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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Keith Edwards v. Officer J. Grubbs

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-12787

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (84)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (633)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 1 of 47

FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

---

No. 24-12787

---

KEITH EDWARDS,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Jerry Blasingame, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

OFFICER J. GRUBBS,

6416,

Defendant-Appellant,
CITY OF ATLANTA,
ATLANTA POLICE DEPT.,
Defendants.

---

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ

---

USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 2 of 47

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

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No. 24-12925

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KEITH EDWARDS,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jerry Blasingame, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

OFFICER J. GRUBBS,

6416,

THE CITY OF ATLANTA,
Defendants-Appellees,
ATLANTA POLICE DEPT.,
Defendant.

---

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ

---

USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026 Page: 3 of 47

24-12787 Opinion of the Court 3

Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL,*
District Judge.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
These consolidated appeals involve a single use-of-force in-
cident in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 10, 2018. On that fateful day,
City of Atlanta Police Officer Jon Grubbs pulled his taser’s trigger,
hit Jerry Blasingame in the back, and sent him barreling down a
steep embankment that led to a metal utility box on a concrete plat-
form at the bottom. Mr. Blasingame suffered severe injuries when
he hit the box and platform, and his guardian sued Officer Grubbs
and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury found against Officer
Grubbs and the City and awarded significant compensatory and
punitive damages. The district court granted the City’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law, and reduced the award of punitive
damages against Officer Grubbs.
We confront a number of issues on appeal, including quali-
fied immunity, municipal liability, and the constitutional limits on
punitive damage awards. Based on our review of the record, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in all respects.

• Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for

the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

I
A
Around 2:30 p.m. on July 10, 2018, Officer Grubbs and his
partner patrolled the streets of Atlanta, Georgia, near an on-ramp
to Interstate 20. Traffic was heavy, as it so often is, and the two
officers observed Mr. Blasingame—a 65-year-old homeless man—
on the side of the roadway reaching into a vehicle and receiving
money from the driver. Officer Grubbs’ partner parked the police
cruiser in the nearby gore. Officer Grubbs then exited the cruiser
to confront Mr. Blasingame.
When Mr. Blasingame saw Officer Grubbs, he ran. Officer
Grubbs crossed two lanes of traffic and chased Mr. Blasingame on
the shoulder of the road. Officer Grubbs ordered Mr. Blasingame
to stop, but he continued to flee.
As Officer Grubbs drew closer, Mr. Blasingame crossed over
a roadside guardrail. Mr. Blasingame, who was unarmed, did not
cause Officer Grubbs to be in imminent fear, and did not say any-
thing to Officer Grubbs during this chase.
Beyond the guardrail, Mr. Blasingame made his way to-
wards an opening in the brush with a steep decline and the highway
below. Without verbal warning, Officer Grubbs drew and de-
ployed his taser, hitting Mr. Blasingame in the back. This caused
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 5

Mr. Blasingame to fall down the steep embankment where he hit
his head on the concrete platform of a utility box. 1
Emergency medical services estimated the embankment to
be 30 feet long. The distance between the point of impact on the
utility box and the guardrail was approximately 23 feet and 9
inches. The angle of the decline was approximately 30 to 40 de-
grees, as displayed in these photographs and diagrams of the scene:

D.E. 211-31 at 4.

1 The entire chase had taken approximately 45 seconds.
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

D.E. 211-31 at 9.

2

2 This diagram was created with generative artificial intelligence.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 7

Emergency medical services transported Mr. Blasingame to
Grady Hospital in critical condition. Mr. Blasingame suffered,
among other injuries, traumatic brain damage and became quadri-
plegic due to a spinal injury. Nearly a month later, on August 9,
2018, Officer Grubbs visited Mr. Blasingame—who was still at
Grady Hospital—to give him a citation for two misdemeanor of-
fenses: (1) pedestrian solicitation on a roadway in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97 and (2) obstruction of a law enforcement officer
in violation of O.C.G.A. 17-4-6.
This event was not recorded because Officer Grubbs’ body-
worn camera was in “buffering mode” from 1:48 p.m. to 2:36 p.m.
Buffering mode records for up to two minutes at a time and then
erases the footage. At 2:36 p.m., Officer Grubbs’ body-worn cam-
era was turned off.3
The City of Atlanta performed an audit on the use of body-
worn cameras by its police officers from November of 2017
through May of 2018. The audit found that officers assigned body-
worn cameras captured body-worn camera footage for only 33%
of dispatch calls despite a policy that officers shall record when ar-
riving at the scene of a call.

3 Mr. Edwards’ experts opined that Officer Grubbs turned off his body-worn

camera intentionally. Officer Grubbs reactivated his body-worn camera once
he was at the bottom of the embankment, with Mr. Blasingame unconscious,
but by then the footage had been erased.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

B
Keith Edwards, Mr. Blasingame’s guardian and conservator,
brought this suit against Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta,
asserting three claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Officer Grubbs and the
City; (2) a state-law assault and battery claim against Officer
Grubbs; and (3) a state-law respondeat superior claim against the
City. The district court granted an unopposed partial summary
judgment motion on the respondeat superior claim. The court
then entered a “stipulated order for voluntarily dismissal” of the
assault and battery claim. Before trial on the § 1983 claims, Officer
Grubbs did not move to dismiss or seek summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds.
In August of 2022, the parties proceeded to an eight-day trial
on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. At the close of
the defendants’ case, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ Rule
50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immun-
ity grounds. The jury returned a verdict totaling $100 million in
favor of Mr. Edwards: $60 million against the City and $40 million
against Officer Grubbs. The $40 million award against Officer
Grubbs consisted of $20 million in compensatory damages and $20
million in punitive damages.
Post-trial, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ renewed
Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified im-
munity grounds and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 9

court, however, granted Officer Grubbs’ motion for remittitur and
reduced the punitive damages award against him to $1 million.
The district court granted the City’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, overturned the jury’s verdict against
the City, and held that Mr. Edwards did not prove that the City’s
policies, customs, or practices were the moving force behind Of-
ficer Grubbs’ unconstitutional conduct. The court denied Mr. Ed-
wards’ Rule 60(b) motion for medical expenses and denied, with-
out prejudice, his motion for attorney’s fees. On September 7,
2023, Mr. Blasingame passed away.
Officer Grubbs appeals the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity in his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law
and his motion for reconsideration. Mr. Edwards appeals the dis-
trict court’s grant of the City’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as
a matter of law regarding municipal liability, the reduction of the
punitive damages award against Officer Grubbs, the denial of his
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and the denial of his
motion for attorney’s fees.
II
We first consider the district court’s denial of judgment as a
matter of law to Officer Grubbs based on qualified immunity. Of-
ficer Grubbs contends that the court improperly denied him the
protections of qualified immunity because, in his view, he did not
violate Mr. Blasingame’s clearly established Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force.
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

