US v. John McLaurin - Criminal Case Vacated and Remanded

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 4261 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. JOHN MCLAURI N, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the District of Mary land, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, Senior District Judge. (1:12 - cr - 00348 - JKB -4) Argued: October 24, 2025 Decided: March 6, 2026 Before NIEMEYER, GREGO RY, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by publishe d opinion. Judge Gre gory wrote t he opinio n, in which Judge Berner joined. Ju dge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Cul len Oakes Macbeth, OFFICE OF THE FEDER AL PUBLI C DEFEND ER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Jason Daniel Medinger, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek S. Barron, United States Attorney, David C. Bornstein, Assista nt United Sta tes Att orney, OFFI CE OF THE UNITE D STATES A TTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

2 GREGORY, Circuit Judge: John McLaurin appeals the revocation of his supervised release based on violations of standard conditions t hat were in his origin al written judgment, but were no t pronounced orally at his original sentencing. Under United States v. Rogers, 961 F. 3d 291, 29 6– 99 (4th Cir. 2020), a district court must orally pronounce all non - mandato ry conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing. Any discretionary supervised release conditions that appear for the first time in the written judgment are nullities. Accordi ngly, we vacate the revocation judgment and remand for resentencing. I. On October 16, 2012, Appellant John McLaurin pled guilty to co nspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute mo re than five kilograms of cocaine. In exchange for th e government’s agreement to recommend a sentence of 120 months, McLaurin agreed to the following appellate waiver: The Defendant and this Office knowing ly waive all right, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or otherwise, to appeal wh atever sentence is imposed (including the right to appeal any issues that relate to the establishment of the advisory guidelines range, the determination of the defendant’s criminal history, the weighing of the sentencing factors, and the decision whether to impose and the calculation of any term of imprisonment, fine, order of forfeiture, order of restitutio n, and term or condition of superv ised release), except as follows: (i) the Defendant reserves th e right to appeal a senten ce of greater than 120 months imprisonment…. JA 34. In a presentence investigation report, the probation officer recommended that the district court impose “[t]he mandatory and standard conditions of supervision adopted by

3 the Court” and four special conditions. JA 122. These four special conditions were: (1) that McLaurin participate in a substance - abuse treatmen t program, (2) that he participate in a “vocational or educational prog ram,” (3) that he not consume alcohol, and (4) th at he participate in “a mental health treatment p rogram.” Id. On January 18, 2013, the court held an oral sentencing and sentenced McLaurin to 120 months of imprisonment and five years o f supervised release. Du ring this sentencing hearing, the court orally recited th e four special cond itions of release that it was im posing. The court did not recite or men tion any “standard” supervised release conditio ns. Later that day, the court entered a written judgment con taining the four special conditions of supervised release. The same judgment also contained six mandatory conditions, such as the condition that McLaurin not illegally u se or possess a controlled substance. In addition, th e judgment contained fourteen “standard” supervised release conditions. Relevant here, standard condition six pro vided that McLaurin “shall notify th e probation officer ten days prior to any change in residence or employmen t,” and standard condition ten provided that he “sh all permit a probation officer to visit him ... at any time at home or elsewhere and sh all permit confiscation of any contrab and observed in plain view of the probation officer.” JA 73. McLaurin was released from prison and began serving his term of superv ision on February 1 8, 2022. On October 31, 2023, a probation o fficer submitted a “Petition on Supervised Release” to the district court, alleging the follow ing violations of McLaurin’s supervised release cond itions:

4 (1) that McLaurin tested positive for THC and admitted to using THC on February 1 8, 2022, i n viola tion of man datory c onditi ons 2 and 3 prohibiting the use and possession of a con trolled substance; (2) that McLaurin failed to app ear for his substance abu se assessment appointments and failed to report for drug testing in March, May, Jun e, and July, in violation of special conditio n 1 on participation in a substance abuse treatment program; (3) that McLaurin failed to appear for a home visit scheduled by the probation officer on August 9 and September 20, 2023, in violation of standard condition 10 regarding compliance with ho me visits; and (4) that McLaurin failed to alert the pro bation officer of a change of add ress, in violation of standard condition 6. JA 125 – 27. On May 7, 2024, the court held a rev ocation hearing. McLaurin had agreed to admit to violations five and six, relating to the failed home v isits in August and September, and the government had agreed to dismiss all other violations. Parties acted con sistently with the agreement, and the d istrict court revoked McLaurin’s superv ised release. The government requested 90 d ays of incarceration while McLau rin requested a sentence of time served. The court sentenced McLaurin to 90 days of imprisonment, followed by an additional 42 months of supervised release “with the exact same terms and conditions as were imposed on the defendant previou sly.” JA 94 – 98. McLaurin did not object to the supervised release conditions in his origin al written judgment, and neither did McLau rin object to the imposition of the same conditio ns in his new term of superv ised release. The court entered judgment on May 7, 2024. M cLaurin brings this ap peal.

5 II. T his appeal raises three issues: whether McLau rin waived his right to appeal this issue as a part of his plea bargain, whether his appeal is timely and procedurally prop er, and w heth er the district court judgment survives plain - error review. We first con clude that the appellate waiver does not bar the Rogers challen ge based on an examination of its plain language. Second, this appeal was timely and procedurally proper under United States v. Brantley, 87 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2023), and United States v. New by, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Ci r. 2024). F inally, under plain - error rev iew, the district court erred when it revoked supervised released based on conditions that, under Ro gers, were never imposed. A. The Government contends that the appellate waiver in McLaurin’s plea bargain prohibits McLaurin from contesting the revocation of his supervised release. The interpretation of a plea agreement is a qu estion we review de novo. U nited States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 3 36, 342 (4t h Cir. 200 1). Plea agreements are generally guided by contract principles. United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 28 1, 287 (4th Ci r. 2019). Th us, we are to “look to the plain language of the agreement, construing it in the ordinary sense.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 20 21). However, because “plea agreements necessarily imp licate a defendant’s constitutional rig hts ... we hold the government, w hich h as a greater negotiating position, to a higher standard for any imprecise language or ambiguity th at appears in plea agreements.” Id.; see United States v. U nder Seal, 902 F.3d 412, 4 17 – 18 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[A]mbiguities in a plea agreement are construed against the government

