Shelton v. Patton - Motion to Dismiss Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWAREDR. DANIEL C. SHELTON,Plaintiff,DONALD PATTON, NAVEEDBAQIR, YUN FEI LOU, andALETHEA SMITH-TUCKER,all individually and in their officialcapacities; and BOARD OFEDUCATION OF THECHRISTINA SCHOOL DISTRICT,Defendants.Civil Action No. 24-1338-CFCThomas S. Neuberger and Stephen J. Neuberger, THE NEUBERGER FIRM, P.A.Wilmington, DelawareCounsel for PlaintiffWilliam A. Crawford, FRANKLIN & PROKOPIC, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware;Marc Sposato, MARKS, O'NEIL, O'BRIEN, DOHERTY & KELLY, P.O.,Wilmington, Delaware; Sarah B. Cole, MARSHALL DENNEHEY, P.C.,Wilmington, Delaware; Daniel A. Griffith, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR &PRESTON LLC., Wilmington, Delaware; Christian J. Singewad and Daryll M.Hawthorne, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP, Wilmington, DelawareCounsel for MEMORANDUM OPINIONMarch 9, Wilmington, Delaware

COLMF.CONTOLLYCHIEF JUDGEPlaintiff Daniel Shelton filed this action against Donald Patton,Naveed Baqir, Yun Fei Lou, Alethea Smith-Tucker, and the Christina SchoolDistrict Board of Education (the Board). Pending before me are Defendants'motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all fivecounts of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can begranted. D.I. 13; D.I. 15; D.I. 17; D.I. 19; D.I. 25.I.When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must acceptas true all factual in the complaint and view them in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiffs. Umland v. Planco Fin. Servs., F.3d 59, (3d Cir.2008). The court may consider only the in the complaint and thedocuments incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which thecourt may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., U.S.308, (2007).To state a claim upon which relief can be granted a complaint must contain"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled torelief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual are not required, butthe complaint must set forth enough factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, U.S.544, (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged. Ashcroftv. Iqbal, U.S. 662, (2009). "Threadbarerecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere statements, do not suffice." Id. Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicialexperience and common sense." Id. at 679.II.According to the the Board hired Shelton in as theSuperintendent of the Christina School District pursuant to a five-year contractrunning from July I, to June 30, (the contract). D.I. I-l ^ 1. TheComplaint alleges that "[pjaragraph of the [2020] contract provides that [thecontract] cannot be terminated during its term 'except for good and just cause,'following a previous 'fair hearing,' and prior to such a hearing 'a written statementof the reasons for termination' must have been provided." D.I. ^ 38. TheComplaint does not mention or discuss any other provision of the contract.The Complaint alleges that in December the Board approved a one-year extension of Shelton's contract through June 30, 2026, and that Sheltonagreed to that contract extension. D.I. I T]]f 39-43. The Complaint alleges that

"[f]or the 2025-2026 school year the contractual wage total here [sic] is $219,898."D.I. T| 39. The Complaint does not mention or discuss any other provision of thecontract extension.The Complaint alleges that after the Board approved the contract extension,it took a series of adverse actions against Shelton by 4-3 voteswithout notice, hearing, or good cause. D.I. If 45. Specifically, the Complaintalleges that: (1) on March 12, 2024, the Board rescinded the contract extension andsuspended Shelton without pay for three days, D.I. 47; (2) on May 24, 2024,the Board passed a vote of "no confidence" in Shelton, D.I. ]f 52; (3) on July 9,2024, the Board "suspended" "reprimanded," and "placed [Shelton] onadministrative leave," and that "[t]hereafter he was denied access to his offices andall systems of the District" and "was denied supervision of any of [the District's]activities or personnel and not allowed to perform any of his prior job duties andresponsibilities," D.I. I ^ 57; and (4) in August 2024, the Board hired areplacement superintendent for a one-year term, D.I. ^ 59. The Complaintalleges that the four individual voted in each instance as the Boardmajority. See D.I. I 48, 140.The Complaint alleges that "as a result" of these Board actions, Shelton"was out of a job." D.I. I ^ 60. It similarly makes in paragraph the that Shelton "was terminated." The Complaint does not, however.

