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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Veronica Bramlett, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. RES 360 LLC and Peach City Properties LLC

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-03312

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

Veronica Bramlett, on behalf of

herself and all others similarly

situated,

                Plaintiff,                                           
                             Case No. 1:25-cv-3312-MLB               

v.

RES 360 LLC and Peach City

Properties LLC,

                Defendants.                                          

________________________________/

                 OPINION & ORDER                                     
In  early  2024,  Defendants  sent  Plaintiff  several  text  messages 

offering to buy her home. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.)1 The messages said Defendants

“specialize[d] in buying land quickly and efficiently,” were “on the lookout

1 Although the messages were purportedly from “Andy” at “RES360,” the

complaint alleges “[both] Defendants sent the text messages at issue” and
neither Defendant disputes that assertion in their briefing. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 6,
26, 55–56, 59; see Dkt. 14 at 1 (Defendants admitting “Bartlett alleges

that Res 360 and Peach City sent her a series of text messages” and

arguing dismissal is warranted “even if Res 360 and Peach City sent the

alleged text messages”).) More generally, the parties treat Defendants

as a single entity throughout their briefing, so the Court takes the same
approach in this Order.

for potential properties in [Plaintiff’s] neighborhood,” “[n]oticed
[Plaintiff’s] property and wanted to see if [she was] thinking about

parting ways with it,” wanted to discuss “the advantages of a

straightforward home sale,” could “make [Plaintiff] a deal and close in as
little as two weeks,” could make the process “quick and easy,” could avoid

“the hassle” of a public listing, and could “take the burden off [Plaintiff’s]
shoulders.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was listed on the national do-not-call

registry, had no prior relationship with Defendants, had not requested

Defendants’ assistance, and was not interested in selling her home. (Dkt.
1 ¶¶ 16, 20–24, 57, 63.) So she sued Defendants for telephone solicitation

under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). (Dkt. 1.)

Defendants now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 14.)

The Court dismisses some of Plaintiff’s theories but otherwise denies

Defendants’ motion.

I. Standard of Review

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. This requires more than a “mere possibility

of misconduct.” Id. at 679. Plaintiff’s well-pled allegations must “nudge[]
[her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

II. Discussion

The complaint claims Defendants’ text messages violated the

TCPA’s prohibition against “telephone solicitation.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 94–102.)

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss this claim because

Defendants’ messages were not telephone solicitations within the

meaning of the statute. (Dkt. 14 at 5.) The Court disagrees.

The TCPA defines a telephone solicitation as “the initiation of a

telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or

rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(4); 47 C.F.R.

§ 64.1200 (f)(15). It is undisputed that Defendants’ text messages qualify

as “telephone calls” under the TCPA, and that Defendants “initiated”

those messages and “transmitted” them to Plaintiff. So the only question
is whether Defendants sent the messages for a prohibited “purpose.”

Plaintiff plausibly alleges they did. That is so because, taking Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, (1) whenever Defendants buy a home, they “take care

of all aspects of the transaction” and provide “numerous services offered
by a real estate agent”; (2) these services include “appraising the fair

market value of the property, arranging for title and escrow services,

[and] preparing and completing purchase paperwork”; (3) Defendants

charge the homeowner a “substantial” fee for these services, which they

deduct from the purchase price of the home; (4) Defendants “derive [a]

profit” from this fee; (5) Defendants’ approach—bundling the sale of real
estate services with the purchase of a home in order to generate profit

from the sale of services—is a core part of their business model; (6) in the
text messages here, Defendants offered to buy Plaintiff’s home in a
“hassle-free” transaction that “t[ook] the burden off [Plaintiff’s]

shoulders”; (7) this was plausibly an attempt to do what Defendants
always did, namely, buy a house and sell “a suite of services to ease the
sale”; and thus (8) Defendants acted with “the purpose of encouraging”

Plaintiff to “purchase” their “services,” as required for telephone
solicitation under the TCPA. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 31, 41–43, 45–46, 48–50); see

Moonsawmy v. JWS Acquisitions, LLC, 2024 WL 6910422, at *2–3 (N.D.