6 as its drafter.”). N onetheless, “[i]f the plea agreemen t is unambiguous as a matter of law, and there is no evidence of governmental overreaching, we should interpret and enforce the agreement accordingly.” United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, the appellate waiver reads: The Defendant and this Office knowing ly waive all right, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or otherwise, to ap peal whatever sentence is imposed (including the right to app eal any issues that relate to the establishment o f the advisory guidelines range, the d etermination of the defendan t’s criminal history, the weighing of the senten cing factors, and the decision whether to impose an d the calc ulation of any term of impriso nment, fine, order of forfeiture, order of restitution, and term or condition of supervised release), except as follows: (i) the Defendan t reserves the right to appeal a sentence of greater than 120 months imprisonment…. JA 34 (emphasis added). Although the Government would characterize this language of a waiver of “‘any issues’ that even ‘relate to’ his su pervised release conditions,” G overnment’s Brief at 13, that is not what the p lain language states. R ather, the waiver specifically ba rs McLaurin from appealing imposed senten ces and the deci sion to i mpose terms of supervised release. This specificity is significant b ecause a Rogers challenge is distinct from a ch allenge to imposed sentences. Rogers deals with the validity of conditions that were never properly imposed: Roge rs h eld that when discretionary supervised release conditio ns appear for the first time in written judgment, they are “n ullities; the defendant has no t been sentenced to those conditions[.]” United S tates v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th C ir. 2 021) (citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 20 20)) (“In Rogers, we established that because a defendant has a r ight to be present wh en he is sentenced, a district court must orally pronounce all n on - mandatory conditions of supervised release at the sentencing

7 hearing.”). Under Rogers, McLaurin’s challen ged conditions of supervised release were never imposed at all because they were nev er orally pronounced at sentencing. To put it another way, McL aurin is not appealing his 2 013 sentence or its related conditions. H e is appealing the 202 4 revocation of his supervised released based on invalid and null conditions. The appellate waiver does not contain plain language covering such an appeal, and all ambigu ities must be construed against th e government. U nder Seal, 9 02 F.3d at 417 – 18; see also Singletary, 984 F.3d at 345 (finding th at an appellate waiver of “whatever sentence is imposed” does not prohib it a Rogers claim on a ppeal). The Government’s reliance on general case law regarding appellate waivers is unavailing. T he Government cites a series of cases for the argum ent that whe n a defenda nt generally waives his appellate rights to challeng e a sentence, the waivers extend to supervised released conditions as well. Government’s Brief at 13 – 14 (citing United States v. Copeland, 7 07 F.3d 52 2 (4th C ir. 2013); United States v. Crews, No. 23 - 4581, 2024 WL 2362207 (4th C ir. May 23, 2024); United States v. Boone, 8 01 F. App’ x 897 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Akinto, 770 F. App’ x 86 (4th C ir. 201 9); United States v. Ballard, 491 F. App’ x 374 (4th Cir. 2012)). But none of these cases deal with appeals regarding Rogers challenges and instead pertain to d irect appeals regarding th e substance of a properly imposed supervised release con dition. Moreover, the only published case that the Government cites, Copeland, explicitly recognizes that an “appeal waiver does not always preclude an appeal.” 707 F.3 d at 530. Rather, a de fendant can successfully bring a challenge despite an appeal waiver when the challenge “involves fundamental issues, including claims that a district co urt exceeded its authority, premised its senten ce on a

8 constitutionally impermissible factor ... or violated [a po st - plea constitutional right].” Id. (cleaned up) (citing United Sta tes v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2012)). No doubt, the revocation of supervised release based on conditions that were never properly imposed is a claim that a district co urt exceeded its authority. McLaurin’s appellate waiver does not extend to the facts of this ap peal. B. The Government makes three further p rocedural arguments: (1) that McLaurin’s appeal is barred by the law of the case doctrine, (2) that the app eal is untimely, and (3) that the appeal is barred by preceden t which prevents a defendant from attempting to challen ge release conditions after a violatio n has been foun d. Because the Government fails to account for the special nature of a Rogers challenge and because Rogers applies retroactively under Brantley and Newby, these arguments are unavailing. First, the Government improperly relies on the law of the case doctrine. This doctrine states that issues decided in earlier stages of a lit igation must continue to control throughout later stages. United States v. Bell, 988 F. 2 d 247, 250 (4th Cir. 1 993). This doctrine extends to issues th at could have been raised in a previo us appeal, but which were not raised and are therefore considered forgone. See Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 4 61, 465 (4th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Court has stated “[a] supervised release revocation h earing is not a proper forum for testing the validity of an underlying sentence or conv iction.” United States v. Sanchez, 891 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 201 8). Ac cordingly, the Government argues that because McLaurin did not challenge his supervised release conditions in 2013, these

