US v. Daron Wright - Affirmation of Supervised Release Revocation

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 4395 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DARON QUASH AWN WRIGHT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Western District of No rth Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judg e. (3:21 - cr - 00035 - MO C - DCK -3) Submitted: January 20, 2026 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before RICHARDS ON, HEYTEN S, and BE RNER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ON BRIEF: Mekka Jeffers - Nelson, LAW OFFICE OF MEKKA JEFFE RS - NELSON, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Ap pellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant Un ited States Attorney, O FFICE OF THE UNIT ED STATES ATTORNEY, A sheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Daron Quashawn Wright appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a 10 - month pr ison ter m and an 18 - month term of supervised release. On appeal, Wright ’s attorn ey has filed a brief pursuant to An ders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising as issues for review wheth er Wright’s revocation sentence is unreason able and whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with sentencing. The Gover nment di d not f ile a response brief, 1 and Wrigh t — although notified of his right to do so — did not file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm. 2 “ A district court has broad d iscretion when imposing a sentence upon rev ocation of supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 4 26, 436 (4th Ci r. 2020). We “ will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statuto ry maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. Before d eciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, [we] must first determine wheth er the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,” id., applying “the same pro cedural and substantive 1 Wrigh t initially pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to commit theft of the mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, an d was sente nced to 30 m onths’ imprisonment and a 2 - year term of supervised release. The Government has not asserted th at the appellate waiver in Wright’s plea agreement bars this appeal in whole or in part. We therefore may consider the issues raised by counsel and conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to Anders. See United S tates v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 26 3, 271 (4th Cir. 2007). 2 Wright was released from prison during the penden cy of this appeal. In view of his service of the 18 - month term of supervised release, this appeal is not moot. See United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 65 - 66 (4th Cir. 2018).

3 considerations that guide our review of orig inal sentences,” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 3 70, 373 (4t h Cir. 201 5) (citation modified). “A [supervised release] revocation sentence is procedurally reason able if the district court adequately explains the cho sen sentence after considering th e Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven po licy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 18 U.S. C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “ A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the [district] court states an appropriate basis for co ncluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence within the po licy statement range is presumed reason able, though the sentencing court retains broad discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373 (citation modified). “Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consid er whether it is plainly so, rely ing on the definition o f plain used in ou r plain error analysis — that is, clear or obvious.” United Sta tes v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). “If a revocation sentence — even an unreasonable one — is not plainly unreasonable, we will affirm it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no plain unreasonableness in Wright’s revocation sentence. The 10 - month prison term does not exceed the maximum prison term allowed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district court pro perly calculated Wright’s advisory policy statement

4 prison range at 6 to 12 months based on his Grade C violations and his Category IV criminal history. S ee U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (2024). The court heard arguments from counsel and Wright’s statements i n allocution, and, after considering these matters and th e policy statement range, exp lained its reasons for imposing t he 10 - month prison term. Th e court’s reasons are grounded in factors appropriate for consideration in the revocation sentencing context, namely, the nature and ci rcumstances of Wright’s v iolative conduct, his history and characteristics, and the sanctioning of his breach es of trust while on release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3 583(e); USSG Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court shou ld sanction primarily the d efendant’s breach of trust. ”). Contrary to the suggestions o f And ers counsel, the district court did not refer to Wright as a “smart criminal” or make “disparaging racial remarks” in imposing sentence, and we d iscern no plain error warranting correction based on the way the district court characterized Wrigh t’s violative conduct. Anders counsel offers nothing to rebut the presumption of reason ableness afforded to the 10 - month prison term, and we discern nothing in the record rebutting that presumption. Wright’s 18 - mont h supervised release term does not exceed the applicable statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 35 83(h), or the maximum authorized under the relevant policy statement, see USSG § 7B1.3(g)(2), p.s., and w e discern no plain error warrantin g correction in the district court’s f ailure to calculate the max imum supervised release term available under the policy statement. The term is supported by the § 3553(a) factors buttressing the p rison term and the d istrict court’s additional statem ent s evincing that the

5 supervision term was warranted to provide Wright the opportunity for need ed treatment after completing his prison term. S ee 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(D), 3583(e). Although Anders counsel suggests that the term is “excessive,” cou nsel does so in wholly summary fashion, and we fin d nothing i n the r ecord supporting such a conclusion or suggesting that the term is otherwise substantively unreasonable. Counsel, further, has not suggested that the district court plainly erred in imposing the discretionary conditions of Wright’s supervision term, and we discern nothing in the re cord sup porting that conclusion. Anders counsel also qu estions whether trial counsel rendered in effective assistance in connection with sentencing. This court typically will not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made on d irect appeal, United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,” United S tates v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 50 7 (4th Cir. 201 6). To demons trate ineffective assistance of trial cou nsel, Wright must satisfy the two - part test set out in Strickland v. Wa shington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He “must sho w that counsel’s performance was [constitutionally] deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. a t 687. After review, we conclud e that ineffective assistance by trial counsel does not conclusively appear on the face of the reco rd. This claim “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 22 55 motion.” Faulls, 821 F.3d at 508. We therefore d ecline to address this claim at this juncture. In accordance with Anders, w e also have reviewed th e entire record in this case an d have found no meritorious grounds fo r appeal. We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. This court requires that cou nsel inform Wright, in writing, of th e right to petition

6 the Supreme Court of the Un ited States for further review. If W right requests that a petitio n be filed, but counsel believes that su ch a petition would be frivolous, th en counsel may move in this court for l eave to withdraw from representatio n. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Wright. We dispense with oral argument becau se the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED