no additional cost to her.

Respondent admits that, although the dissolution papers were signed and ready to be filed by late September 2022, when Wife complained in January 2023, Respondent had not filed the documents and that his delay constituted a violation of RPC 1.3. Respondent admits that, although Wife made numerous attempts to communicate with him, he did not respond and that conduct violated RPC 1.4(a). Respondent admits that by not informing Wife that circumstances were preventing him from completing her legal matter, she was not provided information to permit her to make informed decisions regarding the representation in violation of RPC 1.4(b).

Sanction

the Disciplinary Board considers the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA

1. Duty Violated. Respondent's lack of diligence and failure to adequately
   communicate with his client violated his duty to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in her matter. ABA Standard 4.4.

2. Mental State. Respondent had a knowing mental state for his lack of diligence
   and for his failures to adequately communicate with his client.

3. Injury. Respondent's client suffered actual injury in the form of the anxiety
   and frustration that she suffered as the result of Respondent's failure to adequately communicate with her. In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 496, 8 P3d 953 (2000) (client anxiety and frustration as the result of attorney neglect can constitute actual injury under the ABA Standards). In addition, Respondent's client did not have use of her documents and funds for several months while in they were in his possession.

4. Vulnerability of victim. ABA Standard 9.22(h). Respondent's client
   was a single mother of two who had paid Respondent nearly half of her monthly income for the dissolution matter.

5. Absence of prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.32(a).

6. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b).

7. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c). Respondent
   was experiencing difficulties in his personal life during the events at issue.

8. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences
   of misconduct. ABA Standard 9.32(d). After apologizing and returning his client's funds, Respondent took additional steps to assist her at his own expense.

9. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
   toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). Respondent admitted to his misconduct and shared evidence of his efforts to mitigate the impact of his conduct upon his client.

10. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Respondent expressed remorse
    directly to his client and in response to the Bar's inquiry.

Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally appropriate "when … a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client…." ABA Standard 4.42.

Lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed over significant periods of time are generally suspended. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010); In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (noting that attorneys who knowingly neglect a client's legal matter are generally sanctioned with 60-day suspensions);

In re Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (attorney suspended for 60 days for knowing

neglect of a client matter and failure to communicate).

BR 6.2 recognizes that probation can be appropriate and permits a suspension to be stayed pending the successful completion of a probation. See also, Standard 2.7 (probation can be imposed alone or with a suspension and is an appropriate sanction for conduct which may be corrected). In addition to a period of suspension, a period of probation designed to ensure the adoption and continuation of better practices will best serve the purpose of protecting clients, the public, and the legal system.

Consistent with the ABA Standards and Oregon case law, and recognizing that the mitigating factors, including Respondent's lack of prior discipline, outweigh the aggravating factors, the parties agree that Respondent shall be suspended for 30 days for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b), with all of the suspension stayed, pending Respondent's successful completion of a 2-year term of probation. The sanction shall be effective on the first day of the month following approval of the Stipulation for Discipline by the Disciplinary Board (effective date).

Probation shall commence upon the effective date and shall continue for a period of two years, ending on the day prior to the two-year anniversary of the effective date (the "period of probation"). During the period of probation, Respondent shall abide by the following conditions:

1. Respondent will communicate with Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) and
   allow DCO access to information, as DCO deems necessary, to monitor com- pliance with his probationary terms.

2. Respondent shall comply with all provisions of this Stipulation for Discipline,
   the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to Oregon lawyers, and ORS Chapter 9.

3. During the period of probation, Respondent shall attend not less than 6 MCLE
   accredited programs, for a total of 24 hours, which shall emphasize law practice management, time management, and case management. These credit hours shall be in addition to those MCLE credit hours required of Respondent for his normal MCLE reporting period. (The Ethics School requirement does not count

towards the 24 hours needed to comply with this condition.) Upon completion of the CLE programs described in this paragraph, and prior to the end of his period of probation, Respondent shall submit a Declaration of Compliance to DCO.

1. Throughout the period of probation, Respondent shall diligently attend to client
   matters and adequately communicate with clients regarding their cases.

2. Each month during the period of probation, Respondent shall review all client
   files to ensure that he is timely attending to the clients' matters and that he is maintaining adequate communication with clients, the court, and opposing counsel.

3. Alexander D. Spalding shall serve as Respondent's probation supervisor
   (Supervisor). Respondent shall cooperate and comply with all reasonable requests made by his Supervisor that Supervisor, in his sole discretion, deter- mines are designed to achieve the purpose of the probation and the protection of Respondent's clients, the profession, the legal system, and the public. Respondent agrees that, if Supervisor ceases to be his Supervisor for any reason, Respondent will immediately notify DCO and engage a new Supervisor, approved by DCO, within one month.

4. Respondent and Supervisor agree and understand that Supervisor is providing
   their services voluntarily and cannot accept payment for providing supervision pursuant to this Stipulation for Discipline.

5. Beginning with the first month of the period of probation, Respondent shall
   meet with Supervisor in person (or via video conference) at least once a month for the purpose of:

6. Allowing his Supervisor to review the status of Respondent's law
   practice and his performance of legal services on behalf of clients. Each month during the period of probation, Supervisor shall conduct a random audit of ten (10) client files or ten percent (10%) of Respon- dent's active caseload, whichever is greater, to determine whether Respondent is timely, competently, diligently, and ethically attending to matters, and taking reasonably practicable steps to protect his clients' interests upon the termination of employment.

7. Respondent authorizes his Supervisor to communicate with DCO regarding his
   compliance or non-compliance with the terms of this agreement, and to release to DCO any information necessary to permit DCO to assess Respondent's compliance.

8. Within seven (7) days of the effective date, Respondent shall contact the
   Professional Liability Fund (PLF) and schedule an appointment on the soonest date available to consult with PLF's Practice Management Attorneys to obtain practice management advice. Respondent shall notify DCO of the time and date of the appointment.

9. Respondent shall attend the appointment with the PLF's Practice Management
   Attorneys and seek advice and assistance regarding procedures for diligently

pursuing client matters, communicating with clients, effectively managing a client caseload and taking reasonable steps to protect clients upon the termina- tion of his employment. No later than thirty (30) days after recommendations are made by the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys, Respondent shall adopt and implement those recommendations.

1. No later than sixty (60) days after recommendations are made by the PLF's
   Practice Management Attorneys, Respondent shall provide a copy of the Office Practice Assessment from the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys and file a report with DCO stating the date of his consultation(s) with the PLF's Practice Management Attorneys; identifying the recommendations that he has adopted and implemented; and identifying the specific recommendations he has not implemented and explaining why he has not adopted and implemented those recommendations.

2. Respondent shall implement all recommended changes, to the extent reasonably
   possible, and participate in at least one follow-up review with PLF Practice Management Attorneys within six (6) months after the first meeting.

3. On a quarterly basis, on dates to be established by DCO beginning no later than
   ninety (90) days after the effective date, Respondent shall submit to DCO a written "Compliance Report," approved as to substance by his Supervisor, advising whether Respondent is in compliance with the terms of this Stipulation for Discipline, including:

4. The dates and purpose of Respondent's meetings with his Supervisor.

5. The number of Respondent's active cases and percentage reviewed in
   the monthly audit with Supervisor and the results thereof.

6. Whether Respondent has completed the other provisions recommended
   by his Supervisor.

7. In the event that Respondent has not complied with any term of this
   Stipulation for Discipline, the Compliance Report shall describe the non-compliance and the reason for it.

8. Respondent is responsible for any costs required under the terms of this stipula-
   tion and the terms of probation.

9. Respondent's failure to comply with any term of this agreement, including
   conditions of timely and truthfully reporting to DCO, or with any reasonable request of his Supervisor, shall constitute a basis for the revocation of probation and imposition of the stayed portion of the suspension.

10. A Compliance Report is timely if it is emailed, mailed, faxed, or delivered to
    DCO on or before its due date.

11. The SPRB's decision to bring a formal complaint against Respondent for
    unethical conduct that occurred or continued during the period of his probation shall also constitute a basis for revocation of the probation and imposition of the stayed portion of the suspension.

12. Upon the filing of a petition to revoke Respondent's probation pursuant to
    BR 6.2(d), Respondent's remaining probationary term shall be automatically tolled and shall remain tolled, until the BR 6.2(d) petition is adjudicated by the Adjudicator or, if appointed, the Disciplinary Board.

foreseeable prejudice to his clients during any term of his suspension, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed. In this regard, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed Respondent has arranged for Alexander D. Spalding, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of his actual suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Spalding has agreed to accept this responsibility.

Respondent acknowledges that reinstatement is not automatic on expiration of any period of suspension, if any stayed period of suspension is actually imposed. If a period of suspension is necessitated by his non-compliance with the terms of his probation, he will be required to comply with the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Bar Rules of Procedure. Respondent also acknowledges that, should a suspension occur, he cannot hold himself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until he is notified that his license to practice has been reinstated.

his suspension or the denial of his reinstatement, if a suspension is imposed. This requirement is in addition to any other provision of this agreement that requires Respondent to attend continuing legal education (CLE) courses.

EXECUTED this 20th day of May 2024. /s/ Todd R. Bevans Todd R. Bevans, OSB No. 092840 EXECUTED this 21st day of May 2024. By:/s/ Stacy R. Owen Stacy R. Owen, OSB No. 074826

) ROBERT ROOSEVELT PARKER, ) Case No. 23-310 Bar No. 216437 ) )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.9(a). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of order: July 16, 2024

Robert Roosevelt Parker (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.9(a). DATED this 16th day of July 2024.

Robert Roosevelt Parker, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on December 23, 2021, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time,

On June 8, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.9(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposi- tion of this proceeding.

Facts

An 84-year-old man (TM) hired Respondent in May 2023 to represent him after his wife (Wife) filed a petition to be appointed guardian and conservator over him (the protective proceeding). TM opposed the petition.

On May 11, 2023, Respondent filed TM's response objecting to Wife's petition for guardianship and conservatorship. In that response, TM denied that: he was incapacitated and financially incapable; a guardianship was necessary to promote and protect his well-being; a conservatorship was necessary to manage and protect his property and money; there existed an immediate and serious danger to his life or health and his welfare required immediate action; he appeared to suffer from advanced dementia, he was unable to ambulate, and he required continuous care and assistance with all aspects of daily living.

In July 2023, Respondent began representing TM's adult daughter (Daughter) and filed in the protective proceeding a cross-petition on Daughter's behalf to be appointed guardian and conservator over TM. In her cross-petition, Daughter alleged that TM was incapacitated; appointment of a conservator was necessary because TM was incapable and had money or property that required management and protection; TM was unable to manage and protect his assets and resources; TM appeared to have advanced dementia and ambulated with difficulty; and TM needed continued care and assistance with most of his daily living activities.

Respondent's representation of both TM and Daughter in the protective proceeding obligated him to contend for something on behalf of one client that he had a duty to oppose on behalf of the other. Specifically, in the protective proceeding, Respondent contended as TM's counsel that TM did not suffer from dementia or demonstrate any diminished mental capacity, while as Daughter's counsel, Respondent asserted that TM was incapacitated and apparently suffering from dementia.

Respondent did not obtain informed consent confirmed in writing from TM or Daughter to his simultaneous representation of both in the protective proceeding.

Respondent withdrew from representing Daughter in the protective proceeding on August 27, 2023, and she then became his former client. Respondent continued to represent TM in the protective proceeding and a marital dissolution against Wife. In connection with the protective proceeding, Daughter's interests were materially adverse to TM's, because Daughter continued to seek to be appointed guardian and conservator over TM, an objective TM opposed.

In December 2023, Respondent drafted, and TM and Daughter signed, an acknowledgement and waiver of conflict of interest. The acknowledgment and wavier document did not include the advice to seek independent counsel on whether they should consent to Respondent's continued representation of TM.

"Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. When informed consent is required to be confirmed in writing, the lawyer shall give, and the writing shall reflect, a recommendation that the client seek independent legal advice to determine whether consent should be given. RPC 1.0(g)

Respondent admits that, by representing two clients in the protective proceeding when the representation required him to advocate for directly contradictory positions, there was a significant risk that the representation of one client would be materially limited by his responsibility to the other client, and that he thereby represented clients when the representa- tion involved a current conflict of interest, in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2). Respondent further admits that, by continuing to represent TM in the protective proceeding after Daughter had become his former client, he represented a client in the same matter in which that client's interests were materially adverse to his former client's interests, without obtaining informed consent confirmed in writing by both clients, and thereby violated RPC 1.9(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. The most important ethical duties are those obligations which a lawyer owes to clients. ABA Standards at 5. Respondent's violations are considered failures to avoid a conflict of interest, a duty owed to his clients. ABA Standard 4.3.

