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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Lukas Goodyear, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-05712

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (551)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

LUKAS GOODYEAR, individually and

on behalf of all others similarly

situated,

  Plaintiff,                                                       

       v.                     CIVIL ACTION FILE                    

                              NO. 1:23-CV-5712-TWT                 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

  Defendant.                                                       

                OPINION AND ORDER                                  
This is a putative breach of contract class action. It is before the Court 

on Plaintiff Lukas Goodyear’s Motion to Exclude [Doc. 61] and Motion to
Certify Class [Doc. 96] as well as Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc’s (“Delta”)
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 95]. The Court GRANTS Delta’s Motion

for Summary Judgment [Doc. 95], DENIES as moot Goodyear’s Motion to

Exclude [Doc. 61], and DENIES as moot Goodyear’s Motion to Certify Class
[Doc. 96].

I. Background

This case arises from an overtime wage dispute. Plaintiff Lukas
Goodyear was employed by Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. from 1999 to 2023.
(Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 12, 55, 98 [Doc 95-2].) He
alleges that Delta breached a contract that provides for overtime pay. (Compl.
¶¶ 67–68 [Doc. 1].) It is undisputed that Delta, as an air carrier, is exempt from
the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Def.’s Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1.)

The source of the issue is a change that Delta made to its overtime pay
calculations. For most of Goodyear’s employment, supervisors in Goodyear’s

Crew Tracking department manually reported the overtime hours of their

employees. ( ¶¶ 42, 60, 62–64.) In 2021, Delta conducted an audit of the
Crew Tracking department and determined that overtime hours in that
department had been calculated inaccurately under the manual process. (

¶¶ 67–69.) Later that year, Delta announced that it would transition the
department to a system that automatically calculates overtime hours based on

set parameters, effective March 2022. ( ¶¶ 74–76, 88.) This transition was
not abnormal within Delta, as the company had been transitioning other

departments from the manual system to the automated system since 2016. (

¶ 40; ¶ 42 (“[B]y 2022, Crew Tracking was one of the last remaining
departments to transition.”).)

The automated system calculates overtime hours differently from how
the Crew Tracking department’s supervisors had previously calculated them.

The relevant issue is how overtime is calculated when employees swap shifts.
When two employees swap shifts, the act of covering another employee’s shift
is called “swapping on,” and the act of getting a scheduled shift covered is called
“swapping off.” ( ¶ 28.) Under the manual reporting system, the Crew
Tracking supervisors reported hours as overtime anytime an employee worked

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on a scheduled day off during a given work week the employee’s previously
scheduled hours had been worked by that employee or a colleague. (

¶¶ 64, 70, 76, 78; Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts ¶ 17

[Doc. 109-2].) Under the automated system, overtime hours are logged anytime
an employee worked on a scheduled day off during a given work week the
employee’s previously scheduled hours had been worked by that employee (and
not any other colleague). ( Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
¶¶ 76, 78, 81.)

In advance of the transition to the automated system, Delta provided

various resources about the change to its employees and held town hall
meetings. ( ¶¶ 79, 83, 86.) One of the resources included the following
instruction:

If swapping off one or more shifts during a single pay period

without swapping on an equal number of shifts during the same

pay period, your paycheck will be less because you will only be

paid for hours worked during the pay period. (first scheduled day

of work until last scheduled off day),

                         3                                         

( ¶ 80 (emphasis added).1)

Goodyear contends that Delta’s change to overtime pay breached an

existing employment document titled “Hours of Work, Overtime and Shift

Differential (Ground, Noncontract Employees)” (“HOW”), which he alleges is a
contract. The HOW outlines several Delta policies, including its policy on
overtime and swaps. It defines “weekly overtime” for employees like Goodyear
as “the time required to be worked on scheduled days off,

.” (Pl.’s

Resp. Br. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1, at 14 (emphasis added)

[Doc. 109-4].2) It further states: “Swaps are designed to provide front-line
employees with increased flexibility to swap shifts. . . .