9 conditions have become the law of the case an d must control throughout his revocatio n procedure. The Government misunderstands Rogers. Rogers holds that a discretionary condition not pronounced at oral h earing is a nullity — in other wor ds, such a c ondition never became the law of the case. The Government cites to United Sta tes v. Brantley for the contention that a “ju dgment with a Rogers error, just as any other judgment, is valid until corrected on appeal or amended by the district court.” 87 F.4th 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2023). But a valid judgment should not b e confused with a valid condition. Brantley goes on to reiterate that a judgment can be valid despite containing nullities. Id. at 266. At no point doe s Brantley pu rport to overturn the Rogers holding that condition s appearing for the first time in a written judgment are nullities. To the contrary, Brantley con tinues to recognize t hat Rogers errors occur, while distinguishing a valid judg ment from a valid condition of release. See id. Second, the Government argu es that the challenge is untimely under Federal Ru le of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), which provides that a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district cou rt within 14 days of entry of th e judgment being appealed. McLaurin did not appeal the inclusion of the written conditions of supervised release w hen the written judgment was issued in 2013. Indeed, defendan ts who raise Rogers errors are not “excused from the usual timeliness for fili ng a notice of appeal.” Brantley, 87 F.4t h at 264. There is no “freestand ing right to ask an app ellate court to correct even th e most obvious Rogers error.” United States v. Newby, 91 F.4t h 196, 199 (4th Cir. 2024). For that reason, defendants raising Rog ers challenges must have a “procedurally app ropriate

10 mechanism” for raising the issue p ast the initial appeal deadline. Id. S uch a procedurally appropriate mechanism may be the appeal of a judgment that is “infected by the initial Rogers error.” Id. (f inding, for examp le, that appeal of an amended judgment was an appropriate mechanism through which to raise the Rogers error fro m the original judgment, even though the defendant did not raise a Rogers error at the time of th e initial sentencing in 2008). Here, McLaurin employs that procedurally appropriate mechanism for raising a Rogers challenge. As an initial matter, McLaurin had no grounds to appeal the Rogers error in his 2013 sentencing appeal because Rogers was not decided until 2020. Thus, the fact that McLaurin did not raise a Rogers challeng e in 2013 cannot b e seen as a forfeit or waiver of his right to challenge the written conditions that were not orally imposed. See United States v. Cannady, 63 F.4th 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2023) (finding that a party can “not forfeit or waive any objection” b ased on a decision that “this Cou rt did not issue ... until after” the initial round of litigation). The dissent faults McLau rin for failing to raise a Rogers error after Rog ers was decided in 2020. See Dissent Op. at 6. But Brantley and Newby would have barr ed McLaurin from freely raising the Rogers challenge at that t ime because he has no “freestanding right” to appeal a Rogers error absent a “proced urally appropriate mechanism.” Newby, 91 F.4th at 199. Howev er, the 2024 revocation hearing became McLaurin’s “procedurally approp riate mechanism” to raise a Rogers challenge because it was a hearing that was “infected by the initial Rogers error.” Id. And McLaurin timely utilized that mechanism to raise t his challenge. In relation to the 2024 revocation h earing,

11 McLaurin adhered to Rule 4, filin g a notice of appeal two days after the d istrict court entered judgment. Finally, the Government’s reliance on case law is unpersuasive. The Government invokes Johnson and Whitley for the idea that a defendant “canno t wait for a revocation hearing to challenge the validity of the underlying sup ervised release conditions.” Government’s Brief at 21 (citing United St ates v. Johnson, 13 8 F.3d 115 (4t h Cir. 19 98) and United States v. Whitley, 841 F. App’x 631, 632 (4th Cir. 2021)). But neither case involves a Rogers error. I ndeed, because there is no freestanding right to raise a Rogers challenge and because defendants raising R ogers challenges need a “procedurally appropriate mechanism,” for many defendants who were sentenced before 2020, a revocation hearing is o ne of the few means by which they can raise a Rog ers challenge. Thus, when dealing with a Rogers error, it cannot be true that a defendant “cannot wait for a revocation hearing” to challenge the null cond itions. Rather, under Brantley and Newby, sometimes a defendant can only wait for a revocation or similar hearing in order to do so. * C. McLaurin did not object to the revocation o f his supervised release under Rogers at the underlying hearing. Because he did not preserve this issue, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4t h Cir. 20 10). * Although a defendant may raise a Rogers challe nge only w hen proc edura lly permitted, a district cou rt need not wait for a revocation h earing to correct a so - called Rogers error. This is because district cou rts are free to “modify, redu ce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any tim e prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release .. ..” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); s ee also, United States Sentencing Commission, Guideline Manual, § 5D1.4(a).

12 Under this standard, a defendant must show that: “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 397 (4th Cir. 2021). If these three prongs are met, then we correct the error “if th e error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of ju dicial proceedings.” Rosales - Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 13 5 (2018). First, an error occurred when the district court revoked McLaurin’s supervised release based upon conditions that were null under Rogers. Specifically, the district court sentenced McLaurin to 90 day s of incarceration followed by 42 months o f supervised release upon finding that McLaurin h ad violated the standard conditions relating to ho me visits. These standard conditions were that McLaurin “shall notify the probation office r ten days prior to any change in residence or employment,” and that he “shall permit a probation officer to visit h im ... at any time at home or else where and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the p robation officer.” JA 73. These conditions were contained in McLaurin’s written judgment, but they were never pronounced orally at McLaurin’s s entencing, and nor were they referenced at the sentencing. These cond itions may have been “standard,” but they were not mandatory. Thus, unde r Rogers, the failure to pronoun ce these conditions orally render them “nullities” to which McLaurin was never sentenced. Singletary, 984 F.3d a t 344; Rogers, 961 F.3 d at 295. The district court lacked autho rity to revoke supervised release based on conditions that were never imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Second, the error was plain. There is no amb iguity in the application of Rogers. The Government argues that McLau rin’s discretionary conditions became a part of h is

