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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Atoris Slater

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 22-2838

• Judges: Sykes

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.5K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Diane S. Sykes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/3156/diane-s-sykes/)

In the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

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No. 22-2838
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

ATORIS JAQUEZ SLATER,
Defendant-Appellant.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:20-cr-40053 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.

---

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2023 — DECIDED MARCH 5, 2026

---

Before SYKES, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
SYKES, Circuit Judge. In July 2020 police officers in Rock
Island, Illinois, initiated a traffic stop of an unregistered
minivan, but the driver, Atoris Slater, ignored their lights
and fled. In the high-speed chase that followed, Slater nearly
collided with a truck, so the officers ended their pursuit.
With the police no longer on his tail, Slater pulled into a
parking lot, abandoned the minivan, and hid in an empty
dumpster nearby.
2 No. 22-2838

His escape was short-lived. The police soon located the
minivan and, with it, Slater’s hiding spot. They searched the
van and found a loaded handgun, a bag of marijuana, and
dozens of cannabis edibles. The officers arrested Slater and
transported him to jail. When they arrived, he tried to
discard something in a trash can. It was a bag of crack
cocaine.
A grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging
Slater with possessing controlled substances with intent to
distribute, possessing a firearm as a felon, and possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Slater
pleaded guilty to all three charges, though without a plea
agreement. The parties agreed, however, that his plea to the
drug-trafficking charge hinged on his possession of crack
cocaine, not cannabis or any of its derivatives.
The presentence report (“PSR”) accounted for the other
drugs as relevant conduct. Because Slater possessed more
than one type of controlled substance, the probation officer
used the drug-conversion ratios in § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines to calculate the converted drug weights for
purposes of the advisory sentencing range. For the marijua-
na and edibles, the PSR used the 1:1 ratio that applies to
marijuana and cannabis. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. n.8(D) (2021).
The government did not object. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1)
(requiring objections to a PSR within 14 days of receipt of the
report).
The day before sentencing, however, the prosecutor
learned that some of the edibles constituted THC mixtures—
at least based on preliminary field testing—and thus were
subject to § 2D1.1’s much higher 1:167 ratio. § 2D1.1 app.
n.8(D). Using the higher ratio added about three years to the
No. 22-2838 3

sentencing range on the first two counts. (Count three
required a consecutive 60-month sentence.) At sentencing
the prosecutor raised a late objection to the presentence
report and requested a continuance for lab tests. Slater
objected, but the district judge granted the motion, citing her
duty to correctly calculate the Guidelines range.
Lab testing confirmed that the edibles contained THC, so
the revised PSR recommended application of the 1:167 ratio.
The parties agreed and the judge adopted the new higher
sentencing range. In the end, the judge sentenced Slater to a
below-Guidelines term of 60 months on the first two counts
and the mandatory 60-month consecutive term on the third.
On appeal Slater contests the judge’s decision to entertain
the prosecutor’s belated objection to the PSR. In the alterna-
tive, he argues for the first time that the 1:167 ratio does not
apply to the edibles. Neither argument persuades. A district
judge may consider an untimely objection to a PSR for good
cause. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(D). The judge was within
her discretion to permit the late objection here. And Slater
affirmatively agreed to the higher ratio when lab tests
confirmed the presence of THC. That’s a waiver of his
current claim to the contrary. Even if he merely forfeited the
argument, he has not shown that reversal is warranted on
plain-error review. We affirm.
I. Background
On July 30, 2020, police officers on patrol in Rock Island
spotted a minivan that was not properly registered. As they
activated their emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop, they
recognized Slater as the driver.
Rather than pull over, however, Slater accelerated and
sped away. The officers pursued him, at least initially. Slater
4 No. 22-2838

led them on a chase at speeds approaching 70 miles per
hour, more than twice the posted limit. When Slater nearly
hit a semitruck traveling in an adjacent lane, the officers gave
up the pursuit.
Moments later, however, the dispatcher radioed a report
from a pedestrian who had just narrowly missed being
struck by a speeding minivan. With the benefit of this addi-
tional information, the officers located Slater’s minivan—
now unoccupied—in a parking lot. Inspecting it through the
windows, they noticed a bag of marijuana in plain view on
the center console. Other officers searched the area and
found Slater hiding in an empty dumpster.
The officers then searched the minivan. In addition to the
bag of marijuana, they found a vehicle title and bill of sale
for the minivan, both in Slater’s name, and a loaded revolver
with an obliterated serial number. They also found a bag of
cannabis edibles, including “Sweed ‘n Loud” cereal bars and
various kinds of gummies.
The officers arrested Slater and transported him to the
Rock County Jail. While en route, the squad car’s camera
captured Slater trying to stuff something into the back of his
pants. When they arrived at the jail, an officer saw Slater toss
something into a nearby trash can. The officer immediately
retrieved the discarded object—a clear plastic bag containing
multiple smaller baggies of crack cocaine.
A grand jury in the Central District of Illinois indicted
Slater for (1) possession of crack cocaine, THC, and
marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1);
(2) possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1);
and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). After several
No. 22-2838 5