Respondent appears to have acted with negligence: he failed to heed a substantial risk that by asserting conflicting positions on behalf of different clients in the same proceeding, he had a conflict of interest, which failure deviated from the actions of a reasonable lawyer in that situation. the Disciplinary Board may take into account both actual and potential injury. ABA Standards at 6; In re Keller, 359 Or 410, 417, 506 P3d 1101 (2022). To have TM's own counsel assert against him on behalf of another client that TM needed a fiduciary because he had advanced dementia and could not handle his own affairs resulted in actual injury to TM in the protective proceeding.

1. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d). Respondent engaged in both
   a current client conflict and a former client conflict.

2. Vulnerability of victim. ABA Standard 9.22(h). TM, who was diag-
   nosed with dementia, was vulnerable.

3. Absence of a prior record. ABA Standard 9.32(a).

4. Inexperience in the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.32(f). Respondent
   was admitted to practice in December 2021, less than two years before the conduct in this matter occurred.

Under the ABA Standards, reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negli- gent in determining whether the representation of a client will adversely affect another client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.33.

The Supreme Court has commented that a conflict of interest violation, standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension. In re Campbell, 345 Or 670, 689, 202 P3d 871 (2009);

see also, In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 603, 238 P3d 13 (2010), In re Knappenberger, 338 Or

341, 361, 108 P3d 1161 (2005), and In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164, 734 P2d 877 (1987). But

see, In re Kinsey, 294 Or 544, 660 P2d 660 (1983) (public reprimand for current client conflict

of interest in representing both the corporation and majority shareholders in a shareholder dispute). More recently, the Disciplinary Board has imposed public reprimands in cases involving RPC 1.7(a)(2) violations. See, In re Slinde 37 DB Rptr 153 (2023); In re Towne, 36 DB Rptr 12 (2022); and In re Edgar, 33 DB Rptr 187 (2019).

Although Respondent committed two conflicts violations, which could justify a 30-day suspension, the conflicts flowed from the same representation and involved members of one family aligned together against a third party, and occurred when Respondent was inex- perienced in the practice of law. Consistent with the ABA Standards and Oregon case law, the parties therefore agree that Respondent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.9(a), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

June 8, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties

EXECUTED this 15th day of July 2024. /s/ Robert Roosevelt Parker Robert Roosevelt Parker, OSB No. 216437 EXECUTED this 15th day of July 2024.

) RYAN KRIZ GARDNER, Bar No. 140885 ) Case No. 23-157 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). Stipulation for discipline. 30-day suspension. Effective Date of Order: October 1, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Ryan Kriz Gardner and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Ryan Kriz Gardner is suspended for 30 days, effective October 1, 2024, for violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). DATED this 24th day of July 2024. s/ Mark A. Turner

Ryan Kriz Gardner, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on May 2, 2014, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Multnomah County, Oregon.

formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set

Facts

Starting in 2021, Respondent represented mother in a contested custody and parenting time matter with her child's father. At a hearing on July 12, 2022, the court assisted the parties in reaching a settlement on substantive issues, left the parties to try to resolve a few outstanding issues through their counsel, and tasked father's attorney with drafting a supplemental judgment, to be filed within 30 days of the hearing.

In the following weeks, though Respondent and father's counsel attempted to schedule a conference call to discuss the supplemental judgment, the lawyers never communicated on the substance of the judgment. On August 29, 2022, Respondent received by email a copy of the supplemental judgment drafted by father's counsel. Respondent thereafter took no action regarding the supplemental judgment. He did not inform his client about receiving the draft or provide her a copy for review, nor did he communicate with father's counsel regarding its substance.

For nearly 15 weeks, between July 20, 2022, and November 1, 2022, Respondent did not communicate with his client about the supplemental judgment. During that period, his client attempted unsuccessfully to communicate with him at least seven times. In August 2022, she emailed him five times, expressing her increasing distress over the supplemental judg- ment's status and the 30-day deadline. The following month, she received no response from Respondent after contacting his office. In late October, she emailed Respondent, requesting an accounting and stating her intention to "move on" from his firm, to which Respondent provided a response more than a week later.

Respondent admits that, based on his conduct as described in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of RPC 1.3 and he failed to keep his

client informed about the status of a matter and failed to promptly respond to reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4(a).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. The most important ethical duties are those a lawyer owes to
   clients. ABA Standards at 5. Respondent violated his duty to act with reason-

2. Mental State. "Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
   Respondent acted knowingly in failing to take action to finalize the settlement reached by the parties regarding custody and parenting time. Respondent also knowingly failed to respond to his client's communication attempts and requests for information.

3. Injury. For the purposes of determining an appropriate disciplinary sanction,
   Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Respon- dent caused actual injury to his client in the form of anxiety and frustration. See

In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 496, 8 P3d 953 (2000); In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421,

426-27, 939 P2d 39 (1997). Respondent caused potential injury to his client, as his failure to timely attend to opposing counsel's draft supplemental judgment could have resulted in the judgment being filed unopposed containing terms unfavorable or less favorable to his client.

1. Aggravating Circumstances. Aggravating circumstances include:
   Respondent was admitted to practice in Oregon in 2014.

2. Mitigating Circumstances. Mitigating circumstances include:

3. Cooperative attitude toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e).

4. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l).
   Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services to a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.42.

Oregon case law suggests that some amount of suspension is warranted. See, In re

Redden, 342 Or 393, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (lawyer suspended for 60 days for neglect of a legal

matter); In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010) (lawyer suspended for 30 days for failing to communicate with his client). Given the shorter period of time in which Respondent's neglect occurred in this matter, and given that the factors in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, a 30-day suspension as a sanction is sufficient in this case.

dent shall be suspended for 30 days for violation of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a), the sanction to be effective October 1, 2024.

dent has arranged for Jonathan S. Liou, an active member of the Bar with an address at Chock Barhoum LLP, 121 SW Morrison Street, Suite 500, Portland, Oregon 97204, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of Respondent's suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Liou has agreed to accept this responsibility.

EXECUTED this 22nd day of July 2024. s/ Ryan Kriz Gardner Ryan Kriz Gardner, OSB No. 140885

s/ David J. Elkanich

EXECUTED this 23rd day of July 2024. By: s/ Eric J. Collins

Cite as In re Munn II, 38 DB Rptr 109 (2024)

Cite full opinion as 372 Or 589, 553 P3d 1039 (2024)

) JASON P. MUNN, Bar No. 061674 ) ) (OSB 2139; OSB 2168; OSB 2238; SC S070455) On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board. Jason P. Munn, Redmond, argued the cause and filed the brief for Respondent, pro se. Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State Bar, Tigard, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. PER CURIAM In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon State Bar alleged that Respondent committed four violations of Oregon RPC 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation); two violations of Oregon RPC 1.3 (neglect of a legal matter); three violations of Oregon RPC 1.4(b) (failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make an informed decision); and one violation of Oregon RPC 8.1(a)(2) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority). A majority of the trial panel determined that Respondent had committed all 10 viola- tions and imposed a 24-month suspension. One panel member dissented, disagreeing with one aspect of the majority's analysis under the rules and would have imposed a 12-month suspen- sion. Respondent requested review of both the violations and the sanction. On de novo review, the court concluded that Respondent had violated all four rules and committed all 10 violations. The Court suspended Respondent for 24 months.

) NICHOLAS J. NAUMES, Bar No. 134380 ) Case No. 24-74 )

Kelly Anderson Eugene Bentley, Public Member Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). Trial panel opinion. 60-day suspension. Effective Date of Opinion: September 4, 2024

The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged Nicholas J. Naumes (Respondent) with violating Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) due to his failure to adequately com- municate with a client. The Bar requests that we suspend Respondent for at least 60 days. Respondent is in default. He failed to answer the formal complaint filed against him. When a respondent is in default the Bar's factual allegations in the complaint are deemed true. BR 5.8(a); In re Magar, 337 Or 548, 551-53, 100 P3d 727 (2004). Our role as the trial panel is to first determine whether the facts alleged support the charged rule violations. If we conclude they do, we then determine what sanction is appropriate. See In re Koch, 345 Or 444, 446, 198 P3d 910 (2008); see also In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 253, 27 P3d 102 (2001). we suspend Respondent for 60 days.

On March 28, 2024, the Bar filed a formal complaint against Respondent. Respondent was personally served on April 3, 2024. Respondent failed to answer the complaint within the time allowed. The Bar moved for an order of default on May 3, 2024. The Adjudicator signed the order on May 9, 2024. The Bar submitted a memorandum addressing the appropriate sanction on July 12, 2024.

FACTS

The facts in this case as set forth in the formal complaint are simple. Andrew Hogue (Client) hired Respondent to represent him in a dissolution proceeding filed by Hogue's wife

(Wife). The case was subject to court-sponsored arbitration and was heard by an arbitrator on January 7, 2021. The arbitrator issued a proposed award a week later on January 14. The award stated that Client would receive Wife's wedding band. Respondent sent a copy of the award to his client that day. On January 18, 2021, the arbitrator emailed a revised arbitration award which allowed Wife to keep the wedding band. The arbitrator filed the revised award with the court on January 20, 2021. The arbitrator also notified the parties that they had 20 days to request a trial de novo. Respondent did not tell Client about the revised award or the right to request a trial de novo. Respondent did not request a trial de novo before the deadline. Respondent finally told Client about the revised award allowing Wife to keep the wedding band by email on February 17, 2021. Client responded and asked Respondent to take action regarding the revised award. Client did not hear back from Respondent, and tried to reach him again on February 21, 22, 24 and March 4, 2021. Client's requests for information were reasonable. Respondent failed to respond.

1. RPC 1.4(a)--Duty to Keep Clients Reasonably Informed violation of RPC 1.4(a) occurred we consider the length of time the lawyer failed to

485 P3d 258 (2021). In some circumstances a lawyer may be required to communicate information immediately to keep a client reasonably informed and may also have the obligation to initiate the communication. In re Graeff, 368 Or at 26. In Graeff, the court found a violation where the lawyer's failure to communicate was only for a short time because it occurred during a critical phase of the case. In re Graeff, 368 Or at 25-26. In Graeff a summary judgment motion had been filed against the clients' case and the time for responding was a matter of weeks. We find that Respondent here failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of his case. The revised award and the deadline to ask for a trial de novo was clearly important to Client. Respondent should have advised Client immediately when he received the revised award. Failing to do so violated the rule. The violation was compounded by Respondent when he ignored Client's multiple requests for information. A reasonable lawyer would foresee the damage Respondent's inaction caused Client. We find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(a)

1. RPC 1.4(b)--Duty to Sufficiently Explain a Matter to a Client RPC 1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." The multiple failures to communicate outlined above all deprived Client of information necessary

to make informed decisions about how to proceed in the case. Respondent kept Client in the dark on critical matters, making informed decisions about the representation impossible. We also find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b).

SANCTION

also may find guidance in case law that leads us to adjust the preliminary sanction.

The most important ethical duties lawyers owe are to their clients. ABA Standards at 4. Respondent violated the duty of diligence he owed to his client to timely and effectively communicate. ABA Standards 4.4.

that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and which deviates from the standard of A reasonable lawyer would have recognized the importance of updating a client when critical events were occurring, and decisions had to be made within the 20-day period before the right to a trial de novo was lost. Respondent acted at least negligently in failing to provide the revised award to his client before the deadline lapsed. He then acted knowingly when he failed to respond to his client's requests for information.

We may take into account both actual and potential injury in determining an appropriate sanction. ABA Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). "Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA

Standards at 9.

Respondent's misconduct resulted in actual injury. Respondent denied his client the opportunity to challenge the revised arbitration award and the opportunity to have the matter heard by a jury.

ABA Standard 4.42 applies here. It specifies that suspension is generally appropriate

when: "(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client." The presumptive sanction here is suspension.

The Bar urges us to find that ABA Standard 9.22(d) (multiple offenses) and ABA

Standard 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of law) apply here. We agree.

We find no mitigating circumstances in the record before us.

