Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                    by Lee](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10805073/latosha-bowlin-v-board-of-directors-judah-christian-school/about:blank#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Latosha Bowlin v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23-3049

• Judges: Lee

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Lee

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

---

No. 23-3049
LATOSHA BOWLIN, NICOLE POTTHAST, and AMANDA K.
HUMPHREYS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, JUDAH CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:22-cv-1390 — Colleen R. Lawless, Judge.

---

ARGUED MAY 24, 2024 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 13, 2026

---

Before EASTERBROOK, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic,
the Governor of Illinois required all school employees to ei-
ther receive a vaccination or undergo weekly testing for the
virus. Plaintiffs—three employees at different Illinois grade
schools—refused to receive a vaccination, citing their reli-
gious beliefs. When the schools offered weekly testing as an
accommodation, Plaintiffs claimed the testing also violated
2 No. 23-3049

their moral consciences and refused. As a result, they were ei-
ther placed on unpaid leave or terminated, in line with the
Governor’s Executive Order and joint guidance from the Illi-
nois Department of Public Health and the State Board of Ed-
ucation. Plaintiffs then filed suit, claiming that the schools’ ac-
tions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII); the Emergency Use Authori-
zation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360BBB-3 et seq. (EUA); and the Illinois
Health Care Right of Conscience Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1
et seq. Plaintiffs’ employers (collectively, “Defendants”)
moved for dismissal.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the Title VII claim, reasoning that Plaintiffs had failed to cite
a religious belief that the testing requirement violated. The
district court also dismissed the EUA claim and declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law
claim.
On appeal, Plaintiffs only contest the district court’s dis-
missal of their Title VII claim. They further contend (for the
first time) that Defendants’ actions violated the Illinois Public
Health Code. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plain-
tiffs’ Title VII claim because they did not identify a religious
objection to the schools’ requirement that they undergo
weekly testing. Furthermore, honoring Plaintiffs’ desire to
forgo both vaccination and testing would have required De-
fendants to contradict the Governor’s Executive Order, which
Title VII does not require. The district court’s judgment is af-
firmed.
No. 23-3049 3

I
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor
J.B. Pritzker issued an Executive Order on September 3, 2021
(“the Order”), which imposed a variety of safety measures de-
signed to combat the virus. Among other requirements, the
Order mandated that “School Personnel” have the first dose
of an acceptable COVID-19 vaccine by September 19, 2021, or
be excluded from school premises. Alternatively, an individ-
ual could elect to be tested at least weekly to work at or enter
a school. Relevant here, the Order contained an exemption
from the vaccination requirement if “vaccination would re-
quire the individual to violate or forgo a sincerely held reli-
gious belief, practice, or observance.” If an individual claimed
the religious exemption, however, they would still have to
submit to weekly testing.
The Illinois State Board of Education and Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Health issued joint guidance for schools on
September 21, 2021 (“the Guidance”), that instructed schools
to comply with the requirements of the Executive Order.
Plaintiffs Amanda Humphreys, Latosha Bowlin, and Ni-
cole Potthast were school employees working for Defendants
North Mac CUSD No. 34, Judah Christian School, and Staun-
ton CUSD No. 6, respectively. When these schools instituted
policies consistent with the Order and the Guidance, Plaintiffs
sought an exemption from the vaccination requirement based
on their religious beliefs. When the schools informed Plain-
tiffs that they would have to undergo weekly testing as an al-
ternative, they refused. As a result, Humphreys was sus-
pended without pay (and later terminated); Bowlin was ter-
minated from her employment; and Potthast was suspended
4 No. 23-3049

without pay and, she claims, forced to choose between resign-
ing or returning to a “hostile work environment.”
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in November 2022, alleging that
Defendants violated their rights under Title VII when they
discriminated against Plaintiffs based on their religious be-
liefs. Plaintiffs also claimed that the “vaccinate or test” policy
was in conflict with the EUA because Plaintiffs were denied
“their statutory right to accept or refuse administration” of
the designated COVID-19 vaccines. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged
a violation of the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act,
claiming that they were compelled to violate their religious
convictions in regard to their medical treatment as a condition
of maintaining employment. Each Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, and Plaintiffs filed a com-
bined response to these motions.
Granting Defendants’ requests to dismiss the Title VII
claim, the district court held that the weekly testing require-
ment was a reasonable accommodation to the vaccine man-
date. The court also determined that Plaintiffs had not suffi-
ciently identified a religious belief that the weekly testing re-
quirement offended. The court further dismissed Plaintiffs’
EUA claim, concluding that the legislation does not confer a
private right of action. And, having dismissed the two federal
claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over Plaintiffs’ claim under the Illinois Health Care Right
of Conscience Act.
Here, Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their
Title VII claim. They argue that the district court erred by fail-
ing to properly find that the testing requirement violated their
religious beliefs. They also contend that Defendants’ require-
ment that employees either test or vaccinate violated the Illi-
No. 23-3049 5