continuances at Slater’s request, the parties worked toward a
plea agreement. Drug quantity was an issue in the
negotiations, and a delay in the lab tests for the edibles
slowed progress.
Slater eventually pleaded guilty to all counts without a
plea agreement. The parties agreed, however, that his guilty
plea to the drug-trafficking charge related only to the crack
cocaine; lab tests for the other drugs remained unavailable.
The judge accepted Slater’s guilty pleas, ordered a PSR, and
set a sentencing date four months later.
Key to this case is the treatment of the cannabis edibles
under the Sentencing Guidelines. In the initial PSR, the
probation officer noted that both the marijuana and the
edibles, which weighed a combined total of 1,730 grams
(17 grams of marijuana and 1,713 grams of edibles), had
tested positive in the field for the presence of cannabis. And
because Slater had possessed crack cocaine in addition to
cannabis, the probation officer calculated a combined drug
weight using the drug-conversion ratios set forth in the
commentary to § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines. 1
The probation officer multiplied the weight of the crack
cocaine, 14.1 grams, by the corresponding 1:3571 drug-
conversion ratio, resulting in a converted drug weight of
50.35 kilograms. For the marijuana and cannabis, the proba-
tion officer used the applicable 1:1 ratio, which added
1.73 kilograms to the total. The combined converted drug
weight was 52.08 kilograms, which translated to an advisory

1 To account for the fact that some controlled substances are more
dangerous than others, these ratios multiply a substance’s actual weight
by a factor that loosely represents its harm and potency.
6 No. 22-2838

sentencing range of 30 to 37 months in prison for counts one
and two. Count three carried a mandatory consecutive term
of not less than 60 months. See § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Slater objected to the PSR on several grounds, but only
one is relevant here. He argued that because neither the
marijuana nor the edibles had been lab-tested, he couldn’t be
held accountable for them. He acknowledged, however, that
the crack cocaine alone supported the sentencing range. The
government asserted that the probation officer had correctly
calculated the drug weight and raised no objections of its
own.
That changed on the scheduled sentencing date. At the
beginning of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor in-
formed the court that he had learned the day before that the
edibles had tested positive in the field for the presence of
THC, not cannabis, as everyone had assumed. That devel-
opment changed the government’s position on the applica-
ble drug-conversion ratio. Using the higher 1:167 ratio
applicable to THC, see § 2D1.1 app. n.8(D), the converted
drug weight for the edibles would have been higher, which
in turn would increase the sentencing range on counts one
and two by several years. The prosecutor accordingly moved
for a continuance to allow for lab testing of the edibles and a
corrected PSR.
Slater objected, noting that the 14-day period for object-
ing to the PSR had long since expired. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(f)(1). The judge acknowledged Slater’s “psychological
preparation” for sentencing but emphasized her “duty” to
correctly calculate the Guidelines range. That duty, she
explained, required that she ascertain the merit of the gov-
No. 22-2838 7

ernment’s tardy objection. She granted the motion and
postponed sentencing.
A week later the prosecutor filed a written objection to
the PSR. In response Slater reiterated that the government’s
objection was untimely and added that the prosecutor had
induced his guilty plea by agreeing that the drug-trafficking
count rested only on his crack-cocaine possession. In reply
the prosecutor repeated the judge’s emphasis on the court’s
duty to calculate the correct Guidelines range. That require-
ment, the government argued, established “good cause” to
permit the belated objection to the PSR. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(i)(1)(D).
At the next status hearing, the prosecutor reported that
the lab testing of some of the edibles—specifically, the
Sweed ‘n Loud cereal bars—had confirmed the presence of
THC. The judge then addressed Slater’s contention that the
prosecutor had induced his plea. After a lengthy colloquy,
she rejected the argument, concluding that Slater had en-
tered his guilty pleas knowing that the marijuana and
edibles would be considered in the calculation of the sen-
tencing range. Finally, the judge reiterated that her obliga-
tion to correctly calculate the Guidelines range justified her
decision to permit the late objection to the PSR.
Up to this point in the case, Slater had been represented
by an assistant public defender. A few weeks after this status
hearing, his attorney moved to withdraw based on a possible
conflict of interest arising from her office’s prior
representation of Slater in another case. The judge granted
the motion and appointed a new lawyer.
In the weeks that followed, the probation office prepared
a revised PSR using the higher 1:167 drug-conversion ratio
8 No. 22-2838