Sanctions in disciplinary matters are not intended to penalize the respondent lawyer-- they are intended to protect the public and the integrity of the profession. In re Stauffer, 327

Oregon cases justify imposition of a suspension. Lawyers who knowingly fail to keep clients informed are generally suspended. See In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010). In Snyder, a lawyer was found to have violated RPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) because of inadequate communication which resulted in actual injury. The court ultimately suspended the lawyer for 30 days. In In re Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003), an attorney was suspended for 60 days for a knowing failure to communicate and neglect of a matter. Respondent is charged with inadequate communication causing actual injury. He is not charged with knowing neglect as the lawyer was in Lebahn. The Bar argues that the 30-day suspension found in Snyder is most instructive for us. In Snyder, the court found favorable mitigating factors. Here we have found two aggravating factors but none in mitigation. On these facts we find that the Bar's request for a 60-day suspension is reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, we order that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 60 days effective on the date this decision becomes final.

discharge their professional duties. ABA Standard 1.1. We believe a 60-day suspension will accomplish that goal. Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of August 2024.

/s/ Kelly Andersen Kelly Andersen, Attorney Panel Member /s/ Eugene Bentley Eugene Bentley, Public Panel Member

) JOHN COCHRAN, Bar No. 020022 ) Case No. 22-158 )

Counsel for the Bar: Alison F. Wilkinson Counsel for the Respondent: Arden J. Olson

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.16(c), RPC 1.16(d), RPC 3.4(b), RPC 8.1(a)(1), and RPC 8.4(a)(3). Stipulation for discipline. 9-month suspension. Effective Date of Order: November 1, 2024

The court accepts the Stipulation for Discipline. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Oregon for a period of nine months, effective November 1, 2024. Meagan A. Flynn Chief Justice, Supreme Court August 8, 2024

John Cochran, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on January 4, 2002, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time,

On January 28, 2023, a formal complaint was filed against Respondent pursuant to the authorization of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB), alleging violation of RPC 3.4(b), RPC 8.1(a)(1), RPC 8.4(a)(3), RPC 1.16(c), and RPC 1.16(d). The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of the proceeding.

Facts

On December 14, 2021, Deborah Irsik (Irsik) hired Respondent to defend a lawsuit filed against her. Mandatory arbitration occurred on April 19, 2022. On April 29, 2022, the arbitrator alerted the parties that he found in favor of plaintiffs. The next day, Respondent informed Irsik that she lost the arbitration, but did not inform her of her right to appeal. The arbitration award was entered on May 25, 2022, but Respondent did not communicate this to Irsik or inform her that her right to appeal began with the entry of the order. On Irsik's request, on June 8, 2022, Respondent notified opposing counsel that he was withdrawing from Irsik's matter. He did not notify the court as required by ORS 9.380 and UTCR 3.140(1). At no point did Respondent notify Irsik of her right to appeal.

Irsik filed a complaint regarding Respondent's conduct, and Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) began investigating it in December 2022. On April 3, 2023, DCO requested that Respondent provide, in part: (1) documentation of whether he advised Irsik that she had the opportunity to appeal the adverse arbitration award and, if so, if he advised her of the deadline; and (2) documentation of the termination of his relationship with Irsik.

In response to DCO's request, in April 2023, Respondent fabricated a letter, purportedly dated May 5, 2022, which he stated he sent by regular U.S. mail to Irsik, and which notified Irsik of her right to appeal and of his withdrawal. He sent this fabricated letter to DCO on April 17, 2023, in an attempt to avoid discipline.

Respondent admits that, by failing to inform Irsik of her appeal right, he violated RPC 1.16(d); by failing to properly withdraw, he violate RPC 1.16(c); by falsifying evidence, he violated RPC 3.4(b), by knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter, he violated RPC 8.1(a)(1), and by engaging in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law, he violated RPC 8.4(a)(3).

Sanction

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated his duty to the public to maintain personal
   integrity when he knowingly drafted the purported May 5, 2022, letter. ABA Standard 5.1. The duty to the public exists because "[t]he community expects lawyers to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or inter- ference with the administration of justice." In re Carpenter, 337 Or 226, 232, 95 P3d 203 (2004) (citing ABA Standards at 5). Respondent violated the duties he owed as a professional to properly withdraw from the representation, protect his client's interests, and to cooperate with his regulators. ABA Standard 7.0.

2. Mental State. The most culpable mental state is that of "intent," when the
   lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA Standards at 9. "Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. Id. "Negligence" is the failure to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and which deviates from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. Id. In drafting the falsified May 5, 2022, letter, Respondent acted with an inten- tional mental state, or at least knowingly. He was aware that he was falsifying evidence to supply to the Bar. He did so with the goal of convincing the Bar to dismiss the disciplinary action pending against him. Respondent acted intentionally, or at least knowingly, in providing false evidence to the Bar. He was aware that he manufactured the letter to the Bar when he sent it. He did so with the goal of misleading the Bar regarding his underlying conduct in an attempt to convince the Bar to dismiss the disciplinary action against him. Respondent acted negligently in failing to withdraw with the tribunal and in failing to take steps to protect Irsik's interests.

Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Injury is

defined as harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession that results from a lawyer's misconduct. Potential injury is the harm that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA Standards at 9. Respondent caused actual injury to the Bar and impeded its disciplinary function in the form of time, money, and resources by manufacturing the May 5, 2022, letter. This conduct further caused actual injury to the public and the profession because it undermined the public's confidence in the Bar. See In re

Miles, 324 Or 218, 222-23, 923 P2d 1219 (1996) (discussing former DR 1-

103(c)). See also In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 601, 238 P3d 13 (2010) (citing In

re Paulson, 346 Or 676, 716, 216 P3d 859 (2009)) (noting the potential for

serious injury to the legal system, the profession, and to the public when a lawyer engages in misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). Respondent caused actual injury to Irsik when he failed to properly withdraw from her matter. To remove Respondent from her matter, she needed to file a motion with the court, which took time and resources. Respondent caused potential injury to Irsik when he failed to inform her of her right to appeal, instead telling her that the case was "over." Irsik learned of the appeal deadline on her own.

1. A dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.22(b). Respondent falsi-
   fied the May 5, 2022, letter to avoid discipline.

2. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d). Respondent engaged in
   several distinct acts constituting separate violations of the disciplinary rules rather than one bad act charged under multiple rules. In re

Strickland, 339 Or 595, 606, 124 P3d 1225 (2005).

1. Deceptive practices during the disciplinary process. ABA Standard
   9.22(f). Respondent falsified evidence and knowingly presented it to the Bar as legitimate evidence during the disciplinary process.

2. Substantial experience in the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
   Respondent was admitted to practice in January 2002. At the time he represented Irsik, he had 20 years of experience as an attorney.

3. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c). Respondent's
   mother was ill with ALS during Respondent's representation of Irsik and he provided significant care to her from approximately April 2022 through November 2022.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the following ABA Standards appear to apply: Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. ABA Standard 5.11(b). Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. ABA Standard 5.12. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. ABA Standard 5.13. The ABA Standards are not a perfect fit here because Respondent's dishonest conduct was intentional and seriously adversely reflects on his ability to practice law. However, the Bar is not seeking Respondent's disbarment. ABA Standard 5.12 regarding suspension is also not a perfect fit, as Respondent did not engage in criminal conduct. Finally, Respondent's intentional conduct reflects seriously adversely on his fitness to practice of law, and warrants more than a reprimand. ABA Standard 5.13. See generally In re Carpenter, 337 Or 226, 239-40, 239 95 P3d 203 (2004). Case law supporting a lengthy period of suspension is discussed further below. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.1. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.2. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to the client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standard 7.3.

Oregon case law confirms that a significant period of suspension is warranted for Respondent's misconduct. Sanctions in disciplinary matters are not intended to penalize the accused lawyer, but instead are intended to protect the public and the integrity of the profession. In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998). Appropriate discipline deters unethical conduct. In re Kirkman, 313 Or 181, 188, 830 P2d 206 (1992). The integrity of the disciplinary process is crucial to the sound functioning of the legal profession; issuing an appropriate sanction will deter other attorneys from engaging in such behavior in the future.

See generally Wylie, 327 Or at 183.

For Respondent's negligent failure to properly withdraw from Irsik's matter and his negligent failure to take reasonable steps to protect her interests, a reprimand would generally be appropriate. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 33 DB Rptr 164 (2019) (stipulated reprimand for negligent violation of RPC 1.16(d)); In re Baker, 29 DB Rptr 204 (2015) (stipulated reprimand for negligent violation of RPC 1.16(c) and violation of 8.4(a)(4)). Lawyers found to have falsified evidence and/or misled their regulators often face a two-year suspension. See, e.g., In re Kirchoff, 361 Or at 721 (two-year suspension for

submitting false information to a tribunal and continuing to misrepresent the veracity of the document in discipline, in violation of RPC 3.3(a)(1), RPC 3.4(b), RPC 8.4(a)(3), and RPC 8.1(a)(1)); In re Wyllie, 327 Or at 183 (two-year suspension for violating former DR 1- 102(A)(3) [conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation] and former DR 1-103(C) [requiring lawyers who are the subject of disciplinary investigation to respond fully and truthfully to investigators] by falsely averring he completed his CLE requirements and continuing to misrepresent his successful completion to the Bar); In re Brown, 298 Or at 297 (two-year suspension for violations of former DR 5-103(B) [avoiding acquisition of interest in litigation]; former DR 7-102(A)(4)) [engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation]; and former DR 7-102(A)(6) [participating in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows it to be illegal or fraudulent] by creating a false affidavit to present to the Bar). See also generally In re Sanchez, 29 DB Rptr 21 (2015) (one-year suspension for violations of RPC 8.4(a)(3) and RPC 8.1(a)(1) when lawyer falsely averred he completed his CLE requirements and continued to misrepresent his successful completion to the Bar); see also, generally, In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 923 P2d 1219 (1996) (60 day suspension for each matter in which the accused failed to cooperate in disciplinary proceedings by failing to respond, for a total of 120 days). Respondent acted with knowledge and intent in creating the falsified letter and sub- mitting it as evidence to the Bar, and he caused actual injury to the public and the profession. Based on those factors, and the above case law, a nine-month suspension is justified.

Respondent shall be suspended for nine months for violation of RPC 3.4(b), RPC 8.1(a)(1), RPC 8.4(a)(3), RPC 1.16(c), and RPC 1.16(d), the sanction to be effective the later date of the date the stipulation is approved by the Supreme Court, or November 1, 2024.

Ten days after the effective date of the stipulation, Respondent shall pay to the Bar its reasonable and necessary costs in the amount of $1,071.60, incurred for deposition and transcript. Should Respondent fail to pay $1,071.60 in full by this date, the Bar may thereafter, without further notice to him, obtain a judgment against Respondent for the unpaid balance, plus interest thereon at the legal rate to accrue from the date the judgment is signed until paid in full.

foreseeable prejudice to his clients during the term of his suspension. In this regard, Respondent has arranged for Greg Oliveros, Oliveros Law Group PC, 9200 SE Sunnybrook Blvd. Ste 335, Clackamas, Oregon, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of his suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Oliveros has agreed to accept this responsibility.

suspension, he must apply for formal reinstatement pursuant to BR 8.1. Respondent further

to whether Respondent should be reinstated. Respondent also acknowledges that he cannot hold himself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until he is notified that his license to practice has been reinstated.

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: Washington.