1 Delta refers to this document as a PowerPoint presentation. Goodyear 

appears to deny that Delta provided any PowerPoint presentations and notes
that “the cited evidence does not establish that Delta presented or provided
this as a PowerPoint presentation.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 80. ¶ 85 (admitting elsewhere that

Goodyear did receive a PowerPoint presentation as part of Delta’s resources
on the change to an automatic system).) He also notes that Delta did not
identify the document in Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 15, in which Delta was
asked for documents of the same kind. (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material
Facts ¶ 27.) Delta responds that it identified the “PowerPoint” in its
interrogatory response but erroneously cited it “under its internal control
number DLT757425300000079, rather than its Bates number,

DELTALG00000062.” (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material
Facts ¶ 27[ Doc. 117-1].) Seeing as Goodyear did not formally object to the
admissibility of the evidence and appears to have nonetheless been aware of
the document by 2023, the Court will consider the evidence for purposes of the
present motions. ( Fortin Decl. ¶ 7; Reply Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J., Ex. 1 [Doc. 117-3].)

2 The pagination of this exhibit reflects the PDF pagination.

4

so swapping should never put an employee into an

overtime eligible situation.” ( at 6 (emphasis added).) Relying on the
overtime definition, Goodyear alleges that Delta breached the HOW when it

decided to withhold overtime wages until an employee had worked all hours
for which he or she was previously scheduled. (Compl. ¶¶ 67–68.) He argues
that the HOW requires swap-on shifts to be credited as overtime whenever an
employee works on a scheduled day off and the previously scheduled days
“have been worked” at all, whether by the originally scheduled employee or by
other employees. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 3–4 [Doc. 109].)

Goodyear filed suit on behalf of himself and members of a putative class 

of other Delta employees. His Complaint contains two claims: breach of
contract (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count II). Three motions are before
the Court. Delta presently moves for summary judgment and to exclude
Goodyear’s expert report, and Goodyear moves for class certification.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings,

depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw
any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

, 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970). The party seeking summary

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judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The

burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and

present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. , 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

III. Discussion

A. Breach of Contract (Count I)

1. Existence of a Contract

While an at-will employee does not have a contractual right to remain

employed, “an at-will employment relationship can give rise to certain
contractual rights.” , 333 Ga. App. 446, 450 (2015). An

employee manual generally does not establish any contractual rights, but it
may under certain circumstances. , 302 Ga. 70, 58–

59 (2017). Specifically, an employee manual “of which an employee is aware”
that sets out the terms for additional compensation “may amount to a binding
contract” between the employer and the employee. at 59 (citations omitted).

Georgia courts treat such additional compensation policies as offers by
employers that are implicitly accepted when their at-will employees choose to
remain employed. , 203 Ga. App. 595,

596–97 (1992) (quoting , 160 Ga. App. 692, 695 (1981)).

Examples of contractually binding policies are those that provide for

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compensation in the form of severance pay, disability benefits, and paid
vacation time. , 160 Ga. App. at 695 (severance pay); , 203 Ga.

App. at 595–97 (disability benefits); , 174 Ga. App. 125, 126 (1985) (vacation pay). But where an employee manual
merely “set[s] forth certain policies and information concerning employment”
and does not provide for additional compensation, it is not a contract.

, 178 Ga. App. 787, 787 (1986)

(holding that employment termination provisions in an employee manual were
not contractually binding); , 223 Ga. App. 455, 459 (1996) (same).

Not all mentions of compensation in an employee manual amount to an
additional compensation policy. For example, in , the Georgia

Supreme Court determined that the policy at issue “d[id] not amount to a
promise of future compensation” because its focus was the “administration” of
“temporary appointments” and not additional compensation. , 302

Ga. at 73. The Court noted that the references to pay were “dependent upon

and collateral to” the topic of an employee returning to a prior position after a
temporary appointment. at 72. In , 236 Ga. App.

185 (1999), the Georgia Court of Appeals considered an employee manual that
outlined the eligibility requirements for a promotion. at 185–86. There, the
plaintiff argued that his employer violated the manual because it relied on the

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stricter eligibility requirements in a separate document rather than the
requirements in the manual. at 186. Although pay may be related to a

promotion, the court held that the manual’s promotion policy was not a

contract, as it was “merely [ ] a statement of certain policies and information
concerning employment” and not an “additional compensation” plan.

