Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Kirsch](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10804845/united-states-v-jerron-d-williams/about:blank#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Jerron D. Williams

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-3173

• Judges: Kirsch

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (537)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Kirsch

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 24-3173
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

JERRON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:21-CR-48 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 2026 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2026

Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Jerron Williams pleaded guilty to as-
saulting a federal employee, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a)(1) & (b), and
using a gun during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c). At
a change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge explained the
charges and Williams and his attorney said they understood.
The judge accepted the plea, and the district court sentenced
him to 153 months in prison. But there was a mistake, Wil-
liams insists, because he and everyone else at his change of
2 No. 24-3173

plea hearing wrongfully believed that § 111(b) counted as a
crime of violence to support his § 924(c) conviction. We need
not decide whether Williams is right about § 111(b), both be-
cause he repeatedly waived this argument and because the
judge correctly explained the nature of the charges. We there-
fore dismiss the appeal.
I
A uniformed United States Postal Service letter carrier was
working in Gary, Indiana, and parked her vehicle in front of
Jerron Williams’s home. Williams backed his car into the de-
livery vehicle. He got out and began yelling at the mail carrier,
and then went inside his house and retrieved a gun. The mail
carrier began to drive away. Williams fired four shots into the
retreating delivery vehicle, shattering a window. The mail
carrier suffered cuts to her face and neck, and her vision was
damaged.
A grand jury charged Williams with (1) assaulting a fed-
eral employee while using a deadly and dangerous weapon
and inflicting bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a)(1) & (b); (2) dis-
charging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of vio-
lence, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c); and (3) unlawful possession of a fire-
arm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). Williams entered into an
agreement with the government, pleading guilty to counts
one and two and waiving his right to appeal his conviction
and sentence. At a change of plea hearing, Williams told the
magistrate judge that he had discussed each of the charges
with his lawyer. The magistrate judge explained the law as
follows:
The essential elements of these crimes; in other
words, what the Government would have to
No. 24-3173 3

prove beyond a reasonable doubt before you
could be found guilty, are that you were in the
Northern District of Indiana, and you forcibly
assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimi-
dated, or interfered with a person in the United
States Postal Service while she was engaged in
the performance of her official duties. And then
while committing that act, you used a deadly or
dangerous weapon or inflicted bodily injury
and that you knowingly brandished and dis-
charged and used a firearm during a crime of
violence and knowingly possessed a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence.
Williams’s attorney agreed that these were the elements of
the charged offenses, and Williams acknowledged that he un-
derstood the crimes to which he was pleading guilty. The gov-
ernment described what the evidence would show if the case
were to proceed to trial, and Williams agreed with that ac-
count of the facts. He pleaded guilty to counts one and two,
and the judge accepted his plea.
Before he was sentenced, Williams changed attorneys. He
then moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his first attor-
ney had been ineffective because he advised Williams that if
he did not plead guilty, he would be sentenced to life impris-
onment. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, and
Williams’s first attorney testified that in the lead-up to the
guilty plea, Williams had a theory to avoid being found guilty
under § 924(c). The attorney told Williams that, to argue that
theory, Williams would “have to testify if you’re going to try
to say that [firing the gun] didn’t occur during a crime of vio-
lence.” Similarly, Williams and his second attorney
4 No. 24-3173

repeatedly discussed the possibility that count one (the § 111
offense) wasn’t a crime of violence, but Williams did not make
that argument in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Wil-
liams to 153 months in prison.
II
On appeal, Williams argues for the first time that because
§ 111(b) isn’t a crime of violence that can sustain a conviction
under § 924(c), he pleaded guilty to a nonexistent offense.
And because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires
that a court only accept a guilty plea when a defendant un-
derstands “the nature of each charge to which the defendant
is pleading” and there is a factual basis for the plea, see Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G) & (3), Williams believes his guilty plea
violated Rule 11 and his due process rights such that we must
vacate his conviction. Because he raises this argument for the
first time on appeal, we review only for plain error. United
States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020).
Both due process and Rule 11 require that a defendant’s
guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). When a defend-
ant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of
the crime’s elements—either by the court or counsel—that
standard isn’t met. Id. Similarly, a plea cannot stand when nei-
ther the defendant, nor his counsel, nor the court understood
the essential elements of the crime. Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 618–19 (1998). We consider the totality of the circum-
stances to decide if there’s been a violation of Rule 11. See
United States v. Goliday, 41 F.4th 778, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2022).
No. 24-3173 5

Even if Williams hadn’t repeatedly waived argument that
his plea was invalid (he did, as we discuss below), it would
fail because the magistrate judge did all that was required.
The judge accurately recounted the essential elements of a
§ 924(c) charge, and Williams (with his attorney) reviewed
and discussed the plea agreement and indictment, which also
explained that charge. To determine whether a factual basis
existed for the plea, the court asked the government to outline
what the evidence at trial would have been, and Williams con-
firmed the accuracy of those facts. In short, there was no con-
fusion in the courtroom. Everyone understood that Wil-
liams’s assault on the mail carrier (his conviction under § 111)
was the “crime of violence” supporting his conviction under
§ 924(c). Cf. United States v. Fard, 775 F.3d 939, 944–45 (7th Cir.
2015) (finding a plea invalid when a defendant didn’t under-
stand an element of a charge and never admitted to acting
with the requisite intent).
Based on our decision in United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d
554 (7th Cir. 2002), Williams has, at best, a tenuous argument
that § 111(b) isn’t a crime of violence. Only offenses that re-
quire “purposeful or knowing conduct” qualify, Borden v.
United States, 593 U.S. 420, 434 (2021) (plurality opinion), and
§ 111(b) doesn’t count, Williams contends, because our deci-
sion in Jackson held that § 111(b) does not impose any mens
rea requirement. But see Jackson, 310 F.3d at 556–57 (holding
that a conviction under § 111(b) does not require a showing of
mens rea beyond the intent to assault which is required by
§ 111(a)); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975) (find-
ing that § 111 requires a showing of “an intent to assault”).
Because Williams repeatedly waived this argument about
statutory interpretation, we need not decide whether § 111(b)
6 No. 24-3173