Approval of this Stipulation for Discipline as to substance was given by the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) on May 13, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties agree the stipulation is to be submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration pursuant to the terms of BR 3.6. EXECUTED this 25th day of June 2024. /s/ John Cochran John Cochran, OSB No. 020022 APPROVED AS TO FORM: /s/ Arden J. Olson Arden J. Olson, OSB No. 870704 EXECUTED this 27th day of June 2024. By: /s/ Alison F. Wilkinson Alison F. Wilkinson, OSB No. 096799

) JOSHUA LIPPS, Bar No. 104412 ) Case No. 23-271 )

Andrew M. Cole Eugene L. Bentley, Public Member Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 1.16(a)(1), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). Trial panel opinion. 120- day suspension. Effective Date of Opinion: October 16, 2024

The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged Joshua Lipps with violating Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.16(a)(1) (continued representation when it will result in a violation of the RPCs or other law); RPC 1.3 (neglect of a legal matter); RPC 1.4(a) (failure to keep client reasonably informed or to promptly comply with requests for information); RPC 1.4(b) (failure to explain matter to permit client to make informed decisions); and RPC 8.1(a)(2) (failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority). The Bar asks us to suspend Respondent for at least 120 days. Respondent continued to represent a client, Hicham Ayach (Client), in a civil case (the case) while he was administratively suspended. He failed to tell Client that he was suspended. He also failed to act in response to multiple events in the case, failed to appear in court multiple times, and allowed a $10,000 judgment to be entered against Client. He further failed to tell Client about the court's rulings on the matters he ignored and failed to respond to Client's multiple requests for information. He also failed to respond to the Bar in the course of its investigation of his misconduct. Respondent failed to answer the formal complaint in this case and is in default. When a respondent is in default the Bar's factual allegations in the complaint are deemed true. Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 5.8(a); In re Magar, 337 Or 548, 551-53, 100 P3d 727 (2004). A trial panel is appointed, in this case consisting of the Adjudicator, Mark A. Turner, attorney member Andrew M. Cole, and public member Eugene L. Bentley. Our task as the trial panel is to first determine whether the facts alleged support the charged rule violations. If we conclude they do, we then determine what sanction is appropriate. See In re Koch, 345 Or 444, 446, 198 P3d 910 (2008); see also In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 253, 27 P3d 102 (2001). In addition to the

allegations in the formal complaint, the Bar has submitted a memorandum addressing the appropriate sanction. we suspend Respondent for 120 days.

On March 28, 2024, the Bar filed a formal complaint against Respondent. The com- plaint and notice to answer were served on Respondent by publication on May 31, 2024. Respondent failed to answer the complaint by June 14, 2024, as required by BR 4.3. The Bar advised Respondent that it would move for an order of default if he did not answer the complaint by July 5, 2024. When no answer was filed by the deadline the Bar moved for an order of default on July 8, 2024. The Adjudicator granted the motion on July 9, 2024.

FACTS

The following facts are alleged in the formal complaint: Client was sued in Multnomah County Circuit Court. He hired Respondent to defend him in the case sometime prior to December of 2021. Respondent filed an answer on behalf of Client on March 16, 2022. While the case was still active Respondent was suspended from practicing law on December 16, 2022, for failing to pay his Professional Liability Fund (PLF) assessment. Respondent did not withdraw as attorney of record for Client in the case, nor did he tell Client about the suspension. Richard Todd (Todd) was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case. Todd sent an email to Respondent on January 24, 2023, asking who would be taking over the case due to Respondent's suspension. Todd used an address that Respondent had previously used when communicating about the case. Respondent did not reply.1 Respondent was also suspended on April 4, 2023, for failing to pay his Bar dues. Despite the suspensions, Respondent never withdrew as counsel and remained attorney of record through December of 2023 when the case essentially ended. Respondent never told Client about this second suspension either. A number of significant events occurred in the case which Respondent failed to respond to or inform Client about. Respondent failed to respond to an email from Todd sent on November 2, 2022, to discuss potential trial dates. On November 9, 2022, Todd served a petition for provisional process on Respondent. Respondent did not respond to the petition. The court held a case management hearing on December 7, 2022, to set a trial date. Respondent failed to appear. The court held a hearing on the petition for provisional process on January 24, 2023. Respondent failed to appear. Respondent was served with a motion to compel inspection of property on September 7, 2023. Respondent failed to respond to the All Oregon attorneys and Licensed Paralegals (LP) must designate a current mailing address and 1 email address with the Bar, subject to certain exemptions not applicable here. BR 1.1.

motion. The court held a hearing on the motion on September 15, 2023. Respondent failed to appear. Respondent also failed to appear for a pretrial conference on September 22, 2023. The court apparently found Client in default and two days after the pretrial conference, on September 24, 2023, the court held a prima facie hearing. Respondent did not appear. The court then entered a $10,000 judgment against Client and ordered him to turn over a vehicle in his possession. From March 2022 through January 2024, Client tried to contact Respondent by phone and text message several times seeking an update on his case. Respondent failed to respond to any of Client's attempts to reach him. Respondent also failed to tell his client about the multiple material developments in the case discussed above. These included the fact that Respondent was suspended, that a trial date was set, that the petition for provisional process was filed, that a hearing was held on the petition, that a motion to compel an inspection of property was filed and a hearing was held, and that the court also held a prima facie hearing resulting in a $10,000 judgment against Client. Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) sent a letter dated November 1, 2023, to Respon- dent asking about the course of conduct described above. The letter was addressed to Respondent's address then on record with the Bar (record address) and was sent by first class mail. The Bar also emailed a copy of the letter to Respondent at the email address then on record with the Bar (record email address). The email and letter were not returned undelivered, and Respondent did not respond to either method of communication. DCO sent a second letter on November 27, 2023, repeating the requests sent on November 1. The letter was again addressed to Respondent at his record address and was sent by both first class and certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter was again also sent to his record email address. The email and letters were not returned undelivered. Respondent still did not respond. DCO petitioned for Respondent's interim suspension pursuant to BR 7.1 for failure to respond to the investigation. The Adjudicator again suspended Respondent on January 2, 2024.

We analyze the charges in the order presented by the Bar in its memorandum regarding sanctions.

1. RPC 1.16(a)(1) -- Failure to Withdraw
   RPC 1.16(a)(1) provides: "Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not repre- sent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law." Respondent failed to withdraw at any point in the case in spite of his suspension. Respondent's continued representation of Client after he was suspended violated the law governing attorneys. We find that Respondent violated RPC 1.16(a)(1).

2. RPC 1.3 -- Neglect of a Legal Matter
   RPC 1.3 states: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer." A single instance of negligence may not violate RPC 1.3, but a course of neglectful conduct or an extended period of neglect will. In re Jackson, 347 Or 426, 435, 223 P3d 387, 393 (2009). A course of neglectful conduct is a succession or series of negligent actions. In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 397, 153 P3d 113 (2007). An extended period of neglect will be found if a lawyer fails to act during a time when action is required. Here, Respondent neglected to perform specific tasks for an extended period of time. He failed to withdraw when required to do so. He failed to respond to a motion for provisional process, failed to respond to a motion to compel an inspection of property, failed to appear for the hearings on these motions, failed to appear for court conferences, and allowed a $10,000 judgment to be entered against Client. His neglect of the case lasted for many months. By any yardstick we use to measure neglect, Respondent violated RPC 1.3.

3. RPC 1.4(a) -- Duty to Keep Clients Reasonably Informed
   violation of RPC 1.4(a) occurred we consider the length of time the lawyer failed to

485 P3d 258 (2021). Respondent's failure to communicate lasted for many months. Client's requests for updates were reasonable. Not only did Respondent fail to respond to them "promptly," he failed to respond to them at all. It is likely that Respondent actually knew that his misconduct would prejudice Client. At the very least, a reasonable lawyer would foresee that the failure to communicate would prejudice the client. Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(a).

1. RPC 1.4(b) -- Duty to Sufficiently Explain a Matter to a Client
   RPC 1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." The multiple failures to communicate outlined above all deprived Client of information necessary to make informed decisions about how to proceed in the case. Respondent kept Client in the dark on critical matters, making informed decisions about the representation impossible. We also find that Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b).

2. Failure to Respond to Disciplinary Authority
   RPC 8.1(a)(2) states in relevant part: "An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with…a disciplinary matter, shall not: fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."

On November 1, 2023, DCO sent correspondence to Respondent asking for his comments regarding the allegations detailed herein. After following up a second time in late November DCO again received no response. DCO filed a petition for a suspension pursuant to BR 7.1 for failure to cooperate with the active investigation. The petition was granted on January 2, 2024. Respondent has still not responded to DCO's inquiries. Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a)(2).

SANCTION

Sanctions in disciplinary matters are not intended to penalize the respondent lawyer--they are intended to protect the public and the integrity of the profession. In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998). Appropriate discipline deters unethical conduct. In re Kirkman, 313 Or 181, 188, 830 P2d 206 (1992).

also review Oregon case law to ensure that our decision is in line with the court's treatment of similar cases.

The most important ethical duties lawyers owe are to their clients. ABA Standards at

1. Respondent violated his duty to act with reasonable diligence, which includes the duty to timely and effectively communicate with a client. ABA Standards 4.4. Respondent also violated his duty to cooperate with disciplinary authorities and violated his duty to withdraw when his representation violated the law. ABA Standards 7.0

that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and which deviates from the standard of We find that Respondent acted knowingly when he breached his obligations to his client and to the Bar as a whole.

We may consider both actual and potential injury in determining an appropriate sanc- tion. ABA Standards at 6; In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). "Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably

foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. ABA Standards at 9. Client here suffered actual injury in the form of anguish, uncertainty, anxiety, and aggravation. "Client anguish, uncertainty, anxiety, and aggravation are actual injury under the disciplinary rules." In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 321, 232 P3d 952 (2010). Respondent's client also suffered actual injury when a judgment was issued against him due to Respondent's inaction. Respondent's failure to respond to the Bar caused actual injury to the Bar and the pro- fession. In re Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 182, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (the disciplinary process requires honesty and cooperation from lawyers); see also In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 558, 857 P2d 136 (1993) (the Bar is prejudiced when a lawyer fails to cooperate in inquiries as to their professional conduct because the Bar has to investigate in a more time-consuming way, and public respect for the Bar is diminished because the Bar cannot provide timely and informed responses to complaints).

The following Standards apply here:

Under ABA Standard 7.2, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engaged in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. The presumptive sanction here is a suspension.

The Bar urges us to find that two aggravating factors apply here--ABA Standard 9.22(d) (multiple offenses) and ABA Standard 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of law). We agree. The Bar acknowledges in mitigation that Respondent has no prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.32(a).

Oregon case also law justifies a suspension here. Lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed are generally suspended. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010); In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (noting that attorneys who knowingly neglect a client's matter are generally sanctioned with 60-day suspensions);

see also, In re Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (attorney suspended for 60 days for

knowing neglect of a client matter and failure to communicate causing actual injury). The Oregon Supreme Court has also said that "failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation standing alone, is a serious ethical violation." In re Parker, 330 Or 541, 551, 9 P3d 107 (2000); see, e.g., In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 801 P2d 818 (1990) (attorney suspended for 63 days for seven counts of failing to cooperate with the Bar when providing brief, inadequate responses).

The Bar cites us to In re Shaffner, 323 Or 472, 918 P2d 803 (1996). There the lawyer was suspended for a total of 120 days. Half of the suspension was attributed to the lawyer's knowing neglect of his client's case for several months by failing to communicate with his clients and opposing counsel. The other half was attributed to his failure to respond to the Bar's inquiries. The Bar acknowledges that Respondent here has the additional charged violations of RPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) that were not found in Shaffner. But Shaffner involved our former disciplinary rules, which treated failures to communicate not as separate misconduct covered by its own rule, but instead as misconduct that was included within a charge of neglect. We agree with the Bar that Shaffner is sufficiently analogous to this case that we are confident that a suspension of 120 days here is consistent with Oregon case law. Accordingly, we order that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 120 days, effective on the

discharge their professional duties. ABA Standard 1.1. We order that Respondent be suspended for 120 days, commencing on the date this decision becomes final. Respectfully submitted this 12th day of September 2024.

/s/ Andrew M. Cole Andrew M. Cole, Attorney Panel Member /s/ Eugene L. Bentley Eugene L. Bentley, Public Panel Member

) MICHAEL A. DAY, Bar No. 033048 ) Case No. 23-176 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of Order: September 24, 2024

Michael A. Day (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). DATED this 24th day of September 2024.

Michael A. Day, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on September 26, 2003, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Washington County, Oregon.

On September 14, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b). The parties intend that

Facts

On January 24, 2022, a client hired Respondent to represent her in her bankruptcy proceeding. Respondent executed a fee agreement with the client and gave her an 8-page bankruptcy information packet that explained various aspects of bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy information packet stated that it was not in the client's interest to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with her creditors.

The client owed Oregon State Credit Union (OSCU) approximately $20,000 for an auto loan on her car, and made it clear to Respondent that one of her main concerns during her bankruptcy proceeding was that she keep her car.

On March 8, 2022, Respondent filed the client's Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On March 16, OSCU's attorney sent Respondent the following letter with a proposed reaffirmation agreement attached: "Please be advised that if the debtor does not elect to redeem, surrender or reaffirm this collateral, the Credit Union may seek enforcement of that provision and deem the debtor in default. The default will occur at the deadline for dischargability (sp), which is the last date possible for the debtor to reaffirm on this obligation. After that date, any further payments will be rejected and the loan deemed in default. Please advise your client that the debtor's default will occur on the day following the discharge deadline and payments after that date will be rejected based on the debtor's failure to reaffirm. Please review the attached Reaffirmation Agreement with your client carefully and explain to the debtor the rules regarding 11 U.S.C. 521(d) and its application under Oregon state law."

On March 21, 2022, Respondent sent the client an email explaining that at some point he may get a reaffirmation agreement from her creditors and advised the client that she should not enter into such an agreement. The client replied by asking how she would know if OSCU intended to take her car. On March 23, Respondent reassured the client that it was unlikely that OSCU would take her car. Respondent did not tell the client that he had actually received a

proposed reaffirmation agreement from OSCU, nor did he explain OSCU's position as outlined in the March 16 letter.

On April 11, 2022, OSCU's attorney re-sent Respondent OSCU's reaffirmation agreement with the following letter: "If your client wishes to retain possession of the 2016 Chevrolet Colorado, the Reaffir- mation Agreement will need to be fully executed. The credit union may seek enforcement of the "ipso facto" provision and deem the debtors in default. The default will occur at the deadline for dischargability (sp), May 31, 2022, which is the last date possible for the debtor to reaffirm on this obligation. After that date, any further payments will be rejected and the loan deemed in default. Please be advised that the debtor's default will occur on the day following the discharge deadline and payments after that date will be rejected based on the debtor's failure to reaffirm."

Respondent did not respond to OSCU's letter and did not communicate with his client about the letter. OSCU re-sent the proposed reaffirmation agreement with the above letter to Respondent on May 5 and May 18, and spoke with Respondent on the telephone about the same on May 25. Respondent did not communicate with his client about any of the contacts with OSCU regarding its request for a reaffirmation agreement.

On June 6, 2022, the client's bankruptcy case was closed, her debts were discharged, and Respondent ended his representation. On June 10, OSCU informed the client that OSCU would no longer accept her payments and that they considered her to be in default. OSCU then blocked the client's access to her account.

The client was eventually able to work with OSCU on her own to resolve the issue.

Respondent admits that, even though a entering into a reaffirmation agreement may have been inadvisable, by failing to inform his client that one of her creditors had requested such an agreement, he failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of a matter in violation of RPC 1.4(a), and failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation in violation of RPC 1.4(b).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated his duty to diligently represent his client when he failed to communicate with her about OSCU's position and proposed reaffirmation agreement. ABA Standard 4.4.

Although Respondent knew that he had not sent OSCU's letter and reaffirma- tion agreement to his client, his belief that he had already adequately discussed the issue of reaffirmation agreements with her supports a negligent mental state.

Standards at 6; In re Keller, 359 Or 410, 417, 506 P3d 1101 (2022). Respon- dent's client suffered actual injury by not being informed about the actions a creditor intended to take toward her property.

Respondent has been practicing law since 2003.

negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.43.

Respondent's conduct is similar to two recent cases in which an attorney either negli- gently failed to communicate with his client or knowingly failed to communicate with his client but thought his doing so was in the client's best interest. In In re Billin, 36 DB Rptr 136 (2022), the attorney was given a public reprimand when he neglected to send a pre-filing settlement offer to his client. In In re Daines, 37 DB Rptr 200 (2023), a trial panel publicly reprimanded an attorney after he knowingly failed to apprise his client of material developments in the case, but believed that he was acting in his client's interest by avoiding futile actions and incurring additional attorney fees.

Respondent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 1.4(b), the sanction to be effective upon approval of this stipulation.

September 14, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 23rd day of September 2024. /s/ Michael A. Day Michael A. Day, OSB No. 033048 EXECUTED this 23rd day of September 2024.

) ANDREW C. DOWNS, Bar No. 165230 ) Case No. 23-257 )

Counsel for the Bar: Alison F. Wilkinson

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). Stipulation for discipline. 90-day suspension. Effective Date of Order: September 24, 2024

Andrew C. Downs (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for 90-days, effective upon the date of this order for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(a)(2). DATED this 24th day of September 2024.

Andrew C. Downs, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on October 5, 2016, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Columbia County, Oregon.

On June 8, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(a)(3) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that

Facts

Client retained Respondent on February 15, 2022, for the ancillary probate of her parents' estate in Oregon.

After not hearing from Respondent for several months, Client emailed Respondent in July and August, requesting an update on the estate process. He did not respond.

In September 2022, after emailing the Columbia County probate court, Client learned that Respondent had not filed the probate. After hearing from Client, Respondent submitted the petitions to admit intestate estates to probate on October 4, 2022.

Client followed up with Respondent about the status of the matter in November 2022; Respondent did not respond.

The estate inventory was due in both probates by January 23, 2023. Respondent did not file the inventory in either matter. The court issued a letter indicating that the inventory was past due in April 2023. In response to Client email regarding the court's letter, Respondent told her that he was "filing the inventory lists now." However, Respondent did not file the inventories.

On July 10, and 11, 2023, the court issued a second notice, indicating the inventory was past due in both probates. Respondent filed the inventories on July 14, 2023.

Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO) requested information in response to this grievance on October 24, 2023. Respondent did not respond, and DCO sent a follow-up letter to Respondent on November 16, 2023, making his response due November 27, 2023. Respon- dent still did not respond.

On December 11, 2023, the Bar moved for Respondent's suspension pursuant to BR 7.1 until he responded to the Bar's inquiries in this matter. Respondent provided a partial response and production on December 20, 2023. DCO requested the full production the next day. Respondent did not respond. The Disciplinary Board Adjudicator entered an order suspending Respondent on January 2, 2024. Respondent produced the remaining documents that same day.

Respondent admits that, by failing to file the probate petitions for nearly eight months and failing to file the inventories in a timely manner, he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of RPC 1.3. By failing to communicate with Client despite her reasonable requests for information, Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4. By knowingly failing to respond to lawful demands for information from a disciplinary authority, Respondent violated RPC 8.1(a)(2).

Sanction

(3) the actual or potential injury; and (4) the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Additionally, Respondent violated his duty as a professional by failing to respond to disciplinary inquiries. ABA Standard 7.0.

Respondent acted knowingly. He was aware he needed to initiate the probate proceedings. He also acted at least knowingly in not filing the accounting in April 2023, after telling his client he would file it the same day.

Respondent also acted knowingly in not communicating with Client. She con- tacted him multiple times during their engagement requesting an update. Respondent acknowledged that he had been difficult to reach. Respondent received these communications, but failed to respond. Finally, Respondent acted knowingly in not responding to disciplinary inquiries.

Because of the delay in probate, Client had to file an additional year of estate tax returns; she was delayed in selling her parents' home; she was delayed in receiving payment from the estate; and she incurred additional costs in hiring a new lawyer. Additionally, there is actual harm to the Bar and the public by virtue of Respon- dent's failure to respond to the Bar in a timely manner. See In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 558, 857 P2d 136 (1993).

1. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d). Respondent engaged in several distinct acts constituting separate violations of the disciplinary rules rather than one bad act charged under multiple rules. In re

Strickland, 339 Or 595, 606, 124 P3d 1225 (2005).

1. Personal or emotional problems. ABA Standard 9.32(c). Respondent stated that his wife has a chronic illness that requires significant atten- tion from him.

Under ABA Standard 7.2, suspension is generally appropriate when: "a lawyer knowingly engages in a violation of a duty as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."

Under Oregon case law, generally, lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed are suspended. In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010). In the matter of In re Redden, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that attorneys who knowingly neglect a client's legal matter are generally sanctioned with 60-day suspensions. 342 Or 393, 401, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (court so concluded after reviewing similar cases); see also, In re

Lebahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (attorney suspended for 60 days for knowing neglect

of a client matter and failure to communicate). Consistent with Redden, the Disciplinary Board has authorized 60-day suspensions for similar misconduct over the last several years. See In re Potter, 37 DB Rptr (2023) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b)); In re Faulconer, 36 DB Rptr 189 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.16(a)(1)); In re Maanao, 36 DB Rptr 31 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.15 1(d)); In re Tschudy, 36 DB Rptr 183 (2022) (stipulated 60-day suspension for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.5(c)(3), and RPC 1.15-1(c)). Failure to respond to discipline inquiries also generally results in suspension. See In re

Spinney, 36 DB Rptr 274 (2022) (imposing one-year suspension); In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 225

(1996) (imposing 60-day suspension per violation). Respondent did ultimately fully respond to discipline, but not until after he was suspended by order of the Adjudicator.

Respondent shall be suspended for 90-days for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(a)(2), the sanction to be effective upon approval by the Disciplinary Board.

dent has arranged for Luke D. Miller, Miller Bradley Law LLC, 1567 Edgewater St NW PMB 43, Salem, OR 97304, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have of the files during the term of his suspension. Respondent represents that Luke Miller has agreed to accept this responsibility.

June 8, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties

EXECUTED this 18th day of September, 2024. /s/ Andrew C. Downs Andrew C. Downs, OSB No. 165230 EXECUTED this 19th day of September, 2024. By: /s/ Alison F. Wilkinson Alison F. Wilkinson, OSB No. 096799

) DANIEL ROBERT REITMAN, ) Bar No. 953932 ) Case No. 22-147 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.6(a). Stipulation for Discipline. Effective Date of Order: October 10, 2024

Daniel Robert Reitman and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Reitman is publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.6(a). DATED this 10th day of October 2024.

Daniel Robert Reitman, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar)

Oregon on September 22, 1995, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time. Respondent's office and place of business has primarily been in Multnomah County, Oregon, while a member of the Bar.

On September 14, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against Respondent for alleged violations of RPC 1.6(a) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set

Facts

A client (the client) retained Gary M. Bullock & Associates PC (the firm) to represent her in modifying her 2014 dissolution of marriage judgment in several respects, including parenting time. In early 2020, the court modified the judgment by verbal order regarding visitation between the client's ex-husband and their two sons, but the parties could not agree on the form of the supplemental judgment. At the time, Respondent was of counsel with the firm and was brought on to the case to prepare the supplemental judgment.

While working on the client's matter in 2020, Respondent on multiple occasions mistakenly emailed the wrong recipient information relating to the representation of the client, including the client's financial information. This occurred when Respondent typed out a partial recipient name when addressing an email, and the email program provided a list of potential recipient names. Respondent then clicked on the wrong name and sent the email without noticing his mistake. In some cases, the recipients notified Respondent of the error, and he requested that they delete the emails. Respondent did not become aware of some of the misdirected emails for several years.

After the firm withdrew from the representation of the client, it filed a lawsuit against the client (now former client) claiming breach of contract. During the litigation, confidential information from multiple clients of the firm was mistakenly provided to the former client. This happened when a supervising attorney facilitated the delivery of thousands of pages of discovery before Respondent had an opportunity to review the physical file and remove documents unrelated to the litigation. The former client notified the firm of the erroneously received documents and ultimately returned those materials. Respondent contacted the firm's clients about the mistaken disclosures. Respondent, who was responsible for managing dis- covery in the case, failed to ensure that confidential documents unrelated to the litigation were not disseminated to the former client.

Respondent admits that he violated RPC 1.6(a) by revealing to individuals not asso- ciated with the client's case information related to the representation of the client. Respondent also admits that he violated the rule by failing to ensure that case information related to the representation of other clients was not disclosed to the former client during the subsequent breach of contract litigation.

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. Respondent violated his duty to preserve client confidences.
   ABA Standard 4.2. The ABA Standards presume that the most important ethical duties are those to which an attorney owes a client. ABA Standards at 5.

2. Mental State. The most culpable mental state is that of "intent," when the
   lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA Standards at 9. "Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. Id. "Negligence" is the failure to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and which deviates from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. Id. Here, Respondent acted negligently in failing to ensure he was directing emails containing client information to the intended recipients.

3. Injury. Injury can be either actual or potential under the ABA Standards.

In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). It does not appear that

Respondent's mistaken disclosures injured the client in the underlying matter, though the potential for injury is evident. However, the client reportedly suffered injury in the form of frustration and anxiety after learning that Respondent had disseminated her personal information to strangers, which has been found to constitute actual injury. See In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 496, 8 P3d 953 (2000); In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 426-27, 939 P2d 39 (1997) (both holding that client anxiety and frustration can constitute actual injury under the ABA Standards).

