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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Hal Leslie Reeder and Shannon Carol Reeder

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-10269

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (21.6K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THEF OURN ITTHEED DSITSATTREICST B OAFN KCROULPOTRCAYD OCO URT

In re:

HAL LESLIE REEDER and Case No. 25-10269 KHT

SHANNON CAROL REEDER, Chapter 7

  Debtors.                                                           

 ORDER ON TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION                 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Trustee’s Objection to Debtor’s 

Claim of Homestead Exemption (the “Objection,” docket #24), filed by Chapter 7 Trustee
Jared C. Walters (the “Trustee”), and the Response thereto (the “Response,” docket #26),
filed by the Debtors, Hal Leslie Reeder and Shannon Carol Reeder (together, “Debtors,”
and separately, “Mr. Reeder” or “Ms. Reeder”). The parties submitted stipulated facts
(docket #36) and briefs (docket ##37, 38), following which the matter was taken under
advisement. The Court is now prepared to rule and hereby finds and concludes as follows:

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

Debtors live at 255 N. A Street, Bethune, CO 80805 (the “255 Property”), which is 

an approximately one-third acre parcel of land with a single-family home. Debtors
purchased the 255 Property in December 1998. The 255 Property is encumbered by a
deed of trust securing a mortgage loan payable to NewRez, LLC.

Abutting the 255 Property is property with an address of 275 N. A Street, Bethune, 

CO 80805 (the “275 Property”). The 275 Property is an approximately one-quarter acre
parcel of land with a manufactured home. Ms. Reeder’s mother conveyed the 275
Property to both Debtors in April 2012. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Reeder’s mother conveyed
the manufactured home to Ms. Reeder. No liens encumber the 275 Property or the
manufactured home.

Debtors’ adult son lives in the manufactured home on the 275 Property. He is not 

a dependent of the Debtors. He pays the property taxes on the 275 Property. The
properties have separate account numbers with the Kit Carson County Assessor and are
taxed separately.

Debtors assert they have two large vegetable gardens – one on each Property – 

from which they preserve food. Debtors maintain both properties by mowing, watering,
and weed control. Debtors have two dogs and outdoor cats that have free range of both
properties.

Debtors filed their Chapter 7 petition on January 16, 2025, and Trustee was duly 

appointed. Debtors claimed a homestead exemption in both the 255 Property and the 275
Property.1 Trustee timely filed an objection. The parties submitted the matter to the Court
on stipulated facts and briefs.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

There is no dispute the applicable law is that of Colorado. Colorado law recognizes 

a homestead exemption, as follows:

(1)  Every  homestead  in  the  state  is  exempt  from  execution  and 
     attachment arising from any debt, contract, or civil obligation not 
     exceeding  in  actual  cash  value  in  excess  of  any  liens  or 
     encumbrances on the homesteaded property in existence at the time 
     of any levy of execution thereon:                               

     (a)  The  sum  of  two  hundred  fifty  thousand  dollars  if  the 
          homestead is occupied as a home by an owner or an owner’s  
          family; or                                                 

     (b)  The  sum  of  three  hundred  fifty  thousand  dollars  if  the 
          homestead is occupied as a home by an owner who is elderly 
          or disabled, an owner’s spouse who is elderly or disabled, or 
          an owner’s dependent who is elderly or disabled.           

(2)  As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: 

     (a)   “Disabled” means having a physical or mental impairment that 
          is disabling and that, because of other factors such as age, 
          training, experience, or social setting, substantially precludes 
          the  person  from  engaging  in  a  useful  occupation  as  a 
          homemaker, a wage earner, or a self-employed person in any 
          employment that exists in the community and for which the  
          person has competence.                                     

     (b)   “Elderly” means sixty years of age or older. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201. A homestead may consist of the following property: 

(a)   A dwelling, as defined in section 38-41-201.7;                 
(b)   A  house  and  lot  or  lots,  including  manufactured  homes,  mobile 
     homes, trailers, and trailer coaches, as set forth in section 38-41-
     201.6; or                                                       
(c)   A farm consisting of any number of acres.                      