(citation modified). Lastly, in

, 2008 WL 11405993 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2008), the
plaintiff bus drivers did not sign a written employment agreement. at *1.
Rather, they were provided with a document with an “hourly rate,” “daily rate”

and “annual salary” based on whether the drivers were categorized as “[Four]
Hours Per Day” or “[Five] Hours Per Day.” The plaintiffs alleged their
employer underpaid them when it paid them a fixed annual salary rather than
the hourly rate. at *5. The hourly rate would have resulted in higher pay
because the drivers sometimes worked more than the four or five hours listed
on the schedule. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that “[t]he presence of
pay schedules titled ‘Four Hours Per Day’ and ‘Five Hours Per Day’ and the

use of the words ‘Hourly Rate’” did not by themselves constitute a promise to
pay the drivers by the hour. at *7; (finding that the defendant

“had the flexibility to change their routes and pay schedules at any time” as an
“at-will employer”).

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In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Delta argues that the HOW is not 

a contract. It argues that the HOW is an employee manual merely used to
“inform,” not establish contractual rights. (Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J., at 14.) It also argues that Goodyear cannot show he was aware of
the overtime pay provisions, a prerequisite to the formation of any contract.
( ) Specifically, Delta explains that “employees were told they could find
Delta’s policies on the intranet,” ( at 4), but no one “affirmatively directed
[Goodyear] to HOW, or told him that it governed his pay, until he ‘raised
concerns about his compensation,’” (Reply Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ.

J., at 6 [Doc. 117]). In this case, it is not necessary to determine if the HOW
created a binding contract.

2. Change in Terms of Employment

Even if Goodyear was contractually owed overtime pay by means of the
HOW, it does not mean that Delta was forever bound by the terms of the HOW.
Instead, as an at-will employer, Delta was free to revise and re-interpret its
policies as it saw fit and without the consent of its employees.

     , [238 Ga. App. 657, 659](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1238220/stover-v-candle-corp-of-america/#659) (1999);                               
      , [207 Ga. App. 869, 870](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1289141/johnson-v-metropolitan-atlanta-rapid-transit-authority/#870) (1993) (citing                       
                , [186 Ga. App. 834, 835](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1294662/taylor-v-amisub-mcintosh-trail-regional-medical-center-inc/#835) (1988)). While employers   

must provide notice of a change in policy and cannot apply the change
retroactively, , 246 Ga. App. 439, 440 (2000), Delta met that

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standard here.

In advance of the change, Delta circulated multiple resources to the
Crew Tracking department regarding their transition to an automated pay

system, which included a document outlining the corresponding change in
overtime pay. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 80.) Goodyear
appears to deny that the document was circulated to employees (at all and in
PowerPoint format), ( Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts ¶ 80 [Doc. 109-1]), but he cannot deny its existence or that it is
clearly intended as information for his department. Regardless, the available

evidence indicates that Goodyear was made aware of the change to overtime
pay prior to the system migration. In December 2021, he stated in an “Ethics
Report and Notice” about the HOW that Delta “created a rule that if a swap is
completed, any extra time on an off day will be paid as straight time to bring
the weekly threshold up to the originally scheduled hours prior to paying
overtime.” (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92; Pl.’s
Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92 (noting that

Goodyear stated in the same document his belief that the new policy
“contravenes” the HOW).)

Despite receiving notice that Delta was changing its overtime pay policy
within his department, Goodyear chose to remain employed with Delta after
the change went into effect. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

                        10                                         

¶ 93.) In the employment context, his decision to remain employed constituted
acceptance of the new terms. , 238 Ga. App. at 659; , 207 Ga.