13 sentence when he failed to appeal those conditions, relying on the law of the case do ctrine. However, for all the reasons sta ted in Section II(B), the law o f the case doctrine is inapplicable here, and McLaurin cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Rogers ch allenge before Rogers was even decided. See Unite d States v. Cannady, 63 F.4th 259, 267 (4t h Cir. 2023) (“We will not penalize [defendant] for not objecting to an issue that did not become available until years after the imposition of h is original sentence ...”). Third, the error im pacted McLaurin’s substantial rights, c ausing McLaurin to be sentenced to imprisonment and an extended term of supervised release. The Governm ent argues that the error resulted in no prejudice to McLaurin because the “record sh ows that McLaurin committed additional vio lations, including being ou t of communication with his probation officer for eight months, and being in possession and use of controlled substances.” Government’s Brief at 27. How ever, the referenced “record” is merely th e probation officer’s petition on supervised release and the accompany ing officer report. Because McLaurin admitted to the v iolations pertaining to th e failed home visits in exchange for the government’s agreement to dismiss all other violations, the district court never made findings of fact regarding whether McLaurin had committed the other v iolations. Moreover, this Court has held that wh en assessing prejudice from an invalid conviction, courts ask “whether it is likely a defendant, had he known of the error, wou ld not have pled guilty to the count of conviction.” United States v. McKinney, 60 F. 4th 188, 196 (4th Ci r. 2023). Courts “do not look to w hether it is likely a defen dant, had he known of the error, would not have pled guilty to a dismissed cou nt.” Id.; accord United States v.

14 Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding, in a harmless error analysis on a revocation of supervised release, that the relevant inquiry was what the district actually based its revocation up on, and not what it cou ld have alternatively based its rev ocatio n upon). The same principle applies here. It would be improper to find th at McLaurin’s substantial rights were not affecte d simply because he could h ave had his release revok ed based on another violation. Finally, the error implicates the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Government argues that McLaurin’s appeal relies o n “simple formalism” and that he is seeking a “wind fall” based on a “technical” error. Government’s Brief at 30. Far from it, a Rogers challenge implicates the liberty and due process rights of defendants. The nullification of conditions that were not pronounced orally before th e defendant ensures that defendants can “object to co nditions that are no t tailored to their individual circumstances and ensures that they will be imposed only after consideration o f the factors set out in § 3583(d).” Rogers, 961 F. 3d at 300. A ppeal s such as this one are about the vindication of that righ t and necessarily implicate the integ rity of judicial proceedings. The dissent o bjects that McLaurin’s agreemen t to admit to v iolations of the standard conditions inv ited the error of t he district cou rt. Dissen t Op. at 16. B ut that po sition suggests that w henever a d efendant adm its to wron gdoing, he inv ites whatever erroneous sentence th e court imp oses. In such a world, defen dants wo uld ceas e admitting to any violation for fear o f losing th e ability to appeal erro rs of the cou rt. That w ould im pede both the efficacy an d the integrity o f our system. To avoi d such an out come, we cannot treat McLaurin’s agreemen t to admit to the standard violations as inv iting the error of the court.

15 At the same time, the probation officer and the district court accepted McL aurin’s plea agreement based on the assump tion that the standard conditions h e admitted to violating had been properly imposed. Because we have found that those standard conditions were not properly imposed, th is fundame ntal as sumptio n no longe r holds up the plea agreement and the agreement is invalid. For that reason, we not only vacate the revocation judgment but remand this case for a resentencing on the revocation matter. III. Defendant’s appellate waiver does not p rohibit him from challenging his revo cation proceedings based on null supervised release cond itions. D efendant timely and properly raised this Rogers challenge through an appeal of his revocation hearing. T he district court’s revocation of supervised release was plain error under Rogers. Fo r the foregoing reasons, we vacate the revocation judgm ent and remand for revocation resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

16 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In this appeal of a supervised - release revocatio n judgment, John McLaurin contends that the two conditions of his supervised release that he admitted violatin g were actually “nullities” under our holding in United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 20 20), because they were discretionary conditions that were not orally ann ounced at his January 18, 2013 sentencing hearing and instead on ly appeared for the first time later that same day when the court issued its written judgment. He thus argues that, even though he absconded from supervision for months, the 2013 conditions prohibiting him from doing so were “nullities” and therefore that the r evocation of his supervised release b ased on his violation of those conditions must be vacated an d the revocation proceeding dismissed. In short, McLauri n wants us n ow to open and revie w his 2013 judgment t o find t hat the st andard conditions of supervised release listed therei n cannot be enforced against him and then conclude that his entire revocation proceeding was illegal. The problems with McLaurin’ s argument, however, are manifold. First, he never objected to the 2013 conditions of supervised release that are now being enforced or sought to have the m remove d from his j udgment, a nd he has provi ded no aut hority for us now t o open and review that judgment, which has become final and binding. H e also never objected to those conditions in th is revocation proceeding when they were enforced against him to revoke his supervised release. Instead, he waited to mount his challenge to the validity of the conditions fo r the first time in this appeal. Indeed, yet more difficult for him, he entered into a plea agreement in th is revocation proceeding in which he agreed that his violation of two of the standard conditions of his superv ised release in his 2013

17 judgment should form the basis for a stipulated revo cation, which the court then accepted and entered in this case. That agreement was given in exchange for the agreement by the probation officer and the government to drop char ges that he had violated three other conditions of supervised release, all o f which were undispu tably not tainted by any Roger s error. Thus, by his agreement, McLaurin invited the district court’ s reliance on the two standard conditions to support rev ocation and then, on appeal, see ks to have those conditions declared nullities and his revocation proceeding dismissed. The majority opinion buys McLaurin’ s ar gument “hook, line, and sinker” in what amounts to a super - activistic disregard of binding precedents. Apparently recognizing, however, that ordering a resentencing to correct the alleged Rogers error would be absurd for numerous reasons of finality, the majority instead o rders “a resentencing on the revocation matter,” which no one contends was flawed. Ante at 15. Thus, the majority’ s analysis of the 2013 sentencing can only be dicta. Even so, as I explain, our cl ear precedents require the rejection of McLaurin’ s arguments and the majority’ s approach because we have no jurisdiction to open his 2013 judgment and, in any event, he cannot satisfy the requirements of plain - error rev iew with the error that he inv ited. I In 2012, Jo hn McLaur in was cha r ged with dr ug - traf ficking, robbery, and the illegal possession of a firearm. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he p leaded guilty to one drug - traf ficking count and waived his right to appeal “whatever sent ence [was] imposed,” inc luding “the right to appeal any issue[]” relating to a “term or condition of sup ervised