is a crime of violence. Williams says the court should have
known—based on Jackson and Borden—that § 111(b) could not
serve as a § 924(c) predicate offense and should have told the
parties as much. Neither Rule 11 nor due process, however,
required the magistrate judge to conjure new legal theories on
Williams’s behalf. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 571
(1989) (a strategic miscalculation about the law isn’t grounds
to set aside an otherwise valid plea). There is (and was) no
binding precedent in our circuit that § 111(b) cannot serve as
predicate offense under § 924(c). Cf. United States v. McDaniel,
85 F.4th 176, 187–88 (4th Cir. 2023) (finding, after Borden, that
§ 111(b) is a crime of violence); United States v. Medearis, 65
F.4th 981, 986–87 (8th Cir. 2023) (same). And even if some later
decision showed that Williams “did not correctly assess every
relevant factor entering into his decision [to plead guilty],”
that doesn’t mean that his plea was invalid. Bousley, 523 U.S.
at 619. A judge accepting a plea must ensure a defendant
knows the essential elements of an offense and develop a re-
lated factual basis. The magistrate judge did just that. See also
United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 866–67 (7th Cir. 2024) (en
banc) (“An error that is subject to reasonable dispute is not
plain.”).
Even if the court had erred in some way, it wouldn’t mat-
ter because Williams waived this argument about § 111(b)
three times over—first by pleading guilty, then by waiving his
right to appeal, and finally by failing to raise it in his motion
to revoke his plea.
Williams first waived this argument by pleading guilty.
While he was entitled to notice of the true nature of the
charges against him (as discussed above), “an unconditional
plea of guilty is sufficient to waive a defendant’s right to
No. 24-3173 7

contest the proper interpretation of the statute of conviction.”
Grzegorczyk v. United States, 997 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2021).
As in Grzegorczyk, Williams contends that a predicate offense
is not a crime of violence under § 924(c). See id. Put differ-
ently, while Williams says he was misinformed about the es-
sential nature of the § 924(c) charge, he is actually raising an
issue of statutory interpretation—attacking one component of
the definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c). See United
States v. Wheeler, 857 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2017). That Wil-
liams, unlike in Grzegorczyk, raises his challenge under Rule
11 and based on the law as it existed at the time of his plea
(rather than on a subsequent development) doesn’t matter.
The same waiver principles apply. “[A] valid guilty plea re-
linquishes any claim that would contradict the admissions
necessarily made” by entering the plea. Class v. United States,
583 U.S. 174, 183 (2018) (citation modified). And Williams’s
claim—that § 111(b) wasn’t a crime of violence—contradicts
the admissions made in his guilty plea, because he admitted
that he committed the crimes charged against him. See also
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (“[A] voluntary
plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then appli-
cable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial
decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.”).
Williams waived argument about § 111(b) a second time
by agreeing not to appeal. In the written plea agreement, the
government promised to dismiss the third count of the indict-
ment and recommend a minimum Guidelines sentence. In ex-
change, Williams pleaded guilty to the first two counts and
waived his right to appeal. An appeal waiver rises and falls
with the plea agreement—when a plea is invalid because it
was not made knowingly and intelligently, for instance, such
challenges are excepted from the waiver. United States v.
8 No. 24-3173

Edwards, 145 F.4th 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2025). As discussed
above, however, Williams’s failure to understand a novel ar-
gument about § 111(b)’s status as a crime of violence didn’t
invalidate his plea such that he shouldn’t be held to his appeal
waiver. See United States v. Vela, 740 F.3d 1150, 1152–53 (7th
Cir. 2014); Oliver v. United States, 951 F.3d 841, 845–46 (7th Cir.
2020). That Williams’s argument is based on the law as it was
at the time he pleaded guilty, rather than on some new devel-
opment, doesn’t matter. In either case, we hold a defendant to
their promise not to appeal. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 573 (noting
that the Supreme Court’s decisions “have not suggested that
conscious waiver is necessary with respect to each potential
defense relinquished by a plea of guilty”); Vela, 740 F.3d at
1152–54. Williams voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly
entered into a plea agreement with an appeal waiver, and his
appeal does not fall into any of the bargained-for exceptions.
The waiver must be enforced.
Williams waived argument about § 111(b)’s status as a
crime of violence a third time based on traditional waiver
principles. When a defendant chooses to present one argu-
ment and not another, that’s a “matter of strategy” and the
arguments not made are waived. United States v. Scott, 900
F.3d 972, 974–75 (7th Cir. 2018). The record shows that Wil-
liams and his attorneys knew about and discussed a theory
that § 111(b) wasn’t a crime of violence before pleading guilty
and again as he moved to revoke his plea. Yet in support of
his motion to revoke, Williams argued only that his original
counsel had been ineffective. That Williams or his attorney
may not have been aware of the precise version of the § 111(b)
argument he makes now (centering on Jackson) makes no dif-
ference. Williams was aware of a general objection to § 111(b)
No. 24-3173 9

as a § 924(c) predicate and (with his attorney) chose not to
pursue it despite raising other arguments.
Like every defendant, Williams was entitled to notice of
the true nature of the charges against him. The magistrate
judge gave him that notice, and nothing in our circuit’s prec-
edent disagrees with the elements as the judge described
them. Because Williams repeatedly waived the right to con-
test the proper interpretation of § 111(b) and § 924(c), we dis-
miss the appeal.
DISMISSED