for the edibles. The new calculation was limited to the Sweed
‘n Loud cereal bars, for which lab testing was available; the
revised report did not include the gummies or the bag of
marijuana in the calculation. At 859.1 grams, the cereal bars
contributed 143.47 kilograms to the total converted drug
weight, which when added to the undisputed
50.35 kilograms of crack cocaine produced a combined
converted total drug weight of 193.82 kilograms—nearly
four times the original figure. That new total boosted the
sentencing range for counts one and two to 63 to 78 months.
Slater did not object to the new calculations.
With that, and nearly a year after the originally sched-
uled sentencing date, the case finally proceeded to sentenc-
ing. At the start of the hearing, Slater withdrew his
remaining objections, noting that none of them would alter
the new Guidelines range. And he agreed with the prosecu-
tor that the revised PSR accurately calculated the range. The
judge adopted the revised calculations and the new range.
The government then recommended a within-Guidelines
sentence of 72 months on counts one and two and the re-
quired consecutive term of 60 months on count three.
Slater’s attorney asked for a below-Guidelines sentence of
time served—about 28 months—on counts one and two,
noting that the 1:167 ratio for THC had driven the increase in
the Guidelines range. He argued that the policy underlying
the higher ratio was not scientifically based but instead was
a product of the federal government’s incoherent approach
to marijuana regulation, which he labeled a “political foot-
ball.” The judge invited the government to respond to this
policy critique of the Guidelines. The prosecutor agreed that
the THC ratio was responsible for the increased Guidelines
No. 22-2838 9

range but declined to comment on the defense attorney’s
policy argument.
The judge acknowledged the effect of the harsher THC
ratio but said she found it hard to evaluate whether the ratio
accurately reflected “the danger of that drug to society.” She
said she did not have sufficient information to appropriately
assess the defense attorney’s policy argument. But she
agreed that a downward variance was warranted because
the THC ratio treated Slater’s possession of the edibles
“quite severely” and was “driving the train here.” She did
not agree, however, with the significant variance Slater’s
counsel had suggested. The judge settled on a below-
Guidelines prison term of 60 months on counts one and two
and the mandatory consecutive 60-month term on count
three, for a total of 120 months in prison.
II. Discussion
Slater raises two arguments on appeal, one procedural
and one substantive. Both center on the application of the
1:167 ratio to the THC-infused cereal bars. As a procedural
matter, he challenges the judge’s decision to entertain the
government’s untimely objection to the PSR. If we disagree,
he argues that the judge should have applied the 1:1 ratio to
the cereal bars.
A. “Good Cause” for Late PSR Objection
Rule 32(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires the probation office to distribute the defendant’s
PSR to the parties “at least 35 days before sentencing.” From
there, the parties have 14 days to submit written objections.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1) (requiring the parties to submit
objections in writing “[w]ithin 14 days” of receiving the
report). Though strict, this deadline is not without exception:
10 No. 22-2838

the judge “may, for good cause, allow a party to make a new
objection at any time before sentence is imposed.” Id.
R. 32(i)(1)(D); see id. R. 32(b)(2) (A judge “may, for good
cause, change any time limits prescribed” in Rule 32.).
Slater contests the judge’s decision to permit the gov-
ernment’s eleventh-hour objection. As with other good-cause
findings, we review a good-cause determination under
Rule 32(i)(1)(D) for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hether the cir-
cumstances add up to ‘good cause’ is a question committed
to the district court’s discretion,” so our review “is deferen-
tial.”); see United States v. Henderson, 159 F.4th 213, 218 (4th
Cir. 2025); United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1039 (9th
Cir. 2017). 2
The judge reasonably exercised her discretion here. As
she properly recognized, she had “the ultimate responsibil-
ity” to ensure that the Guidelines range was correct. Rosales-
Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134 (2018). In fact,
failing to do so risked serious procedural error. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). And there’s no question
that the issue at the heart of the prosecutor’s objection
materially affected the range here; as the PSR’s initial and
revised calculations bear out, swapping the 1:1 for the

2 At times Slater’s briefs imply a challenge to the continuance of his

sentencing hearing. Our review of that ruling is similarly deferential; we
will overturn a continuance decision “only for an abuse of discretion and
a showing of actual prejudice.” United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 871
(7th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Thus, regardless of how we frame our
analysis, the outcome is the same. For simplicity’s sake, we focus our
attention on the judge’s good-cause finding.
No. 22-2838 11