18 release.” Pursuant to the plea ag reement, the government then d ismissed the remaining counts. The presentence report prepared for McLaurin’ s sentencing recommended that, as part of his supervised release, the court impose “[t]he mandatory and standard co nditions of supervision adopted by the Court,” as well as four special conditions — namely, that McLaurin (1) participate in a su bstance - abuse treatment program; (2) participate in a vocational or educational program; (3) abstain from alcohol; and (4) participate in a mental - health treatment program. At sentencing, neither party ob jected to the presentence repo rt, and the district court explicitly adopted it before imposing sentence. Thereafter, the court sentenced McLaurin to 120 months’ imprisonment and imposed a five - year term of superv ised release. While the court said nothing further abo ut the mandatory or standard cond itions of supervised release, it orally announced the four special conditions recommended by the probation officer, noting that the justification for each was set out in the presentence report. McLaurin’ s final written ju dgment, issued on January 18, 2013, thus required McLaurin to serve five years of supervised release subject to (1) the mandatory conditions required by statute; (2) the standard conditions of supervised release, which closely tr acked the standard conditions recommend ed by the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) (2013); and (3) the four special cond itions that the court orally pronounced at sen tencing. McLaurin appealed the 2013 judgment w ith a brief prepared by his coun sel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (19 67), and McLaurin himself filed a pro se b rief raising additional issues. Neither McLau rin nor his counsel, however, raised any issue with respect to the conditions of his supervised release, and we affirmed the judgment. See

19 United States v. McLaurin, 608 F. App’x 150 (4th Cir. 2015) (p er curiam). The judgment thus became final. McLaurin was released from prison on February 18, 2022, and began serving his 5 - year term of supervised release. In October 2023, McLaurin’ s p robation officer commenced a revocation proceeding against McLaurin, charging him with six violations of his conditions of supervised release — violations of two mandatory conditions, v iolations of two standard conditions, and t wo violations of a special condition. In particular, the revocation petition alleged (1) that he failed a drug test, in violation of a mandatory cond ition; (2) that he possessed a controlled substance, in violation of another mand atory condition; (3) that he failed to appear for two substance abuse assessment appointments, in violation of a special condition; (4) that he failed to report an additional five times for testing, as required by that special condition; (5) that he twice willfu lly neglected to m ake himself available for schedu led home visits, in violation of standard condition 10, which required him to permit the probation officer to visit him at any time; and (6) that he failed to n otify the probation officer that he had moved from his residence to an unknown location, in violation of standard condition 6, which required him to notify the p robation officer before changing residences. McLaurin’ s whereabouts were unknown when these rev ocation charges were filed, and the probation officer therefore initiated the issuance of an arrest warrant. McLaurin was not taken into custody until over five months later. Prior to the May 2024 revocation hearin g, the government, the probation of ficer, and McLaurin reached a settlement agreement of the revocation proceeding, under which

20 McLaurin would admit to charges 5 and 6 — based on h is absenting himself from his residence prior to scheduled home visits and failing to notify the officer of his change of location, in violation of standard conditions 1 0 and 6 — and the governme nt and t h e probation officer would then dismiss the remaining charges. At the revocation hearing, th e district court accepted McLaurin’ s adm issions and the parties’ agreement, finding that McLaurin had violated standard conditions 10 and 6 of his supervised release, as alleged in charges 5 and 6, respectively. The court acco rdingly revoked McLaurin’ s supervised release and imposed a below - Guidelines sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment, together with a new 42 - month term of supervised release — the balance of his original 60 - month term at the point he absconded from supervision — subject to the same conditions as before. Other than arguing for a time - served sentence of imprisonment, McLaurin made no objection during the revocation hearing to any portion of the proceeding and, in particular, no objection to the original 2013 cond itions of supervised release or, indeed, to the new conditions of supervised release, which were identical. The record thus shows that before appealing to us: • McLaurin never objected to his presentence report’ s recommendation of the mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release, as well as four special condition s. • He made no objection to the co nditions of supervised release imp osed on him duri ng his 2 013 sent encing and i n the jud gment.

21 • He expressly waived his right to appeal any issue relating to the conditions of his supervised release in h is 2013 plea agreement. • He raised no issue on appeal fro m the 2013 judgment challenging the conditions of supervised release con tained in the written judgment, and the judgment was affirmed and became final. • He never asked the district cou rt, after Rogers was decided i n 2020, to amend his judgment to rem ove the standard conditions of supervised release on th e ground that they had not been o rally pronounced. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (au thorizing the district co urt to modify conditions of supervised release); F ed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c). • He made no objection during this 2024 revocation proceeding to challenge the 2013 conditions of his superv ised release. • He agreed, to the contrary, that standard conditions 6 and 10 would be the basis for revocation, and the district court adopted and applied that agreement. • He has made no objection to the identical conditions of supervised release imposed on him in the rev ocation judgment. From the district court’ s revo cation judgment dated May 7, 2024, McLau rin filed this appeal, challenging for th e first time the condition s of his 2013 supervised release. As noted, however, he did not challenge the conditions of his supervised release of h is revocation sentence, nor any other aspect of t hat sentence.