Ga. July 18, 2024) (“offers to purchase homes . . . may be telephone

solicitations” where defendant “implicit[ly] offers” to sell “related real

estate services”).2

Defendants counter that their text messages did not explicitly
mention any real estate services. (Dkt. 14 at 7–8.) But the TCPA does

not “require an explicit mention of a . . . service” where “the context”

plausibly suggests the caller was trying to sell services to the recipient.

Golan v. Veritas Ent., LLC, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting

defendants’ argument that courts “should consider only the content of the
calls in determining whether they were [made for a prohibited purpose]”).

That kind of context exists here. According to the complaint, when
Defendants buy a home, they sell “services [typically] offered by a real

estate agent” in order to make the transaction “quick” and “hassle-free”

and in order to make a profit on those services. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 31, 41–43, 45–
46, 48–50.) And, when Defendants asked to buy Plaintiff’s home, they

offered to do so in a “hassle-free” transaction that (1) was “quick,” “easy,”

2 No one argues Defendants’ messages encouraged Plaintiff to purchase

services with property rather than money, that Defendants would only

receive money for Plaintiff’s property—if at all—from third parties in

later transactions, or that any of this means the messages were not

telephone solicitations. So the Court does not address these issues.

“fast,” “efficient[],” and “straightforward”; (2) did not require Plaintiff to
face “the daunting task” of putting her property on the market; and

(3) “t[ook] the burden off [Plaintiff’s] shoulders.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.) Reading
these messages in the light of Defendants’ alleged business model—that

is, reading the messages in “context”—it is plausible that Defendants

were trying to sell their real estate services when they offered to buy

Plaintiff’s home.

Defendants next argue that, even if they “intended to gain some      

financial advantage by purchasing [Plaintiff’s] property, that fact would
not transform [Defendants’] offers to buy her land into telephone

solicitations.” (Dkt. 14 at 9.) But Plaintiff does not allege only that
Defendants sought to make money. She alleges Defendants sought to

make money by encouraging her to purchase their services. This is a

prohibited purpose under the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(4), (c); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (c)(2), (f)(15) (prohibiting “the initiation of a telephone
call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase . . . of . . .

services” (emphasis added)).

Defendants also argue that the TCPA permits a caller to try to

purchase property from the call recipient, and thus it must also permit

the caller to perform the services required to effectuate that purchase.

(Dkt. 14 at 9–10.) Maybe so, but that does not describe the facts here.

Plaintiff does not allege only that Defendants offered to buy her home

and then performed—or would have performed—the services required to

complete the transaction. Instead, she alleges Defendants offered to buy

her home for the specific reason that they wanted to charge her a
substantial premium for related services, including for services that may

not have been strictly necessary to effectuate Defendants’ purchase of the
home. This meets the statutory definition of a telephone solicitation

because it suggests Defendants acted with “the purpose of encouraging”

Plaintiff to “purchase” their “services.”

Finally, Defendants cite a few district court cases and claim they

support dismissal here. (Dkts. 14 at 6–7; 16 at 3–6.) None of those cases

are from this circuit. And, as Defendants concede, several courts—
including in this district—“have reached a different conclusion than that
argued by Defendants.” (Dkt. 16 at 6; see Dkt. 15 at 12–20 (collecting

cases).) The Court is not inclined to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint at this
early stage based only on the out-of-circuit district court cases on which
Defendants rely.

Plaintiff’s claims may thus proceed to the extent she alleges
Defendants implicitly offered to “take care of all aspects” of Defendants’

purchase of Plaintiff’s home—including “appraisal, title and escrow,
[and] completion of paperwork”—in exchange for a fee baked into the

purchase price of the home. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 41–50.) To the extent Plaintiff

asserts other theories of telephone solicitation, however, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion and dismisses those theories. Specifically, Plaintiff

claims Defendants messaged her not just to sell her the real estate
services incidental to Defendants’ purchase of her home, but also to sell
her “some or all” of Defendants’ other “offerings,” including loan services,

investment opportunities, home construction, home renovation,

“conventional real estate brokerage representation,” and the option to

purchase a home directly from Defendants. (See Dkts. 15 at 23–24, 26; 1

¶¶ 28–40, 62.) The content of Defendants’ text messages does not support
these theories, even considering the broader context and the totality of

Plaintiff’s allegations. So the theories may not proceed.

III. Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

SO ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2026.

                        Ma L. BROWN 
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE