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S.1884 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025

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Summary

The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025 (S.1884) amends the 2016 Act by adding an intent clause (new paragraph (8)) that expressly identifies courts that have frustrated congressional intent, including Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art (2d Cir. 2019), Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation (9th Cir. 2024), and Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum (9th Cir. 2018). The amendment also explicitly precludes time-based defenses (laches, adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, usucapion) and other non-merits discretionary defenses (act of state doctrine, forum non conveniens, international comity, prudential exhaustion) from being used to dismiss covered claims.

What changed

The amendment adds a new paragraph (8) to section 2 of the 2016 Act, expressly stating Congress's intent that claims for Nazi-looted art be resolved on the merits rather than dismissed on procedural or time-based grounds. The amendment identifies specific judicial decisions that frustrated congressional intent and explicitly precludes reliance on laches, adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, usucapion, act of state doctrine, forum non conveniens, international comity, and prudential exhaustion defenses.

Affected parties include museums, art dealers, collectors, and other holders of potentially looted cultural property. Courts hearing these claims must now evaluate them on substantive merits rather than dismissing based on the passage of time or discretionary procedural defenses. This substantially increases litigation exposure for institutions holding works of art that may have been confiscated during the Holocaust.

What to do next

  1. Museums and art institutions should review collections for potential Nazi-looted art exposure
  2. Holders of potentially looted artwork should consult legal counsel on emerging claims risk
  3. Claimants seeking recovery of Nazi-confiscated art may pursue claims previously subject to dismissal

Archived snapshot

Apr 16, 2026

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S.1884 - Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025 119th Congress (2025-2026) | Get alerts

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Text: S.1884 — 119th Congress (2025-2026) All Information (Except Text)

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Enrolled Bill

| | S. 1884 | | |

| | | | | |
| |
AT THE SECOND SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Saturday,
the third day of January, two thousand and twenty six

  • To clarify the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, to appropriately limit the application of defenses based on the passage of time and other non-merits defenses to claims under that Act. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025”.

SEC. 2. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 improvements.

(a) In general.—The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 1621 note) is amended—

(1) in section 2—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (10);

(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:

“(8) The intent of this Act is to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be brought, notwithstanding the passage of time since World War II. Some courts have frustrated the intent of this Act by dismissing recovery lawsuits in reliance on defenses based on the passage of time, such as laches (for example, Zuckerman v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019)) or adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, or usucapion (for example, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation, 89 F.4th 1226 (9th Cir. 2024)) or on other non-merits discretionary defenses, such as the act of state doctrine (for example, Von Saher v Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018)), forum non conveniens, international comity, or prudential exhaustion. In order to effectuate the purpose of the Act to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be resolved on the merits, these defenses must be precluded.

“(9) This Act also is intended to allow claims in accordance with the procedures under this Act for the recovery of artwork or other property lost during the covered period because, or as a result, of Nazi persecution, including by a covered government (as defined in section 1605(h)(3)(B) of title 28, United States Code) or an agent or associate of a covered government, regardless of the nationality or citizenship of the alleged victim, notwithstanding the ‘domestic takings’ rule under Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169 (2021).”; and

(C) in paragraph (10), as so redesignated, by striking “will yield just and fair resolutions in a more efficient and predictable manner” and inserting “may, in some circumstances, yield just and fair resolutions as well”;

(2) in section 3(2), by inserting “and other non-merits defenses” after “statutes of limitation”;

(3) in section 5—

(A) by striking subsection (g);

(B) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (h) and (i), respectively;

(C) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d) as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively;

(D) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) Relation to foreign state immunities.—Notwithstanding any other law or prior judicial decision, any civil claim or cause of action covered by subsection (a) shall be deemed to be an action in which rights in violation of international law are in issue for purposes of section 1605(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, without regard to the nationality or citizenship of the alleged victim.”;

(E) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (e)” and inserting “subsection (h)”;

(F) in subsection (e), as so redesignated—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “Subsection (a)” and inserting “Subsections (a), (b), (f), and (g)”; and

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking “during the period” and all that follows and inserting “on or after the date of enactment of this Act.”; and

(G) by inserting after subsection (e), as so redesignated, the following:

“(f) Defenses based on passage of time and other non-Merits defenses.—With respect to any claim that is otherwise timely under this Act—

“(1) all defenses or substantive doctrines based on the passage of time, including laches, adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, and usucapion, may not be applied with respect to the claim; and

“(2) all non-merits discretionary bases for dismissal, including the act of state doctrine, international comity, forum non conveniens, prudential exhaustion, and similar doctrines unrelated to the merits, may not be applied with respect to the claim.

“(g) Nationwide service of process.—For a civil action brought under subsection (a) in any State or Federal court, process may be served in the judicial district where the case is brought or any other judicial district of the United States where the defendant may be found, resides, has an agent, or transacts business.”; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 6. Severability.

“If any provision of this Act, or the application of a provision of this Act to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.”.

(b) Applicability.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any civil claim or cause of action that is—

(1) pending in any court on the date of enactment of this Act, including any civil claim or cause of action that is pending on appeal or for which the time to file an appeal has not expired; or

(2) filed on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

| Speaker of the House of Representatives |

| Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate | | Speaker of the House of Representatives | Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate | |
| Speaker of the House of Representatives | | | | |
| Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate | | | | |

Named provisions

Section 1 - Short title Section 2 - Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 improvements

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Classification

Agency
Congress
Published
April 13th, 2025
Instrument
Rule
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive
Document ID
S. 1884, 119th Congress (2025-2026)
Supersedes
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016

Who this affects

Applies to
Museums Retailers Consumers
Industry sector
9211 Government & Public Administration
Activity scope
Art restitution claims Cultural property litigation Nazi-looted art recovery
Geographic scope
United States US

Taxonomy

Primary area
International Trade
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Judicial Administration Cultural Heritage

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