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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Jesse Rance Moore

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-10447
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10447 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 24-10447
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

JESSE RANCE MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00079-LAB-JBT-1

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Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Jesse Moore guilty of one count of conspiracy
to commit robbery, three counts of robbery, and three counts of
brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of
USCA11 Case: 24-10447 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 2 of 8

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10447

violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 924(c). The charges stemmed from
the armed robbery of three pharmacies in Florida.
Mr. Moore argues on appeal that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress any evidence or statements derived
from his encounter with Officer Nigel Elliot. According to Mr.
Moore, Officer Elliot conducted an investigatory stop without rea-
sonable suspicion or probable cause. Mr. Moore also contends that
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress any evi-
dence or statements derived from law enforcement officers’ search
of his property because the “open fields” doctrine has been called
into question and he did not consent to a warrantless search. Fol-
lowing a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I
A ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. See United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th
Cir. 2006). We conduct plenary review of legal conclusions and
clear error review of factual findings, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the party which prevailed below. See United
States v. Holmes, 141 F.4th 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2025). We generally
defer to the credibility determinations of the factfinder unless its
understanding of the facts appears to be unbelievable. See United
States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015).
II
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
USCA11 Case: 24-10447 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 3 of 8

24-10447 Opinion of the Court 3

U.S. Const. amend. IV. As relevant here, it shields persons from
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officers un-
der certain circumstances, and subject to certain exceptions. See
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
Evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches and
seizures is generally inadmissible. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
654–55 (1961). This exclusionary rule extends beyond the direct
products of the constitutional violation to the “fruit of the poison-
ous tree”—evidence that became available only through the exploi-
tation of the police misconduct, rather than through an independ-
ent, legitimate search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487–48 (1963).
A
We classify encounters between police and citizens as:
“(1) police-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention;
(2) brief seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) full-scale ar-
rests.” Perez, 443 F.3d at 777. Police-citizen exchanges, or consen-
sual encounters, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id.
The standard to determine whether an investigatory stop has oc-
curred is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, an ob-
jective, reasonable, innocent person “would feel free to terminate
the encounter.” United States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). We consider circumstances
such as the person’s age, education, and intelligence; whether the
person’s path was blocked by the police; the length of detention
and questioning; whether identification was requested; the number
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10447

of officers present; the display of weapons; any physical touching
of the person by an officer; and the officers’ language and tone of
voice. See Perez, 443 F.3d at 778.
Following an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge con-
cluded that the encounter between Mr. Moore and Officer Elliott
was consensual. See D.E. 67 at 2. The district court later adopted
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See D.E. 88.
The magistrate judge based his conclusion on the following
facts, which he found after determining that Officer Elliott was a
credible witness: (1) Officer Elliott—who was wearing a polo with
the insignia for the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office—was driving
on County Road 240 towards Columbia County in an unmarked
police vehicle while being on the lookout for a silver or blue-gray
Hyundai that might have been involved in a robbery of the North
Florida Pharmacy in Fort White, Florida; (2) Officer Elliott saw a
car on the north side of the highway that matched the description
of the vehicle involved in the robbery; (3) the car was stopped off
the road near the entry to an undeveloped and semi-wooded prop-
erty containing two posts and a cable across the posts; (4) Officer
Elliott decided to stop not because of the possible match, but be-
cause he thought the couple (a man and a woman) who were stand-
ing outside of the car were arguing and he did not want the situa-
tion to escalate; (5) Officer Elliott pulled in behind the car, and ac-
tivated his lights (but not his siren) to let the couple know that he
was a law enforcement officer; (6) Officer Elliott placed his police
vehicle behind the couple’s car, leaving enough room for the car to
USCA11 Case: 24-10447 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 5 of 8