A
“The denial of qualified immunity is a question of law we
review de novo.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1246 n.1
(11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “We also review de novo a dis-
trict court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion.” Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v.
Airport Mini Mall, Ltd. Liab. Co., 932 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted).
“Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the facts
and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such
that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “We consider all the evidence, and the infer-
ences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party.” Id. (quotation omitted).
B
Mr. Edwards asserts that Officer Grubbs did not mention
qualified immunity until the middle of trial and thus has “waived”
its protections. See Br. for Appellee at 30. “Although jurists often
use the words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
458 n.13 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations
adopted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
Although “qualified immunity questions should be resolved
at the earliest possible stage of a litigation[,]” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (emphasis added), it is not a jurisdic-
tional defense that must be raised sua sponte. See Nevada v. Hicks,
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 11

533 U.S. 353, 373 (2001). “Qualified immunity,” in other words, “is
an affirmative defense that may be waived.” Bogle v. McClure, 332
F.3d 1347, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). For example,
it “must be pled, and if it is not, it is deemed waived.” Skrtich v.
Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore v. Mor-
gan, 922 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1991)). Here, Officer Grubbs pled qual-
ified immunity as a defense in his answer but did not move to dis-
miss or for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Ordinarily, “[a] defendant can forfeit an affirmative defense
by failing to raise it, and ‘an affirmative defense, once forfeited, is
excluded from the case.’” Patel v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 967 F.3d
1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463,
470 (2012)) (alterations adopted). For qualified immunity, “a de-
fendant is entitled to have any evidentiary disputes upon which the
qualified immunity defense turns decided by the jury so that the
court can apply the jury’s factual determinations to the law and en-
ter a post-trial decision on the defense.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d
1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). “When the case goes to trial, the
jury itself decides the issues of historical fact that are determinative
of the qualified immunity defense, but the jury does not apply the
law relating to qualified immunity to those historical facts it finds;
that is the court’s duty.” Id. (citations omitted).
Special interrogatories can be used when there are issues of
fact that may affect a qualified immunity defense. See Simmons v.
Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2018). In this case, Officer
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

Grubbs did not request any special interrogatories. The verdict
form asked the jury only one threshold question: “Do you find
from a preponderance of the evidence [ ] [t]hat Jerry Blasingame
was subjected to excessive or unreasonable force by Defendant Of-
ficer Jon Grubbs?” D.E. 163 at 1.
After Mr. Edwards rested his case, Officer Grubbs moved for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), arguing that he was
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court declined to grant
Officer Grubbs qualified immunity at that time; the court then de-
nied the motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the
defendants’ case. Officer Grubbs later renewed his motion pursu-
ant to Rule 50(b). The court again rejected Officer Grubbs’ quali-
fied immunity defense and denied the motion.
We reject Mr. Edwards’ contention that Officer Grubbs
waived or forfeited his qualified immunity defense. We do so be-
cause qualified immunity—which is both an immunity from suit
and a defense to liability—can be raised for the first time at trial
(assuming, of course, that it has been properly pled). See, e.g., Cyg-
nar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 842 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989); Spann
v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); White v. Bibb Cnty., 28
F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 1998). Cf. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1317
(“Defendants who are not successful with their qualified immunity
defense before trial can re-assert it at the end of the plaintiff’s case
in a Rule 50(a) motion.”) (citations omitted).
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 13

C
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government of-
ficials who perform discretionary functions from civil liability
when their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “To be eligible for qualified
immunity, a government official must first establish that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the al-
leged wrongful act occurred.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480
(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002)). Here, Mr. Edwards does not dispute that Officer Grubbs
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he
discharged his taser. See Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th
Cir. 2019) (police officers act within their discretionary authority
when they are “on duty . . . conducting arrest and investigative
functions”).
The burden therefore shifts to Mr. Edwards to establish that
qualified immunity does not apply. See Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480. He
can do this by proving (1) a violation of a constitutional right
(2) that “was clearly established at the time of [Officer Grubbs’] al-
leged misconduct.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317,
1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Ed-
wards “must satisfy both prongs of the analysis to overcome a de-
fense of qualified immunity.” Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480.
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

1
The Fourth Amendment forbids the use of excessive force
to apprehend a suspect. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Charles v. John-
son, 18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Amendment’s
objective reasonableness standard governs whether a law enforce-
ment officer’s use of force during an arrest or a seizure was exces-
sive. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–
22 (1968)).
Because this inquiry is an objective one, “the question is
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omit-
ted). We have distilled the evaluation of an officer’s use of force
into six factors:
(1) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (2) whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others,
(3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or
trying to flee, (4) the need for the use of force, (5) the
relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used, and (6) how much injury was
inflicted.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 15

Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Mobley
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam)).
If the force was lethal, “that is, force that an officer knows to
create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
harm[,] . . . we must also consider whether the officer” had “‘prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious phys-
ical harm, either to the officer or to others or that he has committed
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm” and whether the officer gave “some warning about
the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Bradley v. Benton, 10
F.4th 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). See also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (“[I]f the sus-
pect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause
to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.”).
The use of a taser is not per se deadly force. We have said,
however, that “tasing a person who is at an elevated height may
come with a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death.” Brad-
ley, 10 F.4th at 1241 (“join[ing] many other courts” to consider the
issue). When a suspect is in a vulnerable and dangerous elevated
position, the use of a taser becomes equivalent to deadly force be-
cause it “has the capacity to completely incapacitate [the] individ-
ual.” Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 2020). Here Mr.
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