22 II McLaurin contends that we should vacate the district court’ s revocation judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the revocation proceeding. He argues that this relief is justified because the revocation o f his supervised release was based on his v iolation of two standard conditions of supervised release contained in his 2013 judgment that wer e not announced orally at sentencing and therefore were a nullity under our 2020 decision in Rogers. See 961 F.3d at 296; see also United States v. Sing letary, 984 F. 3d 341, 344 – 45 (4th Cir. 2021). The gover nment op poses Mc Laurin’ s ar gum ent on mul tiple gr ounds, ur ging tha t the district court be affirmed. First, it notes that “[i]n exchange for receiving a cap on the government’ s sentencing recommendation, McLaurin agreed to waive all appellate right s,” including “waiver of ‘any issues th at relate to’ a term or condition of supervised release.” Second, it contends that the appeal mu st be dismissed as “violative of the law of the case.” Third, it contends that McLaurin is “raising claims about supervised release conditions imposed more than a decade ago, which is clearly outside the time limits imposed by” Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, an d therefore that we “lack[] jurisdiction o ver this appeal,” which essentially challenges his 2013 judgment. Finally, it contends that McLaurin has failed to satisfy the criteria fo r correction of the alleged error on plain - error review. Thus, the core issue in this appeal is wh ether, based on an alleged Rogers error in his original 2013 judgment, the revo cation judgment must be vacated. McLaurin agrees

23 that because he raises this issue for the first time o n appeal, our review is under the plain - error standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Gr eer v. Un ited States, 593 U. S. 503, 507 – 08 (2021). Under that standard, a defendant must demonstrate not only a plain error that affe cted his substantial rights, but also that we should exercise our discretion to correct the error because it would have “a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Gr eer, 593 U.S. at 508 (clean ed up). III First, it is readily app arent that we simply have no ju risdiction to grant McLaurin the relief he requests. T o as sess and re view M cLaurin’ s underlyi ng 2013 j udgment in thi s revocation appeal, we would have to be able to op en that long final judgment as part o f our review of the revocation judgment. Y et, in United States v. Sanchez, we held that “[a] supervised release revocation hearing is not a p roper forum for testing the validity of an underlying sentence or conviction.” 891 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2018). In Sanchez, the defendant attempted to argue at his revocation hearing that his original sentence was unconstitutional, and when the district court h eld that it could not consider that kind of ar gument in a revocation proceeding, he argued on appeal that “in order to challenge the reasonableness of his supervised release revocation sentence, he must be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of his underlying . . . sentence.” 891 F.3 d at 538. W e squarely rejected th at ar gument, how ever. W e explained that “Cong ress has provided a detailed roadmap” for those defendants who want to appeal their origin al judgments, noting that any appeal had to be taken under Ru le of Appellate Procedure 4(b)

24 and that further review to the Supreme Court could be taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Id. Moreover, we noted, a defendant could also attack the judgment collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. W e explained that these specific procedures strike a careful b alance “between preserving finality and ensuring justice under law.” Id. And until a judgment is successfully challenged and overturned through those avenues, “it is valid, and it stands.” Id. W e also pointed out that “ [e]very other cir cuit to ha v e ruled on the question ha[d] held that a revocation hearing is neither the time nor th e place to entertain challeng es to an underlying conviction or sentence.” Id. at 538 – 39 (emphasis added) (collecting cases). W e thus concluded that in a revocation proceeding, “district courts lack jurisdictio n. . . to consider the validity of an underlying sen tence.” Id. at 537 (emphasis added); see also United St ates v. Johnson, 1 38 F.3d 1 1 5, 1 17 (4th Cir. 19 98) (concl uding i n the a ppeal of a revocation judgment that “ we lack jurisdictio n over [the defendant’ s] . . . argument challenging various special condition s of his supervised release” contained in the underlyi ng judgme nt (emp hasis adde d)). Moreover, we have held specifically that a judgment with a Rogers error is not an exception to this principle — rather, “[a] judgment with a Rogers error, just as a ny other judgment, is valid until corrected on appeal or amend ed by the district court.” United States v. Brantley, 87 F.4th 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2023). Thus, the presence of a Rogers error in a final judgment does not au tomatically invalidate the judgment — or give a defend ant license to ignore its terms. Instead, the defendan t must comply with the “binding,” “presumptively valid” judgment until it is eit her amended by the district court or corrected on appeal, id., which, we have held, requires “a procedurally appropriate mechanism for

25 raising the [Rogers ] issue,” Un ited States v. N ewby, 91 F.4th 196, 19 9 (4th Cir. 2024). And, contrary to the majority’ s bald assertion in disregard of Sanchez and similar cases, see ante at 10 – 1 1, a revocation proceeding is most certainly not an appropriate p rocedural mechanism for raising the issue, as it is a ch allenge to the validity of the underlying judgment. See Sanche z, 891 F.3d at 537. These binding precedents plainly preclude us from reviewing McL aurin’ s 2013 judgment in this appeal from a revocation proceeding, even though the error claimed in that underlying judgment is a Rogers error. In deed, in Brantley, the defendant argued, just as McLaurin argues here, that a judgment containing a Rogers error was “invalid on its face,” as the conditions “were never actually i mposed.” 87 F.4th at 266. And he reasoned then that the judgment “ought to be correctable at any time because the judgment is somehow automatically moot.” Id. Bu t we rejected that ar gument. While we recognized “that discretionary conditions appearing for the first time in a written jud gment are indeed ‘nullities,’” id. (quoting Singletar y, 984 F. 3d at 344), we nonetheless conclu ded that that fact did “not make the written judgment entered here invalid,” id. Rather, “[d]istrict court judgments, no matter how assertedly incorrect, are presumptively valid and bindi ng until an appellate court says otherwise” or they are amended by the district court. Id. W e thus held, plainly and without exception, that “[a] judgment with a Rogers error, just as any other judgment, is valid u ntil corrected on app eal or amended by the district cou rt.” Id. The 2013 judgment in this case was never corrected on app eal, and we have no authority or power to do so now, over a decade later.