24-10447 Opinion of the Court 5

back out or pull forward by removing the cable across the posts;
(7) Officer Elliott stepped out of his vehicle without drawing his
weapon and was met by the woman, who told him that the prop-
erty belonged to her and the man she was with and that they were
clearing the property and planting trees; (8) Officer Elliott did not
mention the robbery, did not ask the woman any questions about
the robbery, and did not ask the woman to call the man (who was
Mr. Moore); (9) Officer Elliott got back into his police vehicle and
was leaving when Mr. Moore approached him and flagged him
down; (10) when Officer Elliott rolled down the window, Mr.
Moore told him that he and his companion were planting trees and
asked Officer Elliott if he wanted to stay and help them; and
(11) Officer Elliott then left without asking the couple for any iden-
tification or asking any questions about the robbery. See D.E. 67 at
4–7.
We see no error—factual or legal—in the magistrate judge’s
conclusion that the encounter was consensual. As a result, Officer
Elliott did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Pe-
rez, 443 F.3d at 777.
Given the facts summarized above, a reasonable person in
Mr. Moore’s position would have felt free to leave. Indeed, it was
Mr. Moore who approached Officer Elliott as he was leaving. For
example, we have held that an officer parking his patrol car close to
the suspect’s car and approaching did not constitute an investiga-
tory stop because the suspect was capable of driving or walking
away and the officer did not display weapons, touch the suspect,
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10447

issue any commands, or ask for identification. See Knights, 989 F.3d
at 1286–87.
Under Knights, the encounter here was not an investigatory
stop. Although Mr. Moore argues that Officer Elliott parked his car
in such a way that he and his companion were not able to leave, see
Appellant’s Br. at 3, he has not shown that the magistrate judge’s
findings of fact about the encounter were clearly erroneous. See
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 293 (2017) (“A finding that is ‘plausible’
in light of the full record—even if another is equally or more so—
must govern.”) (citation omitted).
B
After departing, Officer Elliott called Detective Chad Guery,
who had responded to a pharmacy robbery in Fort White, had in-
terviewed pharmacy staff, and had taken down the description of
the car that the suspect was driving. See D.E. 67 at 7. At some
point, officers from the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office went on
Mr. Moore’s property—the land where Officer Elliott had met Mr.
Moore and his companion—without permission and/or a search
warrant. See id. at 2. Mr. Moore asserts that the officers trespassed
on his property to find a trailer and a tag, and used the information
they learned to obtain subpoenas and search warrants, which in
turn led to evidence creating probable cause to charge him. See
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
The magistrate judge ruled that the trespass of the officers
had “no relevance” because Mr. Moore’s property was a semi-
wooded and undeveloped lot that did not contain a home or other
USCA11 Case: 24-10447 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 7 of 8

24-10447 Opinion of the Court 7

structure. The property, the magistrate judge reasoned, could not
be considered curtilage and was an “open field” to which a reason-
able expectation of property did not attach under Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–83 (1984). See D.E. 67 at 2–3.
Again, we conclude that the magistrate judge did not err.
Persons have “no reasonable expectation of privacy for activities
conducted out of doors, in open fields, except in the areas shielded
from view and immediately surrounding the home.” United States
v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S.
at 178). A person’s residence and the area immediately surround-
ing the residence are constitutionally protected spaces, but the
Fourth Amendment distinguishes between residences and “open
fields.” See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). The Fourth
Amendment does “not extend protection to open fields, which in-
cludes any unoccupied or undeveloped area beyond the immediate
domestic establishment of the home.” Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1208
(quotation marks omitted). Steps taken to protect the privacy of
an open field, moreover, do not create an expectation of privacy in
that field. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 (concluding that fences and
“No Trespassing” signs did not create a legitimate expectation of
privacy in an open field).
Mr. Moore contends that the “open fields” doctrine set out
in Oliver has been undermined by more recent Supreme Court
cases. See Appellant’s Br. at 7–8. Whatever the merits of that argu-
ment, the Supreme Court has not overruled Oliver and we are not
at liberty to ignore it. Indeed, one of the cases cited by Mr. Moore
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10447

acknowledges the continuing vitality of the “open fields” doctrine.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (“The Fourth Amendment does not . . .
prevent all investigations conducted on private property; for exam-
ple, an officer may (subject to Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)]) gather information in what we have called ‘open fields’—
even if those fields are privately owned—because such fields are not
enumerated in the Amendment’s text.”).
III
Mr. Moore’s convictions are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.