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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Earl Parris, Jr. v. 3M Company, et al.

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 4:21-cv-00040

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.6K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ROME DIVISION

EARL PARRIS, JR.

Individually, and on behalf of a Class of

persons similarly situated,

 Plaintiff,                                                       

      v.                     CIVIL ACTION FILE                    
                             NO. 4:21-CV-40-TWT                   

3M COMPANY, et al.,

 Defendants.                                                      

               OPINION AND ORDER                                  

This is an action under the Clean Water Act. It is before the Court on
the Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr. and Intervenor-Plaintiff the City of Summerville’s
Joint Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Maureen Reitman [Doc. 865]. For the
following reasons, this Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

This case arises out of the contamination of surface waters and drinking
water in Chattooga County, Georgia, with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
known as “PFAS.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 1 [Doc. 280]). The facts of this case are
well known to the parties by this point, and the Court will not belabor them
here. In essence, Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr., alleges that the Defendants have
contaminated his water with PFAS. Parris is a resident of Summerville,
Georgia, who receives running, potable water to his home from the
Summerville Public Works and Utilities Department. ( ¶ 21.) The City of
Summerville—which has intervened in this case—uses Raccoon Creek, a
tributary of the Chattooga River, as the main source of its municipal water
supply. ( ) Parris alleges that Raccoon Creek and—consequently, his

household water—have been contaminated with PFAS by the Defendants. ( )
At present, Parris and Summerville jointly move to exclude the opinion
testimony of Defendant 3M’s expert, Maureen Reitman.1

II. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert
testimony. Under that rule, “expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is

qualified to testify regarding the subject of the testimony; (2) the expert’s
methodology is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry
mandated in ; and (3) the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact
in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue.”

, 766 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The Federal Rules of Evidence require
a district judge to undertake a gatekeeping function to “ensure that any and

all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”
, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). “This
gatekeeping role, however, is not intended to supplant the adversary system
or the role of the jury” in determining the persuasiveness of an expert’s

1 The parties have collectively filed a total of seventeen motions to
exclude, the remainder of which are not presently before the Court.

2

testimony. , 730 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.

2013) (citation modified). “In considering the proffered expert testimony, a trial
judge is mindful the burden of establishing qualification, reliability, and

helpfulness rests on the proponent of the expert opinion.” , 766 F.3d

at 1304 (citation modified).

III. Discussion

The Plaintiffs 2 raise two main challenges to Reitman’s opinions:
relevancy and reliability. The Court will address each in turn.

A. Relevancy and Likelihood of Confusion

The Plaintiffs first explain that Reitman is expected to testify as to the
existence of other theoretical PFOS manufacturers beyond Defendant 3M who
could have contributed to PFOS in the Raccoon Creek watershed. (Pl.’s Mot. to
Exclude Reitman, [Doc. 865], at 4). But, the Plaintiffs contend, there is no
evidence of any other sources of PFOS in the Raccoon Creek watershed besides
the 3M PFOS-based products that it sold to Defendant Mount Vernon Mills.
( ). In fact, they assert that Reitman failed to identify any PFOS-containing

products at the Mount Vernon Mill or the Trion Water Pollution Control Plant
(“Trion Plant”) other than 3M’s product. ( at 5). Thus, the Plaintiffs argue
that Reitman’s testimony is irrelevant and won’t help the trier of fact. ( at
5-8).

2 The Court refers to Plaintiff Earl Parris and Intervenor-Plaintiff City
of Summerville collectively as “Plaintiffs.”

3

In response, 3M asserts that because Reitman is a defense expert, she
is not required to provide a definitive causation opinion. (3M’s Resp. in Opp’n
to Mot. to Exclude Reitman, at 10-11). To that end, it contends that Reitman’s

opinion testimony is relevant as evidence challenging the Plaintiffs’ expert’s
opinions that 3M is responsible for the PFAS found in the Raccoon Creek
watershed. ( at 7-8). More specifically, Reitman’s intends to testify about
other possible sources of PFOS in the U.S., including through imported
products that may have been purchased in and around the Trion area. ( at
8-9). In essence, 3M argues that Reitman’s testimony will show it is “less

probable” that it made the PFOS found in the Raccoon Creek watershed than
the Plaintiffs’ experts claim. ( at 9-12).

The helpfulness of an expert’s opinions to a trier of fact speaks
“primarily to relevance,” which is a “liberal” standard.