1 Debtors initially asserted a homestead exemption only in the 255 Property. They later amended their
schedules to assert a homestead exemption in both the 255 Property and the 275 Property. The stipulated
facts before the Court do not support a determination Debtors acted improperly in their homestead
assertions. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-205 (1). And, a “dwelling” includes “conventional housing and
personal property that is actually used as a residence[.]” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201.7 On an objection to a homestead exemption, the following burdens and rules of
construction apply:

     Once an exemption is asserted, the party objecting to the exemption 
has the burden of proving that the exemption is not properly claimed. Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 4003(c); In re Larson, [260 B.R. 174, 186](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1998307/in-re-larson/#186) (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2001). If, however, the objecting party can produce evidence to rebut the 
exemption,  then  the  burden  shifts  to  the  debtor  to  produce  evidence 
demonstrating that the exemption is proper. [Id.](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1998307/in-re-larson/) The burden of persuasion 
remains with the objecting party.                                    

     Notwithstanding, the Colorado Constitution and an unbroken line of 
Colorado cases instruct that Colorado exemptions are to be construed 
liberally in favor of Colorado residents claiming such exemptions. See 
COLO. CONST., Art. XVIII § 1 (“The general assembly shall pass liberal 
homestead and exemption laws.”); [Kulp v. Zeman (In re Kulp), [949 F.2d 
1106](https://www.courtlistener.com/c/F.2d/949/1106/),  1108  (10th  Cir.  1991)]  (interpreting  Colorado  exemption  liberally 
based on Colorado Constitution); In re Case, [66 B.R. 44, 45](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1891454/in-re-case/#45) (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1986).                                                               

In re Romero, 533 B.R. 807, 811 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015) (footnotes omitted), aff’d, 579
B.R. 551, 557 (D. Colo. 2016).

III. DISCUSSION

Trustee objects to Debtors’ claim of exemption in two, separate properties, which 

were acquired at different times, have different parcel numbers, and are taxed separately.
But, the plain language of the homestead exemption provides a homestead is not limited
to one lot or parcel. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-205 (1) (A homestead may consist of “a
house and lot or lots[.]”). As Judge Brown held in In re Soles, 497 B.R. 601 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2013):

The Trustee suggests that Property 2 is not occupied as a home because 
Debtors’ actual house is on a different lot, and because Property 2 was 
deeded to them separately from Property 1. The Court does not read   
Colorado’s  homestead  exemption  so  narrowly.  Rather,  the  statute 
specifically provides that a homestead may “consist of a house and lot or 
lots or of a farm consisting of any number of acres.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38 -
41-205 (emphasis added). This language clearly permits a homestead to 
consist of more than one lot, and that any number of lots surrounding a 
house may considered to be part of the homestead. There is no requirement 
that the homestead consist of one parcel or legal description, or that all lots 
be purchased at the same time, or that a house touch every lot. Id. at 603. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate panel has held similarly, in a case 

applying Wyoming law, cited in Soles. In Kwiecinski v. Community First Nat’l Bank of
Powell (In re Kwiecinski), 245 B.R. 672 (10th Cir. BAP 2000), the debtors sought to claim
a homestead exemption under Wyoming law for a tract of farmland that was contiguous
to the tract on which the debtors’ home was located. The bankruptcy court held the
debtors could not claim a homestead exemption in the farmland because they did not
reside on that tract. But, on appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, stating:

We see nothing in these statutes that might limit a Wyoming homestead in 
the manner the bankruptcy court did in this case. Instead, § 1-20-104 
suggests that separate tracts can constitute a single homestead by stating 
that a homestead may be “a house and lot or lots in any town or city.” This 
does not say that some part of the house must be physically located on 
every lot that is covered by the homestead right. Certainly adjacent lots 
could be purchased at different times under different deeds without the 
resulting homestead violating the literal language of the statute. Similarly, 
nothing in the phrase “a farm consisting of any number of acres” suggests 
that all the acres had to be obtained under a single deed. The bankruptcy 
court’s interpretation of the Wyoming homestead statutes does not seem to 
be required by the language or to constitute a liberal construction that 
“effect[s] their beneficent purposes.”                               

Id. at 675-76, quoted in Soles, 497 B.R. at 604. Because Wyoming’s exemption statute
contains similar language to Colorado’s, and both states’ laws provide for liberal
construction of exemption statutes, this Court finds the Kwiecinski case persuasive. This
Court similarly concludes the two properties’ separate acquisition times, separate parcel
numbers, and separate taxation do not prevent Debtors from claiming one homestead
exemption in both the 255 Property and the 275 Property.