Blasingame was at the top of a 30-foot decline with a slope of 30 to
40 degrees and with dangers—a highway and a concrete struc-
ture—below. Specifically, Mr. Blasingame was running down a
steep embankment when Officer Grubbs tased him in the back. Alt-
hough Officer Grubbs argues that a reasonable officer could not see
the steep embankment and danger from his perspective, this asser-
tion is contrary to other evidence adduced at trial.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Ed-
wards, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation. See
Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007).
First, Mr. Blasingame did not commit (and was not sus-
pected of committing) a serious or dangerous crime. The evidence
at trial at most established that Mr. Blasingame committed the mis-
demeanor offense of panhandling. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97(b). Of-
ficer Grubbs did not have “probable cause to believe that [Mr.
Blasingame] committed a crime involving the infliction or threat-
ened infliction of serious physical harm.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Second, Mr. Blasingame was not an immediate threat to Of-
ficer Grubbs or his partner. Mr. Blasingame may have posed a
threat to the drivers on the highway and might have put himself in
danger had he run onto the highway, but he did not do so. See Mer-
cado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (consid-
ering the extent to which the suspect poses a threat to himself or
herself under the second factor). The evidence at trial uncontro-
vertibly demonstrated that Mr. Blasingame remained on the side
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 17

of the road before and during the interaction with the officers. He
did not act erratically or run into the road at any point.
Importantly, Officer Grubbs testified that he never saw a
weapon on Mr. Blasingame. And he acknowledged that Mr.
Blasingame never threatened him nor put him in “imminent fear”
of his life. See D.E. 197 at 56, 62. Officer Grubbs does not and cannot
argue that he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Blasingame
posed “a threat of serious physical harm” to him or his partner. See
Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1240.
Officer Grubbs did testify that Mr. Blasingame made a
“swinging-type motion” towards him, without making contact. See
D.E. 197 at 59:1–61:8. But the jury was not required to believe Of-
ficer Grubbs on this point, even if his testimony was uncontro-
verted. See, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945); Tyler v. Beto,
391 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1968). In reviewing the denial of judg-
ment as a matter of law, we assume that the jury resolved all logical
inferences and all credibility determinations in Mr. Edwards’ favor.
See SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004).
Third, the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Blasingame ran
away from the officers. Although Mr. Blasingame fled, he was
never given a chance to finally comply before force was used. Of-
ficer Grubbs admitted that he never gave any verbal warning be-
fore deploying his taser.
Fourth, some use of force was minimally necessary to pre-
vent Mr. Blasingame’s escape, as he showed no signs of ending the
chase. See D.E. 197 at 77 (Officer Grubbs testified that he “deployed
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

the Taser to terminate the pursuit [and] to prevent [Mr.
Blasingame] from entering the highway”). But this factor does not
weigh heavily in Officer Grubbs’ favor because the force was more
than minimal.
Fifth, the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used tilts in Mr. Edwards’ direction. The amount
of force used by an officer “must be reasonably proportionate to
the need for that force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. When a non-danger-
ous and unarmed suspect takes flight, deadly force is disproportion-
ate. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Various of our cases reflect this prin-
ciple. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (using “this level of force to stop
an unarmed man who was not suspected of committing a violent
crime from fleeing on foot . . . is excessive”); Salvato v. Miley, 790
F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Using deadly force, without
warning, on an unarmed, retreating suspect is excessive.”);
Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2003) (deadly
force may not be used when the only “danger presented by [the
suspects’] continued flight was the risk of an accident during the
pursuit”).
Sixth, and finally, the injuries inflicted were severe. Mr.
Blasingame’s skull was crushed, and he was rendered quadriplegic.
Due to his spinal cord injury, Mr. Blasingame could not move an-
ything below his neck.
Considering and weighing these factors, we conclude that a
reasonable jury could find that Officer Grubbs violated Mr.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 19

Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. Therefore, the first qualified immunity prong is satisfied.
2
“Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s
conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Co-
lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
A right may be clearly established for qualified im-
munity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law
with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle
within the Constitution, statute, or case law that
clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) con-
duct so egregious that a constitutional right was
clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.
Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025)
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under
the third method, a general constitutional rule may apply with ob-
vious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the
very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.” Id.
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted and alterations adopted).
We held in Bradley that tasing a non-dangerous and unarmed
fleeing suspect on an elevated surface, under similar circum-
stances—the suspect was atop an eight-foot wall when shot—is
“obviously unconstitutional even absent a case directly on point.”
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1244. As in Bradley, Mr. Blasingame “posed no
immediate threat” to Officer Grubbs. See id. And “[h]e was not sus-
pected of committing a crime involving the infliction of serious
physical harm.” Id. “Yet, without any warning, Officer [Grubbs] ap-
plied deadly force to prevent [his] escape from the [ ] stop on foot.”
Id.
Officer Grubbs argues that Bradley, decided in 2021, could
not clearly establish the law here because it post-dates his use of
force in July of 2018. See Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159 (“Any case law
that is ‘materially similar’ to the facts in the case at hand must pre-
date the officer’s alleged improper conduct and ‘truly compel the
conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law.’”). The
problem with this argument is that Bradley was an obvious clarity
case and held that the conduct—tasing a non-dangerous and un-
armed suspect on an elevated surface merely to prevent flight—
was obviously unconstitutional to any reasonable officer even in
the absence of caselaw directly on point. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at
1244 (first citing Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1229 (11th
Cir. 2020), and then citing Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159). The use of
force in Bradley, moreover, took place in August of 2015. See Bradley
v. Benton, No. 1:18-CV-01518-CAP, 2018 WL 8949775, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 30, 2018) (providing the date of the incident). What was
clearly obvious to a reasonable officer in August of 2015 was also
clearly obvious to Officer Grubbs in July of 2018.
Officer Grubbs asserts that the wall in Bradley is so different
in kind from the embankment here that Bradley cannot apply. We
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 21

disagree. First, Officer Grubbs’ characterization of the terrain as a
“grassy hill,” Br. for Appellant at 30, is not determinative. What
matters is that the embankment had a slope of 30 to 40 degrees and
a drop of about 24 feet from the point of impact. Second, the char-
acterization ignores that Mr. Blasingame was running with his back
to Officer Grubbs when he was hit, and had no opportunity to pre-
pare himself for a fall. Third, we need not find that the facts of Brad-
ley are identical to the ones here because we conclude, as did Brad-
ley, that the obvious clarity principle carries the day. 4
In sum, the Fourth Amendment violation here—deploy-
ment of a taser against a non-violent, non-dangerous, and unarmed
suspect fleeing down a steep embankment—was one of obvious
clarity. See Gilmore, 144 F.4th at 1258; Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1244. Cf.
Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding,
under obvious clarity method, that “[t]he Fourth Amendment right
of an injured, visibly unarmed suspect to be free from temporarily
paralyzing force while positioned at a height that carries with it a
risk of serious injury” was clearly established in October of 2015).
Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to
Officer Grubbs and uphold the liability verdict against him.5

4 We acknowledge that in Stewart v. Garcia, 139 F.4th 698, 707 (8th Cir. 2025),

the Eighth Circuit held that a suspect’s right to be free from the use of deadly
force (a taser) while on an eight-or-nine-foot fence was not clearly established
in April of 2018. Stewart, however, did not consider the obvious clarity method
and is in any event contrary to Bradley. See 139 F.4th at 707–08.
5 Officer Grubbs also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration

of the denial of his Rule 50(b) motion asserting qualified immunity. Because
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

III
Now to the City of Atlanta. Mr. Edwards challenges the dis-
trict court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law to the City on his
municipal liability claim under § 1983.
We review a district court’s entry of judgment as a matter
of law de novo. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 38 F.4th
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2022). We apply the same standards as the
district court, meaning “we consider all the evidence, and the infer-
ences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party.” Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d
578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989)).
“Our task is to determine whether the evidence was ‘legally
sufficient’ to support the jury’s verdict.” Taxinet Corp. v. Leon, 114
F.4th 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2024) (first citing Rule 50(b), and then
citing McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241,
1254 (11th Cir. 2016)). “This standard is heavily weighted in favor
of preserving the jury’s verdict.” Taxinet, 114 F.4th at 1223 (quoting
Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1226
(11th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
a court, and we must disregard all evidence favorable to the

the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Grubbs was correct, the district
court did not err in denying his motion for reconsideration.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 23

moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id. (quoting
Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations
adopted). Ultimately, “we will ‘disturb the jury’s verdict only when
there is no material conflict’ as to the evidence and where no rea-
sonable juror could agree to the verdict.” Id. (quoting Brown, 38
F.4th at 1323).
A
A plaintiff may sue a municipality directly under § 1983
when one of its policies, customs, or practices causes a constitu-
tional injury. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). “The policy may be a governmental ‘custom’ which has
not received formal approval through the official decisionmaking
channel.” Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986). “A
custom is a practice so settled and permanent that it takes on the
force of law.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).
A plaintiff like Mr. Edwards must demonstrate, however,
“that the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.”
Barnett v. Macarthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997)). The “municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell,
436 U.S. at 691. This is because “the language of § 1983, read against
the background of the same legislative history, compels the conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort.” Id. Put differently, a local government
“will be liable under [§] 1983 only for acts for which the local gov-
ernment is actually responsible.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d
1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Turquitt v. Jefferson
Cnty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The Monell claim here hinges on the City’s purported failure
to enforce its body-worn camera policy. A failure to train or super-
vise must “reflect[ ] a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a munic-
ipality.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “To estab-
lish a deliberate or conscious choice or such deliberate indifference,
a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew
of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the mu-
nicipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v.
City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir 1998).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indif-
ference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 62 (2011). But “a single constitutional violation may result
in municipal liability when there is ‘sufficient independent proof
that the moving force of the violation was a municipal policy or
custom.’” Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.
1993) (quoting Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 n.10
(11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 25

B
Mr. Edwards contends that the district court erred by con-
cluding that there was insufficient evidence to show that “any pol-
icies and procedures relating to [body-worn cameras] caused the
constitutional violation at issue.” D.E. 177 at 21. Mr. Edwards also
faults the court for undermining his “novel” theory that the failure
to enforce the body-worn camera policy could cause excessive
force violations.
In this case, there was no evidence of a pattern of similar
constitutional violations (i.e., uses of excessive force) driven by the
failure of City police officers to use or activate their body-worn
cameras. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.
Edwards, the evidence showed that the body-worn cameras of the
City’s officers were used only 33% of the time on dispatch calls.
The evidence also showed that officers were not frequently disci-
plined for failing to adhere to the body-worn camera policy. Ac-
cepting that evidence, the missing causal link is that fostering an
environment where body-worn cameras are not properly used,
without more, does not indicate that the City fostered an environ-
ment where officers disabled the cameras to use excessive force and
get away with it. In other words, the failure to present evidence of
similar constitutional violations by officers who were not disci-
plined for noncompliance with the body-worn camera policy is fa-
tal to the argument that the City acted with deliberate indifference
to ignore unrecorded use-of-force incidents. See Gold, 151 F.3d at
1351.
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26 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

One of Mr. Edwards’ experts opined that the use of body-
worn cameras generally prevents excessive force. That opinion,
however, is too far removed to show that the City acted with de-
liberate indifference. Reviewing the expert testimony and the audit
on which the expert relied, there is no connection between the 66%
of dispatch calls that were not recorded and any use-of-force inci-
dents that took place during the same time frame as the audit. Fur-
ther, the data showed that “[l]ess than 1% (1,480) of the 491,753
videos uploaded between November 2016 and May 2018 were cat-
egorized as use of force incidents.” D.E. 211-30 at 22. In the City’s
random sample of 150 videos, only one use-of-force incident was
miscategorized. Without more, Mr. Edwards’ expert testimony
about general policing trends does not amount to deliberate indif-
ference about a culture of body-worn camera misuse and a corre-
sponding culture of excessive force. See Gold, 151 F.3d at 1351.
The single constitutional violation here does not give rise to
Monell liability. There is not “sufficient independent proof that the
moving force of the violation was a municipal policy or custom.”
Vineyard, 990 F.2d at 1212. We find no evidence that Officer Grubbs
turned off his body-worn camera that day because he planned to
use excessive force and knew or believed that he would not be dis-
ciplined for the failure to document his actions. Moreover, there
was no evidence of a previous incident where Officer Grubbs failed
to use his body-worn camera to hide an excessive use of force—
putting the City on notice that he was inadequately trained or su-
pervised. Finally, although its action was delayed, the City
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 27