, 813 F.3d 983, 988 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “Expert
testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and,
ergo, non-helpful.” , 509 U.S. at 591 (citation omitted). “An additional

consideration under Rule 702—and another aspect of relevancy—is whether
expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case
that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” (citation modified).
The Court agrees with 3M that Reitman’s opinions as to other possible
sources of PFAS and PFOS in the Raccoon Creek watershed are relevant to the
issue of causation. Although it is 3M’s burden to establish the relevance and
4

reliability of their expert’s opinions, it is ultimately the Plaintiffs’ burden at
trial to prove the causal connection between their alleged injuries and the
Defendants’ alleged actions. , , 2020 WL

1467247, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2020). Here, 3M seeks to introduce evidence
undermining the Plaintiffs’ causation evidence by showing that there were
other possible causes of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ argument
that Reitman cannot determine “to what extent, if any, a participant in the
global supply and use network for PFAS released a particular substance into
the environment at issue” entirely misses the mark—the fact that Reitman is

testifying she cannot make this determination is the whole point of introducing
her testimony. (Pls.’ Mot to Exclude Reitman, at 4 (citing Reitman Expert
Report [Doc. 865-1] at 6)). 3M intends to rely on this testimony to argue that
the Plaintiffs cannot prove its product is the cause of the alleged PFAS
contamination in the Raccoon Creek watershed. And contrary to the Plaintiffs’
position, this causation evidence is very relevant because “the defendant’s
ability to present alternate causes is of paramount importance in allowing for

an adequate defense.” , 769 F.3d 1063,

1069-70 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, the Court finds this evidence to be relevant
because it will be helpful for the jury resolve the causation issue. , 509 U.S. at 591.

The Plaintiffs also seek to exclude Reitman’s opinions under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, arguing that her testimony about PFOS sources
5

manufactured abroad will confuse the jury because such sources are irrelevant
to their claims. (Pls.’ Mot. to Exclude Reitman, at 9-10). 3M responds that
Reitman’s testimony is not confusing just because it undermines the Plaintiffs’

case and supports alternate causes of the Plaintiffs’ alleged injury. (3M’s Resp.
in Opp’n to Mot. to Exclude Reitman, at 17-18). Again, the Court agrees.
A court may exclude evidence under Rule 403 “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the issues, [or]
misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Because 403 allows a trial court to
exclude probative evidence, it is an “extraordinary remedy” and “should be

used only sparingly”; “[t]he balance under the Rule, therefore, should be struck
in favor of admissibility.” , 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th

Cir. 2022). Because Reitman’s testimony is relevant and will be helpful for the
jury, the extraordinary remedy of exclusion under Rule 403 is unwarranted
here.

B. Reliability

Next, the Plaintiffs argue that Reitman’s testimony is based on

insufficient data and unreliable methods. (Pls.’ Mot. to Exclude Reitman, at 8).
They assert that Reitman admitted she does not have any data indicating
PFOS sources besides 3M’s product are present in the Raccoon Creek
watershed, yet she seeks to testify that other possible sources exist. ( at 8-9).

3M responds that the Plaintiffs’ arguments as to reliability largely
repackage their contention that Reitman had to prove that non-3M sources are
6

responsible for the PFAs found in Raccoon Creek, which is an incorrect
statement of law. (3M’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Exclude Reitman, at
18-19). 3M contends that Reitman’s opinions relied on sufficient data,

including several governmental reports, federal regulations, import records,
and United Nations documents. ( ). 3M notes that the Plaintiffs do not

contest that literature reviews are a reliable methodology and asserts that
ruling out other possible causes of injury is precisely what makes Reitman’s
opinions reliable. ( at 20).

Expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 if, , (1) “the

testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data”; (2) “the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods”; and (3) “the expert’s opinion
reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Plaintiffs’ argument here is based on an erroneous
reading of Reitman’s expert report and a misunderstanding of the purpose of
her testimony. Far from admitting that “she does not have any data or
knowledge indicating that PFOS sources, other than 3M’s [product], are

present in the Raccoon Creek watershed,” ( Pls.’ Mot to Exclude Reitman,
at 8), Reitman’s report explains the reasons why the identification of PFOS
and PFAS “in an environmental sample is not sufficient to identify the original
source of production.” ( , Reitman Expert Report, at 8). Further, she

explains why this is true regardless of the characteristics in a sample
associated with electrochemical fluorination (ECF), a process that 3M is known
7

to have utilized in processing PFOS. ( ). And she provides testimony critical
to 3M’s causation defense that the Plaintiffs have not provided an appropriate
scientific basis for excluding other possible suppliers of the specific PFAS at

issue due to the potential contributions of products associated with global
supply chains. ( ).

In the Court’s view, the Plaintiffs do not truly challenge the reliability
of Reitman’s opinions in so much as the data they rely on the methodology used
to produce them, but instead challenge the content of her opinions. But the
Court’s inquiry at this stage “must be solely on principles and methodology,

not on the conclusions that they generate.” , 509 U.S. at 595. As the

Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly stressed, Rule 702 “is not intended to supplant
the adversary system or the role of the jury: vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.’” , 730 F.3d at 1282 (citation modified). The
fact that Reitman’s opinions may undermine the causation evidence the

Plaintiffs intend to present does not make them unreliable; instead, the
Plaintiffs’ concern goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence. The
Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to cross-examine Reitman at trial, where
their concerns will be more appropriately addressed.

                        8                                         
                       IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Joint 

Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Maureen Reitman [Doc. 865] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of March, 2026.

                                   T  Meteracte.  WO  Frekerrn 
                                    THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
                                    United States District Judge