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Derailment at Denbigh Hall South Junction, 26 June 2025

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Summary

An out-of-service passenger train travelling at 15 mph (24 km/h) derailed at Denbigh Hall South Junction on the West Coast Main Line on 26 June 2025. The train was making a wrong-direction movement over the junction when it derailed on switch diamond points that were in an unsafe position. No injuries occurred but damage was caused to the train and railway infrastructure. RAIB has made four recommendations addressed to Network Rail, West Midlands Trains, and the Rail Safety and Standards Board, covering signalling staff training on wrong-direction movements, staff knowledge of switch diamond points, and potential Rule Book amendments to account for signals at danger near the start of wrong-direction movements.

“At about 12:27 on 26 June 2025, an out-of-service passenger train travelling at 15 mph (24 km/h) derailed as it passed over Denbigh Hall South Junction, on the West Coast Main Line, between Bletchley and Milton Keynes Central stations.”

RAIB , verbatim from source
Why this matters

Railway operators and infrastructure managers should review their signaller training programmes against the competency gaps identified here: wrong-direction movement procedures and switch diamond point recognition. Where Rule Book modules for TSIs 071 and 072 (or equivalent) are in use, safety teams should assess whether the information and strategies used by experienced signallers are adequately captured in current training materials. The finding that a signal at danger at the start of a wrong-direction movement created an unintended Rule Book gap may have implications beyond West Coast Main Line.

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What changed

RAIB's investigation found that signalling staff at Rugby Signalling Control Centre proposed and implemented a train path they did not realise was invalid, and subsequent checking activities did not identify this error. The train crew in the leading cab also did not notice the unsafe switch diamond point position. The investigation identified that staff had variable knowledge and understanding of switch diamond points and how trains operate over them, and that Rule Book training for authorising wrong-direction movements did not sufficiently account for strategies used by experienced signallers. Affected parties include Network Rail signallers, who may require new training on setting up and checking train paths during out-of-course events, and railway operators who should ensure staff have appropriate knowledge of switch diamond points. The Rail Safety and Standards Board has been asked to consider whether the Rule Book needs to address signals at danger located at or near the start of planned wrong-direction movements.

Archived snapshot

Apr 16, 2026

GovPing captured this document from the original source. If the source has since changed or been removed, this is the text as it existed at that time.

Report 04/2026: Derailment at Denbigh Hall South Junction

Derailment at Denbigh Hall South Junction, near Bletchley, Buckinghamshire, 26 June 2025.

From: Rail Accident Investigation Branch Published 13 April 2026 Railway type: Heavy rail Report type: Investigation report Date of occurrence: 26 June 2025 R042026260413Denbigh Hall South Junction

Summary

At about 12:27 on 26 June 2025, an out-of-service passenger train travelling at 15 mph (24 km/h) derailed as it passed over Denbigh Hall South Junction, on the West Coast Main Line, between Bletchley and Milton Keynes Central stations. At the time of the derailment, soon after the start of its journey from Bletchley station to a depot at Northampton, the train was making a wrong-direction movement over the junction. There were no injuries to any of the four members of train crew on the train but damage was caused to the train and to railway infrastructure.

The train derailed on switch diamond points which were in an unsafe position for the direction that the train was travelling over them. It had been necessary for the train to make a wrong-direction movement due to a fault which had prevented the driver from moving the train from the cab at one end. Once the need for the wrong-direction movement was identified and agreed, signalling staff at Rugby Signalling Control Centre proposed and then implemented a path for the train which they did not realise was invalid. Subsequent checking activities by these signalling staff did not identify this. When the train then arrived at the junction, no one in the train’s leading cab noticed that the switch diamond points were in an unsafe position for the train to pass over them.

A probable underlying factor to the accident was the staff involved had variable knowledge and understanding of what switch diamond points were and how trains operated over them. A possible underlying factor was that the training for signallers, when applying the Rule Book modules for authorising a train to pass a signal at danger (red) and for wrong-direction movements, did not sufficiently account for the information, strategies and knowledge used by experienced signallers.

As part of its investigation, RAIB also observed that the Rule Book did not cover the specific circumstances of this wrong-direction movement. This meant that the signaller was unintentionally not following the rules when they had authorised the driver to pass a signal at danger at the start of the movement.

Recommendations

RAIB has made four recommendations as a result of this investigation. The first is addressed to Network Rail to provide training to signallers on the tools and techniques that can be used when setting up and checking the proposed path for a train to take during an out‑of‑course event. The second and third, addressed to Network Rail and West Midlands Trains respectively, are to develop training for staff to give them the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of switch diamond points to allow them to undertake their duties in accordance with the Rule Book. The fourth is addressed to the Rail Safety and Standards Board, in consultation with the rail industry, to consider whether the Rule Book needs to account for the scenario where a signal at danger is located at, or near to, the start of a planned wrong‑direction movement.

RAIB also identified four learning points. They cover staff understanding the impact that personal issues can have on themselves; the importance of staff taking the time to stop and check again, or continuing to challenge if unsure; reminding signallers that they should ask a competent person, if present, to check the path that they have set up for the wrong-direction movement; and reminding drivers that during a wrong‑direction movement, they can approach a junction at a speed slower than 15 mph (or 25 km/h) to give themselves more time to make sure, if possible, that any points, switch diamonds or swing-nose crossings are in the correct position.

Updates to this page

Published 13 April 2026

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Last updated

Classification

Agency
RAIB
Published
April 13th, 2026
Instrument
Notice
Branch
Executive
Legal weight
Non-binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive
Document ID
Report 04/2026

Who this affects

Applies to
Transportation companies
Industry sector
4811 Air Transportation
Activity scope
Rail safety investigation Wrong-direction movements Signaller training
Geographic scope
United Kingdom GB

Taxonomy

Primary area
Transportation
Operational domain
Quality Assurance
Topics
Public Health Occupational Safety

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