App. at 870 (“[B]ecause [the plaintiff’s] employment was terminable at will,

[the employer] was authorized to alter the terms of his employment.” (citation
omitted)); , 428 F.3d 1359, 1374 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Georgia courts have held that an employee can accept new
terms of employment of which the employee is aware by remaining in
employment.”). That Goodyear disagreed with the change and found it
inconsistent with his interpretation of the HOW is of no significance. An at-will

employer need not obtain consent from its employees to enforce a policy change.
, 238 Ga. App. at 659. As Delta points out, “[t]his is consistent with an
employer’s right to terminate an at-will employee at any time and rehire him
under different conditions.” (Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 10
[Doc. 95-1].)

The Court does not wade into the debate of whether the new policy

contradicts the HOW’s language. Even if Goodyear was correct that it did (on

which the Court does not opine), Delta was not required to update its written
policies to reflect this change. Delta notified its employees about the change
and did not retroactively enforce the change. That is all that the law appears
to require when an at-will employer implements a change in policy. It is not
inconceivable that an employer’s policies may be expressed across various

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documents and in various forms, and the law does not even require a written
policy to exist at all. Goodyear cites no case law holding that parties must
amend the language of a written contract in order to later modify it; in fact,

contract law expressly contemplates the contrary. This is the case despite the
fact that Delta continued to refer employees such as Goodyear to the policy
after it transitioned Goodyear’s department to the new overtime policy.

, 236 Ga. App. at 186–87 (acknowledging that the employer did not
modify its written employee handbook on promotions, despite the fact that a
separate document had changed the promotion eligibility standards). Of

course, considering that Delta believed the change would actually bring the
Crew Tracking department in line with the HOW, Delta’s decision to leave the
written policy in place made sense from the company’s perspective.

For these reasons, the Court grants Delta’s Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Count I. Delta modified the terms of Goodyear’s employment,
and Goodyear accepted those terms when he continued his employment with
Delta. Therefore, there can be no breach of contract.

B. Unjust Enrichment (Count II)

Goodyear alleges that Delta “unjustly enriche[d] itself” at his expense
when it “fail[ed] to pay overtime even though the employee’s scheduled time
has been worked and Delta has received employee labor for the entirety of that
scheduled time.” (Compl. ¶ 72.) A claim for unjust enrichment lies where

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(1) “the defendant induced or encouraged the plaintiff to provide something of
value to the defendant”; (2) “the plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant
with the expectation that the defendant would be responsible for the cost

thereof”; and (3) “the defendant knew of the benefit being bestowed upon it by
the plaintiff and either affirmatively chose to accept the benefit or failed to
reject it.” , 338 Ga. App. 382, 387 (2016).

Delta is entitled to summary judgment on this unjust enrichment claim.
Having already found that Delta notified Goodyear of the change in overtime
pay calculations and that Goodyear agreed to the change by remaining

employed, Goodyear was not owed more and should not have “expect[ed]” more.
Goodyear was scheduled to work a certain number of hours each work
period, and Delta paid Goodyear for those scheduled hours in accordance with
his agreed upon base pay. Delta made Goodyear aware that, if he provided the
benefit of working shifts in excess of his scheduled amount, then he would be
rewarded with overtime pay. The Court agrees with Delta that Goodyear’s
cited cases are inapposite.

, 2021 WL 5113200, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2021) (denying summary

judgment on an unjust enrichment claim because the defendant “induced” the
plaintiff to “do additional work” that the defendant did not compensate);
, 2018 WL 1701969, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. Mar. 19, 2018) (allowing an unjust enrichment claim to proceed at the

                        13                                         

motion to dismiss stage where the plaintiff had “minimally” alleged a claim
and “discovery might reveal evidence supporting” the claim). Delta did not
unjustly enrich itself merely because it paid overtime only once Goodyear
worked his originally scheduled hours. Therefore, the Court grants summary
judgment on Goodyear’s unjust enrichment claim. Having granted summary
judgment on both Counts I and II, the Court denies as moot Delta’s Motion to
Exclude and Goodyear’s Motion to Certify Class.
IV. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Delta’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 95],
DENIES as moot Goodyear’s Motion to Exclude [Doc. 61] and Motion to Certify
Class [Doc. 96]. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the
Defendant, and to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of March, 2026.

                                         taroncta         rnp 
                                      THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
                                      United States District Judge 

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