nois Public Health Code, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2305/2, because
only the Department of Public Health can impose such regu-
lations. Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s dismis-
sal of the EUA claim.
II
We review de novo the dismissal of a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cheli v. Taylorville Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 986 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 2021). In evaluating the dis-
trict court’s decision, we determine whether the complaint al-
leged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
This standard is met when the plaintiff asserts facts that “al-
low[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the de-
fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Put another way, the factual allega-
tions in the complaint must “be enough to raise a right to re-
lief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In
conducting our review, we accept all well-pled allegations as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plain-
tiff. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 878 (7th Cir.
2022).
A. Title VII
Among other things, Title VII prohibits employers from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individ-
ual with respect to the terms and conditions of her employ-
ment because of the individual’s religion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Religion includes “all aspects of religious ob-
servance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious ob-
6 No. 23-3049

servance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
To make a prima facie case for religious discrimination un-
der this provision, an employee must show three things. First,
they must demonstrate “the observance or practice conflicting
with an employment requirement is religious in nature.”
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir.
2013). Second, the employee must have called the religious
observance or practice to the employer’s attention. Id. Third,
the religious observance or practice must have been the basis
for the employee’s discharge or discriminatory treatment. Id.
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of religious
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to make a
reasonable accommodation of the religious practice or show
that any accommodation would result in undue hardship to
the employer. Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 150 F.4th
792, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 449).
A reasonable accommodation under Title VII is meant “to
assure the individual additional opportunity to observe reli-
gious practices, but it [does] not impose a duty on the em-
ployer to accommodate at all costs.” Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). A reasonable accommodation
is thus “one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices.’” Jackson v. Methodist
Health Servs. Corp., 121 F.4th 1122, 126 (7th Cir. 2024) (quot-
ing Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir.
1998)). “It need not be the employee’s preferred accommoda-
tion or the accommodation most beneficial to the em-
ployee.” Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir.
2012). “Once the employer has offered an alternative that rea-
sonably accommodates the employee’s religious needs ... ‘the
No. 23-3049 7

statutory inquiry is at an end[.]’” E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Philbrook, 479
U.S. at 68).
Here, Plaintiffs sought an exemption from the vaccination
requirement, and Defendants offered them an accommoda-
tion: weekly testing. Plaintiffs contend that this alternative
was not sufficient because the testing requirement violates
their “moral consciences.” Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’
objections to the testing requirements are not religious in na-
ture and therefore do not warrant protection under Title VII.
“At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommo-
dation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s vac-
cine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an infer-
ence that some ‘aspect[ ]’ of the request is based on the em-
ployee’s ‘religious observance and practice’ or ‘belief.’”
Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2024)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). In United States v. Seeger, the Su-
preme Court described a religious belief as one that is “sincere
and meaningful” that “occupies a place in the life of its pos-
sessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”
380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). We have adopted this test for Title VII
claims. See Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (“In interpreting what
qualifies as religion under the broad statutory definition of Ti-
tle VII, we have endorsed this standard that was used in Seeger
… finding that the definition serves equally well for the pur-
poses of Title VII.”); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901
n.12 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that a religious belief is a belief
that is considered religious “in [the] person’s own scheme of
things” and is “sincerely held”). And, as we noted in Adeyeye,
“a genuinely held belief that involves matters of the afterlife,
8 No. 23-3049

spirituality, or the soul, among other possibilities, qualifies as
religion under Title VII.” 721 F.3d at 448.
Although “a ‘religious’ objection can sound in both reli-
gious and non-religious terms,” Passarella, 108 F.4th at 1010,
here, Plaintiffs do not moor their objections to the testing re-
quirement to any religious beliefs. Their only relevant allega-
tion is that their “moral consciences … prevent them from
submitting to health care procedures which they, competent
adults, do not believe are medically necessary.” This, on its
own, fails to plausibly allege that the request is “based in part
on an aspect of [Plaintiffs’] religious belief or practice” be-
cause Plaintiffs do not identify what belief or practice the test-
ing would violate. Passarella, 108 F.4th at 1011; see id. at 1009
(“Passarella’s statement connects her objection to vaccination
with her Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity of the human
body.”).
In Jackson, for example, we affirmed the dismissal of a Title
VII claim brought by a plaintiff who sought an exemption to
the periodic COVID-19 testing accommodation based on sim-
ilar arguments. 121 F.4th at 1126–28. The plaintiff “opposes
the testing requirement,” we noted, “but she cites no religious
tenet that is at odds with the testing requirement and no reli-
gious practice with which testing would interfere.” Id. at 1126;
see also Passarella, 108 F.4th at 1011 (“Religious accommoda-
tion requests rooting themselves entirely in safety considera-
tions with no plain and express connection to religion will fall
outside of the statute even at the pleading stage.”). The same
is true here.
Next, Plaintiffs allege that their moral consciences “pre-
vent them from submitting to or participating in workplace
procedures which arbitrarily discriminate between employ-
No. 23-3049 9