26 Thus, McLaurin’ s effort to correct the alleged Rogers error in his 2013 judgm ent for the first time in this ap peal from his revocation judg ment must fail, as we lack jurisdictio n to do so. IV Even apart from our lack of jurisdiction to grant McLaurin the relief he requests, let alone the resentencing that the majority grants, it is u nclear that the 2013 judgmen t contained a Rogers error at all. As we have defined it, a Rogers error involves the inclusion in the written judgment of discretionary conditions o f supervised release that “app ear for the first time” in the written judgment, having not been orally pronounced at sentencing. Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344; see also United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193, 197 (4th Ci r. 2024); Brantley, 87 F.4 th at 264. In this case, McLau rin claims that the two s tandard conditions he violated — standard c onditio ns 6 and 10 — were not orally announced at sentencing and appeared for the first time in the subsequent written judgment and th erefore that they were nu llities under Rogers. The 2013 judgment contained 6 mandatory conditions, 14 discretionary standard conditions, and 4 discretionary special conditions. The record also shows that at sentencing, the district court d id not pronounce, in haec verba, the standard conditions, bu t it did pronounce the four special conditions. Also, it did not pronounce the mandatory conditions, but all agree it was und er no obligation to do so. See Rog ers, 961 F.3d at 296.

27 While the default rule under Rogers is that all discr etionary conditions m ust be pronounced orally at sentencing, Rog ers also recognized that discretionary conditions may be pronounced through incorporation by referring to another source available to the parties without reading each condition at sentencing. 961 F.3d at 299. W e have concluded that this incorporation m ethod still serves the purpo se of the Rogers rule, i.e., to g ive the defendant notice at senten cing of the conditio ns of his supervised release so that he “will have the opportunity to object — an opportunity that is lost if a condition is imposed for the first time in a subsequent written judgment.” Singletary, 984 F.3 d at 346; see also United States v. T urner, 122 F.4th 5 1 1, 519 (4th Cir. 2024) (conditions incorporated by reference to the presentence report). In this case, the presentence repo rt expressly recommended that, in addition to the mandatory conditions and four special condition s, the district court should impose the “standard conditions of supervisio n adopted by the Court.” The presentence report wa s provided t o McLauri n befor e sen tencing. Moreover, at sentencing but before imposing sentence, the district court add ressed McLaurin individually and inquired: The Court: Mr. McLaurin, have you an d your attor ney rea d and discuss ed the presentence report, including any revisions that may have been made to that report since it was initially issu ed? The D efendant: Y es. The court then confirmed that fact with M cLaurin’ s counsel. After satisfying itself that McLaurin had read the presentence report and discussed it with h is attorney, the court asked the parties whether they had any “changes, modifications, corrections, [o r] objections with respect to the content of the presentence report,” and both parties responded that they did

28 not. (Emphasis added). The court then “accept[ed]” the repo rt. While the court spoke no further of the mandatory and standard condition s, it did read in full the special conditions of supervised release that were c ontained in the presentence report an d added that the justification for them w as “amply set out in the p resentence report.” Thus, it is clear from the record that the presentence report recommended the mandatory, standard, and special conditions of supervised release; that McLau rin read and discussed the report with his attorney and had no objection to it; that the cou rt adopted the report before sentencing; and that the court explicitly relied on the presentence report w ith respect to supervised release, noting so when it provi ded the justifi c ation for the special conditio ns announced. In response to all of this, McLaurin made no objection, eith er at sentencing or after receivin g his written judgment that con tained all of the cond itions — mandatory, standard, and special. These circumstances are similar to those examined in United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4 th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022), where we recognized that an effective incorporation could be made with distribution and adoption of the presentence report. In Cisson, we explained that “[u]nless and until a district court adopts a presentence report’ s recommendations, those recommendations remain just that: nonbinding r ecom mendati ons.” Id. But “when a district court adopts the recommendations of a presentence report at a sen tencing hearing, the report’ s contents . . . at th at point . . . become part of the court’ s oral sentence.” Id. (first emphasis added). And we honored that principle recently in United States v. Smith, 1 17 F.4th 584, 606 (4th Cir. 2024), where we rejected an ar gument that the district court

29 had incorporated the conditions in the presentence report because it had not adopted th e report before sentencing. As we exp lained: Here, although the sentencing court stated that it had “read,” “consid ered,” and “resolved all objections” to Alcorn’ s PSR, it did not expr essly adopt the PSR befor e orally pronouncing Alcorn’ s sentence. Id. (second emphasis added). T ogether, Cisson and Smith provide that district courts can satisfy Rogers by adopting the presentence repo rt if the defendant has (1) n otice of the recommended conditions befor e sentencing and (2) an op portunity to object at sentencing. See, e.g., Cisson, 33 F.4th at 193 (explaining that “Cisson’ s presentence report put him on notice that his sentence might include discretionary conditions of supervised release” and that those conditions would have “become part of the court’ s oral sen tence” had the court adopted the report at sentencing); Smith, 11 7 F.4th at 606 (“Because the sentencing court failed to expressly adopt the PSR’ s recommended conditions of supervised release in open court, the government’ s effort to rely on the list of conditions in the PSR is misplaced”). In this case, McLaurin clearly had notice before sentencing of the probation officer’ s recommendation that he be subject to th e “standard conditions of supervision ad opted by the Court,” and he had an opportunity to object to that recommendation — the very pillars of the Rogers rule. Se e Singletary, 984 F.3d at 346. It could thus be well ar gued that the district court satisfied the purpo ses of the Rogers rule well before Rogers was decided. The fact that it is not clear that the 2013 judgment violated Rog ers should a lone preclude McLaurin from obtaining relief under the p lain - error standard of review because, under that rule, the defendant must, as an initial matter, demonstrate the existence of an