allege facts about Shelton's alleged termination. It does not, for example, allegewhen, how, or at whose direction Shelton was terminated. It also does not allegethat Shelton's alleged forced administrative leave has ended. Moreover, theComplaint alleges that Shelton's salary "is currently $210,043." D.I. I Tf (emphasis added). Thus, notwithstanding the Complaint's that Shelton "was terminated," the Complaint's factual do not plausiblyimply that he was terminated. Rather, the Complaint's factual plausiblyimply that Shelton is currently on paid administrative leave. (Consistent with thisreading of the in an affidavit submitted by the Board in support of itsmotion, the District's Chief Financial Officer averred that as of April 15, 2025,Shelton "has remained on paid administrative leave and continues to receive fullpay and benefits without any changes or restrictions pursuant to his contract of June 4, 2020." D.I. 20-1 ^ 5. Although I make note of this declaration,I did not rely on it but instead relied on the plausible inferences I have made basedon the Complaint's factual allegations.)The Complaint has five counts. Counts I and II allege the same "FourteenthAmendment—^Procedural Due Process" claim under U.S.C. § 1983. D.I. Iat 17, 19. Although they are structured as separate counts, the two counts merelyallege different theories for the same claim. Count I alleges that Shelton"possessed protected property interests in his based on his written

contracts," and that he was deprived of these interests with "[n]o [pjrocess[wjhatsoever." D.I. at 17. Count II alleges that Shelton was deprived of theseproperty interests by a "[b]iased [djecisionmaker" without due process. D.I. at 19. Count III alleges that "the Board breached multiple terms of th[e] [2020]D.I. ^ 149. Count IV alleges that "[t]he Board breached multipleterms ofth[e] [extension] D.I. ^ 157.III.argue that Counts III and IV fail as a matter of law because theComplaint "merely makes that the Board 'breached multipleterms of [each] contract' without citing to any particular term [of either contract]and linking it to any act of the Board." D.I. at 7; see also D.I. at 3.' I agree.Nowhere in the paragraphs of the hyperbolic, painfully redundant, andirrelevancy-filled Complaint does Shelton ever identify an obligation in the contract or the contract extension that allegedly breached.As noted above, other than the contract's duration, the only provision of thecontract mentioned in the Complaint is paragraph 9, which, according to the"provides that [the contract] cannot be terminated during its term'except for good and just cause,' following a previous 'fair hearing,' and prior to' Each Defendant incorporated and adopted the arguments of the other Defendants.D.I. at II; D.I. at 2; D.I. at 1; D.I. at n.l; D.I. at 13.

such a hearing 'a written statement of the reasons for termination' must have beenprovided." D.I. 1^38. As noted above, the Complaint does not plausibly implythat Shelton was terminated. But putting that failure aside, the Complaint does notallege even in a fashion that any Defendant breached paragraph of thecontract.With respect to the contract extension, other than its duration, the onlyprovision of that alleged contract mentioned in the Complaint is the amount ofShelton's salary for the 2025-2026 school year. And the Complaint does notallege that the Board failed to pay Shelton that salary.In sum, the Complaint alleges that breached "multiple terms" ofthe two contracts, but it does not identify a single term that was breached and doesnot allege any facts that plausibly imply that any Defendant breached anyprovision of either contract. D.I. I ^ 149. "Stating that a contract was breached isstating a legal conclusion." Chemtech Int'l, Inc. v. Chem. Injection Techs., Inc.,F. App'x 805, (3d Cir. 2006). And "[t]o adequately state a claim forbreach of contract under Rule 12(b)(6), [Shelton] ha[s] to do more than simplyassert that [the Board] 'breached'... a See id. Accordingly, I willdismiss Counts III and IV.Since Shelton may try to amend Counts III and IV, I note for the benefit ofhis counsel that even his briefing fails to identify a specific contractual provision

that Shelton claims the Board breached. In his Answering Brief filed in oppositionto the motion, for example, counsel argues that the Board's unilateral terminationof the contract extension violated the contract extension because "[n]o writtennotice of the reasons was given to [Shelton]; no 'fair hearing' was held beforedoing so; and no 'good and just cause' existed to justify this material breach ofD.I. at (citing paragraphs and of the Complaint). But likethe the Answering Brief does not point to a provision in the contractextension that prevents the Board from terminating the contract extension withoutgood and just cause. Nor does the Answering Brief identify a provision in thecontract extension that has a notice or hearing requirement. And again, the onlyterms of the contract extension that are plausibly implied in the Complaint are itsduration and the amount of Shelton's salary.With respect to the contract, counsel argues in the Answering Briefthat the Board wrongfully suspended Shelton without pay and that "no provision of[the 2020] contract or District Policy provides for this type of suspension." D.I. at 13. Counsel seems to think that to allege a cognizable contract claim, all youhave to do is allege the existence of a contract and accuse the defendant of awrongful act and then the burden switches to the defendant to find a provision inthe contract that allows the defendant to perform that act. That's not how it works,and counsel is warned that before he tries to amend the Complaint or file another