ees on the basis of health care choices made pursuant to free-
dom of conscience.” But Plaintiffs cannot request an exemp-
tion from a workplace policy only to argue that differential
treatment based upon the exemption would violate their reli-
gion. The purpose of a Title VII accommodation is to “elimi-
nate[] the conflict between employment requirements and re-
ligious practices.” Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70). Plaintiffs’ position
would allow an employee to reject any accommodation be-
cause they would be treated differently than other employees.
This proposition has no support in the law.
Nevertheless, even assuming Plaintiffs had adequately al-
leged that Defendants violated their religious beliefs, their
claim still fails because the accommodation they request
would require Defendants to violate the law, thereby impos-
ing upon them an undue hardship. An “‘undue hardship’ is
shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of
an employer’s business.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468
(2023). We recognize that analyzing whether an accommoda-
tion imposes an undue hardship is “generally inappropriate
for resolution on the pleadings.” McWright v. Alexander, 982
F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992). But courts have upheld the dis-
missal of Title VII claims at the pleading stage when the re-
quested accommodation requires the employer to violate the
law. See, e.g., Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d
826, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s
complaint because the requested accommodation would re-
quire the employer to violate federal law, which was an un-
due hardship as a matter of law).
Here, Plaintiffs assert that instead of undergoing weekly
testing, they are “willing to abide by protections that have
10 No. 23-3049

been demonstrated to protect against COVID-19, namely,
self-monitoring for symptoms, wearing a mask when appro-
priate, [and] voluntary reporting of potential symptoms ….” 1
But the Order required school personnel to either receive a
vaccination or test weekly, without any other options. And
these orders carry the force of law. See Bradley Hotel Corp. v.
Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2021)
(finding that similar COVID-19 Executive Orders fall “well
within what we understand to be laws, just as rules and adju-
dications by executive agencies acting under legislative grants
of authority have binding force of law”). Thus, allowing Plain-
tiffs to continue working in the schools would force Defend-
ants to contravene their legal obligations, something Title VII
does not require. Accord Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp.,
777 F.3d 362, 363 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Every circuit to consider the
issue has ... h[e]ld that Title VII does not require an employer
to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if
such accommodation would violate a federal statute.”); Sut-
ton, 192 F.3d at 830 (“[C]ourts agree that an employer is not
liable under Title VII when accommodating an employee’s re-
ligious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal
or state law.”); Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th
182, 186 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[A]n accommodation that would re-

1 Such measures, it is worth noting, would be largely ineffective to
prevent transmission in the event of asymptomatic cases of COVID. Plain-
tiffs also note that they are willing to undergo “reasonable testing require-
ments” as an alternative to vaccination or the testing required by Defend-
ants. But they do not explain what makes testing “reasonable,” nor do they
denote a specific alternative. They only mention this “reasonable” testing
alternative once in their complaint and do not differentiate the type of test-
ing elsewhere. We thus interpret their objection to testing as to any test
that would satisfy the Order and the Guidance.
No. 23-3049 11

quire an employer to violate the law imposes an undue hard-
ship.”); Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“Requiring defendants to violate the Internal Revenue Code
and subject themselves to potential penalties by not providing
Seaworth’s [social security number] on information returns
results in undue hardship.”).
Plaintiffs’ requested accommodation—exemptions from
both the testing and vaccination requirements—would re-
quire their employers to defy the Order, thereby imposing an
undue hardship. Plaintiffs have thus failed to state a claim for
relief under Title VII.
B. The Illinois Public Health Code
Plaintiffs next claim that Defendants’ enforcement of the
Order violates the Illinois Public Health Code because only
the Department of Public Health can enforce such rules. See
20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2305/2(e) (“The Department may order the
administration of vaccines, medications, or other treatments
to persons as necessary in order to prevent the probable
spread of a dangerously contagious or infectious disease.”).
But Plaintiffs have waived this argument as they never men-
tioned it in their complaint or before the district court. Wheeler
v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Failing to
bring an argument to the district court means that you waive
that argument on appeal.”). As such, we need not consider it
here.

---

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.