Supreme Court Order List - Certiorari Denied/Granted

(ORDER LIST: 607 U.S.) MONDAY, MARCH 9, 2026 ORDERS IN PENDING CASES 25-112 CHATRIE, OKELLO T. V. UNITED STATES The motion of petitioner for leave to file Volume III of the joint appendix under seal is granted. 25-6484 MORTVEDT, DONALD N. S. V. CLAWSON, CHARLES E., ET AL. 25-6486 BOWMAN, MARVIN V. CITY OF CHICAGO BD. OF ED. The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 30, 2026, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. CERTIORARI GRANTED 25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE, ET AL. V. GUAHAN, PRUTEHI The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. CERTIORARI DENIED 25-290 ODEKU, CHRISTOPHER V. TEXAS 25-308 LYNK LABS, INC. V. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., ET AL. 25-461 MANGANO, EDWARD V. UNITED STATES 25-634 FAMILY FEDERATION, ET AL. V. MOON, HYUN J., ET AL. 25-641 ABDULLA, ABDULMALIK M. V. BONDI, ATT'Y GEN. 25-658 JONES, MATTHEW, ET AL. V. KING, AMBER M., ET AL. 25-753 ZIONESS MOVEMENT, INC. V. THE LAWFARE PROJECT, INC. 25-783 CARUSO, SONIA H. V. TX MEDICAL BD., ET AL. 25-786 MINKOWSKI, JULIA V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA

25-787 CARBIN, JOHN F. V. MA BD. PLUMBERS AND GAS, ET AL. 25-789 PLESE, ANGELA K. V. AUSTIN, RONALD, ET AL. 25-791 ARNOLD, EDWARD R. V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. 25-804 HUTCHINSON, GEORGE B. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL. 25-843 DISABILITY RIGHTS NY V. NY STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, ET AL. 25-868 HUGHES, BRANDON V. NFL 25-871 BROOKS, GLENN A. V. UNITED STATES 25-872 LaFAVE, KIMBERLY, ET AL. V. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA, ET AL. 25-877 CLAY, JEFFREY S. V. UNITED STATES 25-883 FORD, JAMES T. V. FLORIDA 25-895 PEDERSON, LEE M. V. SEC 25-897 SMITH, RONALD V. SAENZ, HUNTER, ET AL. 25-913 LOVELL, KEEGAN L. V. UNITED STATES 25-5629 McFARLIN, DARVELL V. McFARLANE, WARDEN 25-6051 COLEMAN, CLAUDE V. UNITED STATES 25-6079 MORELOCK, JAMES A. B. V. UNITED STATES 25-6285 ALTAMIRANO, RUDY V. UNITED STATES 25-6481 WEBSTER, BRENT E. V. REDWOOD HOLDINGS, LLC 25-6482 MYLES, ARIANNE A. V. FLORIDA 25-6483 MUSGROVE, THEODORE E. V. IDAHO 25-6488 JONES, MATTHEW V. YOST, ATT'Y GEN. OF OH 25-6495 ELYSSE, JASON V. FLORIDA 25-6496 CARR, PAUL D. V. MACOMBER, SEC., CA DOC 25-6498 JONES, CYNTHIA S. V. PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION 25-6500 BRYANT, ANITA V. ESTATE OF LAURA J. BRYANT 25-6507 NICHOLSON, DERRICK V. GEORGIA 25-6510 CARTER, TILON L. V. TEXAS 25-6619 RUBINI, JACOB V. GREENE, WARDEN

25-6644 ARBAUGH, JAMES D. V. UNITED STATES 25-6704 BACA-RODRIGUEZ, HORACIO V. UNITED STATES 25-6721 JEFFERSON, PALMA V. UNITED STATES 25-6730 CARLOS-RAMOS, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES 25-6732 DELGADO, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES 25-6741 CANNON, KIMBERLY V. FLORIDA 25-6749 WILLIAMS, COLIN V. UNITED STATES 25-6750 JOHNSON, SHAWN T. V. UNITED STATES 25-6751 YOUNG, JEFFREY W. V. UNITED STATES 25-6753 SHARPE, MICHAEL V. CONNECTICUT 25-6760 TEALEH, FLOMO V. STEINER, POSTMASTER GEN., ET AL. 25-6767 MANBORDE, MARIO A. V. DIXON, SEC., FL DOC 25-6773 CLEMONS, DEVERN V. FLORIDA 25-6805 PROPHET, ANTONIO V. FRAME, SUPT., MOUNT OLIVE The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. 25-529 BROWN, WARDEN V. CHANDLER, LOUIS The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 25-781 WENGER, DONALD V. WARREN, JAMES T., ET AL. The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment is denied. 25-6474 DOVE, ANTHONY V. BROADWELL, DR., ET AL. The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner

unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Jackson, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the order barring this incarcerated petitioner from filing future in forma pauperis petitions in noncriminal matters. See Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana, 607 U. S. ___ (2026) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 25-6742 EDWARDS, GEZO G. V. UNITED STATES The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. MANDAMUS DENIED 25-803 IN RE ANDY DESTY The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. 25-785 IN RE VAN IRION, ET AL. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is denied. PROHIBITION DENIED 25-6508 IN RE ANGELIINA L. LAWSON 25-6538 IN RE JEFFERY GREENE The petitions for writs of prohibition are denied. REHEARINGS DENIED 25-249 POON-ATKINS, CHRISTY, ET VIR V. RIVERSPRINGS HOA, INC., ET AL. 25-355 DONDERO, JAMES, ET AL. V. JERNIGAN, STACEY G., ET AL. 25-544 CHEN, MAY Y. V. AMERIWAY CORPORATION 25-5856 STEELE, CHERYL V. SALB, MICAH The petitions for rehearing are denied.

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) GSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JARON BURNETT v. UNITED STATES ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25–5442. Decided March 9, 2026 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting from the denial of certio- rari. Almost two decades ago, Jaron Burnett pleaded guilty toa federal crime that carried a maximum sentence of 120 months in prison. Initially, the district court sentenced Mr. Burnett to less than that—105 months in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release.Over six years after his release from prison, the govern- ment charged Mr. Burnett with violating the terms of his supervised release. In response, the district court sen- tenced him to 13 additional months in prison. See 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(3) (providing that a district court may im- pose a term of imprisonment if a defendant violates theterms of his supervised release). That new term broughtMr. Burnett’s total time in prison to 118 months, just 2 fewer than the maximum Congress authorized for his un-derlying conviction. Mr. Burnett finished serving his time in July 2022 and returned to supervised release.Two years later, the government again charged Mr. Bur-nett with violating the terms of his supervised release andagain sought to send him to prison. This time, Mr. Burnett argued, the court needed to proceed differently. His under-lying conviction subjected him to a maximum lawful termof 120 months in prison, no more. Should the governmentseek prison time beyond that because of his latest alleged supervised release violations, Mr. Burnett submitted, the

2 BURNETT v. UNITED STATES GSixth Amendment required the government to prove itscase to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court disagreed. Proceeding without a juryand applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, thecourt found that Mr. Burnett had committed some of the alleged supervised release violations. And, based on its fac-tual findings, the court sentenced him to 14 more monthsin prison, bringing his total term of incarceration to 132months—12 more than the statutory maximum associatedwith his crime of conviction. The court of appeals affirmed that result. In his petition to us, Mr. Burnett does not ask for much. He does not object to receiving new prison time for super- vised release violations. He does not even object to a court issuing that prison time based on its own factual findingsunder a preponderance of the evidence standard, so long as the punishment issued does not exceed the statutory maxi-mum for his underlying crime of conviction. All Mr. Bur-nett claims is the right to have a jury decide any contested facts under the reasonable doubt standard where, as here, a court seeks to impose a sentence that will cause a defend-ant’s total time in prison to exceed the statutory maximum Congress has authorized for his underlying conviction. I would have taken this case to consider that argument.Most federal criminal defendants serve time on supervised release. Some commit violations. Few face a realistic pro- spect of spending more time in prison than the maximumterm authorized for their underlying convictions. See United States v. Henderson, 998 F. 3d 1071, 1086 (CA9 2021) (Rakoff, J., dissenting). But even if the class of cases like Mr. Burnett’s is small, the stakes are high. Many fed-eral criminal defendants today serve long terms on super- vised release (terms that can be further extended after any new violation). See §§3583(b), (h). Others serve on super-vised release for life. See §3583(k). And, under the logic of the decision below, defendants like these can effectively

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Gwind up losing for decades (and sometimes forever) the right to receive a federal jury trial to resolve charges against them under the reasonable doubt standard. All the government need do is accuse the defendant of a supervised release violation and convince a judge to find by a prepon-derance of the evidence that more punishment is war-ranted. With no more than that, further prison time may follow—even for periods that exceed the maximum Con-gress has authorized for the defendant’s only crime of con-viction. Bypassing juries, trials, and the reasonable doubt stand-ard in this way may hold some obvious advantages for pros-ecutors. But whether this arrangement can be squared with the Constitution is another thing. Under the Sixth Amendment, this Court has held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (empha- sis added); see also Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. 821, 833 (2024); United States v. Haymond, 588 U. S. 634, 644 (2019) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). The Court’s failure to grant review to address whether what happened to Mr. Burnett complies with that Sixth Amendment rule is unfortunate. I can only hope we will take up another caselike his soon—and that, in the meantime, lower courts will more carefully consider the Sixth Amendment’s applicationin this context. Respectfully, I dissent.