disciplined Officer Grubbs for the failure to activate his body-worn
camera on the day in question.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
Mr. Edwards, does not reflect a deliberate or conscious choice by
the City to allow excessive force violations by failing to discipline
officers for deactivated body-worn cameras. We affirm the district
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the City.
IV
We next consider the district court’s reduction of the puni-
tive damages award as to Officer Grubbs. “We review de novo the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award, deferring to the dis-
trict court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Kerrivan v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 953 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2007)).
The three guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), guide our review of a punitive damage
award for constitutional excessiveness. See Johansen v. Combustion
Eng’g., Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999).
“First, we consider the degree of reprehensibility of the de-
fendant’s misconduct.” Cote v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 985 F.3d 840,
847 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Action Marine, Inc., 481 F.3d at 1318).
We have said that “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct is essentially a judgment about facts.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at
1335. “Such judgments are properly the role of the district court[.]”
Id. “If a district court’s finding regarding the defendant’s degree of
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28 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

reprehensibility is not supported by the record or is contrary to the
evidence, it is ‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
“Second, we look at the ratio of the punitive damages award
to the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Cote, 985
F.3d at 847. We have described the ratio as a “historical fact.” Jo-
hansen, 170 F.3d at 1334. So we “accept [the district court’s] finding
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id.
“Third, we look at the difference between the punitive dam-
ages award and the civil [and criminal] penalties authorized or im-
posed in comparable cases.” Cote, 985 F.3d at 847. As to this guide-
post, “the selection of the most appropriate point of comparison—
actual fine imposed [or] the maximum possible penalty or penalties
in similar cases—is an issue of law.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1334.
We “determine de novo whether the punitive damage award
is constitutionally excessive when measured by these guideposts.”
Id. at 1335. “[T]he essential legal issue is whether the relevant facts
of this case, as indicated by the various BMW factors, constitution-
ally support the punitive damage award, i.e., do these facts indicate
that [the defendant] had adequate notice that its conduct might
subject it to this punitive damage award[?]” Id. The end goal of the
guideposts is to calculate “the maximum the Constitution permits”
in each case. See id. at 1339.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 29

A
Mr. Edwards argues that Officer Grubbs’ motion for remit-
titur was untimely, and therefore the district court procedurally
erred by considering it.
As a prefatory matter, Officer Grubbs brought his motion
under Rule 59(e), or in the alternative, under Rule 60(b)(6). Mr. Ed-
wards argues that the motion should be treated as a Rule 50 or Rule
59 motion, both of which carry a 28-day deadline following the en-
try of judgment. See Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59(b). We agree and con-
strue the motion as a Rule 50 motion because “a court proceeds
under Rule 50, not Rule 59, in the entry of judgment for a consti-
tutionally reduced award.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331.
Rule 50(b) provides as follows:
No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or
if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a
verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was dis-
charged—the movant may file a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and may include an alter-
native or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.
On September 22, 2022, the district court entered its post-trial judg-
ment. In April of 2023, both sides appealed. On February 15, 2024,
we dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction:
We do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, how-
ever, because there is no final judgment. Final judg-
ment generally requires that the district court resolve
“conclusively the substance of all claims, rights, and
liabilities of all parties to an action.” Sanchez v. Disc.
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30 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

Rock & Sand, Inc., 84 F.4th 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2023)
(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). And Rule 41
“provides only for the dismissal of an entire action,”
not a single claim. Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141,
1143 (11th Cir. 2023). So the district court’s Rule 41
dismissal of only Count II is invalid, and “a final judg-
ment was never rendered.” Id. We DISMISS
Grubbs’s and Edwards’s appeals for lack of jurisdic-
tion.
Edwards v. Grubbs, No. 22-13261, 2024 WL 630999, at *1 (11th Cir.
Feb. 15, 2024).
On remand, the district court entered final judgment on
May 2, 2024, based on an amended complaint dismissing the state-
law assault and battery claim. The court ordered the parties to file
any post-judgment motions within 14 days, and Officer Grubbs
met this deadline. Because there was no final judgment rendered
at the time of the first appeal, and because the text of Rule 50(b)
begins the clock “after the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(b), Officer Grubbs’ motion was timely. See Weatherly v. Ala. State
Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that “Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(b) require the motion to be
filed within 28 days after the entry of final judgment”) (emphasis
added).
B
Mr. Edwards, who seeks reinstatement of the full $20 mil-
lion punitive damages award, contends that the district court mis-
applied all three BMW guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of Officer
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 31

Grubbs’ conduct; (2) the ratio of the punitive damages award to the
compensatory damages; and (3) the differential between compara-
ble criminal or civil penalties. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
Officer Grubbs does not address the three guideposts in his brief.
1
“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is out-
rageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless in-
difference to the rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46–
47 (1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The most im-
portant indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to determine the
reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether
the harm caused was physical as opposed to eco-
nomic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of oth-
ers; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerabil-
ity; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of in-
tentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 576–77). “The existence of any one of
these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient
to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them
renders any award suspect.” Id.
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32 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

The district court found that Officer Grubbs’ conduct was
reprehensible but not overly egregious. See D.E. 270 at 26–27. This
finding—to which we owe deference—is supported by the record.
See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1335. In considering the degree of repre-
hensibility, “we will not second guess the judge who sat through
the trial, heard the testimony, observed the witnesses and had the
‘unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the living court-
room context’ while we have only the ‘cold paper record.’” Id.
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., 518 U.S. 415, 437 (1996)).
The evidence and testimony at trial revealed that Officer
Grubbs tased Mr. Blasingame in the back, without warning, and
sent him plummeting down the embankment for nearly twenty-
four feet. The harm to Mr. Blasingame was physical, and he suf-
fered traumatic brain damage and quadriplegia.
There is also evidence, however, that this constitutional vi-
olation was isolated and not motivated by intentional malice to-
wards Mr. Blasingame. The entire chase and use of force lasted less
than one minute. In addition, Officer Grubbs did not try to cover
up what he had just done. Instead, he called for an ambulance and
notified his supervisor of the use of force. Nonetheless, as the dis-
trict court found, Officer Grubbs’ conduct evinced a reckless indif-
ference to the rights of others. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 46–47.
The district court’s findings underlying the reprehensibility
sub-factor were not erroneous. Officer Grubbs’ conduct, though
reprehensible, was not so egregious as to support a $20 million
award.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 33

