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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Waseem Daker v. Gregory Dozier

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-13122
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (988)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-13122 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 1 of 9

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 24-13122
Non-Argument Calendar

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WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

GREGORY DOZIER,
former GDC Commissioner,
HOMER BRYSON,
former GDC Commissioner,
TIMOTHY WARD,
former GDC Assistant Commissioner,
RICK JACOBS,
former GDC Facilities Director,
DEPUTY FACILITIES DIRECTOR, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 24-13122 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 2 of 9

2 Opinion of the Court 24-13122

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-00072-JRH-CLR

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Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Waseem Daker appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismiss-
ing his complaint for failure to comply with the District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia’s (“Northern District”) filing in-
junction (“Order”). Daker makes six arguments as to how the dis-
trict court abused its discretion: (1) the Order is an impermissible
universal or nationwide injunction pursuant to Trump v. CASA, Inc.,
606 U.S. 831 (2025), (2) the warning that failure to comply with the
Order would result in summary dismissal only applies to the
Northern District, (3) Daker’s amended complaint corrected any
issues, (4) the district court did not accept Daker’s factual allega-
tions as true, (5) Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025), required the
district court to submit Daker’s court-access claims to a jury, and
(6) dismissal with prejudice was impermissible.
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24-13122 Opinion of the Court 3

I. DISCUSSION
A. Universal Injunction
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his complaint for failure to comply with the Order be-
cause the Order is an impermissible universal or nationwide injunc-
tion pursuant to Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025).
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to
comply with a court order for abuse of discretion. Foudy v. Indian
River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017).
We review questions of constitutional law de novo. Kentner
v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014).
In CASA, the Supreme Court held that universal injunctions
are beyond the power of the federal courts because the Judiciary
Act does not permit them, and federal courts “resolve cases and
controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given
them.” 606 U.S. at 847, 861. The Supreme Court stated that “[s]uch
[universal] injunctions are sometimes called ‘nationwide injunc-
tions,’ reflecting their use by a single district court to bar the en-
forcement of a law anywhere in the [n]ation.” Id. at 837 n.1. How-
ever, the Supreme Court further stated that “the term ‘universal’
better captures how these injunctions work,” because “[e]ven a tra-
ditional, parties-only injunction can apply beyond the jurisdiction
of the issuing court.” Id. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he
difference between a traditional injunction and a universal injunc-
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13122

tion is not so much where it applies, but whom it protects: [a] uni-
versal injunction prohibits the [g]overnment from enforcing the
law against anyone, anywhere.” Id. (italics in original).
We have stated that “[f ]ederal courts have both the inherent
power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction
from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III
functions.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986)
(en banc). The courts have “a responsibility to prevent single liti-
gants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery
needed by others.” Id. at 1074. One means through which the
courts can execute this responsibility is through the “power to en-
ter injunctive relief against such a recalcitrant litigant.” Id. We
have also stated that “the district courts are authorized by the All
Writs Act” to issue injunctions “to restrict access to vexatious and
abusive litigants.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir.
2008).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion because
the Order is not a universal injunction. The injunction is limited to
Daker, who is a party in the litigation, and it does not “prohibit[]
the [g]overnment from enforcing the law against anyone, any-
where.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 837 n.1 (italics in original). Because the
Order is not a universal injunction, it is not barred by the Judiciary
Act. Id. at 847.

B. Failure to Comply Warning
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24-13122 Opinion of the Court 5

On appeal, Daker argues that the district court abused its
discretion by dismissing his complaint because the warning that
failure to comply with the Order would result in summary dismis-
sal only applies to the Northern District and does not warn him of
dismissal in other courts. But this Court held in a recent un-
published opinion that, “contrary to Daker’s assertion, the [Order]
clearly stated that it applied outside of the Northern District.”
Daker v. Hays SP Warden (Daker II), No. 23 12852, manuscript op. at
6 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026). Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion because Daker received warning that failure to
comply with the Northern District’s Order would result in dismis-
sal in the district court.

C. Amended Complaint
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his amended complaint because dismissal was overly
harsh, his amended complaint showed that he tried to comply with
the Order, he had a right to amend and timely did so pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) (“Rule 15(a)(1)”), and the
amended complaint was operative and mooted any issues with the
original complaint.
Rule 15(a)(1) states that:
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of
course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13122

(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive plead-
ing is required, 21 days after service of a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f ), whichever is earlier.
Daker’s amended complaint failed to comply with the Order
by omitting a copy of it, the district court reasonably determined
that his litigiousness indicated that he did not attempt to comply in
good faith, and the district court reasonably determined that allow-
ing belated compliance would overlook abuse. In addition, even if
this Court were to address Daker’s timeliness argument, he tacitly
admits that a reading of the plain language of Rule 15(a)(1) would
not allow his amendment, given that he did not file his amended
complaint within 21 days after his original complaint, and there has
been no response or service of an apt motion. Thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion because Daker’s amended com-
plaint failed to comply with the Order.

D. Allegations in the Complaint
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his amended complaint without accepting his allega-
tions that prison staff denied him access to stored legal materials
and photocopying and destroyed his only copy of the Order as true
because they showed good cause as to why he did not comply with
the Order.
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24-13122 Opinion of the Court 7

We have held that a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 and
RLUIPA claim for failure to state a claim should view the allega-
tions in the complaint as true. See Dorman v. Chaplains Off. BSO, 36
F.4th 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2022). However, the district court did
not abuse its discretion because it did not dismiss Daker’s com-
plaint for failure to state a claim; rather, it dismissed Daker’s com-
plaint for failure to comply with a court order.

E. Court-Access Claims to a Jury
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his complaint without submitting his court-access
claims to a jury because Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025), re-
quires such since his claims were intertwined with the merits of
whether there was a showing of good cause for failure to comply
with the Order. In Perttu, the Supreme Court held that inmates
“have a right to a jury trial on [Prison Litigation Reform Act] ex-
haustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim
that falls under the Seventh Amendment” right to a jury trial. 605
U.S. at 468.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion because
it did not dismiss Daker’s complaint for lack of exhaustion; rather,
it dismissed Daker’s complaint for failure to comply with a court
order.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13122

F. Dismissal with Prejudice
Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his complaint effectively with prejudice pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) because defend-
ants were unserved and the district court therefore lacked personal
jurisdiction over them, neither the magistrate judge nor the district
court made the required findings for a dismissal with prejudice, and
the Northern District has said that such summary dismissal for non
compliance should be without prejudice.
Rule 41(b) states that:
If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the
dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under
this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this
rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—oper-
ates as an adjudication on the merits.
We have held that a district court may order a dismissal
with prejudice when it makes the required findings that “(1) a party
engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt (contuma-
cious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds that lesser
sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada,
432 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). A dis-
trict court may implicitly find that less severe sanctions would not
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24-13122 Opinion of the Court 9

sufficiently penalize the party’s conduct. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d
479, 484 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion because
dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. The district court here
also did not specify whether its dismissal was with prejudice but,
assuming that it was pursuant to Rule 41(b), it made the required
findings that Daker engaged in contumacious conduct by blatantly
disregarding the Order and, implicitly, that no less severe sanction
would sufficiently penalize his conduct. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Daker’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.