1. A pattern of misconduct. ABA Standard 9.22(c). Respondent has practiced law since 1995.

Under the ABA Standards, a public reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to the representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.23.

Lawyers who have violated RPC 1.6(a), or the predecessor rule, have been repri- manded. See, In re Dennis, 33 DB Rptr 61 (2019), where the lawyer disclosed to the court that his client, a professional fiduciary, had paid herself without court approval; In re Scannell, 8 DB Rptr 99 (1994) (attorney reprimanded after negligently revealing to opposing counsel and the court a letter that included legal analysis and strategy, without the client's consent).

dent shall be publicly reprimanded for violation of RPC 1.6(a).

disposition of this proceeding. Other jurisdictions in which Respondent is admitted: Washington.

September 14, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The

EXECUTED this 8th day of October 2024. /s/ Daniel Robert Reitman Daniel Robert Reitman, OSB No. 953932 EXECUTED this 8th day of October 2024.

) FRANK WALL, Bar No. 733160 ) Case Nos. 24-43 & 24-44 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.7(a)(2). Stipulation for Discipline. 1-year Effective Date of Order: December 23, 2024

The court accepts the Stipulation for Discipline. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Oregon for a period of one year, effective 60 days from the date of this order. Meagan A. Flynn Chief Justice, Supreme Court October 24, 2024

Frank Wall, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on September 21, 1973, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Multnomah County, Oregon.

On July 20, 2024, the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) authorized 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.7(a)(2) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this proceeding.

Facts

Case No. 24-43: McFarlane and Anderson

Marshall McFarlane and Mary Anderson (collectively, "McFarlane") were evicted from their home after their landlord (landlord) defaulted on her mortgage, resulting in fore- closure and repossession of the property. McFarlane retained Respondent in October 2021 to contest the judgment of eviction. Respondent filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which the court denied. Respondent then filed a notice of appeal on April 28, 2022. Over the next five months, McFarlane called Respondent multiple times asking for a status report; eventually, in April 2023, Respondent told McFarlane that the appeal had been lost on a technicality. After this communication, McFarlane made multiple requests for addi- tional information about the dismissal. In February 2024, after McFarlane visited Respondent's office to request a copy of the dismissal, Respondent sent McFarlane a copy of the appellate judgment, which revealed that the appeal had been dismissed because Respondent had failed to timely file the opening brief. The judgment recited that the Court of Appeals had issued a notice of default on January 25, 2023, giving McFarlane 14 days to show good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed based on failure to file a brief. When Respondent responded that he had failed to calendar the then-most current due date, the court found that Respondent's negligence in failing to make a timely filing did not constitute good cause for excusing untime- liness and dismissed the appeal. Respondent had not previously informed McFarlane of these developments in the appeal, even though he had agreed to advise them on a possible conversion claim against land- lord (based on her failure to use $30,000 she had received from the Oregon Rental Assistance Program for McFarlane's rent to reinstate her loan). Respondent did not obtain McFarlane's informed consent, confirmed in writing, to his continued representation of McFarlane after he realized that McFarlane had a potential legal malpractice claim against him based upon the court's dismissal of the appeal due to his negligence.

Case No. 24-44: Pettis

Michael S. Pettis (Pettis) and his wife signed a contingency fee agreement with Respon- dent on March 30, 2022, to pursue habitability and other claims against their residential landlord. After their initial meeting with Respondent, Pettis never heard from Respondent

again, despite sending multiple emails and leaving phone messages in April, May, June, and September 2022, September 2023, and January 2024. Respondent did not comply with Pettis's requests for information. Respondent lost track of the Pettis case and failed to attend to it.

Respondent admits that, by failing to comply promptly with McFarlane's reasonable requests for information about the appeal, to explain the court's dismissal of the appeal to the extent reasonably necessary to permit McFarlane to make informed decisions regarding the representation, or to obtain McFarlane's informed consent, confirmed in writing, to his con- tinued representation of McFarlane when his personal interest in avoiding malpractice liability could materially limit his representation of McFarlane, he violated RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.7(a)(2). Respondent admits that, by failing to attend to Pettis's case or to comply promptly with Pettis's reasonable requests for information, he violated RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a).

Sanction

1. Duty Violated. Through neglect and failures to communicate, Respondent violated his duties of diligence to both Pettis and McFarlane. He violated his duty of loyalty to McFarlane when he did not disclose his possible conflict of interest.

On the Pettis matter, Respondent acted with negligence, as he lost track of the case. However, when Pettis continued to contact him for updates, Respondent became aware that he was not taking appropriate action. For McFarlane, Respondent acted knowingly in failing to fully inform the clients that his negligence had resulted in dismissal of their appeal, and in failing to obtain their informed consent to his personal conflict.

1. Injury. Both Pettis and McFarlane suffered actual injury in the form of aggra- vation and frustration over Respondent's lack of action and communication.

See, In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 321, 232 P3d 952 (2010) ("Client anguish,

uncertainty, anxiety, and aggravation are actual injury under the disciplinary rules.") McFarlane was also injured by Respondent's failure to disclose his con- flict, as the clients were denied the opportunity to consult other counsel about their options in the appeal or to promptly seek recovery against Respondent.

1. A prior record of discipline. ABA Standard 9.22(a). To qualify as a prior
   disciplinary offense, the prior offense must have been adjudicated before the imposition of the current sanction, and the similarity and temporal relationship between the prior offense and the current offense are also relevant. See, In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997). Respondent has previously been disciplined, including for neglect and failures to communicate. Each of the prior matters were resolved before Respondent engaged in the misconduct at issue in the present cases.

2. Respondent was admonished in October 2018 for violating RPC
   1.4(a).

3. Effective April 1, 2020, Respondent was suspended for 60 days,
   all stayed pending a two-year disciplinary probation, for viola- tions of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). In re Wall, 34 DB Rptr 38 (2020).

4. In March 2022, Respondent was suspended for 60 days for
   neglect and failure to promptly deliver client property (a land- lord's refund check made payable to Respondent's client). In re

Wall, 36 DB Rptr 71 (2022).

1. A pattern of misconduct. ABA Standard 9.22(c). When a lawyer vio-
   lates a rule for which he has been disciplined before, the prior violation can establish both a record of prior discipline and a pattern of miscon- duct. This factor focuses on whether the violation is a one-time mistake, which may call for a lesser sanction, or part of a larger pattern, which may reflect a more serious ethical problem. See, In re Bertoni, 363 Or 614, 643-644, 426 P3d 64 (2018).

2. Multiple offenses. ABA Standard 9.22(d).

3. Vulnerability of victim. ABA Standard 9.22(h). Respondent's clients in
   both cases were individuals who had been damaged by the acts or omissions of their residential landlords.

4. Substantial experience in the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
   Respondent has practiced law in Portland since 1973.

5. Mitigating Circumstance. There is one mitigating circumstance in this matter:

6. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
   toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). This mitigating factor applies to the Pettis complaint only, on which Respondent admitted that he had lost track of the case. (In contrast, on the McFarlane complaint,

Respondent delayed responding until DCO was required to file a BR 7.1 petition for his immediate suspension.)

Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.32. When a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer's own interests, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, reprimand is generally appro- priate. ABA Standard 4.33. When a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, suspension is generally appropriate. ABA Standard 4.42(a). Repri- mand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.43. Given the actual injuries and substantial aggravating factors including prior discipline, suspension is appropriate.

Neglect, alone, results in a presumptive sanction of 60 days. In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (60-day suspension was appropriate for each instance of the attorney's neglect and failure to cooperate with the Bar). See also, In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (60-day suspension imposed for single serious neglect despite no prior discipline); In re LaBahn, 335 Or 357, 67 P3d 381 (2003) (60-day suspension for neglect and subsequent failure to notify client). Failures to communicate also result in suspension See, e.g., In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010) (30-day suspension for failure to respond to client's inquiries, inform client of communications with opposing counsel, and explain settlement strategy); In re Koch, 345 Or 444,198 P3d 910 (2008) (120-day suspension where attorney failed to advise client that another lawyer would prepare a qualified domestic relations order and thereafter failed to communicate with client and second lawyer when they needed information to complete the legal matter). With respect to a personal interest conflict violation, In re Ramirez, 362 Or 370, 408 P3d 1065 (2018) resulted in a one-year suspension for a lawyer who failed to advise his client in a single matter that the client had a potential malpractice claim against him but continued to represent the client on the same matter without written informed consent. Ramirez also involved violations of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.8(h) (failure to provide competent representation; contracting with a client to limit his malpractice liability without advising client to seek inde- pendent counsel). Ramirez had similar aggravating factors to the present matter: prior disci- pline, multiple violations, pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience.

Respondent's prior discipline weighs heavily in aggravation. The court scrutinized the impact on sanction of an attorney's prior discipline in In re Knappenberger, 344 Or 559, 186 P3d 272 (2008) (Knappenberger IV). Knappenberger had already been disciplined four times for a variety of misconduct by the time he was found guilty of charging an illegal fee to one 1 client and an excessive fee to a second client. The court noted that such violations would normally warrant only a short suspension in light of the one mitigating factor (full cooperation in the disciplinary process) and the aggravating factors other than his prior discipline (multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law). While the prior offenses in the aggregate were serious, the court gave them only moderate weight because they involved different disciplinary rules and some had occurred after the conduct at issue in the case before the court. Knappenberger IV, 344 Or at 576-77. Nevertheless, the court suspended Knappen- berger for two years, a period twice as long as his then most-recent one-year suspension.

Knappenberger IV, 344 Or at 580. See also, In re Meyer, 328 Or 220, 970 P2d 647 (1999)

[lawyer who had previously been reprimanded for improper withdrawal from representation and neglect was suspended for one year for a subsequent neglect violation]; In re Bourcier, 325 Or 429, 939 P2d 604 (1997) [lawyer who stipulated to a 60-day suspension for neglect on one matter was subsequently suspended for two years for neglect and failing to cooperate with the Bar, and was thereafter disbarred for neglect and failing to cooperate]; In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 939 P2d 39 (1997) [lawyer who was previously suspended for 120 days for neglect and failing to cooperate was subsequently suspended for two years for violating those same rules among others].

Respondent shall be suspended for one year for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a) (two counts), RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.7(a)(2), the sanction to become effective 60 days after this stipulation is approved.

dent has arranged for Mike Doty, OSB No. 195611, Doty Law LLC, 4411 NE Tillamook Street, Portland, OR 97213, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have of the files during the term of his suspension. Respondent represents that Mr. Doty has agreed to accept this responsibility.

suspension, he must apply for formal reinstatement pursuant to BR 8.1. Respondent further Reprimand for a single violation of contacting a represented party; 90-day suspension for a self-1 interest conflict and neglect; 120-day suspension for improper communication with a represented person and a former client conflict of interest; and a one-year suspension for neglect. Knappenberger

IV, 344 Or at 574.

to whether Respondent should be reinstated. Respondent also acknowledges that he cannot hold himself out as an active member of the Bar or provide legal services or advice until he is notified that his license to practice has been reinstated.

suspended: none.

July 20, 2024. Approval as to form by Disciplinary Counsel is evidenced below. The parties agree the stipulation is to be submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration pursuant to the terms of BR 3.6. EXECUTED this 11th day of September 2024. /s/ Frank Wall Frank Wall, OSB No. 733160 EXECUTED this 12th day of September 2024.