2
Next, we take up the ratio between the punitive damages
and the compensatory damages. “[F]ew awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a sig-
nificant degree, will satisfy due process.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
The Supreme Court “has indicated that a ratio greater than 4:1 be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages will likely be close to
the line of constitutional impropriety.” Williams v. First Advantage
LNS Screening Sols., Inc., 947 F.3d 735, 750 (11th Cir. 2020). Never-
theless, there is not “a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. “If the ratio of
actual to punitive damages is too great, it is an indication that the
defendant did not have adequate notice that its conduct might sub-
ject it to an award of this size.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1336 (citing
BMW, 517 U.S. at 574).
Mr. Edwards argues that we should consider the jury’s orig-
inal verdict of $80 million in compensatory damages and $20 mil-
lion in punitive damages, leaving him with a presumptively consti-
tutional ratio. But our Monell ruling renders the jury’s $60 million
award against the City legally invalid. See United States v. De La
Mata, 535 F.3d 1267, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Where a judgment
is vacated or set aside by a valid order or judgment, it is entirely
destroyed and the rights of the parties are left as though no such
judgment had ever been entered.”) (quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments
§ 357 (2008)).
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34 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

We discern no clear error in the district court’s conclusion
that the proper ratio under this guidepost is 1:1—$20 million in
compensatory damages to $20 million in punitive damages. See Jo-
hansen, 170 F.3d at 1334 (stating that the ratio is a “historical fact”
which we must accept “unless it is clearly erroneous”). And we
agree with the court that “the ratio of compensatory and punitive
damages in this case must necessarily account for the high compen-
satory award.” D.E. 270 at 29.
The 1:1 ratio is not presumptively unconstitutional: “When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
Admittedly, it is “[n]ot eas[y]” to determine whether the dis-
parity between punitive damages and compensatory damages is
“too great.” Williams, 947 F.3d at 754. But we agree with other
courts which have explained that “the ratio without the amount
‘tells us little of value.’” Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d
1071, 1089 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 103
(2d Cir. 2012)). On this record, we conclude that the 1:1 ratio is
neutral given that we know of no courts that have reduced a puni-
tive damages award below such a ratio. Cf. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata
Consultancy Servs., 980 F.3d 1117, 1145 (7th Cir. 2020) (“In sum, con-
sidering the factors together, we conclude that the maximum per-
missible award of punitive damages in this case is $140 million—a
1:1 ratio relative to the compensatory award.”).
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 35

3
Finally, we compare the punitive damages award to poten-
tial civil or criminal penalties for Officer Grubbs’ conduct. See
BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. The appropriate points of comparison in-
clude the actual fine imposed by statute or the outer bounds of pu-
nitive damages awarded in similar cases. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at
1334.
“Whether a defendant had constitutionally adequate notice
that his conduct might result in a particular damage award depends
in large part upon the available civil and criminal penalties the state
provides for such conduct.” Id. at 1337. Mr. Edwards does not ad-
dress the district court’s reliance on the $250,000 damages cap for
Georgia tort actions and the identical $250,000 limit for federal
criminal fines for a conviction for deprivation of rights under 18
U.S.C. § 242. See O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g); 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (b)(3).
These statutory comparators weigh in favor of reducing the $20
million punitive damages award significantly.
Moreover, the award of $20 million here exceeds punitive
damages awarded and upheld in comparable cases. See, e.g., Stew-
ardson v. Titus, 126 F.4th 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 2025) (upholding an
$850,000 punitive damages award against a single officer in a brutal
police beating); Masters v. City of Indep., 998 F.3d 827, 842 (8th Cir.
2021) (holding that “the district court correctly found the jury’s in-
itial punitive damages award [of $1,000,000] was disproportionate,”
and remanding for “entry of a judgment imposing $425,700 in pu-
nitive damages” where the plaintiff suffered an anoxic brain injury
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36 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

after the officer tased him for a prolonged period, rendering him
unresponsive, and then “dropp[ed] him face-first onto concrete”);
Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding a
jury award of a total of $1,000,000 in punitive damages in an exces-
sive physical force case ($250,000 against each of the four defend-
ant-officers)); O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1988) (up-
holding a $185,000 punitive damages award for the brutal beating
by several police officers of a defenseless plaintiff at a police sta-
tion). 6
Canvassing the case law reveals an outlier: Estate of Moreland
v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2005). In Dieter, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a $27.5 million punitive damages award ($15 million against
one officer and $12.5 million against the other). In that case, a pris-
oner died after the two officers severely beat him, left him to die,
and attempted to cover their actions up. See id. at 751–53. Even this
award against each officer was less than the $20 million here against
a single officer, and the total award was less than the compensatory
damages of $29 million. See id. at 756–78. The degree of reprehen-
sibility and the ratio make Dieter distinguishable in material ways.

6 Adjusting the two awards in comparable excessive force cases prior to this

decade for inflation still leaves these awards well below $20 million: $1 million
in 2006 is equivalent to approximately $1.6 million in 2025, see Casillas-Diaz,
463 F.3d at 80, and $185,000 in 1988 is worth approximately $500,000 in 2025,
see O’Neill, 839 F.2d at 14. See U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., CPI In-
flation Calculator (last accessed Jan. 6, 2026), https://www.bls.gov/data/infla-
tion_calculator.htm.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 37

Mr. Edwards also identifies Reeves v. Town of Cottageville, No.
2:12-cv-02765 (D.S.C. 2014), and S.T. v. Isbell, No. 2:09-cv-616-MHT
(M.D. Ala. 2010), as apt comparators. We disagree. Reeves was a
§ 1983 excessive force case where a Town of Cottageville police of-
ficer confronted and killed the Town’s former mayor. See Reeves,
No. 2:12-cv-02765, D.E. 1-1 at 6–7. The jury awarded the plaintiff
$60 million in punitive damages against the Town. See No. 2:12-cv-
02765, D.E. 163 at 2. The parties settled while the motion to reduce
this verdict was pending. See No. 2:12-cv-02765, D.E. 205. Isbell was
a § 1983 case in which an Alabama law enforcement officer and a
girls’ softball coach for a municipal entity subjected the plaintiff, a
minor, to years of sexual abuse. See Isbell, No. 2:09-cv-616, D.E. 1;
D.E. 45. The district court entered default judgment on liability
against the officer and held a trial on the issue of damages. See No.
2:09-cv-616, D.E. 36; D.E. 47. The jury awarded the plaintiff $10
million in punitive damages. See No. 2:09-cv-616, D.E. 51. The of-
ficer never challenged this award.
Neither of these cases resulted in a judicial opinion analyzing
or upholding the constitutionality of the punitive damages awards.
Thus, they are of little persuasive value.
This last BMW guidepost weighs in favor of concluding that
Office Grubbs did not have constitutionally adequate notice that
his conduct may result in a $20 million punitive damages award
against him. Some meaningful reduction is warranted. See Johansen,
170 F.3d at 1337.
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38 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