30 error that is plain. See Gr eer, 593 U.S. at 507. He must also show that it af fected his substantial rights and that letting th e error stand would have “a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or pub lic reputation of judicial proceedin gs.” Id. at 507 – 08 (cleaned up). I conclude that he does not make either showing; not only was the alleged erro r not plain, it hardly affected McLaurin’ s substantial rights or threatens public confidence in the co urts. McLaurin had, befor e sentencing, notice through the p resentence report that his term of supervised release would likely be subject to the standard condition s routinely applied during sentencing, and he made no objection to those conditions prior to the district court’ s adoption of the report. Moreover, McLaurin received his written judgment listing all the conditions of his supervised release, including the standard conditions, and his probation officer also presumably gave him a written statement of “all the conditions to which [his] term of supervised release [was] su bject,” as required by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f). Again, McLaurin made no objection or in any way requested that th e district court amend his final written judgment’ s description of the conditions of his supervised release. See id. § 3583(e)(2) (authorizing district courts to modify a defend ant’ s conditions of superv ised release “at any time prio r to the expiration or terminatio n of the term”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c). And as important, when McLaurin was charged with violating those conditions of supervised release, including standard condition s 6 and 10, he did not object that those conditions were “nullities” with which he need not comply. T o th e contrary, he agreed with the probation offi cer and the government that he had violated standard conditions 6 and 10 and that those violations should be the basis for the court’ s revocation of his supervised release, thus affirming the validity of the conditions. And with that

31 agreement, the probation officer and the government abandoned enforcemen t of the other four alleged violations, which charged violations of indisputably valid conditions that could support revocation, as they related to two mandatory conditions and two spe cial conditions that were in fact orally pronounced to McLaurin during sentencing. Based on McLaurin’ s agreement, the court revoked McLaurin’ s 2013 supervised release and imposed a new term of sup ervised release subject to th e same conditions as the o rigi nal term. In these circumstances, McLaurin ’ s substantial rights have not been affe cted. V Finally, what becomes apparent from the record is that any error in the district court’ s reliance on the standard conditions to revoke McLaurin’ s superv ised release — leading the revocation hearing to be, in th e majority’ s telling, “infected by the initial Rogers error,” ante at 10 — amounted to an invited err or. Ag ain, in his agreement with the probation officer and the government, McLaurin agreed to base revocation on h is violation of standard conditions 6 and 10 of his 2013 written judgment, thu s ef fectively stipulating that standard conditions 6 and 10 were a legitimate basis for revocation. And based on McLaurin’ s agreement, the cou rt revoked McLaurin’ s 2013 supervised release. Y et, on appeal, McLaurin now contends that those standard conditions, which he agreed should be the basis for the rev ocation, were unenforceab le nullities, requiring the vacatur of his revocation judgment. This is clearly “invited error,” precluding revie w on appeal. See United States v. Herr er a, 23 F.3d 74, 75 – 76 (4th Cir. 1994) (“It has long been recognized that ‘a court can no t be asked by counsel to take a step in a case and later be

32 convicted of error, because it has complied with such req uest’” (quoting Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 586 (19 27)); see also United States v. D ay, 700 F.3d 713, 727 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A defendant in a criminal case cannot complain of error which he himself has invited” (cleaned up)). Indeed, we have found invited error in several other analogous circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir. 20 13) (finding invited error when a defendant successfully op posed a lesser - included offense instruction and then challenged its omission on appeal); United States v. W illiams - Singleton, 849 F. App’x 394, 398 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding invited error when the defendant stipulated to a loss amount contained in the presentence report and then sought to challenge the amount on appeal); United S tates v. Spivey, 129 F. App’x 856, 858 (4th Cir 200 5) (per curiam) (finding invited error when the defendant requested a jury v erdict on an offense not charged in the indictment and then challenged its submission to the jury on appeal). Invited error not only precludes our review, but it also precludes a finding that the plain - error standard of review has been satisfied. As we explained in L espier: In the context of plain error review, an error that was in vited by the appellant cannot be viewed as on e that affect ed the fairness, integ rity, or public reputation of judicial pro ceedings. Indeed, recognizing an invited error would seriously undermine confiden ce in the integrity of the courts. 725 F.3d at 450 (emphasis added) (cleaned u p); see also Spivey, 129 F. Ap p’x at 859 (noting that “[w]hether we call the error an invited error or a waived error under Olano is irrelevant. Invited errors are by definition waived errors, and under Olan o, not reviewable on appeal”).

33 In sum, McLaurin’ s s tipulation of revocation in th is case, which he now seeks to challenge, means that any error in the district court’ s reliance of stan dard conditions 6 and 10 was an invited error that necessarily fails to satisfy the final plain - error p rong. * * * The majority’ s decision simp ly and without analysis applies Rogers to all sentences imposed before Rogers was decided, whether those sentences were components of fin al judgments or not and regardless of h ow old the judgment is. And in doing so, it fabricates a totally new gate by which to op en every prior criminal judgment — like this jud gment, which is over ten years old. This is foundationally shocking, unp recedented, and completely unwise, and the consequ ences will be wide - sweeping. Members of our court have already been expressing concerns about the implementation of Rogers. See U nited States v. Smith, 1 17 F.4th 584, 607 (4th Cir. 2024) (Agee, J., concurring in p art and concurring in the judgment) (writing separately “to again point out the mess that has resulted from” Rogers and Singletar y); United States v. Kem p, 88 F.4th 539, 547 – 53 (4th Cir. 2023) (Quattlebaum, J., concurring). Y et, today’ s decision injects Rogers with steroids, expand ing its boundaries beyond all established pr eceden ts. Now at revocation hearings where the defendant was sentenced prior to Rogers, district courts will have an independent obligation to go back to the transcript of the original sentencing hearing and perform a Rogers review to see w hether the sentencing judg e sufficiently orally pronounced any non - mandatory conditions that the defendant is char ged with violating. And if those conditions were n ot suffici ently pronounced, the court will have to open the final jud gment to strike them, thus authorizing the defen dant with

34 complete impunity to violate even the most basic, common - sense conditions that h ad been in his final written judgment for years without objection. As the facts of this case illustrate, a defenda nt could a bscond f rom super vision for month s without c onseque nce. Th is is lawless and beyond reason. Accordingly, I v ote to affirm the judgment of the district court and therefore dissent.