) VALERIE BETH HEDRICK, ) Bar No. 073991 ) Case No. 23-112 )

Counsel for the Respondent: Theodore W. Reuter and Amber Bevacqua-Lynott

Disposition: Trial Panel Opinion. Dismissal. Effective Date of Opinion: November 26, 2024

The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged Respondent with making a statement she knew to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge in violation of Oregon Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.2(a). The Bar asks that Respondent be suspended for 30 days. The parties stipulated pursuant to Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 2.4(f)(2) that I serve as the sole decisionmaker in this case. Trial was held August 19-21,

1. The Bar appeared through counsel, Eric Collins. Respondent appeared personally and was represented by counsel Theodore Reuter and Amber Bevacqua-Lynott. Respondent and three of the judges in Klamath County had a contentious relationship. Respondent was vocal about what she perceived to be bias against her. The three judges had filed a 25-page Bar complaint against Respondent. All of those charges were investigated and dismissed by Disciplinary Counsel's Office (DCO). Respondent moved to disqualify the judges from her cases after the Bar complaint was filed and she filed judicial fitness complaints against them. None of these communications or actions are alleged to be misconduct here. Respondent handled court-appointed juvenile dependency cases under a contract with Oregon Public Defense Services (OPDS). This case is about four sentences in a lengthy (three- page) and dense (single spaced) email Respondent sent on January 28, 2022, to OPDS's deputy general counsel, Erica Herb. One of the three judges denied Respondent's court appointment in a juvenile dependency proceeding. Respondent wanted OPDS to back her in an effort to challenge that denial and be appointed in the case. Herb replied with an email telling Respondent that OPDS declined to support her based, in part, on the electronic case record showing when certain documents were filed and orders signed. Respondent replied to Herb, disputing the decision on a number of grounds, including her belief that the electronic record was inaccurate. Respondent concluded her email by terminating her contract with OPDS. The statement in the email to Herb that the Bar charges was misconduct is:

"The record is not accurate. Things did not happen on the day OECI [Oregon eCourt Case Information system] says … OECI reflects what the court staff enter and they can - and do - manipulate the record on OECI to fit their judge's narrative. Fun fact: They can - and do - also manipulate audio records." Ex. 11 at 12. The Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that this statement violates the terms of the rule. BR 5.2. Clear and convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. In re Taylor, 319 Or 595, 600, 878 P2d 1103 (1994). The plain language of the rule requires that the statement must be about the qualifications or integrity of a judge. The quoted statement, however, is about the conduct of court staff, not the qualifications or integrity of a judge. It does not run afoul of the rule. The evidence at trial showed that some of Respondent's interactions with and commu- nications about the three Klamath County judges were not polite, proper, or professional, but they were not misconduct. I am not tasked with deciding whether Respondent's conduct demonstrates courtesy, decorum, or professionalism, only whether it meets the minimum behavioral standards set forth in the RPCs. If Respondent's statement does not question the qualifications or integrity of a judge, it is not misconduct. Accordingly, and as discussed in more detail below, I dismiss the charge against Respondent.

FACTS

In August of 2021, Klamath County judges Marci Adkisson, William Bunch, and Alycia Kersey filed a joint 25-page Bar complaint against Respondent alleging multiple acts of misconduct in several matters. The violations alleged in that complaint were investigated by the Bar and all dismissed. Not surprisingly, after the complaint was filed, Respondent began moving to disqualify the three judges when they were assigned to preside over her cases. Ex. 11. She also filed judicial fitness complaints against the three. Id. There were five judges in total on the Klamath County bench at that time. Id. Much of Respondent's work at that time was court-appointed counsel in the juvenile department. Respondent had a contract with OPDS to handle juvenile matters. OPDS made the case assignments to the lawyers it contracted with. These cases often require multiple lawyers. Individual parties, like the parents, require separate representation, and sometimes children in the same family need separate attorneys. The frequent need for multiple attorneys and the small size of the Bar in Klamath County meant that Respondent was involved in a large share of the cases in the juvenile court. The disqualification motions Respondent filed affected judicial case assignments. Id. at 23. Two judges, Judge Adkisson and Judge Andrea Janney, handled the juvenile docket. If -a case in which Respondent was appointed was assigned to Judge Adkisson it had to be reassigned to Judge Janney. Id. A disproportionately high number of juvenile cases thus ended up with Judge Janney. Id. at 3. After consultation with various individuals, Judge Adkisson concluded that ORS 419B.195(1), dealing with court appointments for juveniles, gave her authority to deny

Respondent's court appointment in dependency cases. She decided to deny Respondent's court appointment in dependency cases assigned to her court. Id. On January 25, 2022, Respondent was named by OPDS for appointment on a new juvenile dependency case. Ex. 3. The case was assigned to Judge Adkisson. She denied Respondent's appointment. A written order denying the appointment was issued showing an electronic signature by Judge Adkisson at 12:41:42 PM on the 25th. Ex. 2. According to the declaration of one of the court personnel, she entered the order in the electronic file at 12:49 p.m. on the 25th. Ex. 10. A few minutes later, court staff emailed the Klamath Public Defense Case Coordinator and told her Respondent's appointment was denied and asked for the name of the new attorney who would be assigned to the case. Id. The case coordinator responded at 1:00 that afternoon identifying Diana Bettles as the new attorney. Court staff sent a proposed order for court appointment of Bettles to Judge Adkisson at 1:13 p.m. and it was signed at 4:33 p.m. Id. That same day Respondent spoke by phone with Herb, the OPDS assistant general counsel, about the denied appointment. She told Herb that she intended to offer to substitute into the case pro bono on behalf of the child if necessary. Respondent believed that OPDS would support her actions. She also believed the denial of her appointment was an illegal attempt to deprive the child of representation. Shortly after 1:30 p.m., again on the 25 , Respondent spoke to court staff about the th denial of her appointment, stating, "they can't f*** with her contract." Id. Respondent asked to speak to Judge Adkisson's staff and her call was transferred at 1:46 p.m. Id. At 3:14 p.m., Respondent's office electronically filed a notice of representation in the dependency case to represent the child, and a motion to disqualify Judge Adkisson. Id., Exs. 4, 5. A proposed order to disqualify Judge Adkisson was sent to the judge's judicial assistant at 3:18 p.m. Ex. 10. At 3:28 p.m., Respondent sent an email to the judicial assistant stating: "Please inform Judge Adkisson that I have filed an additional judicial ethics complaint against her for not only violating the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct, but also for her direct violation of ORS 419B.195(1) which provides (in relevant part, and with emphasis added):

419B.195: Appointment of counsel for child or ward; access of appointed counsel to records of child or ward. (1) If the child, ward, parent or guardian

requests counsel for the child or ward but is without sufficient financial means to employ suitable counsel possessing skills and experience commensurate with the nature of the petition and the complexity of the case, the court may appoint suitable counsel to represent the child or ward at state expense if the child or ward is determined to be financially eligible under the policies, procedures, standards and guidelines of the Public Defense Services Commission.

Whenever requested to do so, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the child or ward in a case filed pursuant to ORS 419B.100. The court may not substitute one appointed counsel for another except pursuant to the policies, procedures, standards and guidelines of the Public Defense Services Commission.'

Additionally, I'd point out that I filed a Notice of Representation in the matter she denied my appointment in and, additionally, I appreciate it [sic] if she'd sign the Motion to Disqualify I submitted in the same matter. Thank you! (And my sincere apologies for your being in the middle of this nonsense.)" Ex. 6. Respondent called the judge's assistant and told her to print the email and deliver it to Judge Adkisson on the bench. Ex. 11, at 3. A shelter hearing is required within 24 hours of placement of a child in substitute care. ORS 419B.183. The primary purpose of a shelter hearing is to determine whether a child who is (or who may be) taken into protective custody and is alleged to be within the juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction can be maintained safely in the home, pending adjudication of the petition. Oregon Juvenile Dependency Benchbook - 3/20 at 2. A shelter hearing was set for the afternoon of January 25, 2022, with Judge Kersey presiding. This created a further issue for Respondent because Judge Kersey had stated in a letter in mid-December 2021, that she could not be a neutral in matters involving Respondent and recused herself from cases where Respondent was the attorney. Ex. 106. Judge Kersey acknowledged at trial that if Respondent had appeared in her courtroom for the shelter hearing she would have had to recuse herself because of the December letter. Tr. at 120. Respondent, however, did not go into the courtroom during the hearing because she was also concerned about Judge Kersey's stated bias. Bettles appeared on behalf of the child. Ex. 8, Ex. 10, at 2. As noted earlier, the record shows that Judge Adkisson signed the order appointing Bettles to represent the child at 4:33 p.m. Ex. 9. Court staff did not enter the order into the electronic record system until the following day, January 26, 2022. Ex. 1, at 2. The publicly viewable record that Respondent reviewed thus showed the appointment order being signed on January 26, 2022, not January 25, after Respondent had filed her notice of appearance and motion to disqualify Judge Adkisson. Subsequent investigation showed this was apparently a clerical error and the date the Bettles appointment order was signed was changed to the 25th. Id. The discrepancy, however, became a problem for Respondent in her dealings with OPDS. On January 27, 2022, at 8:03 in the evening, Herb emailed Respondent to tell her that OPDS had determined that it could not fund her representation of the child because, after review of the OECI record, it appeared that Respondent had filed a notice of representation but there was no order appointing her. Ex. 25 at 4-5. Bettles was the only attorney with an order of appointment, and she was the only one OPDS could pay for in the case. Id. She also rejected Respondent's argument under ORS 419B.195(1) about Judge Adkisson's lack of authority to deny Respondent's appointment because it only "applies after the court has appointed counsel." Id. Respondent believed Herb was relying on an inaccurate electronic record, among other things, when Herb decided not to support Respondent's fight to be appointed in the case. Tr. at 292, 302-303. Respondent was angry with Herb and OPDS for not supporting her and decided to quit. The next day, January 28, at 2:57 in the afternoon, Respondent sent Herb the lengthy email that is alleged to contain the improper comments. Id. at 1-4. She addressed the

email to Herb, Bettles, and a woman named Tammy Worthington, and copied the email to six other recipients, which included OPDS personnel and Respondent's own office staff. Id. In the message, Respondent set forth six numbered paragraphs, headed in bold type, in the following order, "1. Funding is irrelevant."; "2. The record is not accurate."; "3. Your

interpretation of the law is wrong."; "4. Support denied."; "5. Honesty is a virtue."; and

"6. OPDS could be supportive." The email then included a section where Respondent explained what OPDS was losing with her departure set forth in lettered paragraphs a, b, c, d, and e. Four more paragraphs followed, one containing the statement: "Your failure to stand behind me not only allows Judges Adkisson and Kersey to continue their illegal and bullying behavior but, frankly, it is chicken shit." The penultimate paragraph, in bold, consisted of one sentence: "Therefore, effective immediately, and pursuant to provisions 2, 3 and arguably

4.1 of the Public Defense Legal Services Contract, I am terminating my contract with OPDS."

The language the Bar charges as misconduct opens numbered paragraph 2. That para- graph is set forth in total here: "2. The record is not accurate. Things did not happen on the day OECI says … OECI reflects what the court staff enter and they can - and do - manipulate the record on OECI to fit their judge's narrative. Fun fact: They can - and do - also manipulate audio records. In actuality I filed my Notice of Representation about an hour or so before the shelter hearing, along with a motion, declaration and order to disqualify Judge Adkisson. Judge Kersey, who has a documented and admitted bias against me, had full knowledge of my notice of representa- tion, as it was discussed on the record. Despite the judicial ethics requirement that she recuse herself and have another judge hear the shelter [sic], she pro- ceeded and prevented me from appearing (given her bias, I cannot - and will not - be in her courtroom and subject myself to additional bullying). The TAG notes (the notes the court staff take when on the record, which can also be manipulated) could verify what I'm saying. However, despite that they are supposed to be entered fairly soon after the conclusion of the hearing and are records that can be provided upon request, they didn't exist the following day when I asked about them. Additionally, the order appointing Diana was posted to OECI the day after the shelter sic." Id. Respondent also forwarded her email on January 28, 2022, to five other attorneys who practiced law in Klamath County at the time. Id. She explained to them: "See below. (Condensed version: OPDS's failure to support me in my efforts at keeping cases assigned to me is the last fucking straw. I'm not going to keep killing myself to continue doing juvenile dependency work when even OPDS doesn't care enough to support my ability to do the work their (sic) fucking paying me for.)" Id at 1.

She reiterated at trial that her focus in the email was expressing her dissatisfaction with OPDS: "A.ꞏ So the purpose of it was, listen, Erica, if you're going to tell me that you're not going to have my back and you're going to use the way that OECI appears when you look at it as part of your basis, you're wrong. ꞏLike, don't rely on that.ꞏ It is not always accurate. ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ ꞏ And in this case it wasn't.ꞏ Like, this is not correct.ꞏ So if you don't want to have my back, just don't have my back, but don't rely on this because this is not accurate.ꞏ And it's not accurate because people are fallible.ꞏ Like, you know, maybe they're -- maybe they're making a mistake in how they're entering it.ꞏ Maybe they don't have all the information when they're entering it.ꞏ Regardless, it's not always accurate when you look at it, and here it's not." Tr. at 398. On January 31, 2022, Klamath County Circuit Court judges were told that Respondent had terminated her contract with OPDS and would no longer be handling court-appointed cases. Ex. 11, at 3. The judges also received a copy of the email at issue here. They considered it an attack on the court. Id. at 4. The next day Judges Adkisson, Kersey, and Bunch sent another complaint to the Bar about Respondent's conduct in the dependency case. After investigation of the matter, and consideration of all of the acts and communica- tions described above, DCO brought this action alleging a single act of misconduct involving only the statement identified above.