4
In sum, the BMW guideposts lead us to affirm the district
court’s reduction of the $20 million punitive damage award. The
three guideposts indicate that some award of punitive damages is
appropriate and constitutional, but $20 million exceeds the bounds
of due process. The degree of reprehensibility—not overly egre-
gious behavior—and the size of comparable penalties and awards
will not permit such an award here.
The difficulty, we candidly admit, is trying to figure out the
maximum amount of punitive damages that a jury could have con-
stitutionally awarded on this record. Why, for example, shouldn’t
the reduced award be $2 million or $5 million instead of $1 million?
The district court explained that a $1 million punitive damages
award would “serve[ ] the purposes of punitive damages” without
“surpassing ‘the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause.’” D.E. 270 at 36 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 568). Maybe the
district court was right, but it is not intuitively clear to us that $1
million is the constitutionally maximum award. Fortunately, we
need not try to figure out ourselves whether a punitive damages
award of $2 million or higher would have been constitutionally
permissible. On appeal, Mr. Edwards has taken an all-or-nothing
approach; he contends that no reduction was appropriate based on
the BMW guideposts because the $20 million award is constitu-
tional, and he does not suggest any alternative lower figure. On
appeal, Officer Grubbs also does not address whether a different
figure (such as $250,000, his alternative request below) would be
constitutional.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 39

“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the
principle of party presentation.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590
U.S. 371, 375 (2020). This principle requires that “we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role
of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” See id. (quoting
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)). In other words,
“courts ‘call balls and strikes’; they don’t get a turn at bat.” Clark v.
Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (quoting Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590
U.S. 595, 599 (2020)). In the absence of adversarial briefing, we de-
cline to weigh the potential constitutionality of awards between $1
million and $20 million. Accordingly, we affirm the reduction of
the punitive damages award to $1 million.
V
We next consider the denial of Mr. Edwards’ Rule 60(b) mo-
tion for relief from judgment. “We review the denial of a motion
for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discre-
tion.” Howell v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 730 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2013). Mr. Edwards argues that the district court erred by con-
cluding that the City was not statutorily responsible for Mr.
Blasingame’s medical bills and denying his motion for relief from
judgment on his claim under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2.
In Georgia, § 42-5-2 proscribes the responsibilities of govern-
mental units over inmates in custody. It states that “it shall be the
responsibility of the [governmental entity] to bear the costs of any
reasonable and necessary emergency medical and hospital care
which is provided to any inmate. . . .” § 42-5-2(b). As a matter of
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40 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

state law, Georgia courts have generally recognized a claim for a
breach of the statutory duty to provide medical care under § 42-5-
2—without stating that such claims require another statutory right
of action—but have continually held that such claims must over-
come sovereign immunity and ante litem notice requirements to
proceed. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Columbus, 521 S.E.2d 51, 58 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1999); Bd. of Regents v. Putnam Cnty., 506 S.E.2d 923, 924
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Graham v. Cobb Cnty., 730 S.E.2d 439, 443 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2012).
Mr. Edwards argues that § 42-5-2 applies to this action, but
in his brief, he does not address the district court’s two reasons for
denying his Rule 60(b) motion. First, the court ruled that a claim
for medical expenses under § 42-5-2 must be pled to give “the de-
fendant fair notice,” and Mr. Edwards did not raise the statute until
the summary judgment stage. See D.E. 219 at 13–14 (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Second, and al-
ternatively, the court ruled that Mr. Edwards had “not carried his
burden to show that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Id. at
14.
An “argument that has not been briefed before the court is
deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
Mr. Edwards addresses neither his delay in failing to raise the stat-
ute until the summary judgment stage nor the sovereign immunity
issue. We see no reason to resurrect this matter under Access Now
because Mr. Edwards has abandoned any argument that the
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 41

reasons the district court provided for denying Rule 60(b) relief
were in error. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (where an initial brief “fails to clearly raise any
challenge to the alternative holdings,” and “treats those holdings as
though they do not exist,” the argument that the holdings were
error is abandoned, and affirmance is in order).
VI
Finally, we consider the denial of Mr. Edwards’ motion for
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) as premature. “Our re-
view of the district court’s denial of [§] 1988 attorney’s fees is lim-
ited to determining whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Sol-
omon v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1981)).
The district court deferred its ruling on the attorney’s fees
“until the appeal has been completed.” D.E. 219 at 6. “If an appeal
on the merits of the case is taken, the court may rule on the claim
for fees, may defer ruling on the motion, or may deny the motion
without prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1993
Amendment. Nothing in Rule 54 or § 1988 requires the district
court to order fees to the prevailing party before an appeal on the
merits is resolved. We therefore conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in deferring its calculation of reasonable fees
and denying Mr. Edwards’ motion without prejudice.
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42 Opinion of the Court 24-12787

VII
We affirm the judgment against Officer Grubbs, as modified
by the reduction of the punitive damages award to $1 million. We
also affirm the district court’s Rule 50(b) judgment in favor of the
City of Atlanta. We further conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in deferring its ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees.
We do not reach whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying the Rule 60(b) motion because Mr. Edwards has aban-
doned any challenge to the court’s reasons.
AFFIRMED.
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 1