brief in this action, he needs first to study the basic tenets of contract law and thepleading requirements for cases in federal court.IV.Citing Chenvert v. DeJohn, WL 1728257, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 11,2000), aff'd, F.3d (3d Cir. 2001) and Unger v. Nat'I Residents MatchingProgram, F.2d 1392, (3d Cir. 1991), argue that the dismissalof Shelton's contract claims necessitates dismissal of his procedural due processclaim because his alleged protected property interests are based on those contracts.D.I. at 16. Shelton does not dispute this argument. See generally D.I. 28.^ And^ The parties presented to me, and I regrettably signed, a stipulated order thatallowed Shelton to file a consolidated Answering Brief of up to 18,469 words.D.I. 27. Most of the 18,176 words used by Shelton in his Answering Brief, seeD.I. at 83, were devoted to irrelevant, over-the-top argument. As just oneexample, Shelton dedicated pages through of his Answering Brief to asection called "Liberty Interests" that included sub-sections titled "How LibertyInterests are Created," "Part - The Stigma," "Part - The Plus," and "DevastatingImpact on Future Employment Prospects is Established." All this, notwithstandingthe fact that the Complaint does not allege a liberty interest-based Due Processclaim. Notably, Shelton did not use a single word of his Answering Brief to cite ordiscuss Chenvert or Unger. Nor did he spill a single drop of ink to dispute that hisDue Process claim fails if his contract claims fail.The opening sentence of Shelton's Answering Brief is telling: "The 22-page, paragraph, 5,555-word Complaint was filed on December 9, (D.I. 1), andtimely service was achieved on December 16, 2024." D.I. at 1. Shelton'scounsel seems to think that more pages, paragraphs, and words are—to use hisword—a "Plus." To be clear, the Complaint in this case reads more like a pressrelease than a legal filing. It recounts, for example, how Shelton earned "severaldegrees" including "a Bachelors of Science in Health and Physical Education," and

I agree, as the majority in Unger suggested, see F.2d at 1399-40, and as JudgeStapleton expressly stated in his concun-ence in Unger, that "[wjhere a contract isrelied upon to provide the necessary property interests supporting a due processclaim, no deprivation is alleged unless the plaintiff can point to a breach of thecontract," id. at (concurrence) (emphasis in the original). The Complaintalleges in paragraph that Shelton "possessed protected property interests in hisbased on his written contracts, and from local government laws,policies, customs and practices, both written and unwritten, and from mutuallyexplicit understandings between his government employer and its employee."D.I. (citing Stana v. Sch. Dist of City ofPittsburgh, F.2d 122, (3dCir. 1985)). The however, does not identify any law, policy, custom,it lets us know that Shelton belongs to a Rotary Club and is an HonoraryCommander of Dover Air Force Base. D.I. at 2-3. None of these facts bears onthe legal claims Shelton attempted to allege in the Complaint. could go on, butsuffice it to say that the Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8's requirements thata complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim" and that "[ejach[in the complaint] ... be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.Should counsel attempt to file an amended complaint that does not comport withRule 8, he should expect that I will sua sponte dismiss it. See Tillio v. NorthlandGrp. Inc., F. App'x 78, (3d Cir. 2012) ("A district court may sua spontedismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule . . . ."); see also In reWestinghouse Sec. Litig., F.3d 696, (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming districtcourt's dismissal under Rule of "unnecessarily complicated and verbose"complaint). Counsel should also expect that I will no longer agree to requests toextend word limits for his briefs.

practice, or understanding that could give rise to a property interest. TheComplaint expressly states in a sub-heading in its "Facts" section that "the twocontracts create[ed] protected property interests." D.I. at (somecapitalization removed). And the only factual bases for a property interest ofShelton's alleged in the Complaint are the two alleged contracts. Accordingly, Iwill dismiss Counts I and II because Shelton has failed to plausibly allege a breachof either of the two contracts he relies on to provide the necessary deprivation ofproperty interests supporting his Due Process claims.V.For the foregoing reasons, I will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss.D.I. 13; D.I. 15; D.I. 17; D.I. 19; D.I. 25.The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.