1:167 ratio increased Slater’s advisory sentencing range by
about three years.
To be sure, the judge did not specifically couch her ruling
in good-cause terms. Ideally, she would have done so. But
“good cause” is a “uniquely flexible,” fact-specific, and
“capacious” concept. United States v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835,
846 (7th Cir. 2020); see Good Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(12th ed. 2024) (“A legally sufficient reason.”). And given our
highly deferential standard of review, we see no reason to
second-guess the judge’s exercise of discretion.
Slater resists this conclusion on two grounds. First, he
argues that if every Guidelines-calculation error inevitably
satisfied the good-cause standard, then Rule 32’s 14-day
deadline and grant of discretion to hear late objections
“would be meaningless.” United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d
536, 539 (5th Cir. 2001). Fair enough. It’s worth emphasizing
that because the good-cause determination is committed to
the court’s discretion, a judge is not “obliged to entertain” an
untimely objection to a PSR. Id.; see United States v. Overholt,
307 F.3d 1231, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, although the
judge emphasized her “duty” to correctly calculate the
Guidelines range, there’s no indication that she thought she
had no discretion at all. On the contrary, she expressly
acknowledged that the decision was a discretionary one.
Second, Slater sketches an argument about waiver. More
specifically, he contends that the government waived its
objection by declining in the first instance to submit the
cannabis edibles for lab testing and then later expressing
agreement with the drug-conversion calculation in the initial
PSR.
12 No. 22-2838

The waiver argument is misplaced. As just explained,
Rule 32—not waiver doctrine—governs PSR objections,
giving district judges the discretion to permit late objections
“for good cause.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(1), (i)(1)(D). No
doubt some changes in litigation position may undercut, or
even foreclose, a finding of good cause. But here, it’s far
from clear that the prosecutor disclaimed application of the
1:167 ratio. The record reflects uncertainty on the part of all
parties, not to mention the judge herself, about the proper
treatment of the cannabis edibles.
The prosecutor’s initial position turned out to be mistak-
en. After hearing from both sides, the judge reasonably
exercised her discretion to permit the government’s late
objection. We see no legal misstep in that decision, which
was otherwise well within her discretion. Slater’s procedural
argument fails.
B. Drug-Conversion Ratio
On the merits Slater argues that the 1:167 ratio does not
apply to the cannabis edibles. His argument is new on
appeal and rests entirely on a dissent from the denial of en
banc rehearing in a case from the Fifth Circuit. See United
States v. Koss, 831 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2016) (Dennis, J., dissent-
ing from denial of reh’g en banc). Briefly, the dissenting
judges in Koss posited that the harsh 1:167 ratio applies only
to “pure, isolated organic or synthetic THC.” Id. at 261.
Otherwise, because “[a]ll cannabis-derived substances
contain THC,” the government could subject any cannabis
derivative—even marijuana itself—to the heightened ratio.
Id. And that, the dissent argued, would vitiate § 2D1.1’s
careful scheme, which sets forth specific ratios for marijuana
No. 22-2838 13

and cannabis (1:1); cannabis resin and hashish (1:5); and
hashish oil (1:50).
Slater emphasizes that the government never proved that
the Sweed ‘n Loud cereal bars contained organic or synthetic
THC. Drawing on the reasoning in the Koss dissent, he
argues that the converted weight for the cereal bars should
have been calculated using the generic 1:1 ratio for marijua-
na and cannabis, not the 1:167 ratio for THC and THC
mixtures. § 2D1.1 app. n.8(D).
This argument was waived, so we need not consider it.
Recall that at the start of the sentencing hearing, Slater
withdrew all outstanding objections to the PSR. Then, when
the judge announced the new Guidelines range and invited
the parties to state any further objections, Slater expressly
agreed with the government that the probation office had
correctly calculated the new range. That is a “textbook
waiver.” United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778, 781 (7th Cir.
2022); see United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he withdrawal of an objection generally
results in a waiver of that argument on appeal.”)
Even if this argument was forfeited rather than waived,
Slater has not met his burden to win reversal on plain-error
review. A plain error is one that is “clear or obvious” and
not “subject to reasonable dispute.” United States v. Harris,
102 F.4th 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). A novel interpretation of the
marijuana conversion ratios in the Sentencing Guidelines—
one that neither we nor any of our sister circuits has em-
braced—does not satisfy the plain-error standard.
AFFIRMED