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the Court’s deci-
sion that denies Officer Grubbs qualified immunity on the claim
that he violated Mr. Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment rights. The
Court’s rejection of Officer Grubbs’ qualified-immunity defense
rests on two necessary premises: (1) that he used unconstitutionally
excessive force when he tased Mr. Blasingame; and (2) that in doing
so he violated “clearly established” law. The Court may or may not
be right about the former—it’s a close call, as the Court’s own anal-
ysis reflects—but it is, in my view, wrong about the latter.
With respect to the “clearly established”-ness of the govern-
ing law, it’s important to focus on exactly what the Court does—
and doesn’t—say. The Court notably does not say that the six
(nine?) factors that inform its excessive-force analysis, see Maj. Op.
at 16–19, so definitively favor Mr. Blasingame that any reasonable
policeman in Officer Grubbs’ position would have known that his
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. And with good reason.
As an initial matter, it’s pretty unrealistic to think that a law enforce-
ment officer responding in the heat of the moment should be
charged with working his way through a multi-part balancing test
before deciding whether to deploy his taser. Moreover, and in any
event, as the Court’s own merits assessment demonstrates, the ex-
cessive-force factors here don’t point uniformly (and certainly not
decisively) in a single direction. For instance, the Court essentially
acknowledges that Mr. Blasingame was “trying to flee” law enforce-
ment when Officer Grubbs tased him. See Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th
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2 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 24-12787

1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022); Maj. Op. at 18. So too, the Court con-
cedes that there was a “need for the use of force,” Wade, 36 F.4th at
1325, as Mr. Blasingame “showed no signs of ending the chase,”
and rejoins only that this factor doesn’t “weigh heavily” in Officer
Grubbs’ favor, Maj. Op. at 18. And while some of the excessive-
force factors clearly support Mr. Blasingame—perhaps most nota-
bly, that he “did not commit (and was not suspected of committing)
a serious or dangerous crime,” id. at 16—others do so only margin-
ally. For example, with respect to the “relationship between the
need for force and the amount of force used,” the Court can bring
itself to say only that it “tilts” in Mr. Blasingame’s direction. Id. at
18.
The point is clear enough, and the Court seems to get it:
Having “consider[ed] and weigh[ed]” the manifold excessive-force
factors in evaluating the merits of Mr. Blasingame’s Fourth Amend-
ment claim, the most that can be said is that “a reasonable jury
could find” that Officer Grubbs violated the Constitution, see id. at
19—not that any reasonable officer would necessarily have come to
the same conclusion.
How, then, if not by crunching the factors, does the Court
get over the “clearly established” hump? By analogizing this case
to Bradley v. Benton, in which we held that an officer’s conduct was
“obviously unconstitutional even absent a case directly on point.”
10 F.4th 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2021). Respectfully, I just don’t think
the analogy holds up.
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 3

It’s true, as the Court says, that Bradley, like this case, in-
volved the “tasing [of ] a non-dangerous and unarmed fleeing sus-
pect.” Maj. Op. at 20. But in a crucial respect, the cases are very
different: The suspect in Bradley wasn’t on a slope when he was
tased, he was perched atop an 8-foot ledge. See 10 F.4th at 1240.
Accordingly, we emphasized there, he was in a particularly “precar-
ious position,” with nothing but air between him and the concrete
below. Id. Any jolt, we explained, would lead him to “los[e] his
balance” and “fall from atop the wall.” Id. at 1241. And that is
presumably why the pertinent department policy in that case in-
structed that a taser should never be used when “the risk of falling”
itself “would likely result in death”—as, for example, when the sus-
pect was “on a roof or next to a swimming pool.” Id.
Whether framed in terms of physics, trigonometry, or plain
old common sense, the circumstances here are just different. Tak-
ing a look at the photos referenced in the Court’s opinion, we see
a grassy hill overgrown with vegetation. See Maj. Op. at 5–6 (citing
D.E. 211-31 at 4, 9). The angle of descent is 30–40°, not the 90° at
issue in Bradley. Accordingly, to be clear, this case did not involve a
24-foot “drop,” as that term is ordinarily understood. Contra Maj.
Op. at 21. Rather, it involved, at most—and I’m not trying to trivi-
alize matters, just to distinguish Bradley—a very short drop, from a
standing to a prone position, followed by a 24-foot downhill tumble.
One needn’t be a scientist—parsing the interactions between grav-
ity, inertia, friction, etc.—to appreciate the difference between
knocking someone off a high wall and causing him to roll down a
hill.
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4 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 24-12787

In the end, I worry that the Court’s conclusion is based not
so much on an analogy to Bradley—perhaps because it recognizes
the salience of the distinctions between the two cases—but on raw
assertion: “[W]e need not find that the facts of Bradley are identical
to the ones here,” the Court says, “because we conclude, as did
Bradley, that the obvious clarity principle carries the day.” Maj. Op.
at 21. A fair translation, I think, goes something like this: Officer
Grubbs’ conduct clearly violated the Fourth Amendment because,
well, we say it did. Now, to be sure, the Court can’t be blamed for
engaging in ipse dixit. The “obvious clarity” path to clearly estab-
lished law—QI’s proverbial “Bucket Three”—essentially requires
judges to make impressionistic determinations about the egre-
giousness of a defendant’s conduct. But as I see it, Officer Grubbs’
actions here don’t even belong in the same conversation with those
at issue, for instance, in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (lashing a
shirtless and manacled inmate to a “hitching post” in the hot sun
for seven hours), Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (slam-
ming an already-handcuffed and non-resistant woman’s head into
the trunk of her car in the course of arresting her for honking her
horn), and Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019)
(tasing a pretrial detainee for a second time even though he had
collapsed, lay motionless for eight full seconds, and wet himself
following an initial taser shot).
To this point, courts have been vigilant about reserving the
obvious-clarity category for the worst-of-the-worst official misbe-
havior—the sorts of things, to be blunt, that any old fool would
know violate the Constitution. Officer Grubbs’ conduct here—
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 5

however debatable, and however undeniably tragic the conse-
quences—just doesn’t qualify.
Rather, it seems to me, this is a classic gray-area case—the
very sort in which qualified immunity has (for good or ill) histori-
cally protected officers’ split-second judgments. The situation that
Officer Grubbs encountered was “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 90 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring). When Mr. Blasingame saw Officer Grubbs approaching,
he fled along the shoulder of a highway, ignored orders to stop,
hopped over a metal guardrail, and entered an overgrown area that,
after a short upward slope, descended at what we now know was a
30° to 40° pitch toward another road. Faced with those circum-
stances—perhaps most notably, the fact Mr. Blasingame was run-
ning in the direction of a busy highway—Officer Grubbs decided
to deploy his taser. Was he right to do so? Maybe not. But the
“maybe” there does all the necessary work. The point is that Of-
ficer Grubbs wasn’t obviously, indisputably wrong to use the taser.
And that is conclusive.