ANALYSIS

1. The challenged statement is not "concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge."

RPC 8.2(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge or adjudicatory officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial or other adjudicatory office." As noted at the outset of this opinion, an essential element of the Bar's case is that the statement at issue must be about a judge. The statement here is about court staff. Respondent claims that court staff can manipulate what appears in OECI records and in the audio record. These statements, even if false, are only about court staff and so are not misconduct under RPC 8.2(a). The only mention of a judge in the challenged statement is that court staff may manipulate the record "to fit their judge's narrative." This statement does not attack any judge. It is again referring to court staff. The only information about a judge contained in the statement is that court staff's judge may have a "narrative." The fact that a judge has a "narrative" is not a challenge to that judge's qualifications or integrity. I can infer from the statement that if a judge has a "narrative" that differs from the OECI record then court staff, again, may "manipulate" it. That inference may challenge the integrity of court staff, but it is a value-neutral statement as it relates to "their judge." The

statement does not state that a judge is even aware of court staff's alleged activity, much less the cause of it. The Bar contended at trial that Respondent's statement must be about a judge when taken in the context of her overall message. On the contrary, I find that the context in which the statement appears reinforces the conclusion that it is not about a judge at all. Respondent mentions Judge Adkisson by name six times in her email and Judge Kersey three times. She is not shy about explicitly expressing her dissatisfaction with the judges. She accuses Judge Kersey of bias and bullying later on in paragraph 2. She goes on to state that Judge Adkisson's denial of her appointment was "in direct violation of the law." She says that Judge Adkisson's staff told her that the judge denied her appointment to even out caseloads, "not for a legitimate reason." She also states that allowing Judge Adkisson to pick and choose appointed counsel "condones and supports her in her efforts to not only violate the law, but bully your own contractor into a position where I can't do the job the State is paying me for." She ultimately tells Herb that OPDS's failure to stand behind her "not only allows Judges Adkisson and Kersey to continue their illegal and bullying behavior but, frankly, is chicken shit." If Respondent intended to accuse the judges of "manipulating" the record, I am convinced she would have done so by name. Instead, she addressed that comment only to court staff. The Bar is required to prove that it is "highly probable" that Respondent's challenged statement was about a judge. On the evidence before me, I find it is highly probable, instead, that the statement was not about any judge's qualifications or integrity. The charge must be dismissed. Respondent made a number of statements that were obviously and openly critical of Judges Adkisson and Kersey, but the Bar has not alleged that any of them amounted to misconduct. The Bar may not change its theory behind the charge at trial. It must proceed based on the allegations in the formal complaint and the theory on which its charge is premised. In

re Ellis, 356 Or 691, 738, 344 P.3d 425 (2015). Moreover, in this case the parties participated

in a BR 4.6 Issue Narrowing Conference in which they agreed to the precise charge, which did not include reference to any statements other than the one discussed here. My dismissal of the one charge, however, should not be read as approval of how Respondent conducted herself. Her overall course of conduct may have merited some adverse consequence, but the disciplinary system and the Rules of Professional Conduct are not the means to that end.

1. Other Considerations. Respondent also raised important issues about the constitutionality of the rule under both the Constitution of the United States, and the Oregon State Constitution. I do not have 1 2 to reach those issues so I will leave those questions for another day. In the event the Bar seeks review of this decision, and the Oregon Supreme Court disagrees with my conclusion about culpability, the court will have to address these very legitimate concerns.

For the foregoing reasons, I find the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated RPC 8.2(a) and order that the charge be dismissed. Respectfully submitted this 25th day of October 2024.

E.g., "'[I]t is clear that lawyers do not forfeit the right to speak or write freely or to petition the 1 government just because they are 'officers of the courts.' In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474, 591 P.2d 728 (1979) (Citation omitted). If an attorney's activity or speech is protected by the First Amendment, attorney disciplinary rules cannot punish the attorney's conduct. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432- 33, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 355, 365, 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1054, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part)." Respondent's Trial Memo at 14. E.g., "It is settled law in Oregon that a lawyer may not be disciplined by this body for a statement 2 unless the rule alleged is in conformity with the free speech protections of the Oregon Constitution. Cf.

In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 591 P.2d 728 (1979) (interpreting former DR 7-107 narrowly to avoid

conflict with Article I § 8 of the Oregon Constitution when an attorney wrote to various members of the public regarding a decision pending in an administrative proceeding) with In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983) (holding that a prosecutor did not violate former DR 7-107(B)(5) where the Bar failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor intended to prejudice the jury with his comments to a newspaper reporter)." Respondent's Trial Memo at 16.

Cite as In re Turner, 38 DB Rptr 159 (2024)

) STEVEN TURNER, Bar No. 091643 ) Case No. 24-117 )

Counsel for the Bar: Angela W. Bennett

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.4(a), RPC 1.4(b), RPC 3.4(d), and RPC 3.4(e). Order granting BR 3.5 petition for reciprocal discipline. Public reprimand. Effective Date of Order: January 4, 2025

This matter is before me on the Oregon State Bar's (Bar) Petition for Reciprocal Disci- pline pursuant to BR 3.5 filed November 7, 2024. Respondent answered the petition on November 27, 2024. The Bar filed a reply on December 3, 2024. Respondent stipulated to a public reprimand as discipline in the state of Washington by order dated April 1, 2024. The misconduct occurred in connection with Respondent's repre- sentation of a company in litigation against a former employee. Respondent stipulated that he failed to provide certain checks in discovery to the defendant in violation of Washington Rule of Professional Conduct (WRPC) 3.4(d); that he failed to advise his clients that he had not produced the checks, and/or he failed to adequately explain why the checks were excluded from evidence at trial in violation of WRPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b); and that by asking to present the excluded checks during trial he violated WRPC 3.4(e). See Stipulation to Reprimand at 4- 5 (Exhibit 1 to the Bar's petition). Respondent does not contest the imposition of reciprocal discipline. Respondent's only objection to the petition is that he does not agree with the discussion of facts presented by the Bar "to the extent it seeks to summarize or characterize the facts that I stipulated to," and "the only facts he is willing to agree with are those set forth verbatim" in the Washington stipula- tion. Answer to Petition for Reciprocal Discipline (BR 3.5). Although this is not an enumerated defense in a reciprocal discipline case, Respondent need not be concerned that he is accepting the Bar's recitation or summary of facts by declining to contest the imposition of reciprocal discipline. The stipulation itself is the only actual evidence in the record of the misconduct involved here. Summary and characterization are not evidence. The only factual matters established in this proceeding are those expressly set forth in the stipulation.

Cite as In re Turner, 38 DB Rptr 159 (2024) BR 3.5(d) allows me, in my discretion, to decide the question of imposition of reciprocal discipline on the record submitted. Based on the stipulation for discipline entered into in Washington on April 1, 2024, and being otherwise fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Reciprocal Discipline is GRANTED and Respondent is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED. DATED this 4 day of December 2024. th

) ERINN M. CYPHER, Bar No. 115794 ) Case No. 23-198 )

Disposition: Violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). Stipulation for Discipline. 30-day suspension. Effective Date of Order: December 21, 2024

This matter having been heard upon the Stipulation for Discipline entered into by Erinn

1. Cypher (Respondent) and the Oregon State Bar, and good cause appearing, Respondent is suspended for thirty (30) days, effective December 21, 2024, for violation of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b). DATED this 16th day of December 2024.

Erinn M. Cypher, attorney at law (Respondent), and the Oregon State Bar (Bar) hereby

Oregon on October 11, 2011, and has been a member of the Bar continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Jackson County, Oregon.

On March 26, 2024, a formal complaint was filed against Respondent pursuant to the authorization of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) for alleged violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this Stipulation for Discipline set forth all relevant facts, violations and the agreed- upon sanction as a final disposition of the proceeding.

Facts

In July 2020, a husband and wife (the clients) retained Respondent to draft and facilitate the execution of estate documents, including the establishment of a revocable living trust. During the initial meeting with the clients, Respondent indicated to them that, due to several factors, it would take a longer time than normal for him to produce work product for their review. In September 2021, approximately 15 months later, the clients had not received any drafts or further communication from Respondent. The clients called Respondent's law office seeking information but did not reach anyone directly. Respondent's staff tried unsuccessfully to call them and sent an email that was not returned undeliverable but that the clients did not receive. Respondent did not further confirm that the clients obtained a response to their request for information.

By April 2022, after having still not received drafts or communication from Respon- dent, the clients again called Respondent's law office for a status update and left a voicemail. Both Respondent and his staff tried unsuccessfully to reach the clients by phone using the contact information provided by the clients; Respondent did not take further action to respond to the request for information.

By March 2023, Respondent had not yet completed drafts of all the trust documents, and he had not provided any of the documents he had drafted to the clients for review. That month, Respondent emailed the clients seeking a time to meet to discuss the contents of the draft documents in person. Respondent used the email address they provided to Respondent when retained, but they did not receive the email though it was not returned undeliverable. Respondent took no further action to confirm that they had received the information from his email.

In June 2023, nearly three years after they had retained Respondent, the clients had received no drafts of estate documents from Respondent and he had not been able to communi- cate with them further regarding the matter, leading the clients to complain to the Bar about his conduct.

Respondent admits that, based on his conduct as described in paragraphs 5 through 8 above, he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of RPC 1.3, he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their matter and failed to promptly respond to reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4(a), and he failed to explain that his work on the trust documents was significantly delayed, which was reasonably necessary to permit the Cardinals to make informed decisions regarding whether to continue the representa- tion in violation of RPC 1.4(b).

Sanction

stances.

1. Duty Violated. The most important ethical duties are those a lawyer owes to clients. ABA Standards at 5. Respondent violated his duty to act with reason-

Respondent acted knowingly in failing to complete drafts of the estate docu- ments in a timely manner and failing to respond to his clients' requests for information, including that his work on their matter was significantly delayed.

1. Injury. A trial panel may take into account both actual and potential injury when determining an appropriate disciplinary sanction. ABA Standards at 6;

In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992). Respondent caused

actual injury to his clients in the form of anxiety and frustration. See In re

Cohen, 330 Or 489, 496, 8 P3d 953 (2000) (client anxiety and frustration can

constitute actual injury under the ABA Standards), citing In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 426-27, 939 P2d 39 (1997). Respondent caused potential injury to his clients, as his significant delay in completing their matter meant they were without an estate plan.

Respondent was admitted to practice in Oregon in 2011.

1. Cooperative attitude toward proceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e).
2. Remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l). Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services to a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.42.

Under Oregon case law, lawyers who knowingly neglect a legal matter or fail to keep clients informed over significant periods of time are generally suspended. See In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 153 P3d 113 (2007) (lawyer suspended for 60 days for neglect of a legal matter);

In re Snyder, 348 Or 307, 232 P3d 952 (2010) (lawyer suspended for 30 days for failing to

communicate with his client). Given that the factors in mitigation outweigh those in aggrava- tion, and that the client injury falls on the lower end of the spectrum, a 30-day suspension as a sanction is sufficient in this case.

dent shall be suspended for 30 days for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.4(b), the sanction to be effective December 21, 2024.

In addition, on or before March 1, 2025, Respondent shall pay to the Bar its reasonable and necessary costs in the amount of $531.45 incurred for Respondent's deposition. Should Respondent fail to pay $531.45 in full by March 1, 2025, the Bar may thereafter, without further notice to him, obtain a judgment against Respondent for the unpaid balance, plus interest thereon at the legal rate to accrue from the date the judgment is signed until paid in full.

dent has arranged for Zachary W. Light, 14 N Central Avenue, Suite 101, Medford, Oregon 97501, an active member of the Bar, to either take possession of or have ongoing access to Respondent's client files and serve as the contact person for clients in need of the files during the term of his suspension. Respondent represents that Zachary W. Light has agreed to accept this responsibility.

EXECUTED this 12th day of December 2024. /s/ Erinn M. Cypher Erinn M. Cypher, OSB No. 115794

EXECUTED this 13th day of December 2024.