Trustee further argues Debtors’ son’s occupancy of the 275 Property prevents 

Debtors from claiming a homestead exemption in it. The Court cannot so find. First, a
homestead exemption applies to property, not to people. As the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado held:

[T]he  homestead  has  always  been  regarded  as  an  exemption  which 
attached to the realty and not to a debtor personally. That fact is initially 
evidence from the statute itself, which states “Every homestead ... occupied 
as a home ... shall be exempt from execution and attachment....” Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 38-41-201. It cannot be convincingly argued that this language 
creates a personal right, for how can a personal right be “occupied as a 
home”? The posit of the question suffices as its answer.             

     Moreover, Colorado courts have always regarded the homestead as 
a property right, the purpose of which is to preserve a right of occupancy, 
In re Wallace’s Estate, [125 Colo. 584](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1178835/wallace-v-first-national-bank/), [246 P.2d 894](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1178835/wallace-v-first-national-bank/) (1952), and to preserve 
family habitation, Weare v. Johnson, [20 Colo. 363](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6683338/weare-v-johnson/), 38 P. 374 (1894). 
Indeed, in Wright v. Whittick, [18 Colo. 54](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6683097/wright-v-whittick/), 31 P. 490, 491 (1892), the 
Colorado Supreme Court stated:                                       

     The homestead exemption act extends certain protection to       
     the premises set apart by the owner as a homestead.... It       
     protects [the premises] against proceedings by execution and    
     attachment.... (emphasis added).                                

The debtor would have me ignore the statutory and historical basis of the 
Colorado homestead exemption and treat it as an individual exemption 
arising out of the Bankruptcy Code like Athena from the head of Zeus. He 
postulates that since 11 U.S.C. § 522 (m) requires the § 522 exemptions to 
be applied “separately with respect to each debtor,” perforce he is entitled 
to claim the value of the homestead as an exemption upon his interest in 
the jointly held property. That approach simply ignores the basic nature of 
the homestead and its attachment to the realty instead of to the property 
owner. The authorities relied upon by debtor in support of his argument are 
not apposite to the extent they deal with exemption rights which are not 
affixed to the property.                                             

In re Robinson, 44 B.R. 292, 293-94 (D. Colo. 1984) (footnote omitted). If the property at
issue were one parcel with one home, and Debtors’ adult son occupied one of the home’s
bedrooms, the son’s residency would not prevent Debtors from claiming an exemption in
their property. Here too, the Court finds the son’s residency does not prevent Debtors
from claiming an exemption in the property they own and use.

Here, the undisputed facts show Debtors use both the 255 Property and the 275 

Property. This is not a case where an abutting property is rented to a third-party tenant
who has sole, exclusive use of the rented property. Debtors’ son’s occupancy of the 275
Property is not adverse to Debtors’ use, as Debtors maintain both properties and Debtors
and their pets use both properties for home-related activities, including gardening.

Finally, the 255 Property and the 275 Property have been in the family for quite 

some time. The 275 Property was formerly owned by Ms. Reeder’s mother, who
conveyed the 275 Property to both Debtors in April 2012. As Judge Brown concluded in
Soles:

The purpose of the Colorado homestead exemption is “to preserve the  
home for the family,” Fleet v. Zwick, [994 P.2d 480, 482](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1256156/fleet-v-zwick/#482) (Colo. App. 1999), 
as well as to “secure the permanent habitation of the family,” and “to 
cultivate the interest, pride, and affection of the individual,” Matter of Estate 
of Dodge, [685 P.2d 260, 263](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1427048/matter-of-estate-of-dodge/#263) (Colo. App. 1984). [497 B.R. at 604](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8338245/in-re-soles/#604). Here, the Court finds allowing an exemption in the 255 Property and the 

275 Property best preserves the Debtors’ home for their family.

ORDER ON TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Case No. 25-10269 KHT
To the extent Trustee met his burden of showing Debtors’ homestead exemption
was not properly claimed, the Court finds Debtors have produced sufficient evidence to
show the exemption is proper. The Court cannot find Trustee has satisfied his burden of
persuading the Court Debtors’ two abutting lots cannot be claimed as one homestead.
The Court will therefore overrule Trustee’s Objection.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds Trustee has not satisfied his
burden of persuasion. The Objection will be overruled.
Accordingly, it is
HEREBY ORDERED that the Objection is OVERRULED.
Dated March 12, 2026 BY THE COURT:

                                   Kimberley H. Tyson    i 
                                   United States Bankruptcy Judge